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ABSTRACT 
Russia has always been a primary factor in the development of the Baltic States. It is 
impossible to analyse Baltic security without looking into the processes inside Russia 
and the prevailing trends vis-a-vis the Baltic States. However, the changes in the 
Baltic security landscape in the 21st century lack a comprehensive analysis. This 
thesis seeks to bridge the gap. 
Two key aims are being pursued in this thesis. The first is to present an analysis of 
Russia's European agenda under President Vladimir Putin and to examine the place of 
the Baltic States in this agenda. The second aim is to define Russia-related threats and 
challengers to the Baltic States, as well as prospects in Russo-Baltic relations. 
To attain these aims, inter-active approach to international relations, comprising three 
levels of analysis - the international system, the nation state (domestic level) and the 
individual (personality) level - has been applied. The neo-realist paradigm of 
international relations theory, comparative analysis and the Knudsen model, which 
addresses the peculiarities of relations between great powers and small states, are the 
methodological framework of the thesis. 
When analysing the development of Russo-Baltic relations in 1990-2006, this thesis 
focuses on the evolution of the Baltic States from factors to actors and their chance of 
shaping Russo-Baltic relations from within the enlarged EU and NATO. It also 
examines possibilities for more active engagement of Russia in the Baltic region. 
The thesis concludes with an analysis of perspectives for the Baltic States in 
countering Russia-related threats and building cooperative relations with Russia. The 
author maintains that 'high politics' in Russo-Baltic relations has ended, yet, the 
tensions do remain in 'low politics'. Russia seeks to retain her political and economic 
influence in the Baltics by exploiting various tools, primarily economic levers and 
Baltic dependence upon Russian energy. 
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CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis presents an analysis of Russia's domestic and foreign policy under Vladimir 
Putin, who has been the country's president since 2000, Russia's approach towards the 
global and European security architecture in general, and the Baltic region, in particular. 
Beside this, it systematically examines the evolution of Russo-Baltic relations 
throughout 1990-2006, outlining the main dimensions of the Russian factor, which has 
had an impact on the security environment in the Baltic Sea region. The thesis also 
assesses possibilities for more active engagement of Russia in the Wider Europe' 
through bilateral and multilateral cooperative frameworks for regional security. Above 
all, it concentrates on the particular evolution of the Baltic States and their possibilities 
of shaping Russo-Baltic relations from within the enlarged European Union and NATO. 
Lithuanian-Russian relations, including their Kaliningrad-related content, are presented 
as a case study. 
Reasonsfor undertaking this study 
Russia is a key factor in terms of the political development of the Baltic States. It is 
impossible to analyse Baltic security without keeping in mind the processes taking place 
inside Russia and the prevailing trends vis-A-vis the Baltic States. It is noteworthy that 
the undergoing changes in the Baltic security landscape lack the comprehensive 
analysis, since researchers tend to address only specific issues rather than provide a full 
picture. This particularly applies to Russo-Baltic interaction in the 21't century. 
Moreover, there is a need for a (re)assessment of the peculiarities of relations between a 
great power (Russia) and small states (the Baltics). To provide a broader perspective on 
Russo-Baltic relations, the dissertation aims to give a conceptual view of Russia's 
policy on the Baltics within the European security context. A particular emphasis is put 
on the post-1 I September 2001 (after - 9/11) global security environment and the dual 
enlargement of NATO and the EU. 
This work is a further and broader development of the author's MSc thesis Yhe Russian 
Factor in the Present Security Policy of Lithuania 2 (covering the period 1996-2001), 
and, to some extent, a sequel to Ambassador teslovas Stankevidius' monograph 
Enhancing 
3 
Security of Lithuania and Other Baltic States in 1992-94 and Future 
Guidelines . 
1.1. Background 
States exist in a certain space, defined by their geography, historical experience and 
culture. This space is in the process of constant change, and the dynamics impacts on 
the political processes of states, their relations with neighbours and their geopolitical 
orientation. This equally applies to the main subjects of this dissertation - Russia and 
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the Baltic States. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has been 
reshaping her policy. The Baltic States, since the restoration of their independence in 
1990, have also been redefining their place on the continent and in the region. 
Russia is no longer a super-power or even a global power; after the Cold War she 
became a regional power. 4 Russia is largely a transition state: from totalitarianism and 
planned economy to democracy and market economy; from a superpower to a regional 
power; from an empire to a national state; from a Eurasian 'special' way to cooperation 
with the West. The geo-strategic location of Russia remains important but her 
geopolitical situation is unenviable. In the West, Russia borders the enlarged EU with 
its population of about 454 million and with its economy about 10 times larger than 
Russia's. In the South, Russia is surrounded by Islamic countries with the population of 
300 million and by China with the population of 1.2 billion and an economy which is 
four times bigger. However, it would be a mistake to consider Russia as a non- 
influential state. Suffice it to say that Russia is one of the richest states in the world in 
terms of natural resources - oil, gas and timber reserve. Moreover, Russia also possesses 
some 2000 nuclear missiles and still remains the only power in the world, which can 
maintain the balance of mutually assured destruction with the United States. This 
confirms that Russia is an important player on the European, Asian and global scenes. 
Although Russia initially relinquished some of her power as the nation fell into disarray 
following the USSR! s dissolution, she is undergoing recovery and has influence over the 
world, especially due to the growing need for her energy resources. 
Putin's Russia is a largely authoritarian state with a state directed, although mostly 
private, economy and a weak civil society. The belief that after the Tsarist and Soviet 
periods Russia will become a state with a Western-type market economy can only be 
supported by the belief that contemporary Russia will become a country, which she has 
never been before in her history, without a burden of the past and other relics. Russia 
has never developed into a Western European democratic type of state, albeit this 
5 chance was given to her many times. 
Russia is what she always has been -a vast country with the longest frontier in the 
world and more neighbours, than anyone else in the world. Those neighbours are either 
unthreatening (in the West), or unstable (on the Southern border) and potentially 
menacing (in the East). Russia therefore needs a foreign policy, which maintains her 
domestic stability and prosperity, expands good relations with neighbours, and other 
states, manages threats from the South and contains threats from the East. This requires 
a defence posture that combines 'efficient and flexible conventional forces with a 
minimum but sufficient nuclear deterrent'. 6 
To achieve these aims Russia needs to reform her political and economic institutions 
and to conduct far-reaching military reform. It will not be quick, cheap or easy. The 
most fundamental challenge for Russia in the last decade was to fashion a foreign and 
security policy that matches the country's limited means. In the meantime for Russia 
there is no point in setting herself foreign policy goals, which she has no hope of 
achieving - that way leads only to further humiliation. Russia probably will never again 
be a superpower but she can aspire to become a 'major power of the second rank 97 _ 
more important than any of the other European powers because of her size, geo-strategic 
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position and natural resources. Having realised her limitations, Putin's Russia has 
refused a messianic doctrine and acts within the framework of classical concert of the 
great powers. 8 This implies that Russia has dropped open confrontation with great 
powers but has not abandoned the ambition of restoring her greatness so as to enable her 
to challenge the West. 
There is no question that the current Russian foreign policy is the foreign policy of her 
president. Two catchphrases used to describe Vladimir Putin's presidency - pragmatism 
and active diplomacy. In this context, one should not disregard the so-called 
4securitization' of Putin's foreign policy, which implies, first and foremost, the primacy 
of political-security over economic priorities. Despite the awareness of economic 
imperatives increased, it is geopolitics that remains dominant; prominence is given to 
traditional political-military and security interests. Although 'balance of power', 'zero- 
sum', 'sphere of influence' and other geopolitical notions are abandoned in Moscow's 
official lexicon, their spirit permeates much of the current Russian foreign policy, where 
the pursuit of supposedly economic objectives becomes the instrument for projecting 
Russia's strategic influence. 9 
Russia's immediate agenda is modernization and her foreign policy should serve this 
end. An effective foreign policy is one that creates a strong state, which will in turn 
restore Russia's greatness. Russia has two key foreign policy objectives: the first is 
creating an international environment that is conducive to the country's economic 
growth and development and further integrating Russia into the global economic 
system; the second is resurrecting Russia's position as a modem great power. 
Russia's first task towards achieving these objectives in her European agenda is the 
restoration of full control over the continental zone (heartland), i. e. rebuilding herself as 
a great power on a regional scale (i. e. CIS wide) based on a sound economy and backed 
by credible military might, as well as by strengthening the internal consolidation of the 
state. The second step is guaranteeing, at least, neutral or buffer state status to the 
countries of the Southern and Western hinterland, i. e. the South Caucasus and European 
CIS states, in the discontinental geo-strategic zone (rimland). 10 Therefore Russia aims 
not only to prevent the spread of the influence of the U. S. and other Western States, as 
well as their dominated international organisations, to Eastern Europe but also seeks to 
strengthen the geo-economic and geo-energetic dependence of Central Europe and the 
Baltic States on Russia. If circumstances become favourable, Russia, through her 
economic and energy influence, may try to transform some of Central and Eastern 
European countries, including the Baltic States, into her agents of influence in Euro- 
Atlantic institutions. Russia intends to use them for dividing the EU and weakening 
trans-Atlantic relations, and for supportinp those political and economic decisions of 
NATO and the EU that are useful for her. 1 It is in this light Russia's foreign policy is 
considered in this thesis. In foreign policy terms, this implies zero-sum attitude to 
diplomacy, the pursuit of great power status, especially via energy exports, and a 
propensity to believe that that the rest of the world thinks and acts in just the same way. 
There is a new trend in Putin's foreign policy. If Gorbachev and Yeltsin's foreign 
policies were primarily aimed at inclusion and integration into the West, Putin is 
focused on independence from the West and interaction with it. At the same time, 
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Putin's approach is not a policy of isolationism, rather it is pure realpolitik. The current 
rearrangement of the state, undertaken by President Putin, is an attempt to adapt Russia 
to the conditions of globalisation. It is in this context - the end of modernity and the 
adaptation to a global, post-industrial world - that the foreign policy of Russia can be 
interpreted. 
Putin recognises that both East and West can be helpful in his project of rebuilding the 
state, although the Western direction has always been the first priority in Russia's 
expansion plans. Throughout the history, Russia has been both a threat to and a 
guarantor of the European power equilibrium. 12 Although Russia's choice between a 
European and Eurasian identity is still an ongoing process, as reflected in her multi- 
vector foreign policy, most experts agree that Europe is the best natural partner for 
Russia due to shared cultural traditions, as well as the tendency of the Russian people 
itself to embrace a European self-identity. In this sense, Russia's European policy has 
two imperatives: 'civilisation' and 'modernisation'. 13 
Moscow's primary interest with respect to Europe consists of making it instrumental for 
the country's transformation: it is mainly in Europe that markets and potential 
investment lie. The interaction of Russia and Europe is considerably influenced by the 
current changes on the continent: the enlargement of NATO and the European Union, 
the impact of the 9/11 events and beyond, the Iraq war and other developments. Beside 
this, the residual 'imperial syndrome', manifesting particularly in Moscow's policy 
towards post-Soviet space affects Russia's relations with Europe. After EU 
enlargement, the new 'common neighbourhood' has acquired a particular importance 
because it may stimulate both cooperation and conflict between Russia and Europe. The 
developments during the last several years have demonstrated that Russia has a lot of 
problems with exercising her role of the judge or broker in this 'common 
neighbourhood'; that apparently Russia has no power to proceed with her so-called 
'Monroe Doctrine' 14 . 
It should be said that Russia has never been opposed to cooperation with Europe per se. 
What she seeks are forms that advance her concrete benefits. Russia is too large and too 
different to be easily absorbed into all of Europe's institutions but is also too important 
to be ignored. A democratic Russia is Europe's best hope for a cooperative relationship. 
The success of Russia's integration into a Wider Europe and into a new European 
security order will depend, to a large extent, not only on the political and economic 
structures she adopts internally but also on her ability to adjust ultimately to her loss in 
status. 
Although this dissertation is dealing with Russia's European agenda, developments 
beyond Europe, above all Russia's relations with the United States, are no less relevant 
to the research subject. Suffice it to say that the Russia-U. S. relationship has a very 
obvious European dimension. The U. S. is strongly involved in many European-based 
issues, not least those that touch upon Russian concerns, such as NATO, Russia's 'near 
abroad', the Middle East, let alone U. S. influence on global affairs and key Western 
security and economic organisations (NATO, EU and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO)), and important bilateral issues, such as nuclear arms control, which remain the 
preserve of Moscow and Washington. 
8 
As a big power, Russia has always been an important neighbour of the Baltic States. 
When examining Russo-Baltic relations, it is important to make a conceptual analysis of 
a relationship between great powers and small states. The analysis is premised on the 
argument that relations between contiguous small and great powers tend to be unstable. 
The reason for this instability is that, at any given time, the nature of relations between 
neighbours is largely determined by factors outside the bilateral relationship. 15 
Moreover, while the relationship is important to both sides, the importance is 
asymmetric: it is a matter of survival to a smaller state, but rarely, if ever, is that crucial 
to a great power. Thus, the search for a condition of 'enduring normality' is 
predominant in the policymaking of small states (i. e. the Baltic States). 
Consequently, Baltic security is predetermined to a large extent by Russian policy: will 
Russia adhere to democratic principles and international legal norms, or will she pursue 
a policy of the former 'velikaya derzhava' (great power)? It is noteworthy that during 
the 1990s NATO aspirations of the Baltic States were rejected vigorously by Russia, 
which developed the security strategy of a 'traditional ma or state nature seeking 16 
strategic influence through power projection and intimidation'. Meanwhile NATO and 
the EU have modified their strategies towards the opposite direction: by placing much 
more emphasis on cooperative security regimes based on commonly shared non- 
military threats, on the engagement of all actors, on confidence and security building 
measures and on spreading of stability. Thus, the essential strategic problem of the 
Baltic States has been that they have faced the challenge of having to relate to 'two 
opposing and incompatible external security strategies directed towards them': a 
Western co-operative security strategy and a traditional Russian power-based security 
strategy. ' 7 
Regarding the evolution of the Baltic States, during the last decade they have undergone 
an epoch-making transformation - from the Soviet style republics to progressive 
Western-style societies. The three Baltic States avoided being granted a 'special case' 
label, which would be a real danger not only for them but equally for the entire region: 
it would mean isolation, uncertainty and a grey security zone. In 2004, the Baltic States 
succeeded in their ultimate strategic goals - they became full-fledged members of 
NATO and the European Union. Furthermore, the Baltic Sates have acquired a status of 
reliable partners and allies of the West, which provides not merely privileges but 
responsibilities as well. This also means a dividing line, separating two periods of Baltic 
foreign policy - prior to the membership of the EU and NATO and afterwards. 
Throughout the last decade Russo-Baltic relations have changed tremendously - from 
confrontation to dialogue and cooperation. The Baltic States are seeking to find modus 
vivendi with their big neighbour - Russia. It is the Baltic membership of NATO and the 
EU that should make possible the ultimate reconciliation between Russia and the Baltic 
States and create more solid ground for stable mutual relations in the future. The Baltic 
countries are already designing their relations with Russia as an integral element of 
NATO-Russia and EU-Russia partnership and cooperation. It is in the self-interest of 
the Baltic States to promote a more constructive Russian posture in European security 
affairs. European and Baltic security can only be assured through integrating Russia into 
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a security community with the rest of Europe and the United States. This is the true 
security guarantee. 
This thesis argues that 'high politics' of the ever-complicated Russo-Baltic relations is 
over. With the accession of the Baltic States to NATO, the Baltic security dilernma has 
been removed from the top of the agenda of the EU and NATO, i. e. the Baltic security 
question has been 'desecuritized' and became a matter of nonnal routine politics. Yet, 
tensions persist in 'low politics'. The key areas that top the Russo-Baltic agenda are 
Russian energy policy in the Baltic States and the sensitive bilateral issues related to 
Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and civil and military transit to the 
Kaliningrad oblast via Lithuania. 
1.2. Aims and objectives 
The place and the role of the Baltic States in the region and in Europe cannot be 
assessed without taking into account the context of their relations with Russia. This 
thesis will analyse Russia's approach towards European security architecture and 
establish how the Baltic States are seen in this architecture. 
The thesis seeks to achieve two key aims: 
" The primary aim is to provide an analysis of Russia's European agenda in 
general, and her agenda in the Baltic region in particular. 
" The secondary aim is to define threats and challenges, as well as prospects in 
Russo-Baltic relations. 
These aims are to be achieved within a conceptual framework by analysing the forces 
behind policy continuity and change and identifying broader trends across the different 
subject areas. The attainment of these aims will provide Baltic foreign policy makers 
with new perspectives on the dynamics of Russo-Baltic relations. 
Seeking to facilitate the achievement of these aims the following objectives are set: 
" First, to examine Russia's European policy in the context of global 
developments and their interplay, including post-9/1 I security enviromnent and 
the dual enlargement of NATO and the EU; 
" Second, to define the peculiarities of asymmetric relationship between Russia, as 
a great power, and the Baltic countries, as small states, in relation to the 
Knudsen model; 
" Third, to assess to which extent Russia's foreign policy trends vis-a-vis her 'near 
abroad', manifest themselves in Russo-Baltic interaction; 
" Fourth, to analyse the role of international institutions and cooperation 
frameworks in mitigating relations between Russia and the Baltic States and to 
the changing security regime in the Baltic Sea region; 
" Fifth, to provide future perspectives for the Baltic States in countering Russia- 
related threats and shaping their cooperative relations with Russia. 
10 
1.3. Research methodology 
1.3.1. Basic approaches 
The basic approach of this dissertation is that the reasoning behind foreign and security 
policies in Russia and the Baltic States is based on two factors - the external 
environment and patterns of domestic decision making. Any state exercises its foreign 
policy within the context of the international system. By defining the starting point of 
this study with Russia and the Baltic States as reference points, two key questions need 
to be answered: what is the present international system like, and what is the role of 
Russia and the Baltic States in this system? The dynamics of Russia's European agenda 
cannot be understood in full without an analysis of the country's politics within the 
European institutional frameworks. Regarding the role of international institutions, the 
dissertation will seek to answer the following questions: Do institutions matter to 
Russia? Can they enhance cooperation between Russia and the Baltic States? Can 
institutions prevent or contain Russia's (unilateral) behaviour and make her behave in a 
more co-operative way? The thesis will show that international institutions do matter in 
promoting Russia's cooperative attitude towards the Baltic Sea region and Europe, 
mitigating Russo-Baltic relations and changing security regime in the region. 
To give arguments for the choice of a theoretical model of this dissertation, the author 
provides a brief look at the three schools of thought - three major paradigms of 
contemporary international relations theory - neo-realism (or structural realism), neo- 
liberalism (liberal institutionalism), and constructivism. 18 Each of these three paradigms 
allows form and forecast international politics in a different way. Neo-realists would 
explain Baltic-Russo relations in accordance with the theory of balance of power and 
world structure, institutionalists would give the greatest attention to cooperation with 
international institutions (NATO, the EU, the UN, the OSCE, and so on), whilst 
constructivists would analyse interaction between collective identities of these states. 
Each of these schools has its own flaws and limitations, and each of them may give 
different answers to the same questions. 
The neo-realist school claims that the distribution of resources and power atnoný states 
determines security politics, thus critically diminishing their freedom of action! In the 
neo-realists' view, interests of the states are derived from their power2o. States are 
assumed to be rational unitary actors, are seen to recognise structural change in the 
international system, reorder their interests and adapt. Distribution of power within the 
system determines its structure. Put another way, changes in the distribution of power 
result in changes within the system itself. According to all the characteristics related to 
power, the Baltic countries belong to the category of small states. When analysing 
Russo-Baltic relations in neo-realist terms, one should emphasise a big power 
asymmetry between the parties. Neo-realism particularly underlines the security 
dilemma, which appears between states as they increase their power. Relations between 
the Baltic States and Russia and the latter's negative attitude towards NATO 
enlargement is a classical example of the manifestation of the security dilemma. 
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The second school - neo-liberalism - assigns a key role to international institutions. As 
international systems are self-help systems by nature, neo-liberalists view security 
policy as a function of the binding and integrating role of international institutionsýi 
Albeit considering states' interests as pre-existing, neo-liberalists, in contrast to neo- 
realists, reject the notion of the state as a unitary actor. Moreover, they break the state 
into its component parts and challenge the utility of neo-realist assumption of the state 
as a rational actor. Leading institutionalists, however, are generally cautious with 
respect to 'institutionalisation' as encompassing conflict-solution strategy, since 
institutions depend on evident self-interest. 22 At the same time, they claim that national 
interests can be restrained by the civilising effects of international institutions: they may 
mitigate fears of cheating, allow cooperation to emerge and provide for reciprocal flows 
of information. 23 According to institutionalists, even the aspirations for membership in 
international organisations substantially affected security policy of the Baltic States. 
NATO and EU membership and the obligations related to it - good neighbourly 
relations, domestic stability and liberalisation of economics - have had solid stabilising 
effect on Russo-Baltic relations. 
Finally, the constructivist strand holds that the social construction and projection of 
identity defines security policies, which are 'projection of self-images' and 'behavioural 
norms'. 24 Constructivists treat security as a function of collective or national identity: 5 
changes of identity would affect interests and the pursuit of national security policies. 
Another characteristic feature of constructivism is that it is not a theory of the type of 
realism, neo-realism or neo-liberalism, rather it is a meta-theoretical position. 26 Like 
institutionalism, constructivism decouples the emergence and enforcement of 
international norms from domestic interests, thus making the theory itself very 
suspicious. Constructivists stress the role of perceptions, politics of identity and 
specialisation of actors through international interaction, making the argument that 
'identities are the basis of interests'. 27 In their view, security is not defined by 
distribution of power and resources but is a reflection of the epistemological and 
institutional environment. 28 In terms of constructivism, Russo-Baltic relations should be 
analysed as the expression of threat perceptions, historical experience, and cultural 
values and norms. 
To sum up, the discussed schools of thought share the same pitfall: to a smaller or 
greater extent, they all are too simplistic, or have a too narrow perception of the 
international system. The dividing lines between neo-realists on the one hand and neo- 
liberalists or constructivists on the other are well drawn: the three theories give different 
interpretations of the international system, thus they would differently explain Russia's 
role in this system. Besides, these theoretical approaches may compliment each other 
and, equally, contradict to each other. Thus, the choice of a theoretical model for a 
research subject becomes crucial. 
The author considers a neo-realist approach best suited as a theoretical basis for the 
research subject. This choice is supported by the argument that neo-realism can best 
explain Russia's threat perception, her interests and policy towards Europe and the 
Baltic States. Russia's foreign policy itself is conceptualised using neo-realist 
terminology, such as 'national interest', 'domination', 'sphere of influence', and other 
notions. The theories of relations between big and small states are based on the neo- 
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realist paradigm. The very notion of 'big' and 'small' states comes from this paradigm. 
Furthermore, the author upholds the view dominating Western political thinking, that 
although today we are witnessing the replacement of a traditional external balance of 
power by an internal institutional balance of influences, the essential features of 
international politics remain unchanged . 
29 The shift to substantial minimisation of a 
probable mass-scale armed confrontation, the increasing all around interdependence and 
harmonisation of states' interests do not put an end to interstate rivalry but only alter its 
forms. In this respect, despite the shortcomings of neo-realism, it has been labelled as 
30 'the most prominent contemporary version of realpolitik'. It is the latter that remains 
of particular relevance to Russia's politics, where traditional security issues play the 
decisive role, where geopolitical rather than cooperative priorities dominate. 
1.3.2. Application ofthe neo-realist paradigm 
This section looks into some specific strands of neo-realism relevant to the research 
subject, their interplay with other international relations theories, and provides further 
reasoning behind the choice of neo-realist paradigm as a conceptual basis for this 
dissertation. 
Waltz's neo-realism31, frequently referred as 'structural realism' or 'defensive realism', 
is the most well known version of neo-realism, although some might prefer Buzan's 
version. 32 Neo-realism assumes that international system largely determines a state's 
behaviour, which is a function of 'objective' national interests and constraints imposed 
by international power configurations. Domestic structures and political regimes have 
only limited affect on a state's foreign policy, if at all . 
33 Similarly to classical realism 34, 
Waltzian neo-realism also defines ideology, identity, motives and intensions of a state 
simply unimportant. Thus, neo-realism treats security as embodiment of ob ective 
structure, as an 'unavoidable expression of anarchy in international relations' .3 Neo- 
realists assume that statesmen will respond rationally to this precondition and will 
choose that foreign policy course, which is most likely to maximise security benefits 
and minimise security risks. 36 
It is noteworthy that neo-realism is not a coherent school of thought, rather a range of 
theories which in many cases come to different conclusions or explanations. One 
particular branch of neo-realist studies highlights the peculiarities of the foreign and 
security policy of small states. It argues that due to their limited means, policies of small 
states are usually confined to their own region. Changes in foreign policies of small 
states are subject to fluctuations in the structure of the international system and/or the 
degree of threat posed by great powers. 37 Given their sense of vulnerability (their 
survival is far more precarious than that of big powers), small states may counter the 
dominance of great powers by joining alliances, by demanding an 'import' of security 
guarantees, and by capitalising on their smallness and producing 'moral noise'. 38 
The Baltic States seem to share certain listed features. The neo-realist claim holds that 
the Baltic States are 'over-determined by external conditions', betrayed by history of 
'victim-hood', threatened by Russia, are, therefore, in need of alliances, particularly 
with NATO . 
39 These kinds of assertions serve as explanatory context for security. What is problematic here is that Baltic security policy is reduced to geopolitics. The context 
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of 'geopolitical and historical self-evidence' marginalises the availability of possible 
choices, the role of domestic security policies, and eventually national interests. 40 
Furthermore, a standard neo-realist treatment of small states follows the logic of power 
balancing and is based on two questionable assumptions: neighbouring great powers are 
expansionists and cooperative security is almost impossible. Some authors nonetheless 
argue that, in contrast to bigger powers, small states are keen to reject confrontational 
attitudes . 
41 Even 'hard-line' realist thinking acknowledges that cooperation rather than 
competition but would be the best way to increase security. 
Finally, international institutions occupy a secondary place in the neo-realist school. 
Neo-realism admits the existence of collective interests and a collective strategy, but it 
assesses the nature and content of international institutions, above all, on the basis of the 
interests and calculations of great powers. 42 Simply put, neo-realists emphasise relative 
gains from international cooperation: they ask who will get more from international 
cooperation. 
Some scholars, however, uphold 'soft' neo-realist approach, acknowledging that 
international institutions can change states' behaviour. As Robert Jervis writes, 
'international arrangements can alter the power, beliefs, and goals of groups in society 
in ways that will affect foreign relations'. 43 This is certainly valid for the Baltic case 
since structural factors, resulting distrust and fears vis-a-vis Russia 'could, at least 
theoretically, become subject to changes due to the international institutions in which 
the Baltic States participate'. 44 As Charles Glaser argues, 'increases in the adversary's 
security often increase one's own security because a more secure adversary has smaller 
incentives for pursuing an expansionist foreign policy'. 45 The mutual gain in security 
would be a change in adversary's intentions but not in relative gains in terms of military 
power. In the securitl realm, instead of a 'relative gains problem', one achieves 'a 
mutual gains benefit'. 6 
To sum up, neo-realism is particular in that it is not only a certain concept and a system 
of viewpoints but is also a 'practical set of guidelines, a method of carrying out a policy 
and a dimension of political reality'. The approaches inherent in neo-realism, albeit not 
exhaustive, still remain necessary and important for analysis and decision-making in the 
realm of international politics. 47 Taking all these arguments in mind, the author 
considers neo-realism the most complex and balanced mindset to be applied as a 
conceptual basis of this study. Identities and norms are not treated as the absolute root 
causes of policy agendas both in Russia and the Baltics. 
A major problem with neo-realist theories is that they dismiss other important variables, 
e. g. the role of international institutions, domestic structures and individuals. The 
international system defines the broad parameters of foreign policy behaviour but 
obviously it cannot explain the specific decisions that determine the behaviour of states 
in the realm of international politics. Only when national interests are clear can neo- 
realist theories adequately explain foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, although this 
dissertation is broadly located within the neo-realist interpretation, it does not confine 
itself by the international systemic approach but includes other levels of analysis - the domestic political and individual levels. 
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1.3.3. The Knudsen model 
When examimýf Russo-Baltic relations in neo-realist terms, the author applies the 
Knudsen model 8 as a conceptual framework for the analysis. The thesis will show that 
this model can explain many features of the asymmetric relationship between a great 
power and a small state, therefore it is applicable to the analysis of Russia's relations 
with the Baltic States. It should be stressed that smallness of a state is important here in 
terms of capabilities. Resource capabilities necessarily constrain the scope and domain 
of a state's foreign policy. Thus, a small state can be defined as a state having limited 
capacity to influence security interests of, or directly threaten, a great power and defend 
itself against an attack by an equally motivated great power . 
49 In analysing the security 
of a small state, one is dealing essentially with power disparity -a significant power 
differential between great powers and small states - as seen from the perspective of the 
weaker side. In other words, while continuing to use the term 'small state', it is the 
experience of power disparity and the manner of coping with it that is the focus of this 
thesis. That said, the point of the model is to explain 'the application of political 
50 pressure by a great power against its smaller neighbour'. 
In studying power disparity, Knudsen introduces six independent variables, which seem 
to influence the prospects for preserving the autonomy of a smaller state. Variable 1- 
the strategic significance of a small state's geographic location - is defined as the 
predominant elite perception in the nearest great power of the difference it would make 
to its security if a small state were to fall in the hands of their main opponent. From this 
perspective the security issue linking two neighbours becomes a question of how the 
territory of a state can be exploited by another great power in the execution of sinister 
designs. Variable 2-a degree of tension between great powers - is the chief dynamic 
variable for a small state's security. In other words, a small state is important for a great 
power not so much for its own sake or ability, but for what it can do to the strategic 
relationship. Therefore, the greater the conflict between great powers, the greater 
strategic importance of a small state to its great power neighbour and to a neighbour's 
great power enemy (rival) .51 Given high tension, the nearest great power is more likely to respond to 'apparently non-conforming small-state action with restrictive measures', 
and more likely to take preventive measures to keep the options for a small state to a 
minimum. 52 Variable 3- phase of the power cycle - 'the degree of extroversion in a 
great power's foreign policy'. This should be thought as the 'sum-total of the state's 
resources devoted to external activities'. 53 All great powers go through power cycles, 
starting from internal growth to external expansion to overextension and subsequent 
decline, and this directly affects their peripheries: pressure on small neighbours will rise 
and ebb as cycles change. In the extrovert phases, not only are small neighbours 
squeezed, tension is also likely to rise between a great power and its rivals, ftirther 
exacerbating the neighbourly pressures. 54 Variable 4- the historical record - gives 
reference to the history of relations between a small state and the nearest great power. 
Trust is essential for the development of stable relations between states. Historical 
experience is the 'strongest conditioner' for the development of truSt. 55 Thus, history 
may work against attempts to stabilise the relationship of power disparity. Variable 5 is 
the policy towards a small state of other rivalling great power(s). A neighbouring big 
power is always fearful that a small state might be pushed into the sphere of influence 
of another (more distant) great power. The rival's policy vis-&-vis one's own 'near 
is 
abroad' is indeed a very sensitive issue. Hence, the power disparity relationship 
becomes linked with the overall balance of power. Variable 6- the existence of the 
environment of multilateral security and cooperation - helps stabilise a5srnmetric 5 relations (due to their power disparity) between great powers and small states. 
To sum up, the six variables taken together define the political environment of power 
disparity: interacting over time, they constitute the operative surroundings for the policy 
of a small state. 57 Not all of the variables are equally active in the interaction process. 
Obviously, the importance of a strategic position is a necessary condition for a power 
disparity relationship to be politically salient. Historical experience conditions the 
choice of policy on both sides - the lack of trust contributes to tension. The chief 
operating variable is tension between great powers. The variable most likely to interact 
with the tension variable is the power cycle variable. Sharp increase or decrease in a 
major state's power position will in both cases affect the expectations of conflict and 
violence on the part of that and rival states. Small states located near such changes are 
likely to be affected. Multilateral security institutions may be able to have a dampening 
effect on instability factors. This is not to say that a small state is doomed to passive 
acceptance of the environment inputs; it may also, under certain circumstances, be able 
to influence the operative environment to improve its position. 
Apart from independent variables, the Knudsen model introduces a dependent variable - 
'de-occupation'. In the Baltic case, 'de-occupation' is perceived as a process, 
comprising attempts of the Baltic countries to liberate themselves from the influence of 
the big neighbour. In a broad sense, the process of 'de-occupation' encompasses three 
levels: consolidation of legal, political and economic independence of a small state. The 
importance of different combinations of these variables in the evolution of Russo-Baltic 
relations will be analysed in the later parts of this dissertation. 
On the whole, the reasons behind the choice of this model are obvious. First, Knudsen is 
a prominent representative of neo-realist paradigm, which has been chosen as the 
theoretical basis of this thesis. Second, this model incorporates both internal features of 
states and external (geopolitical) environment. This broadens the analysis of relations 
between states and allows us to study them not merely on a bilateral level but in a wider 
international context. Third, instead of taking international system in general as an 
independent variable, the model uses the degree of tension between a neighbouring big 
state and another (more remote) great power. When analysing Russo-Baltic interaction, 
it allows us to take into account the relations and the degree of tension between Russia 
(as a neighbouring power) and the United States (as another great power). Fourth, the 
model provides all-inclusive assessment of players: it takes into account domestic 
developments of a great power and strategic significance of a small state. Fifth, a 
dependent variable makes possible to consider Russo-Baltic relations as a continued 
'de-occupation' process. Last but not least, this model introduces a significant factor of 
multilateral security and cooperation (which is largely ignored by many authors). All 
these arguments were in support of choosing the Knudsen model for this dissertation. 
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1.3.4. Research methods 
To meet the aims and objectives of this dissertation, a factual model based on events 
and main policy trends is established. Political processes, discussed in this study, are 
seen from both Russian and Baltic perspectives. With regard to Russia's performance in 
domestic and international environment, the author adopts the method of comparative 
analySiS58, measuring the key aspects of the Putin administration's performance against 
that of Yeltsin. The aim is to evaluate changes in Russia's foreign and security policies, 
her perceptions of Europe and the Baltics, and to reveal trends how Russia's foreign and 
security policy may develop in the years to come. Comparative analysis is also applied 
to assess the evolution of security policy of the Baltic States. 
The author maintains that despite some differences in the current conditions of the 
Baltic States' development (e. g. ethnic composition, treatment of their minorities, the 
Kaliningrad factor), they have much more in common: their geo-strategic position and 
threat perception, their joint past as part of the Soviet Union, similar political agendas, 
comparable problems in constructing security policies, and the outside view of the 
Baltic States as a group. Therefore the author tends to rely more on a theme-based 
layout than a case-based approach with one exception - the case study of Lithuanian- 
Russian relations (chapter 7). Chapters 2-8 provide analysis of a focused grouping of 
literature supported by practical experience of the Baltic countries and the author's 
personal observation and expertise. 
To incorporate the full array of factors affecting complex Russo-Baltic policies, an 
interactive approach based on the interplay between the international, domestic and 
individual levels has been used . 
59 The international systemic approach argues that 
foreign policy outcomes result solely from a changing external environment but not 
from a domestic change. The domestic political level (or state level) defines foreign 
policy as the result of 'domestic political manoeuvring'. 60 This level examines the 
operational environment - the political context and mechanisms - for policy making. 
The individual level of analysis focuses on the actions and behaviour of individual 
policy makers in order to explain how they define purposes, choose among causes of 
action and utilise national capabilities to achieve objectives in the name of the state. 
Taken separately, the importance of these levels of analysis for Russian and Baltic 
foreign policies is different. This is explained by their power asymmetry: the larger and 
more powerful a state, the greater is its freedom of action; while the choice for small 
states is more limited. 61 Since the Baltic countries (as small states) are more 
preoccupied with survival than Russia (a great power), the international system will be 
the most relevant level of analysis in explaining their foreign policy choices. Baltic 
policies reflect attentiveness to the constraints of the international environment, 
meanwhile Russia is supposed to be less vulnerable to external threats, and thus has 
more options for action. This makes her foreign policy formation 'more susceptible to 
domestic political influences'. 62 However, this is not to say that the international 
environment does not play an important role in the conduct of Russian foreign policy. 
Suffice it to mention that since the end of the Cold War Russia has no longer enjoyed 
her former position as a superpower. 
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1.3.5. Review of the thesis sources 
In every aspect of international relations, Russia is a central research subject. In that 
sense, it is important for a researcher not to get lost among a great variety of sources. In 
this dissertation, the author refers to two types of sources: primary and secondary 
sources. Primary sources include interview data (the author's conducted face-to-face 
interviews with policy experts on Russia), conference material, document analysis, 
speeches, statements, lectures, as well as personal observation and expertise. Secondary 
sources comprise different types of literature: books and monographs, research papers, 
academic journals, current affairs magazines, internet sites, and the others. This body of 
sources provides a comprehensive account of the key developments of Russian 
domestic and foreign policy and its impact on the Baltic States. The author uses both 
Russian and foreign sources to provide a balanced view. The cited Russian sources are 
transliterated by using the NATO Stanag system. 
The most serious flaw of many sources analysing Russian politics and Russo-Baltic 
relations is their piecemeal approach. Actors, mechanisms, ideas, interests and external 
influences are treated as separate factors, more or less unrelated to one another and 
divorced from a wider context. By and large, there are several approaches to Russia's 
domestic and external developments: some writers tend to focus exclusively on 
personality-driven politics; others have emphasized the influence of dominant ideas 
such as Russia's 'great power complex' or neo-imperialism; a third group sees 
particular sectional interests - the Presidential Administration, the siloViki 
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, the Foreign Ministry - as largely monolithic entities, while still others view Moscow's approach to 
international relations as largely ad hoc, chaotic and reactive. Indisputably, each of 
these perspectives contributes to the overall picture but in isolation they are too narrow 
and, therefore, misleading. The task of this dissertation is to find the relationship 
between the different views that inform Russia's European agenda and her approach to 
the Baltic States. 
In contrast to countless research papers on Russia's domestic and external agendas, up 
to date Russo-Baltic relations have not yet been systematically examined. The 
development of the Baltic States as independent countries, the evolution of their 
cooperative relations with Russia, as well as the latter's changing policy towards the 
Baltics, lack a comprehensive analysis. Throughout the 1990s, few sources provided a 
more complete picture what was going on in the Baltic region, notably: 0. Norgaard et 
al, The Baltic States after Independence (1996); C. Stankevidius, Enhancing Security of 
Lithuania and Other Baltic States in 1992-94 and Future Guidelines (1996); 
'Strategicheskaya Liniya Rossii v Otnoshenii Stran Baltii' (1997); G. P. Herd's studies: 
'Baltic Security Politics' (1997); 'Baltic Security -A Crisis AvertedT (1997); and 'Russia-Baltic Relations, 1991-1999: Characteristics & Evolution' (1999); and S. Main, 
'Instability in the Baltic Region' (1998). The majority of authors addressed only 
specific issues of Russo-Baltic interaction: J. Hiden and P. Salmon, Yhe Baltic Nations 
and Europe (1994); S. Lieven, The Baltic Revolution (1994); G. Smith, The Baltic 
States: Yhe National Sel(-Determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (1996); R. 
Krickus, The Lithuanian Rebellion and the Break-up of the Soviet Empire (1997); D. 
Trenin, Baltiyskiy Shans (1997); S. Blank, 'Russia and the Baltic States in the age of 
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NATO enlargement' (1998); N. Sokov, 'Russian Policy Towards the Baltics' (1999), G. 
P. Herd, 'Russia's Baltic Policy and the August Meltdown of 1998' (1999). 
The Putin period (since 2000) is particularly marked by a scarcity of sources covering 
Russo-Baltic relations. The few sources are: G. P. Herd's articles: 'Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania: Security Politics into the Twenty-First Century' (2000) and 'Russian 
Systemic Transformation and its Impact on Russo-Baltic Relations'(2000); W. C. 
Clements, Yhe Baltic Transformed (2001); D. Smith et al, The Baltic States: Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania (2002); and G. Vitkus, 'Changing Security Regime in the Baltic Sea 
Region' (2002). When examining the evolution of various aspects of Russo-Baltic 
relations since the early 1990s up to date this dissertation seeks to contribute to bridging 
a gap in such an analysis. 
1.3.6. Summary 
The aims of this thesis are pursued by using one of the most common frameworks for 
international relations' analysis - inter-active approach - which comprises three levels of 
examination: the international system, the nation state (domestic) and the individual. 64 
The systemic level - international system - examines the constraints of international 
(and regional) environment on foreign policy choices; the nation state level reflects how 
foreign policy is perceived and constructed domestically; the individual (personality) 
level reveals the role of individuals in the conduct of a state's foreign policy. 
On the whole, the neo-realist paradigm of international relations theory, comparative 
analysis and the Knudsen model are the conceptual framework of the thesis. To assess 
changes in Russia's foreign policy, her perception of Europe and the Baltic States, as 
well as transformations in Baltic policies towards Russia, the method of comparative 
analysis is applied. The author uses qualitative approach and a theme-based layout, 
except the case study of Lithuanian-Russian relations (chapter 7). 
Scope of the dissertation 
The dissertation provides the analysis of Russia's European policy under Putin (2000- 
2006) and the development of Russo-Baltic relations since early 1990s to 2006. In 
support of analysis, until I April 2006, the author carried out a systematic review of 
primary and secondary sources to provide the most up to date information. 
The author tried to find an appropriate balance between Russian and foreign sources, 
between academic and non-academic material, written and oral. It is not merely the 
result of an examination of a wide range of written sources but, more importantly, it is 
the product of ideas developed through countless exchanges with foreign and Russian 
scholars, and Russian decision makers during meetings, seminars and conferences, as 
well as personal observation and reflection. Synthesis of analysed data provides the 
necessary conclusions of this dissertation and policy guidelines for Baltic policy 
makers. 
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1.4. Framework 
Within the limits of research methodology the dissertation examines the evolution of 
Russia's foreign and security policy, focussing on her European agenda and defining the 
place and prospects of the Baltic States in that agenda. The dissertation is organised into 
nine main chapters. 
Chapter I is the introduction in the dissertation, comprising the background of the 
research subject, aims and objectives, the research methodology and a brief review of 
thesis sources. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the Yeltsin legacy, which sets the stage for the 
Putin era. The chapter focuses on the distinct features of Russia's post-Soviet foreign 
and security policy and its constraints imposed by domestic situation and international 
environment. Seeking to examine the main trends of Russian foreign and security 
policy, the chapter looks at Russia's strategic documents - National Security Concept 
and Military Doctrine. The chapter also deliberates on Russia's policy in the CIS, 
Russia's perceptions and reactions in respect of NATO and EU enlargement. The 
chapter concludes by delineating successes and failures of the Yeltsin presidency in 
domestic and international affairs. It states that the major shortcomings in foreign and 
security policy in Yeltsin's Russia was its largely chaotic and ad hoc character. Under 
Yeltsin, Russia was torn between her status as a regional power in terms of capabilities 
and a great power in terms of ambitions. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the analysis of the key determinant of the Putin regime, widely 
considered as 'managed democracy'. The chapter discusses the peculiarities of the 
regime (power vertical combined with the tremendous influence of the siloviki in the 
conduct of the state, fusion between power and business, strengthening authoritarian 
trends), provides comparison of Yeltsin's and Putin's rule and contemplates possible 
scenarios of Russia's future development. By exploring Russia's domestic situation (the 
status of democracy, economic outlook, bargaining with oligarchs, the Chechnya 
problem, regional policy), the chapter assesses the effectiveness of the regime in terms 
of three key elements of state building: state capacity, state integrity and state 
autonomy. It concludes that the Putin regime shows clear regression in democratic 
trends. What is more, Putin's rule has not produced a more effective state, but a weak, 
corrupt and unaccountable regime, which is a major outcome of 'managed democracy'. 
This raises doubts about the long-term sustainability of the regime and its ability to 
respond to the needs of Russia's modernisation. 
Chapter 4 is about the actual conduct of foreign and defence policy under Putin. It 
starts from analysis of a conceptual basis of Russia's foreign policy: Russia's power 
cycle in accordance with the Knudsen model; policy priorities; aspect of multi-polarity 
and Eurasianism. On this basis chapter looks at a 'new' foreign policy, which 
particularly manifested itself through Russia's rapprochement with the West in the wake 
of 9/11. To provide the reasons behind this course and identify whether it is a strategic 
or merely tactical shift, the chapter analyses Russia's relations with the key Western 
countries, her policy in the post-Soviet space, cooperation with NATO and her defence 
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policy. In comparison with the Yeltsin period, the chapter argues that Putin 
administration's approach to many foreign policy areas contains significant elements of 
continuity, as well as transformation. The chapter concludes that the key factor of 
Putin's foreign policy is Western-centrism: Russia would not be able to fulfil her 
modernisation task without Western support and investments. The chapter also 
highlights a paradox in Putin's foreign policy: he is pursuing a Western-centric foreign 
policy, but has no interest in westernising (democratising) Russia. Due to resource 
constraints Russian foreign policy is likely to remain pragmatic and is not expected to 
challenge overtly Western interests. 
Chapter 5 focuses on Russia's relationship with Europe: their inter-dependency in 
economic relations, energy dialogue, security relations, the main obstacles in Russia- 
EU cooperation, and Russia's difficult choice between the U. S. and Europe. Part of the 
chapter is devoted to the Kaliningrad puzzle in the context of dual, and specifically EU, 
enlargement. The chapter analyses two 'faces' of Russia's Westem-centrism - her 
balancing between the U. S. and the EU. The chapter concludes that Russian-European 
dialogue under Putin has become more institutionalised but has practically progressed 
little: their relations lack a strategic depth and largely remain in the sphere of narrow 
pragmatic matters. Beyond their general agreement on 'common spaces' the EU and 
Russia agree on little at present. They differ in many fundamental issues of cooperation; 
the underlying reason is growing value gap between Russia and the EU. 
Chapter 6 deals with Russia and the Baltic States. The chapter presents Russia's 
geopolitical and geo-strategic studies on the Baltics, analyses the importance of the 
Baltic region for Russia, and the changing dynamics of the Russian factor in Baltic 
security. It explores arguments related to the security dilemma in the Baltic Sea region, 
Russia's role in the process of NATO enlargement and her shifting attitude vis-a-vis this 
issue. It analyses peculiarities of relations between the great power (Russia) and the 
small states (the Baltics) in accordance with the Knudsen model. When looking into 
new Russia-related threats and challenges the Baltic States are facing today, the chapter 
argues and that these threats are no longer of a traditional military nature. The tensions 
remain in Russo-Baltic interaction in 'low politics'. Russia seeks to retain her political, 
economic and even cultural influence in the Baltics by exploiting various tools of 
power, primarily by using economic levers and Baltic dependence upon Russia's gas 
and oil. 
Chapter 7 presents a case study of Lithuanian-Russian interaction, underlining strong 
and weak points. The chapter focuses on two key areas: Lithuania's cooperation with 
Kaliningrad oblast and her dependency on Russian energy resources. It deliberates on 
Russia's civil and military transit to/from Kaliningrad via Lithuania and looks into EU 
and Lithuanian initiatives on the development of Kaliningrad oblast as a 'pilot' region 
with the aim of its integration into a Wider Europe. The chapter argues that Lithuania 
has managed to develop a stable relationship with the oblast, considerably reshaping its 
image, which provides a good opportunity for her cooperative relations with Russia. A 
lot of space and attention is devoted to Russia's geo-economic interests in maintaining 
Lithuania's dependence on her energy resources, which provides Moscow with some 
leverage on Lithuania's political life. The chapter concludes that Russia's economic 
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pressure on Lithuania impedes the consolidation of the economic independence of the 
state and worsens bilateral relations between the two countries. 
Chapter 8 assesses the importance of international institutions in Russo-Baltic relations 
and region building. By taking the densely institutionalised multilateral security 
environment in the Baltic Sea region, the chapter analyses the link between regional 
cooperation and security in neo-realist and neo-liberalist discourses. it argues that major 
impact of international institutions in the Baltic Sea region is 'desecurization' of hard 
security issues, which positively contributed to the development of Russo-Baltic 
relations and confidence and security building in the region. The chapter states that 
because of NATO and EU enlargements security environment in the region is becoming 
more homogeneous, which leads to the change of security regime in the region. The 
chapter concludes that despite these positive changes in the region, conditions for the 
creation of a security community are still lacking, therefore it is necessary to find ways 
of more active engagement of Russia in regional cooperation. 
Chapter 9 provides conclusions on every aspect of Russia's European agenda, which 
could be analysed in terms of: Russia's role in international system, her domestic and 
foreign policy, her interaction with the EU, her approach towards the post-Soviet space 
and the evolution of Russo-Baltic relations. The thesis places a special focus on the 
place and role of the Baltic States in Russia's European agenda. It deliberates the future 
perspectives for the Baltic States in countering Russia-related threats and shaping their 
cooperative relations with Russia, and simultaneously contributing to the strengthening 
of regional (and European) security. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S POST-SOVIET FOREIGN AND 
SECURITY POLICY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT 
2.1. Russia's statehood: historical context 
I do not know Russia, I know only the Russian empire. ' 
This maxim, attributed to Count Witte, a prominent Russian statesman of the late 
19'h/early 20'h century, meant to be the epitome of national pride, can also be interpreted 
as a script for Russia's tragedy. Indeed, Russia as a nation had not really existed outside 
an imperial format. This makes Russia unique in comparison to other empires. To gain a 
better understanding of Russia today and the ways in which Russians viewed and 
thought to change the world, one has to look at the historical context of Russia's 
statehood. In other words, contemporary Russia has to be measured against traditional 
Russia, as she has become known to the world in the past 500 years. 
It is widely accepted that the capture of Kazan, the capital of Tatar Khanate on the 
Volga, by Ivan the Terrible in 1552 was the key event in the rise of the Russian state. 
From the mid-thirteenth to the late fifteenth centuries (about 250 years), the Tatar yoke 
completely excluded Russia from the mainstream of European civilisation, relegating 
her to the continental periphery, squeezed between Lithuania and the Horde. A religious 
and national revival, started in the fifteenth century, followed by the assembly of the 
Russian lands during the emergence of the Moscow Principality (Muscovite state) as 
(an essentially modem phenomenon 2, in the words of Russian scholar Sergey 
Medvedev. It was during this period that the messianic geopolitical idea of Moscow as 
the 'Third Rome' took shape and the double-headed eagle, the icon borrowed from the 
Byzantine Empire was introduced. This eagle, with one head looking West and the other 
East, still remains Russia's coat of arms. 
Medvedev argues that what started in Russia some 500 years ago was the process of 
'territorial expansion taken ad infinitum'. 3 Indeed, for the last five centuries the state 
had been spreading across the continent, largely uninhibited by adversaries or other 
obstacles. In this process the statehood came to be manifested first and foremost in 
territorial dimension, the state's primary functions being expansion, control and defence 
of the territory. Consequently, throughout the centuries, the territorial imperative 
became the essence of Russian, and later Soviet, policy. 
Russia had been 'an empire par excellence', a space in which national statehood had 
been subordinated to imperial expansion and nationalism to imperialiSM. 4 The state with 
her strategic tasks, permanently expanding, 'had precluded the emergence of stable 
patterns ... where ethnicity could develop into nationality'; in the end the Russian state had prevented the formation of a Russian nation, failing to provide anchors of national identity. 5 Simply put, the Russian state became an empire before the Russian people 
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became a nation, and as a result, the Russian state has never been a nation state, a 
'compact between the government and the people' but the Russian people have always 
been a state nation, a 'state defined not by itself but by those in power'. 6 Hence, the 
fundamental problem was a hypertrophied state, which subordinated the nation, 
economy, individual and public life to all-encompassing goals of national security and 
territorial expansion. This model set forth by Ivan the Terrible was further used by Peter 
the Great, Stalin, other Soviet and Russian leaders even today. 7 
As much as it had prevented the development of the Russian nation, the state had also 
prevented the appearance of a proper economy in Russia. Obliged to defend long 
borders, to conquer numerous neighbours and to sustain a vast territory, the Russian 
state had to withdraw a large part of her resources for the control of the space. The 
territorial imperative gave birth to a specific phenomenon of the 'national-security 
state', which included the pursuit of total control, territorial expansion and messianic 8 
goals in different parts of the world 'from the "Third Rome" to the Third International'. 
The requirements of conquest and of security became merged'in the minds of Russian 
leaders. Analysts frequently explain Russian expansionism as stemming from the sense 
of insecurity, but Russian observers tend to justify it as a messianic vocation. 9 
Paradoxically enough, the permanent territorial expansion increased Russia's power but 
not security; the bigger the territory of the state, the more intense pressure from outside, 
as well as the threat to internal disintegration. Thus Russia confronted the classical 
permanent (in)security dilemma: attempts to safeguard security of the state through 
imperial expansion all but increased Russia's insecurity. 
The logic of the 'national-security state' culminated in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. 
To borrow Medvedev's phrase, the USSR was 'the ultimate modem experiment in 
history': secular, urban, militarised and industrial. 10 The entire country was devoted to 
its imperial ambition aiming for the world proletarian revolution (in the 1920s and 
1930s) and for a strategic parity with the West during the Cold War. However, by the 
1970s and 1980s the Soviet state and its foreign policy had proven themselves 
unsustainable and the USSR began a historical decline. The state's economic growth 
stalled as a result of militarisation and heavy industry. Most importantly, the planned 
Soviet economy had proven itself to be completely inadequate to cope with the 
challenge of the information revolution. 
Soviet leaders tried to transform an obsolescent system and adapt USSR to new global 
rules of engagement in a post-industrial world. Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroika 
(restructuring) was essentially an evolutionary project that attempted to adapt the 
socialist structure to a changed environment but did not question the regime's 
fundamentals. More precisely, Gorbachev's reformist project was 'socialism with a 
human face' with the aim of preserving socialism by a partial introduction of market 
mechanisms, limited political freedoms and a considerable freedom of speech 
(glasnost). The failure of perestroika and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 brought 
Boris Yeltsin to power. He attempted to transform Russia by means of anti-communist 
revolution and 'shock therapy'. Although his reform plan ran into problems, its impact 
has been quite dramatic. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin's projects initiated the critical 
assessment of Russia's role in the world affairs and set the stage for Putin. 
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2.2. Yeltsin's leadership: domestic and international aspects 
Following the failure of the evolutionary changes of Soviet structures during 
perestroika, for Boris Yeltsin the way forward was their revolutionary abolition. 
Yeltsin's key mission was to break up the Soviet empire and to destroy the old 
communist nomenklatura and administrative structures. The dismantlement started 
under Gorbachev with the elimination of the branch ministries of the Soviet economy in 
1989 and continued with the collapse of the Soviet imperial structures in Eastern Europe 
in 1989-1990. It was furthered by Yeltsin's abolition of the USSR, the Communist party 
and the KGB in 1991, the destruction of the socialist economy in 1992, and outlawing 
the Soviets in his battle with the Supreme Soviet in 1993. Thus, according to Medvedev, 
not just economy but 'all of Russian/Soviet modernity' was put to the test of 'shock 
therapy'. 11 
It was not simply Communism, its ideology and system, that was being targeted, but 
communists as people. This combination of the ideological and the personal permeated 
the entire Yeltsin presidency. Such a combination 'engendered an unusually fractious 
political environment', in which implementation of a demanding and controversial 
domestic reform agenda was undermined by bitter conflicts between the executive and 
legislature, in addition to other problems like political corruption or lack Of Will. 12 
After he came to power, following the failure of the coup attempt in August 1991, 
Yeltsin's original goal was the creation of the 'presidential vertical' chain of authority - 
his own semi-authoritarian regime, which was supposed to be based on a market 
economy and which would work by relying on cadres loyal to him. 13 At the core of the 
Yeltsin regime was a leader who put himself above the political scene and concentrated 
all the main levers of power in his hands, while serving as a guarantor of the stability of 
society. What arose as a result of his rule looked on the surface like a super-presidential 
republic. The dissolution of the parliament in 1993 gave the president and his team the 
opportunity to begin implementing his plan for creating an 'elected monarchy'. 14 
The processes unleashed by Gorbachev and continued under Yeltsin, albeit allowing 
pluralism to appear, did not lead eventually to liberal democracy in Russia, as they 
failed to consolidate democracy-supporting institutions. In the 1990s, Russia had the 
basic features of an electoral democracy in that elections took place under a universally 
recognized set of ru - 
les, their results were not entirely certain beforehand and no 
authority intervened after elections to reverse the outcome of the vote. However, a 
serious setback in this respect took place in 1996, which were marked by a wide use of 
'electoral technologies' by the Yeltsin's team during the presidential elections. 
The British Professor Richard Sakwa argues that one of the most important qualities of 
the Yeltsin regime was its non-systemic nature. 15 Of course, in Yeltsin's Russia there 
were certain elements of a political system, but a system as an aggregate of independent 
institutions, acting on the basis of clear rules of the game had not come into being. 
Russian power relied above all on one aspect of politics: a presidency, under which 
other institutions were amorphous and insignificant, and the division of functions 
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among them was weak. 16 This made the regime much more fragile than a liberal 
democracy. 
Hence, under Ycltsin, Russia had pluralism but it was not a democracy. In essence, 
what arose was a hybrid regime, in which the most contradictory components were 
combined: 'democracy, authoritarianism, oligarchy, and the elements of autocracy that 
were traditional in pre-Soviet Russia'. 17 Yeltsin's rule was authoritarian but his 
authoritarianism created weak and demoralised society. After 1996, when the oligarchs 
came to Yeltsin's rescue and orchestrated his victory in the presidential elections, they 
started to regard themselves as Russia's real rulers. During the decade of Yeltsin's 
regime, the middle class remained small and undeveloped and, together with small and 
medium-sized business, suffered from the pressure of the oligarchs, officials and 
organised crime. In short, there was no social basis for democracy. Lilia Shevtsova, a 
leading political analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says that 
an essential element of the Yeltsin regime was the lack of ideology, anticommunism 
being its only ideological aspect. But, in everything else, Yeltsin could move in various 
directions and combine various ideologies - 'Westernisation, liberal democracy, open 
authoritarianism, statism and elements of nationalism'. 18 
The first decade of Russia's post-Communist transformation witnessed many difficult 
and complex processes when Soviet socialism evolved into a specific national 
capitalism, permeated by economic interests and pressure groups -a process that still 
continues at varying speeds in varying sectors. By the year 1993-1994, the Yeltsin 
leadership started to perceive that the West was taking advantage of Russia's weakness 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The amount of help offered by the West was much 
less than Russians hoped and, as Jeffrey Surovell noted, 'hope for Russia's economic 
stabilisation and the effective utilisation of Western aid had faded'. 19 That was the 
catalyst for Russia's move toward nationalistic rhetoric. Paradoxically, this shift bore 
fruit: Russia soon became a member of the G7 group of industrial nations and started to 
receive loans from world financial institutions and individual countries. 
But it should be stressed that it was not the lack of Western support, but rather inherent 
Russian inertia, incompetence and the emergence of a corrupt oligarchic regime, which 
were the main obstacles to the attempted revolution taking place in the inherited Soviet 
system. These features particularly manifested themselves at the end of Yeltsin's first 
(1994-1996) and throughout his entire second term (1996-1999). 
Yeltsin's presidency was negative in developing the state's economy. His 
administration attempted to turn a control-economy into an open one in one fell swoop, 
without apparently understanding what it was doing. Yeltsin borrowed too much money 
from abroad, at incredibly high interest rates, and his policy of selling off state 
enterprises was badly managed. Finally, his financial policy led to meltdown in the 
stock market and devaluation of rouble in 1998. The transition to a market economy 
was too fast and badly planned. To make matters worse, Russia's entire transition, 
including privatisation, democratisation and social change, was 'appropriated' by 
powerful economic elites like the oil and gas industry, the banking and financial elite, 
the defence sector, the metal industry, and the others, who, together with the state 
bureaucracy, were setting new rules of the game. 20 
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Such a chaotic style of governance led to a dramatic fall in the standard of living for 
most Russian people, creating huge social differences of a dimension similar to that of 
Tsarist times. Above all, what happened in Russia during the late Yeltsin period was not 
just privatisation of the state but also 'privatisation' of society. The oligarchs 
'privatised' society's most important institutions - those that can influence and 
counterbalance government - especially the major media outlets, including two of the 21 three main national broadcasting TV networks, ORT and NTV. Increasing ethnic 
tensions, rising nationalism and growing crime rate were all symptoms of the illness 
called 'Yeltsinism'. In 1996, in his message to the Federal Assembly Yeltsin 
proclaimed as two of his great successes the fact that the country had managed to avoid 
a civil war and that the country had held together. 22 
Although the 1993 Constitution gave the president enormous power, Yeltsin did not use 
this power to build a state that would integrate social, institutional and political 
institutions within the framework based on the rule of law. By the end of his presidency, 
Russia was an extremely weak federation; decentralised and unsustainable. One can 
recall Yeltsin's famous offer to regional leaders 'take as much sovereignty as you can 
swallow', under which decentralisation proceeded, largely in a chaotic way. Political 
confrontations between the executive and legislative branches weakened the central 
government, allowing maýy republics and regions to demand greater autonomy, and in 
some cases independence. 23 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia emerged as an independent state in the 
world politics. Yeltsin was expecting Russia to act as substitute for the Soviet Union on 
the world stage. That is why for Russia a special status - the successor of the USSR - 
was created. The new Russian leadership wanted the bipolar world to exist in the future, 
with Russia being one of the superpowers opened to the West and actively consuming 
all the achievements of the West. However, the Russia which was established after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was in a much worse geo-strategic situation than the 
USSR: with the break up of the latter, the Russian Federation had only limited access to 
the Baltic and Black Seas, retained about 60 percent of its territory and a little over 50 
percent of its rapidly declining population. In the years immediately following the break 
up, the Russian Armed Forces had been reduced to less than a third of the former Soviet 
Army, and Russia's share in the world GDP had fallen from 8 to 1.5 percent. 24 
Russia's enormous economic and political problems reduced her capabilities at 
international level. For the first time in its recent history, Russia did not have the 
resources to match her traditional global role. Russia's internal weakness and worsened 
geopolitical situation was ftu-ther aggravated by the loss of her allies. The latter, in 
Russia's perception, was largely due to NATO's surviving beyond the Cold War, which 
caused imbalance and inequality in Russia's relations with the individual members of 
NATO, and the United States in particular. 
Russia's overall institutional arrangements in dealing with foreign policy were flawed. 
Having lost her empire, Russia could not find a new role. Since 1996, Russia was 
balancing on the brink of open confrontation with the West, and her foreign policy was 
not capable of resolving the tasks set by the ruling elite. The self-destruction of the 
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Communist ideology had not changed the mentality of the Russian elite, and the 
ideological vacuum had been filled by concepts typical of the past. Of all foreign 
policy-related issues, developments in the 'near abroad' commanded the most attention. 
The Soviet collapse has had the effect of generating debate on Russia's national 
identity, which is yet to be resolved. Imperial Russian national identity and non-ethnic 
Soviet identity (the Soviet people) was the product of territorial expansion, which partly 
explains why it has been so difficult for Russians to agree on a post-Soviet identity. 
Russia is in the process of finding new identity as a natural big regional power. What is 
really intriguing is the fact that the basic parameters of these debates are just the same 
now as they used to be centuries ago. 
2.3. National Security Concept and Military Doctrine 
The strategic documents of Russia's post-Soviet foreign and security policy should be 
interpreted not as a meaningful guide for action or a conceptual framework, but rather 
as an indicator of political fashion and a mechanism designed to 'reconcile ... sharp 
contradictions between competing sectional interests'. 25 Although such documents were 
sometimes useful indicators of policy trends and shifts, their importance was above all 
presentational. Thus, in examining Russia's foreign and security policy one needs to be 
careful in interpreting declared policy as necessary reflecting real intensions and 
commitments. It is one thing for the government to articulate a concrete issue as a top 
priority, but quite another to translate such rhetoric into practice. 
Despite their limitations as policy documents, the National Security Concept and the 
Military Doctrine are undoubtedly useful in patching over the serious contradiction 
between the liberal agenda, the imperial syndrome and the great power ideology. But it 
is naive to assume that the 'consensus' of an official policy document 'actually reflects 
26 a confluence of often very different views' within the government. What these 
documents did reveal were the trends in government thinking in domestic and 
international context. 
It should be noted that due to the chaotic nature of Russia's post-Soviet development, 
she lacked an official national security policy until 1997. Prior to 1997, Russia's only 
official security policy document was her 1993 Military Doctrine. The period of 
economic and political development from 1993 to 1997 marked a struggle for 
competing demands on the Russian political scene. On one hand, President Yeltsin and 
his followers from the liberal elite sought cooperation and the integration of Russia into 
the international community. The opposition, on the contrary, favoured a more 
traditional, hard-line security policy. The National Security Concept of 1997 struck a 
compromise between these two opposing political camps. The 1997 Concept did 
articulate NATO enlargement as a key problem for Russia, but it also maintained that 
'partnership' with the West was the key instrument in ensuring Russian national 
security objectives. 
Whereas the 1997 National Security Concept and the 1993 Military Doctrine devoted a 
great deal of attention to the internal threats, arising primarily from the difficulties of 
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Russia's post-communist transition and unsuccessful economic reforms, 7 
their new 
versions of 2000 (the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrineý ) affirmed 
that the dominant security threats to Russian security were of an external nature. These 
included the efforts of individual states and international organisations to diminish the 
role of existing international security mechanisms, above all the OSCE and the UN; the 
strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, particularly NATO's expansion 
to the East; initiation and escalation of conflicts on the borders of Russia, and the CIS 
territorial claims against Russia. In many ways, the 2000 Military Doctrine was a more 
'Soviet' document than ever, downplaying the threat from low-intensity conflicts and 
putting increased emphasis on the need to maintain advanced and sizeable strategic 
nuclear forces, which were viewed as an effective deterrent factor. 
Both documents reflect the key turning point in Russian security policy by late 1999, 
when the strategic setting changed dramatically. The combination of the Kosovo 
conflict and the second Chechen war amounted to a political imperative that could not 
be disregarded. Added domestic political and socio-economic concerns, particularly 
aggravated after the 1998 financial crash, gave a basis to more traditional threat 
perceptions such as the West's (more precisely, the U. S. ) 'alleged attempts to impose its 
diktat on the world'. 28 Russia's conservatives judged NATO's intervention in Kosovo 
as the final evidence that Yeltsin's security strategy of cooperation and integration with 
the West had absolutely failed. The significant departures of the 2000 version of the 
Concept and the Doctrine from the previous ones made it clear that Russia perceived the 
prospect of unilateral action of NATO as a threat to her sovereignty. From Russia's 
perspective, this type of behaviour undermined the very norms upon which the modem 
(Westphalian) system of international relations was based. The fact that NATO's 
intervention in Kosovo challenged the supposedly absolute and incontestable rights of a 
sovereign state was extremely frightening to Russia. 
That said, both documents could be viewed as a political response to this alarming trend 
and to the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept. This explains why the 2000 versions of the 
Conc9pt and the Doctrine contain far more anti-Western provisions than the previous 
ones. 29 It was not so much that the Yeltsin administration believed, as a result of the 
Kosovo crisis, in a 'threat of direct military aggression against Russia' 30 , but that there 
was overwhelming political compulsion to demonstrate the depth of Russian opposition 
to NATO's actions. Russia developed these documents on the assumption that only a 
multi-polar world, a world not dominated by the United States or NATO, is able to 
secure international stability, security and progress. Interestingly, both documents focus 
almost solely on how to re-establish Russia as an equal player in a multi-polar world, 
instead of how to cope with the reality of a predominantly uni-polar world. In this 
respect, it is important to note the 2000 Concept's provision, revealing Russia's 
intention to have, under certain circumstances, military contingents in strategically 
important world regions. 31 In other words, Russia declared her plan to project power 
beyond the limits of her territory in the future. 32 
It is equally understandable why the threat of international terrorism appeared at the top 
of the agenda; its inclusion in this way served to 'legitimise' the Putin administration's 
conduct of the Chechen war at home and abroad. On the other hand, it was typical that 
the documents should demonstrate to the West that Russia was still capable of 
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responding effectively to perceived external threats. 33 The supposed lowering of the 
nuclear threshold was a notable case in point. It is also of note that the Russian 
denouncement of the nuclear no-first-use policy, which was first made in the 1993 
Military Doctrine, was reaffirmed in the 2000 version. 34 This only implies Russia's very 
realistic perception of her inability to defend herself from a conventional large-scale 
Western (NATO) attack, which has led Russia to expand the scenarios in which she 
could possibly use nuclear weapons. 
When analysing these documents from a Baltic perspective, it is notable that the list of 
basic external threats in the 2000 Military Doctrine includes 'disturbance of the existing 
balance of forces near the borders of the Russian Federation'. 35 As it warned against 
NATO expansion in general, this might have been interpreted as a specific warning 
against the Baltic membership of NATO in particular. Besides this, the Doctrine (to 
lesser extent, the Concept) provides for more assertive and interventionist role of the 
Russian military, especially in the sphere of protecting rights of their citizens. 36 This 
point was of great concern for the Baltic States, which are home to a significant number 
of Russian nationals. It implied that in 2000 Russia did not rule out the use of the 
military instrument to secure the rights of Russian minorities in the Baltic States, 
particularly in Estonia and Latvia. 
To sum up, it is noteworthy that the contents of the 2000 versions of the National 
Security Concept and the Military Doctrine are absolutely compatible, as they both 
contain similar assessments and conclusions about the threats that Russia faces today. 
First, both documents can be viewed as a political attempt to re-establish Russia as a 
major actor in both European and global security, and both of them have a decisively 
anti-Western, particularly anti-NATO, nature. Secondly, both documents revealed that 
Russia, being increasingly aware of her inferiority in comparison to NATO, was 
prepared to compensate for that by expanding a number of scenarios in which nuclear 
weapons could be used. Thirdly, the increased awareness of external threats, 
predominantly from NATO, stemmed from Russia's inability to prevent NATO's 
intervention in Kosovo without a UN mandate. Finally, in both documents Russia 
articulated that she perceived her foreign policy interests as extending to citizens of 
Russia living abroad. This had implications for the Baltic States in general. 
2.4. Distinct features of Russian foreign policy 
'Russia has traditionally been a geographical concept. Its external borders have defined its 
cultural and international identity. 37 
Russia's geographic position between Europe and Asia has sh4ped her geopolitical 
evolution and foreign policy and even her domestic development. 38 According to Mark 
Webber, lecturer in politics at Loughborough University, the Asian dimension and the 
balance of Russia's interests between Europe and other regions around her periphery 
have always been of great importance. This position has been rationalised in Russia 
through the concepts of Eurasianism and multi-polarity. 39 The former identifies 
Russia's unique position as a bridge between Europe and Asia. The latter points to the 
need for a multidirectional foreign policy, which is focussed on multiple centres of 
power such as Europe, China and India. 40 
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Russia has never really been an integrated part of Europe, neither politically, nor 
economically. Nor has Russia been integrated with Asia, in spite of the fact that the 
Russian expansion took place mostly to the East, making up more than 80 percent of 
4 Russian territory. 1 By and large, Russia's search for her new role in Europe and in the 
world is controversial; it is lost between the matters of national identity and 
interpretations of history, great aspirations and frustrations. 42 Medvedev argues that the 
genes of the Russian statehood are European, but operating in the wider European 
space, the Russian state had 'carried the EurOT3 ean ideas of territoriality and sovereignty 
to an extent unimaginable in Europe proper'. But despite Russia's confusion in search 
of identity, the West retained its dominant position in Moscow's world-view. The key 
Western country has been the United States, representing the greatest external influence 
on all aspects of Russian foreign policy making. 
According to Bobo Lo, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, 
the 'single most important feature' of the Yeltsin Russia's foreign policy was her 
'sectionalised character'. 44 The political elite was deeply divided over underlying 
concepts and values, policy priorities and the means to implement them. There was no 
consensus because the conditions for it were almost entirely lacking. Fundamental 
disagreements over Russia's identity and her place in the world, contrasting perceptions 
of the post-Cold War order and Yeltsin's divide-and-rule tactics conspired against the 
development of consensual approach to external relations. In addition, the regime faced 
great difficulties in conducting any kind of credible foreign policy in conditions of 
political uncertainty and deep socio-economic crisis. The product of this fluid 
interaction was a reactive and ad hoc foreign policy, lacking a clear direction and 
transparency in its formation. Decision-making was driven by 'lowest common 
denominator principles', based on the avoidance of risk. 45 
Other important aspects of Russian foreign policy were ideologisation and domination 
of geopolitics. Although awareness of economic imperatives increased, geopolitical 
mindset remained dominant. Notions of 'zero-sum', 'balance of power', 'spheres of 
interests' and the like continued to influence thinking of the elite. Traditional 
geopolitical imperatives dominated Russia's security concerns and policy directions. It 
could be said that post-Soviet Russia has been pursuing a dualist foreign policy, one 
with the countries of 'near-abroad', the other with the rest of the world. This is 
particularly evident in Moscow's approach to the principles of sovereignty and non- 
interference in international relations. In the wider international environment, Russia is 
one of the most vocal defenders of the principle of non-interference in a state's internal 
affairs. Such attitude was reflected in her soft position on human rights abuses in other 
countries (Kosovo, Iraq), strong refutation of Western criticism of such abuses within 
the Russian Federation (particularly in Chechnya), and, above all, her rejection of the 
principle of 'humanitarian intervention' during and after the Kosovo crisis. At the same 
time, in reserving the right to intervene militarily and maintain 'quasi-perinanent' bases 
on the territory of the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), Moscow applied very 
different standards to notions of sovereignty and non-interference. Such FSU/non-FSU 
dichotomy has but acquired a new vigour under Putin (see 4.6: Retaining control in the 
post-Soviet space). 
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The development of Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin (1990-1999) could be split 
into several distinct periods. The AtIanticists or Westernisers (liberal-internationalist 
trend), led by Andrey Kozyrev, first Foreign Minister of post-Soviet Russia, dominated 
the debate during the first years (1990-1993) of Yeltsin's administration. 46 They argued 
that foreign policy should seek to create the most favourable international environment 
to promote their success and wanted that Russia should build better relations with the 
West and subscribe to regional and global integrationist trends . 
47 However, since 1992- 
1993, Kozyrev's policy came increasingly under attack from the opposition as not 
bringing any significant gains to Moscow: Russia was still being excluded from security 
48 matters in Europe. The Atlanticist period was premised on an assumption that Russia 
would be treated as an equal of the Western states and she would, therefore, play an 
influential role in the post-Cold War reconfiguration of Euro-Atlantic institutions, and 
linked security, economic and political relations. 49 
This explains why the further Kozyrev term (1993-1996), albeit still maintaining 
Western orientation, was marked with disharmony among Russian foreign policy 
makers . 
50 Russian diplomacy in 1992-1995 advanced its twin interests in dominating 
the Commonwealth of Independent States ((CIS) or FSU states) and good relations with 
51 the G-7 . Without conceptual clarity, Russian foreign policy was aimed mainly at 
protecting economic and social transformation and secure Western support for it. 
Unwillingness to open Western central institutions for Russia (no Marshall plan, no 
NATO membership, no EU association) sparked criticism and accusations of neglecting 
Russian national interests. An attractive alternative to Kozyrev's line was that of 
Eurasianism, which called for a more balanced foreign policy and recognised Russia's 
Asian, as well as its European, roots. 
The years 1996-1999 witnessed the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov (in 1996) and 
his successor Igor Ivanov (in 1998). This period was distinctive for its two-tier 
approach: Russia was becoming cooler towards the West, meanwhile turning to the East 
to explore 'Eurasian possibilities'. Primakov, a former Soviet diplomat and intelligence 
official, was suspicious of the West and touted a multi-polar world and a Russian- 
Indian-Chinese alliance as an alternative to slavish cooperation with the West. He was 
the last official to pursue Soviet-style grandeur. What Primakov brought was a greater 
clarity to Russian foreign policy in comparison to his predecessor. 52 He also brought a 
different tone, more pragmatic, 'state-centric' discourse, one that focused explicitly on 
Russia's state interests (as distinct from those flowing from nominal liberal democratic 53 aspirations). More accurately, Primakov's policy has been characterised as 'statist' or 
&multi-polar' in outlook. 54 It was a policy that gave priority to the CIS states, extensive 
relations with major regional powers (India, China, Iran) and simultaneously sought to 
maintain relations with the West. 55 But it was widely accepted that with Primakov the 
Western orientation of Russian foreign policy disappeared. 
The relatively balanced foreign policy, which was conducted under Kozyrev and 
Primakov, had deep institutional roots within the Russian political and administrative 
order. Under both foreign policy administrations, Russian diplomacy, notwithstanding 
the collapse of basic indicators of national power, avoided the twin traps of complete 
defiance and hopeless dependency: a state nevertheless managed to assert its interests 
(its primacy within the CIS, defiance of U. S. policy in Iraq and Iran) without 
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undermining its multiple ties with the immensely more powerful Western world. 56 
Primakov played a subtle game pretending to show himself as a Russian nationalist, 
whilst in reality remaining rather more pragmatic in his dealings with the West. 57 Igor 
Ivanov sought a more even-handed approach, taking something between an Eurasianist 
and a Euro-Atlanticist view, favouring closer ties with the United States and Europe, but 
emphasizing the importance of relations with Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. 
All in all, Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin, especially in 1993-1999, was driven by 
internal ('unit-level') rather than external ('system-level') influences: it had more to do 
with the specific interests of the political and economic elites which dominated Russian 
politics during the Yeltsin era than it has with the constraints imposed by Russia's 
external environment. While the debate over identity and interests proceeded among the 
intelligentsia, Russia had neither the resources nor the ability to pursue a coherent 
foreign policy. 
2.4.1. The Primakov Doctrine 
The Russian perception of the international situation in traditional geopolitical and geo- 
strategic terms contrasted to the much broader Western concept of co-operative security. 
Russia realised that the West would never allow a new security system in Europe to be 
based on Moscow's preferred OSCE. Instead, a NATO-centred security system was 
emerging, a system from which Russia obviously would be excluded. The reassessment 
of Russia's foreign policy was distinctly expressed in what has been called the 
'Primakov Doctrine', which can be described as generally anti-Western and 
pragmatic. 58 It was presented as an alternative both to the previous bi-polarity or the 
emerging uni-polarity. As a strategic approach active multi-polarity had two 
components: firstly, the building of active network of relations, which Russia needs in 
order to be able to fulfil its proper role as a great power in world affairs; secondly, - 
standing up to American domination and NATO's monopoly over security provision in 
Europe. It was difficult for Russia to accept the concept of co-operative security when 
she tended to consider international politics as a zero-sum game. 
However, Russia lacked adequate resources for the implementation of this ambitious 
policy. The domestic basis for Russia's revival as a regional power - political stability, 
economic growth and military coherence - remained underdeveloped. Her dependence 
on Western support for economic reform was indisputable. All important political and 
strategic factors of international environment were developing in a direction that was 
highly unfavourable for Russia. First of all, the extension of NATO by adding three 
former members of the Warsaw Pact profoundly changed the military balance to 
Russia's disadvantage. 59Furthermore, efforts to enhance integration with the CIS had 
largely failed. Primakov was striving for partnership and strategic alliances with China 
and India, but had only a limited success, especially in relation to China, which was 
reluctant to become a close ally of a weak Russia. 60 In addition, the first Chechen war in 
1994-1996 demonstrated Moscow's weakness in maintaining the cohesion of the 
Federation, which strengthened the perception of Russia's highly vulnerable position. 
There was a suspicion among the Russian political class that the West preferred 
Russia's disintegration. Above all, it was widely perceived that the West had apparently 
lost its interest in Russia, disappointed with her domestic development. 
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In this light, Russian foreign policy can be interpreted as a policy of weakness, 
preoccupied with the management of decline and the promotion of external conditions 
favourable to internal recovery. According to a Russian political analyst, Alexei 
Pushkov, the West three times 'tested' Primakov's policy of multi-polarity. In the 
'bargaining' with the Alliance on the decision on NATO enlargement in 1997 and 
during the Kosovo crisis in the first half of 1999 Primakov failed, receiving only 
symbolic compensations which led to Russia's isolation. Only in 1997-1998 during the 
Iraq crisis Primakov's tough policy achieved some benefit, when the U. S. and UK were 
forced to postpone air raids. 6 
A concept of multi-polarity, as Dmitri Trenin, Deputy Director of the Moscow-based 
Camegie Endowment for International Peace, put it, 'attaches undue prominence to 
traditional geopolitics'. Indeed, it assumes a capacity that is simply lacking in today's 
Russia: the country's principal economic measurements are too modest for such an 
ambitious project. Traditional territorial thinking, Trenin argues, is unlikely to yield 
positive results. It is possible to 'elevate geopolitics to a new mantra', but it is 
impossible to restore imperialism. 62 
During the Yeltsin era both the residual superpower syndrome ('active multi-polarity') 
and cooperation with the West ('pragmatic engagement') played a part. Russia found 
herself in the unfavourable position of having lost all her old allies in Europe and being 
unable to attract any new ones (except Belarus). This 'no allies' situation drew Russia 
away from Europe, both geopolitically and ideologically. 63 
2.4.2. Problems andpolicy instruments towards 'near abroad' 
The term 'near abroad' - Moscow's euphemism to describe its view of other states of 
the FSU - was used for the first time by Kozyrev in his official statement in 1992.64 
Since then, a consensus over the 'near abroad' began to emerge as one of Russia's 
preferences in the foreign policy area. Russia's complicated policy towards the FSU 
states arises from the fact that that the Yeltsin administration itself did not have a clear 
idea what it expected to see after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow had no 
experience in conducting interstate relations with the former Soviet republics. From the 
outset, there were several puzzles to be solved. The first was to determine whether the 
CIS as an organisation should be a Commonwealth of Independent States in real sense 
of this meaning, in which Russia would simply be a first among equals, or the 
instrument by which Moscow would assert its influence over the former Soviet space. 
Alex Pravda, Director of the Russian and East European Centre and Fellow of St 
Antony's College of Oxford University, argues that since the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union Moscow's attitude towards the CIS initially was rather benign. It 
concentrated on agreeing the distribution of responsibilities and resources inherited 
from the USSR and establishing damage-limitation mechanisms. However, after the end 
of the Atlanticist phase, there was emerging a more common view in favour of retaining 
former Soviet republics in Russia's sphere of influence. Russian political elites were 
increasingly referring to the 'near abroad' as a 'natural sphere of Russian interests and 
influence' or 'national security zone', in which Russia bore 'special responsibilities'. 65 
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According to Dov Lynch, Research Fellow of the EU Institute for Security Studies, 
Russia 'shifted from disengagement and withdrawal after the Soviet collapse, to 
assertive, sometimes coercive, re-engagement'. 66 By the end of 1993, Moscow adopted 
policies aimed at restoring its influence in the 'near abroad'. Labelled as 'neo-imperial' 
(aimed at restoring the empire under different guise), this posture escalated into security 
concern of the states, targeted by such grand designs. For the Baltic States, which 
regained independence after the break-up of the USSR, the direction and nature of 
Russian foreign policy became a matter of high importance in their effort to secure and 
consolidate sovereignty. At the core of this anxiety were the methods that Russia 
seemed to have relied heavily upon. 
At the conceptual level, to justify Russia's legitimate role in the post-Soviet space, a 
parallel was drawn with the Monroe Doctrine of the United States. The importance of 
the 'near-abroad' in Russia's foreign policy was finther revealed in official documents 
and in the so-called 'Kozyrev Doctrine' - Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine. It 
stated that 'countries of the CIS and the Baltics ... [constitute] a region where the vital interests of Russia are concentrated... We should not withdraw from those regions 
which have been the sphere of Russia's interests for centuries'. 67 
The second puzzle was related to the costs and benefits of Russian involvement. As 
Yeltsin put it, 'Russia is for the strengthening of the Commonwealth ... [but] integration must not be detrimental to Russia itself or involve the overstraining of our 
68 forces and resources, both material and financial'. In Primakov's view, the costs while 
real were all the same necessary to F9 rotect Russia's political, security and economic 
interests in a longer-tenn perspective. 9 
The third puzzle was a dilemma concerning the means by which Russia should pursue 
CIS-related objectives. Notwithstanding the apparent broad consensus behind the 
necessity for Russia's active policy in the post-Soviet area, it remained uncertain 
throughout the 1990s, whether she should work to develop multilateral mechanisms and 
institutions focussed on the CIS or act through bilateral channels, well-established 
between the former Soviet republics. Both things were important: the credibility of the 
CIS as organisation and maintaining close ties with its separate members. This issue 
was very much related to the problem of differentiation, i. e. should Russia treat the 
whole FSU space as equally important or should she deal with CIS-related issues on a 
largely case-by-case or region-by-region basis. 70 In reiterating that the post-Soviet space 
is a 'zone of Russia's vital interests', Alexei Arbatov, then the Deputy Head of the 
Duma Defence Committee, admitted that this was 'by no means true in equal measure, 
or true everywhere in the long-term' . 
71 By and large, the issue was never satisfactorily 
resolved. 
Russia's foreign and security policy has a specific focus upon certain regions: the Baltic 
region, the Black Sea area and South Caucasus. Russia's sensitivity towards these 
regions is and will remain of a special character for several reasons. First, all three 
zones are viewed through a prism of traditional strategic considerations. Their 
importance to Russia's defence posture is believed to be significant, and outside 
influences in those areas could seriously increase Russia's vulnerabilities. Second, there 
are important historical factors. Since the time of Ivan the Terrible, Russia's territorial 
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gains have mainly be directed towards the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Trans- 
Caucasus. Loss of control over what had been consolidated through several centuries 
was a strong psychological shock (map I shows to which extent the former USSR 
shrank). Third, Russia's strong involvement was considered essential with respect to 
some big issues on the agendas of these regions. In the Baltic region, Russia was 
concerned with the status of Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia; in the Black Sea 
region, - with the overall organisation of relations with Ukraine; and in South Caucasus, 
- with the prospects of the Caspian oil project. Each of the three areas also matters in 
terms of Russia's broader stakes in the international arena. 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
SMDEN 
MAND 
-s sIA 
urm 
UKIýNE 
MOMAMA 
KAZAKSTAN 
Bimk S" a. - 
CHINA 
ý. TURKEY 
U"AN 
Afedo. m- 
S. Tý* 
IRAN AFGHANISTAN INDIA I RýLQý 
PAK. 
Map 1. The former Soviet space: the CIS countries and the Baltic StateS72 
Active steps followed to establish building blocks of integration. This was one of the 
major priorities of post-Soviet foreign policy as early as 1993 and it was set out in the 
National Security Concept of that year. The Concept specified integration in all spheres 
of Russia's vital activities: economic union and common market, a collective security 
treaty for mutual defence, joint peacekeeping and conflict resolution, a common 
external border, and the coordination of foreign policy positions. 13 Primakov, however, 
perceived it in primarily security terms, more generally, 'creating a stable situation 
along the perimeter of [Russia's] borders and ... preventing conflicts 
from having a 
74 provocative influence on certain regions of the Russian Federation' . In this respect, the 
creation of 'common economic space' was more a security than an economic objective, 
the way to lessen the tension in interstate relations. 
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Economic priorities, considerations and means represent an integral and important part 
of Russia's policy towards the 'near-abroad'. Business and the activities of the energy 
complex became a key factor in determining Russia's geo-economic concerns and 
objectives. As the energy sector accounts for a considerable proportion of Russia's 
industrial production output and gross domestic product, the Russian government has 
always been supportive of the economic concerns of the energy sector. The Yeltsin 
leadership exploited the gas and oil leverage to advance political goals in the FSU 
countries. 
In handling its economic relations in the CIS Moscow had to deal with two-fold 
concerns: to retain and build ties to expand political influence, security and long-term 
regional economic integrity and yet to do so without damaging Russia's national 
economic interests. 75 The problems of satisfying both sets of concerns were 
compounded by the economic environment. The break-up of the USSR adversely 
affected the economies of all the CIS countries and prompted rapid diversification of 
trade from that area. The first half of the 1990s saw sharp declines in trade among the 
CIS. The majority of them started to establish their ties with the West - the EU and 
NATO, and, as Mark Smith noted, they have been 'unable to restore even the levels of 
trade that existed ... when they were union-republics in the USSR'. 
76 By 1999 only 
Belarus, TaJikistan and Moldova were still heavily dependent on Russia for their 
exports; Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan were the most successful in reorienting 
their goods to world market. 77 This diversification was driven not only by economic 
rationale but also by a political imperative to reduce dependency on Russia. 
It is in the security area that Russia's hegemonic tendencies and neo-imperialist 
instincts have emerged more clearly and were pursued most forcefully. They were 
largely centred on a 'strategy on extended border defence', which is based on the idea 
that the best way to protect the Russian Federation is to ensure the security of the 
former Soviet frontiers. 78 Moscow's reasoning was straightforward. The collapse of the 
USSR left Russia with large sections of undefended frontier, and the newly emerged 
independent states, particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia, were unable to secure 
the old Soviet borders and manage local conflicts. The resulting instability could not 
only undermine border security but also spread to adjacent regions and ethnic republics 
of the Russian Federation. But what Moscow viewed as legitimate security concerns, 
many of the new states perceived as pretext for Russian neo-imperialism. Such anxieties 
were reinforced by Russia's objective to keep the 'near-abroad' as Russia's security 
preserve and sphere of influence in keeping with her great power status. 
In the beginning of 1990s, Russia used her armed forces to pursue her strategy of 'outer 
border defence', in particular taking the opportunities offered by the armed conflicts, 
which erupted in some of the FSU states. Russia intervened militarily in the conflict 
between Moldova and secessionist Transdnistria region in 1992, as well as in the 
conflicts between Georgia and her breakaway autonomous republics of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia in the same year. High pressure tactics in Georgia have proved fruitful for 
Russia. With troops already on the ground, Russia managed to turn the conflict between 
Georgia and Abkhazia to her own advantage. Moscow did so through a peculiar form of 
'peacekeeping', in which it acted as a 'player', rather than a 'referee', exercising 
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pressure on both sides to maximise leverage. 79 As a result, Georgia became a part of 
Moscow's sphere of influence, with her borders patrolled by Russian troops. Russia also 
responded militarily to the threat of collapse of a pro-Moscow Communist regime in 
Tajikistan in 1992. In all four cases, having intervened, Russia re-invented herself as a 
4'peacekeeper'. Her 'peacekeeping' forces continue to operate in the aforementioned 
regions, and military bases still remain in Moldova and Georgia. 
The interventions of 1992 had an enduring impact catalysing shifts in conceptual 
thinking and pushing foreign policy into reactive and subordinate position vis-6-vis the 
military engagements. Throughout the mid-1990s, military activism declined with the 
appointment of Yevgeny Primakov, and then experienced a certain upsurge (especially 
internally) with the ascendancy to power of Vladimir Putin. Primakov managed to break 
the hold of the military and the use of force in diplomacy, although this policy line was 
challenged during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Subsequently, it might be argued that 
Putin upgraded this role into genuinely instrumental to match a more assertive style in 
foreign policy he sought to cultivate. 
When the Soviet Union disintegrated, leaving some 25 million ethnic Russians beyond 
the borders of the Russian Federation within the former Soviet Union, many anticipated 
that Moscow would play the ethnic card to bring pressure to bear on the Baltic States, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan, all of which have large Russian minorities. The 'protection of 
compatriots' (sootechestvenniki - this term was used for Russian-speaking population) 
developed into one of the major, if not central, elements of Russia's 'near abroad' 
policy. However, such a policy largely proved to be assertive rhetoric, rather than 
practical assistance for the allegedly discriminated Russian-speaking population. The 
'compatriots' card was occasionally utilised to distract public attention from domestic 
problems, obtain economic or political concessions or pressure internationally the 
governments of the respective countries. 
In reality, Moscow's handling of diaspora issues reflected the disjunction between the 
declared policy and lack of political will. Part of tile difficulty was the tendency in the 
Yeltsin administration to view Russian diaspora through an 'instrumentalist priSM,. 80 
The administration frequently exploited concerns about discrimination against Russian- 
speaking population to apply pressure on FSU governments, including the Baltics. 
During the 1990s, Moscow continued to protest occasionally about the violation of 
minority rights but abstained from taking any action that might risk seriously disrupting 
ties and causing problems in relations with the West. In fact, Russia has wisely left it to 
the Western governments and the OSCE to press Tallinn and Riga on minority issues. 
Within the CIS, local military support for Russian separatists in the Transdnistria region 
of Moldova in 1992 proved to be an exception. 81 With regard to other CIS countries, 
Moscow showed a greater restraint, doing very little to support the large number of its 
compatriots in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Policy was all words and minimal action. It 
was also very much the case of the leadership allowing elite preferences to influence the 
mood and not the specifics of foreign policy making. 82 The way the Kremlin dropped 
the question of Crimean local autonomy in order to facilitate conclusion of the 1997 
bilateral treaty with Ukraine was further indication of how diaspora issues were placed 
in the greater context of things. 83 All in all, the 'protection' of Russian-speaking 
population was manifested mostly in rhetoric. 
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in practice the CIS integration had not advanced. From the outset, it faced difficulties, 
the most obvious of which was irreconcilable views between Russia and the CIS 
countries. Moscow was not getting away from the reality that all the CIS members had 
been politically and economically dependent on Russia for at least 150 years, and 
especially so during Soviet times. But equally many of these states, once they became 
independent, were opposed to Moscow's efforts to reassert its dominance over them. 
Another difficulty stemmed from the inability to implement intra-CIS agreements and 
commitments. A series of summits, councils and committees, established within the 
CIS, turned out to be useless as they did not achieve any of the principal objectives, e. g. 
Common Economic Space, Customs Union, Collective Security Treaty. Despite the vast 
majority of bilateral and multilateral intra-CIS agreements, only a few of them were 
implemented. 84 Worse still, this was accompanied by deterioration in Russia's relations 
with many FSU states, as well as by weakening of her political and economic positions 
in the CIS area. Above all, rather than operating as a vehicle for influence, the CIS has 
proved difficult to manage, even becoming a forum for criticism of Moscow. This 
unwelcome development was highlighted by the growth of interregional grouping 
GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova)85 . The appearance 
of GUUAM (see map 2) was significant, not so much as an effective cooperative body, 
but for its symbolic value. It was a clear signal that some CIS member-states wished to 
6move out of Moscow's direct orbit' 86 , not to mention GUUAM's increasing links with 
NATO. Such a development pointed up the failings of the CIS and was an obvious 
tendency towards its disintegration. This attracted growing official criticism, with even 
Yeltsin acknowledging in his final State of the Nation address that the Commonwealth 
had 'so far failed, both economically and politically, to develop into a reliable 
mechanism for ensuring conditions conducive to mutually beneficial cooperation'. 87 
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To sum up, throughout the 1990s, the major issues of Russia's 'near-abroad' policy 
were predominantly pertaining to the political, economic and security domain, as well 
as the humanitarian concerns regarding the problems of Russian diaspora. In each of 
these policy areas, Moscow had several policy instruments at its disposal for potential 
xploitation with the aim of increasing Russia's influence in the region. The security 
concerns and presence of the Russian military, a considerable number of Russian 
compatriots in the former Soviet republics, and importance of access to the transit 
routes for Russia, as well as dependence of FSU countries on Russia's energy supplies, 
generated both enduring interests and substantial leverage for Russia to pursue a pro- 
active policy in the post-Soviet area. 89 
Under Yeltsin, the development of the CIS appeared to be a failure with sharply 
conflicting interests between Russia and the other post-Soviet countries. In addition to 
conflicting interests, there was a 'clash between the imperial syndrome and the liberal 
foreign policy agenda', i. e. the usual dichotomy between the urge to reassert Moscow's 
control over the FSU as the sphere of vital interests and an equally strong worry to limit 
the costs of such a project. 90 Above all, the real problem was that the Kremlin was never 
able to decide what it wanted from the CIS integration more generally. This explains the 
Yeltsin administration's reactive approach to CIS-related problems and a reluctance to 
bring adequate political, human and financial resources. 
2.4.3. Russia's perceptions of the changing Euro-A dantic region 
Throughout the 1990s, Moscow was pursuing a two-track strategy in response to what it 
perceived as a gap between new developments in the Euro-Atlantic area and Russia's 
security interests. One track consisted of searching for cooperative measures aimed at 
promoting Russia's integration into a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture and 
neutralising any consequences of developments in this area that might destabilise or 
damage Russia's interests. The other track included tough positions towards various 
political and defence issues. 
Following the collapse of the USSR, 'no single definition (friends, partners, rivals, 
competitors) could fully reflect the complexity of Russian-NATO relations'. 91 Part of 
the problem is that the Russian military-political leadership felt deep psychological 
discomfort in its relationship with NATO. Although Moscow officially declared that 
there was no winner in the Cold War, Russian officials, perhaps even more so than 
those at NATO, regarded the North Atlantic Alliance as the victor. Russia never quite 
believed the West's assurances that NATO, created as a counterweight to the Soviet 
Union and its expanding empire, ceased to be a foe for Russia. As a result, for most of 
the 1990s, NATO relations with Russia oscillated between resentful cooperation and 
outright hostility, when suspicion, uncertainty and negativity were their prevailing 
features. 
A significant rationale for Moscow's opposition to NATO enlargement was that Russia 
did not have direct access to this structure playing the central security role in Europe. 
Therefore, some kind of special relationship with NATO, such as the one 
institutionalised by the May 1997 Founding Act, was considered a more attractive 
strategy than promoting the re-emerging confrontational model. Moscow seemed to be 
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open to fin-ther rapprochement with NATO but considered it conditional upon a number 
of factors. First, Russia preferred substantive rather than symbolic cooperation with 
NATO. Second, Russia wanted the issue of the second round of enlargement to be 
removed from the agenda or at least delayed and played down. Third, Moscow was 
against NATO's central role in the European security environment. Finally, NATO 
must evolve towards a political rather than a military structure. 92 
By and large, the underlying tension in NATO/U. S. -Russian relations was American 
hegemony in the world, or uni-polarity in power politics. Russia was upset with her 
marginalized status, which was openly demonstrated by NATO during the Kosovo 
campaign. Moreover, put into one package, the Kosovo crisis, perspectives for ftuther 
NATO's expansion and the Alliance's new Strategic Concept (1999) caused an outcry 
in Russia. 
Many of the Russian elites viewed NATO's eastward enlargement as a direct threat to 
Russian security. However, according to Trenin, the effect of NATO enlargement on the 
elites cannot be explained merely in terms of threat perceptions. Nor is the notion of 
Russia becoming isolated as a result of NATO's admitting new member states in Central 
and Eastern Europe able to explain the vehemence of Moscow's reaction. 93 Russia's 
concerns were not solely caused by eastward expansion of the Alliance; they were also 
the result of NATO's evolving 'out of area operations' to respond to regional crises at 
the periphery of the Alliance. Once NATO had enlarged, the periphery of the Alliance 
became also the periphery of Russia, an area that the Russian government considered to 
be 'within its legitimate sphere of influence'. 94 Thus the main problem the Russian elites 
had with NATO came from traditional geopolitics. 
Why did Russia find NATO enlargement eastwards, and especially to the Baltics, so 
contentious? Suffice it to remember that the Baltic region in the two World Wars of the 
20th century has been one of the main axes of military invasions of the Russian 
Empire/Soviet Union. Thus, historically a fundamental objective of Russia's national 
strategy has been to ensure that a buffer of weak nations, held firmly within the Russian 
sphere of influence, protected her frontiers. Even with the end of the Cold War and the 
troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe it was doubtful that Russia expected to lose this 
buffer. 95 However, Russia's plans to replace the Warsaw Pact with a shield of neutral 
and non-aligned nations, held under its influence, failed when these nations began to 
look at the West for protection. Instead of having the Baltics, serving as a buffer zone 
between Russia and the West, NATO's expansion into that region threatened to place a 
military united Europe at the Russian border, simultaneously eliminating 'a highly 
sensitive psychological barrier'- literal and metaphorical 'window to the West'. 96 Last 
but not least, while Estonia's membership 'would bring NATO to the doorstep of St. 
Petersburg', Lithuania's membership 'would turn Kaliningrad into a later-day version of 
West Berlin'. 97 These prospects for Russia were the worst security nightmare. 
Russia's uneasy acceptance of the first round of NATO enlargement was based in part 
on the assumption that Russia, being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, 
held a veto over NATO's missions beyond collective self-defence of her members. 
From Moscow's perspective, the assertive stance by NATO in Yugoslavia, particularly 
the use of force outside the area of application of the Washington Treaty without a 
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mandate of the UN Security Council, denied Russia's veto right. This explains why 
relatively mild opposition with regard to NATO after the first round of enlargement 
grew into a powerful wave of anti-Western, anti-American and anti-NATO protests in 
the wake of the Kosovo crisis, marking a turning point in U. S. -Russian relations. 
Suffice it to compare the 1997 and 2000 versions of Russia's National Security Concept 
or the 1993 and 2000 editions of the Military Doctrine (see 2.3). 
The most frequent question in the debates on NATO enlargement toward the Baltics 
was how this process would influence Russia's relations with the West and whether it 
would maintain the post-Cold War status quo that was highly acceptable to the West. 
Would NATO provoke Russian hostility and force it go back to the Cold War 
approaches? Although Russia was not able to prevent NATO's expansion into the 
Visegrad countries", her leaders informed the West with unmistakable clarity that they 
viewed Baltic membership of NATO as the 'red line'. Should NATO cross that 'red 
line' 'European stability might not withstand the new tension'. 99 How was Russia 
prepared to respond to NATO expansion? Russian officials used to reiterate that they 
would take 'adequate measures'. But what was 'adequate? "Oo The Russian government 
started to realise that it had no real veto power over NATO decisions: economic 
weakness limited Russia's ability to respond. Furthermore, the argument about the 'red 
line' running 'along the former Soviet border' was not particularly convincing. 
It is noteworthy that Russia's attitudes towards the European Union have always been 
very different from those towards NATO. For a long time the 'bad West' to Russia was 
the United States and NATO. The 'good West' was the EU, which was regarded as the 
most powerful economic partner and most important political actor in Europe. At the 
same time, Russia's policy had been far from unchanging in her relations with Europe. 
But it should be noted that, albeit after the 'honeymoon' period, which ended fairly 
swiftly in the early 1990s, Russia's relations with Europe became more conditional and 
fraught (since the mid-1990s), a co-operative trend did not disappear. 101 
In contrast to the enlargement of NATO, Russia has been generally positive with 
respect to EU enlargement. When treating the Union as a benign organisation, Russia 
liked about it 'not the things that the EU had ... but rather the things the EU lacked', 
namely, the American presence and an integrated military structure. 102 As part of the 
Primakov doctrine, Russia had undertaken considerable political and diplomatic activity 
to promote a 'pan-European security architecture', i. e. non-NATO security framework. 
In this context the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 
with the aim of strengthening the EU as an autonomous international actor, seemed a 
rather positive factor for Moscow. Interestingly enough, the launch of the ESDP 
coincided with a period of sharp deterioration in Russia's relations with NATO as a 
result of the Kosovo campaign. The Primakov doctrine's treatment of NATO as 'little 
more than an instrument of American power projection' was pertinent to Russia's initial 
response towards the ESDP. 103 The ambitions of the ESDP were seen as narrow and 
modest, preserving the EU's image as a primary economic actor and an unlikely 
military power. 
Overall, under Yeltsin, Moscow was making a contradistinction between Atlantic and 
European military and political cooperation the cornerstone of its policy. 104 A 
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perception of the European Union as an essentially non-threatening, economic 
organisation, remained prevalent. NATO, on the contrary, was viewed as a U. S. - 
dominated military bloc, whose advance to Russia's borders was intrinsically a cause 
for concern. There are serious grounds for believing that it was precisely because of 
NATO's drive eastwards that Russia adopted a benevolent attitude towards the EU's 
own enlargement project, viewing it as an alternative project. 
2.5. The unreformed armed forces 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the military balance changed dramatically to the 
disadvantage of Russia. Russia retained only 8 of the 16 Soviet military districts. The 
Russian military lost the ma ority of the USSR's most capable military units, the so- 
called 'first strategic echelon', which had been stationed in the newly independent 
states. 105 From a geo-strategic point of view, Russia had withdrawn about 1500 km from 
the ccntre of Europe: from Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia to Kursk and 
Smolensk in European Russia. The Leningrad, Moscow and the North Caucasus 
Military Districts have turned from the deep rear areas (for more than 300 years) into 
the advanced defence lines of Russia in the West and South West. Meanwhile NATO's 
operational depth had been increased by 20 percent. 106 In short, the strategic 
environment of Russia's Western strategic direction has changed fundamentally, 
requiring the formulation of a new strategic approach. 
The prestige of the Soviet Army was already declining in the Gorbachev period. Lack of 
success in the Afghan war reflected on its professional credibility; under glasnost the 
media published stories about corruption among senior officers and bullying in the 
barrack room, which damaged the army's image even more. The armed forces' close 
links with the Communist Party meant that the military were tainted with politicians' 
corruption and incompetence. 107 At the same time the rebirth of Russia provided an 
opportunity to create new armed forces, which could act as a nation-building force. 
However, this opportunity was wasted as the Yeltsin leadership was inclined to 
maintain as much of the Soviet military machine as possible. 
Since the whole state was geared for conflict for 70 years, every aspect of the state had 
to face reform. In other words, reform of all sectors simultaneously was needed for the 
military to implement successful reforms. Military refon-n had to encompass not only 
the armed forces but also the military industrial complex (MIC), policy making and 
command and control structures, the legal framework of the state, and, not least, 
economic and social spheres. 108 It is important to note that Russians make a difference 
between reform of the military and reform of the armed forces. 109 The result of the 
confusion between the two and the necessity of having a fully functioning economy 
placed additional strains on reforms. In the end, reforms came to mean simple 
downsizing, without the vision to implement a decent force structure revision. 
After the establishment of the Russian Ministry of Defence (MOD) in May 1992 a 
three-stage plan was put forward: to reduce, reform and restructure the armed forces by 
the end of 1990s. However, General Pavel Grachev, Russia's first defence minister 
(1992-1996) lacked professional judgement. In the opinion of many experts, Grachev 
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was an incompetent minister: reform was basically replaced with the mechanical 
reduction of the numerical strength of the Russian military and the redeployment of 
military units and equipment from the foreign states and territories of the former Soviet 
republics. 110 
In the early nineties the Russian Armed Forces had been hit by a series of disasters. 
First of all, numerous cuts in the armed forces, mainly because of arms control 
agreements, concluded during the period of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze"'. were 
difficult for the military system to absorb. Secondly, the lack of reform, coupled with a 
perceived loss of status, had a tremendous impact on the morale of the Russian officer 
corps, which was still in shock from the effects of the end of the Cold War. What was 
worse, the absence of economic reforms and high inflation in Russia, contributed to the 
further decline of defence budget and had led to a wider malaise throughout all levels of 
the military. The continued appalling treatment of conscripts, the so-called 
dedovshchina, undermined the morale of servicemen. As a way to compare the morale 
and living standards of troops, the USSR allegedly suffered 15,000 killed in 10 years of 
war with Afghanistan. Russia lost the same number of soldiers to accidents, suicides, 
killings and disease between 1990 and 1993.1 12 The crisis in morale in the armed forces 
particularly manifested itself during the first Chechen war in 1994-1996. An army of 
Chechen guerrillas and combat forces defeated the armed forces of an enormously 
larger and richer country. Even when Chechen guerrillas invaded Russia twice in 1995, 
Russian forces were unable to prevent the escape of their leaders. 
As a result of the poor political standing of the MOD, there was a rise in parallel armies 
- military and paramilitary formations controlled by various internal security agencies. 
Another characteristic feature of the military was the endemic corruption at all levels of 
service. It was well documented that a 'military financial mafia' was manipulating 
money in the military budget by delaying the transfer of huge sums to troops in the 
field. ' 13 The involvement of military personnel in crime and corruption made the 
'protectors' of Russian security a threat to that security. 
Russian failure in the first Chechen war provoked General Grachev's replacement with 
Colonel-General Igor Rodionov (1996-1997). However he was sacked in less than a 
year for refusal to compromise on the matter of the military reform. Rodionov's 
successor Marshal Igor Sergeyev (1997-2001) was tasked to implement reform within a 
severely retrenched defence budget. In accordance with the reform pro Ar amme, the 
strength of the armed forces was reduced to 1.2 million personnel by 1999. As part of 
organisational reform, the integration among similar services allegedly allowed the 
elimination of duplicated structures, unified combat training and rear services, thus 
reducing the overall costs of maintenance! 15 Some military districts were merged, 
reducing the total number from eight to six: Moscow, Leningrad, Trans-Caucasus, 
Trans-Volga-Ural, Siberia and Far East. By 2000, this structural organisation was 
complete. But it was far from a comprehensive military reform. 
The outcome of reform had, for the most part, limited itself to downsizing and massive 
cutting. The monstrous MIC was in stagnation, research and development (R&D) was 
suspended, and highly trained personnel were lost. The government was relying on 
foreign arms sales to finance the MIC, to keep it going at its Soviet level in the hope of 
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reconstituting the whole Soviet MIC b agreements within the CIS. "' This all took 
place under the slogan of 'conversion'. But the biggest problem was the military 
leadership: the style of leadership was the legacy from the Soviet era. It developed in a 
conscript army serving an authoritarian political system. Meanwhile after the collapse of 
the USSR Russia was evolving as a quasi-democracy trying to raise professional armed 
forces. Quite apart from the implications this had for civil-military relations the armed 
forces needed a new basis for relationships within their ranks. The weakness of Russia's 
conventional Armed Forces and their failure to effectively prepare for local wars and 
other armed conflicts was tacitly admitted by the Russian government in the promotion 
of its nuclear deterrent forces. ' 18 Tbroughout the 1990s, Russia's nuclear forces had 
been vital in justifying her residual claim to a great power status. 
All in all, the Russian military authorities missed at least two good chances to launch a 
comprehensive military reform - at the very start of its new state building in 1992 and 
after the defeat in the first Chechen war in 1996. It is clear that military reform could 
not be implemented in the absence of deep economic and societal changes. Despite 
Russia's 'opening' to the West between 1991-1994, and since her reversal in 1999, 
reforms had gone nowhere. Disputes, internal struggles, and even public infighting 
among the military leadership (in particular between Defence Minister, Marshal 
Sergeyev, and Chief of the General Staff (GS), Anatoly Kvashnin) stalled reforms; and 
finally, the Kosovo and Chechen conflicts basically nullified reform. 119 Morale 
remained low and desertions high, because high ranking officers were often corrupt and 
brutal, and because the whole military establishment had no direction. 
2.6. Conclusions 
Boris Yeltsin's leadership can be judged from different perspectives. One could look at 
the results of his activities as a destroyer of the Soviet Union and communism. In this 
aspect, his performance would receive high marks. But if one evaluates the 
consequences of Yeltsin's actions from the point of view of how far he succeeded in 
moving Russia closer to liberal democracy, taking into account opportunities and 
chances that were wasted under him, then the assessment of the regime is completely 
different. It is also important to bear in mind that the number of tasks and challenges 
facing Russia at that time were so enormous and conditions for solving them were just 
as limited. On the other hand, it should be noted that Yeltsin had several levers of power 
concentrated in his hands at the initial stage, when the political field and society had yet 
to be structured and he had substantial opportunities to influence the course of events. 
Thus, what aspects of his legacy can be considered positive from a liberal-democratic 
perspective? Firstly, he played a huge part in the peaceful break up of the Soviet Union 
and guaranteeing the emergence of independent states on its territory. Secondly, an 
outcome of Yeltsin's rule was the emergence of preconditions that made Russia's return 
to communism impossible. 120 Thirdly, under Yeltsin, democratic legitimisation of 
power became the most important element of the political regime. Fourthly, his clear 
progress towards promoting freedom, political pluralism and regular elections could be 
also assessed favourably. Fifthly, Yeltsin got the political elite 'accustomed to solving 
international questions in a relatively modem way', making a return to a Cold War after 
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his period more difficult, and perhaps impossible. 121 It should not be overlooked the 
professionalism with which Russian diplomacy has been conducted on key issues under 
both Kozyrev and Primakov, the extent to which, Primakov especially, was able to 
insulate foreign policy-making process from the broader turbulences of Russian politics. 
Finally, Yeltsin made the return to a planned centralised economy impossible. He 
recognised the need for market reform as the sole factor that could lead Russia from the 
deep economic crisis that accompanied the collapse of communism. 
At the same time, negative features of Yeltsin's rule are equally obvious. First, it was 
under his government that corruption, shadowy relations, and the merger of political 
power and business became systemic, becoming the most important component of 
survival of both the leader and society. The legacy of Yeltsin's years in power was the 
hybrid political and economic system, combining substantial elements of democracy, 
arbitrariness and kleptocracy. 122 Second, Yeltsin returned Russia to the tradition of 
personalised rule. Third, with his direct participation, there emerged a regime that 
encouraged a lack of accountability in all political institutions, including the presidency. 
This led to a malaise in all spheres of the state: political, military, economic, social, and 
other spheres. It was under his leadership that the principles of liberal democracy were 
discredited, given that they were used as a 'fagade for shady relations and autocratic 
rule'. 123 
Such a chaotic domestic situation has a direct impact on the conduct of foreign and 
security policy. The most striking features of foreign policy used to be incoherence and 
ambivalence, reflecting the ambiguous nature of Russia as 'a regional power in terms of 
124 capabilities and a great power in terms of nostalgia, pride and ambition'. The root of 
Yeltsin's failures in foreign policy was the lack of an overarching vision of where he 
was taking his country. Despite the production of documents solemnly listing 'concepts' 
and 'doctrines', policy objectives were not clearly defined, and Yeltsin kept shuffling 
personnel at such a rate that implementation of such a policy became impossible. 
Simply put, the overall approach of Russia's foreign policy was reactive and ad hoc. 
The outcome, largely accidental, was 'pragmatism by default' instead of consensus 
sought by the regime. 125 On the whole, the Yeltsin legacy is indeed a mixture of 
successes and failures but there is a little doubt that liberalist view of Kozyrev, who 
indisputably wanted Russia to choose her strategic direction towards West, had an 
enormous impact on the conduct of Russia's foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PUTINIS RUSSIA: QUO VADIS? 
Two unsuccessful exit strategies attempted from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s - 
'Gorbachev's evolution and Yeltsin's revolution" - had instilled the awareness of a 
systemic crisis and of the necessity for structural change. They questioned the tenets of 
Russia's modem self-perception as a superpower and territorial giant and initiated a 
critical reassessment of Russia's role in world affairs. Various intellectual groups and 
think-tanks had provided different perspectives, from liberalism to Eurasianism, but 
there had been a shared sentiment that 'from shaping the world Russia should turn to 
adaptation to the external environment. 2 Russia faced the challenge of adapting to 
globalisation. This was precisely the new agenda of the new leader, Vladimir Putin, 
who was a symbolically appointed president by the outgoing Boris Yeltsin on 31 
December 1999. Strategies of adaptation are key for understanding Putin's domestic 
project and Russian foreign policy, both of which are analysed in chapters 3 and 4 of 
this thesis. The results of President Vladimir Putin's rule allow us to draw some 
conclusions as to possible direction in which Russia is heading in the near future, as 
well as the challenges that she is likely to face. 
There is an apparent lack of congruity between Putin's domestic and foreign policies. 
This is the so-called 'parallelism in Russia's politics', whereby domestic developments 
are characterised by autocratic measures and foreign policy follows a more liberal line. 3 
But the Russian foreign policy parallel intersects with the Russian domestic policy 
parallel, as foreign policy is ultimately geared to domestic concerns. By and large, the 
complexity of Russia's transformation blurs the methodological border between 
domestic and foreign policy, inside and outside. Internal actors, challenges and 
constraints are increasingly setting the foreign policy agenda, while the external 
environment increasingly shapes domestic identities and responses. In this fluid 
environment globalisation has entered Russia in unpredictable, at times uncomfortable, 
ways, defining new imperatives for Russia's national interest, security strategy and 
foreign policy. 
In assessing Russia's domestic agenda, much depends upon the assessment of the 
character and intentions of the Russian President himself. Putin is, paradoxically, the 
driving force behind much of the policies that have raised concerns in the Western 
world (building 'power vertical', steps taken against opposition media, the military 
campaign in Chechnya) and the driving force behind enhanced cooperation with the 
West. He is generally viewed within Russia and abroad as having brought stability at 
some cost in liberty, and both President Putin and some of his most controversial 
policies (such as the post-Beslan reform or the campaign against Yukos) remain popular 
among an apolitical electorate. A question that needs to be answered first of all is how 
has Vladimir Putin's rise to power influenced the course of consolidation and 
modernisation of the state or the lack thereoP 
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The chapter does not seek to grasp the full range of issues related to Putin's regime. 
Instead it focuses on the three key elements of state building: state capacity, state 
integrity and state autonoMy. 4 State capacity refers to the ability of a state to ensure 
reliable implementation of its decisions by its own personnel. In Russia's context, it 
comprises a variety of tasks starting from the implementation of reforms aimed at 
modernizing the state, ensuring social and physical security of the population to 
establishing a well functioning apparatus of the Russian Federation, which would 
ensure adequate balance of authority between federal and regional levels. State integrity 
in Russia largely concerns federalism and inter-ethnic relations, specifically Chechnya. 
State autonomy implies that the Russian state is able to make major policy decisions 
independently, without them being hijacked by well-positioned groups of the elite. 
3.1. Putin's state building project 
3.1.1. Differences between the Yeltsin and Putin periods 
Vladimir Putin's blitzkrieg presidential campaign and overwhelming victory in the 
April 2000 presidential elections raised many concerns among the liberal Russian 
intelligentsia and in the West about the re-emergence of authoritarian trends in Russia. 
These concerns were prompted in the first instance by Putin's background as a KGB 
officer with an uncertain political agenda. The new leader was a man with neither a 
brilliant career nor charisma. In stark contrast to Yeltsin, his career 'had been that of a 
perennial second in command'5 (Putin used to work as a deputy to Anatoliy Sobchak, 
mayor of St. Petersburg, and in a variety of posts in the Yeltsin administration). 
Ironically, these features of Putin, in addition to 'his appearance, modesty, dullness, 
sportsman style', even his origins in the KGB, perceived within society as 'the least 
corrupted organisation', played to his advantage and helped his rise to power. 6 The key 
thing about Putin: he was just like everyone else. The Russian people had lost faith in 
the traditional type of leader, who was 'elderly, conservative, experienced in 
bureaucratic struggle, and represented the Soviet nomenklatura #7 
The contrast between Putin and Yeltsin is striking: the leader with a new kind of 
personality -a relatively young and an educated individual, who came from the old 
capital of St. Petersburg, who had lived abroad and spoke a foreign language - is 8 exactly the opposite to his predecessor. Beyond this, Putin's appearance on the scene 
illuminated the need 'to get away with a revolutionary cycle'9 and make a transition to a 
more stable environment that required a new type of leader. 
Yeltsin had led a weak state, which had lost its central authority and integrating feature 
and suffered from a split in the ruling elite. The political environment under Yeltsin was 
fragmented. This fragmentation resulted in a critical role for the Russian president, who 
acted as a supreme referee solving conflicts between competing groups. Yeltsin was 
unable to address fundamental problems and could not overcome resistance from 
political groups. As head of the Effective Policy Foundation and Putin's spin-doctor, 
Gleb Pavlovsky, put it, 'Yeltsin did not build a state. He led a revolution for ten 
years'. 10 It fell to Putin to become the consolidator of the tenuous elements of statehood 
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that had emerged out of Yeltsin's permanent revolution. Thus, Putin was a logical 
conclusion to the Yeltsin era. 
Political literature has labelled Putin's era as a post-revolutionary period following 
Yeltsin's political and social turmoil. The country had been weakened by decade-long 
decline and was badly affected by the domestic socio-economic impact of post- 
Communist transition. The whole state machinery was not functioning: there was poor 
corporate governance, lack of clear legislation, fading central authority over the regions, 
unlimited power of oligarchs, especially the 'family', corruption and criminality. 
Furthermore, the loss of status after the Cold War, financial restraints, and the war in 
Chechnya had a demoralising and devastating effect on the Russian military, which 
remained unreformed and thus ineffective. Russia's economic conditions were poor, and 
the country was facing the problem of high debt to the West. Ironically, for all her 
weaknesses, Russia mattered for the outside world for three reasons: 'the atom, the veto 
and the location'. " 
President Putin pursued a goal of consolidation of the state accompanied by unification 
of the political elite. Those who resisted Putin's policy were pushed out of the political 
scene. Unlike Yeltsin, Putin openly relied on bureaucratic instruments, while limiting 
both democratic and oligarchic tendencies. At the same time, he attempted to make the 
political structure more businesslike: he abandoned the overstated monarchic style, 
rationalised the system of power, making it more technological. Putin's ruling style, his 
rhetoric and his sources of support revealed his intent to change Yeltsin's 'patrimonial 
monarchic system'. At least on the outside, Putin demonstrated an entirely different 
ruling style: rational, cold, avoiding 'displays of partisanship' . 
12 In 2000-2001 the 
complex political structure of the Yeltsin years, characterised by a high level of 
infighting and decentralisation, was gradually replaced by a processes of unification and 
the fon-nation of administrative teams along hierarchical lines. However, while in his 
first two years Putin had managed to impose a sense of purpose and unity to the very 
concept of the state, towards the end of his first term, it appeared once again to be 
'disintegrating into the struggle between clans and factions'. To quote Richard Sakwa, 
Professor of Russian and European Politics at the University of Kent, 'the Yeltsinite 
conglomerate state' began to appear. 13 
From the very start of Putin's presidency, the word 'pragmatism' was used as the best 
definition for his external policy. The first policy statement that Putin made as a newly 
elected president contained three overlapping themes. First, he emphasised that the 
Russian state needed to be put back in order that it was compatible with democracy. 
Second, the basis for the whole thing would be market economy: if Russia's GDP grew 
by 8 percent a year, in 15 years it would only reach present living standard of Portugal, 
then the poorest country of the EU. 14 Both goals are central to Putin's efforts to restore 
Russia's power and influence in the world. Last but not least, was 'reviving a sense of 
nationhood"s in post-Soviet Russia. Putin also stressed the necessity to have good 
relations with all Russia's neighbours, the United States, and Europe in particular. 16 
This was his general political manifesto and a comprehensible political line. 
Putin's post-revolutionary era was to solve problems inherited from the past and 
included its own specific elements. For example, preserving power and property without 
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public control was the strategic interest of post-Soviet elites, who were mainly 
preoccupied with conservation of their status quo and protection from further 
competition. Predictability and stability became the priorities for the current period. 
Putin realised that first of all Russia needed to become a politically stable and 
economically vibrant country. Only then could she promote the multi-polar world order. 
Medvedev argues that Putin has been actually 'reformulating Russian national 
interests', the key to which is ensuring a favourable environment for the introduction of 
domestic reform. 17 
3.1.2. Power vertical 
The regime inherited by Vladimir Putin was totally decentralised. Putin's primary 
objective on assuming power was to re-establish the authority of the Russian state, 
which had been severely weakened since the late 1980s. Having perfectly exploited the 
terrorist acts in Moscow and Volgograd, he resolutely waged a new war in Chechnya. 
The war fostered nationalism and chauvinism and created such an atmosphere that 
allowed Putin to restrict democratic freedoms and to start building the so-called 'power 
vertical'. He considered of particular importance the strengthening of the presidency 
vis-A-vis the other major institutions and actors in the political system. This meant 
redefining the Kremlin's relations with the Federal Assembly, the regional elite and, 
above all, wresting influence from oligarchs, who had shot to prominence under Boris 
Yeltsin and who seemed to have dominated Russian politics since the mid- I 990s. 
The Federal Assembly was the softest target. The State Duma had always been 
relatively weak and the 1999 elections had produced a chamber that was ready to follow 
the president's lead. It proved an eager partner when Putin set out to emasculate the 
Assembly's upper house, the Federation Council, by replacing the elected regional 
bosses with appointed senators. The new Federation Council was even less likely than 
the old one to act as a serious counterweight to the executive. The restructuring of this 
chamber, in turn, was part of a wide-ranging drive to bring the regional bosses to heel. 
The results of this campaign were mixed at best, but there is little doubt that they 
succeeded in strengthening central authority at the expense of the subjects of the 
federation. 
During his first two years as president, Putin generally succeeded in restoring vertical 
governance. The omnipotence of the regional governors was ended. Controlling the 
governors allowed Putin to halt the drift of regions and republics towards greater 
autonomy. The establishment of seven federal districts, together with the appointment 
of the presidential envoys to those districts, was aimed at forming a common legislative 
space in the country and bringing local laws, with rare exceptions, in line with federal 
legislation. 18 The 'family', which included members of the Yeltsin family, leading 
oligarchs, and chief executives of mass media outlets controlled by those oligarchs, was 
destroyed as a non-institutional centre of power. Hence, the Russian political and 
economic actors, who sought to privatise the state, together with all of its resources and 
institutions, were weakened. In foreign and security policy, Putin has established a clear 
hierarchy by strengthening the role of the institutions involved. 
55 
Presidential authoritarianism and discipline on the one hand and release of economic 
dynamism on the other defined the parameters of Putin's program. First of all, he 
wanted to strengthen patriotism (and through this to consolidate popular support), 
restore the central power of the state, which was prerequisite for modernising the 
country by establishing economic growth and social justice. Moreover, a strong central 
power, in his view, was also the prerequisite for the restoration of Russia's position in 
the international system. 
Patriotism is probably 'the quality for which Putin would like most to be 
remembered'. 19 Yeltsin's political career was built on the rejection of his own Soviet 
past and that of his country. Putin, on the contrary, has characterised himself, without 
any embarrassment, as a successful product of the patriotic education of a Soviet man. 20 
His vision of a strong, paternalist Russian state includes the Soviet period, rejectin 
only the Soviet economic system on the grounds that it did not lead to prosperity. 2 
There is little doubt that Putin's kind of patriotism is better suited than Yeltsin's 
patriotism to the majority of Russians still struggling to overcome the humiliation 
brought about by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
'People are thirsty for a strong leader, ' said Yuriy Levada, a sociologist at Moscow's 
National Public Opinion Research Institute, mainly because they are afraid of general 
disorder. 22 During his time in office, Putin has been popular with Russian society, 
having constant public approval ratings of 70-80 percent. This is especially striking 
when seen against the backdrop of criticism of the government. Trenin argues that 
Putin's 'high marks are not being given for concrete achievements', but rather for his 
'guarantee of overall political predictability'. 23 It is likely that if Russia's economy is in 
bad trouble, only then may Putin's political position be affected. His popularity, 
according to Trenin, does not really depend that much on his foreign policies, but more 
on the skill of implementing economic reforms and making people's lives better. 24 
Putin's very strong domestic position allowed him far greater flexibility to develop 
substantial relations with the West. 
What is the clue to Putin's popularity? First, among his appealing features is that he is 
seen as a president of stability: revolution is over. This is the direct result of Russia's 
economic growth over the past six years. Moreover, Western support for Putin has 
generated expectations among the public that, in the long run, Putin's decisions will 
advance Russia's international integration and economic development. Second, 
democratic changes under Yeltsin did not bring any substantial benefits for ordinary 
Russians. Meanwhile Putin is perceived by the public as fulfilling his duties in a 
'predictable and dignified way', which Yeltsin did not . 
25 That is why people prefer to 
have a reliable, albeit less democratic, president. Third, unlike his predecessor, Putin is 
not perceived by the nation as someone responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and this enables him to act very pragmatically in the post-Soviet space. 26 
However, Putin's strategy of building a strong and effective state focused primarily on 
eliminating checks and balances on presidential power, but not on strengthening the 
effectiveness of state institutions. Putin wrongly equated democracy with weakness and 
centralized authority with powerful rule. He has undermined every independent source 
of political power. First of all, the State Duma and the Federation Council have been 
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stripped of the influence they held previously. The Duma now largely acts as an 
extension of the executive branch. The Federation Council, composed of appointed 
senators, appears to be another rubber-stamp machine. The separation of powers in 
these conditions becomes more a slogan than a reality. The parliamentary and 
presidential elections of 2003-2004 were marked by excessive use of so-called 
sadministrative resources'. The direct Kremlin's intervention in the December 2003 
elections to the State Duma influenced the outcome of voting, which contributed to the 
elimination of oppositional political parties from the parliament. The final outcome was 
indeed the creation of a one-party state: wiping out the two small liberal parties 
('Yabloko' and the 'Union of Right Forces') and filling the Duma with 'grey Kremlin 
yes-men' (the dominant force being the pro-Kremlin party 'United Russia' ). 27 
Shevtsova argues that the December 2003 parliamentary elections were a watershed, 
symbolising the end of the Yeltsin era and the shaping of the new political regime. 
Politics and power started to acquire a new quality - 'elective autocracy gave a way to a 
bureaucratic-authoritarian regime 128 or 'managed democracy'. The latter could be 
defined as 'a system that combines authoritarian and democratic tendencies and guides 
them from above without any need to account for executive actions to anyone I. 29 
Second, Putin has used economic leverage to shut down critical media and to scare off 
potential political rivals. Building a media-based power vertical is over: the media, 
especially leading television channels, have come under strong government controls, 
and by mid-2004, almost all political TV programmes had been closed down. Third, 
there have also been cases of using judicial law enforcement organs to pursue political 
ends, including selective prosecution of oligarchs and media outlets critical to the 
government. Fourth, Putin has installed agents of Federal Security Service (FSB)30 and 
military officers in all the key nodes of the state bureaucracý. To quote Professor 
Stephen Blank, 'Russia remains a government of men, not laws'. 
A major reshuffle of the Cabinet just before the March 2004 presidential elections 
replaced the last holdouts from the Yeltsin 'family' with figures personally loyal to 
Putin, thereby ensuring his pre-eminence in all areas of day-to-day policy making. The 
presidential elections, in which Putin received more than 70 percent of the vote after all 
serious competitors gradually dropped out of the race, further consolidated his hold on 
the reins of power. But the culmination of Putin's centralisation of power happened in 
the wake of the Beslan tragedy. His proposed sweeping changes in Russian system of 
governance were justified by citing a 'state of war' against international terrorists bent 
on destroying Russia. Paradoxically, he placed stress not on new security measures but 
on a wide range of reforms of Russia's political system, which aimed, in his words, to 
strengthen the unity of the country in the face of the threat. In reality, this reform has 
had no relation to the fight against terrorism; it was merely a logical conclusion of the 
epower vertical', which Putin has pursued ever since taking office on 31 December 
1999. 
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3.2. Characteristics of the Putin regime 
3.2.1. Status ofdemocracy in Russia 
Many thought a decade ago that Russia had irreversibly crossed the boundary separating 
dictatorship from democracy. Yet now one can see discouraging evidence of an 
authoritarian revival that places Russia back in the grey zone between these two 
political regimes. Has Russia ever been a democracy? 
Identifying an erosion of democratic practices implies that some form of democracy 
existed in Russia in the first place. It is clear that Russia has never been a liberal 
democracy. Whatever Russia had under Yeltsin definitely was not democracy but was 
more pluralism and freedom; 'democracy means institutionalisation of freedom'. 
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Russians appear to have achieved, as Sir Rodric Braithwaite, the former UK 
ambassador to Russia, put it, a 'real taste of the most basic rudiment of democracy': 
free, albeit by no means fair, elections. 33 It is worth noting that the fori-nal institutions of 
the democratic regime appeared in Russia just before the collapse of the Soviet Union 
but the negative trends, which emerged in the mid-1990s, have accelerated during the 
Putin era. Russia underwent a transition from communist rule to some form of 
democratic rule in the 1990s. Democratisation did occur. Electoral democracy did 
emerge. On the other hand, elections have never been free and fair because the 
information system has been tightly controlled by the state and there has been a major 
interference in electoral process. In this sense, even elections can hardly be called 
democratic. 34 
According to Joseph Schumpeter, democracy is the 'institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions, in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle. 35 Elections are a necessary but insufficient condition 
for democracy. The key indicator of democracy is the principle of separation of powers. 
In the Yeltsin era, some signs of the separation of powers started to appear: the State 
Duma became relatively independent, a kind of political opposition to the president. 
During Putin's rule, every effort has been made to incorporate the parliament into a 
single pyramid of political power. It could be said that since 2000 the Duma has 
evolved 'from the body of power to the power body' -a supporter for the ruling elite in 
ideological and intellectual sense. 36 In fact, under Putin, the Duma has never had actual 
leverage on decision-making. Furthermore, while some formal institutions in Russia 
seem to be stable, their democratic content has eroded. Larry Diamond refers to this 
condition of many new electoral democracies (i. e. when states manage to meet the 
minimum criteria of electoral democracy but fail to consolidate the institutions of liberal 
democracy) as the 'twilight zone' without legitimisation and institutionalisation. 37 In 
Russia, this has mostly occurred within the Duma and the government, which, being 
weak from the very start, became even weaker during the late 1990s, and especially 
during the Putin era. As far as electoral democracy is concerned, the parliamentary and 
presidential election cycle in 2003-2004 was, to borrow Andrew Kuchin's phrase, 'a 
textbook case of a managed democratic spetsoperatsiya' (special operation). 38 
On top of these anti-democratic trends came Putin's post-Beslan reform, which violated 
three constitutional principles at once: the principle of federalism, the principle of 
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democracy and the principle of a rule-of-law state. 39 First, governors of federal regions 
are no longer elected; they are nominated by the president and endorsed by regional 
legislators. This violates the principle of federalism as an element of territorial 
democracy, calling into question the federal nature of the Russian Federation itself. 
Second, single mandate districts, which currently comprise half of the Duma, are going 
to be eliminated and all deputies elected on the basis of authorised party lists. Although 
justified as being aimed at strengthening political parties in Russia, this initiative, in 
fact, seeks to remove oppositional parties from the legislature and radically changes 
participatory governance. Both initiatives significantly undermine the principle of 
democracy, as they deprive citizens of their right to elect regional authorities and 
candidates in one-seat constituencies. Third, there is an obvious violation of the 
principle of the rule of law because these initiatives run counter to the spirit and letter of 
the Constitution. 
In addition to this, a part of the post-Beslan reform was'the establishment of the Public 
Chamber, in effect a shadow parliament composed entirely of Putin's appointees and 
empowered to propose constitutional changes . 
40 Indeed, albeit a consultative body, the 
Public Chamber represents a calculated move to diminish the role of Duma and 
strengthen the Kremlin's centralisation of power. In its current form the chamber 
represents a strange mix of NGOs and its functions are far from clear. 
Under the cover of the increased threat of terrorism, the profile of Russian special 
services and other power structures in exercising domestic politics and giving them full 
control of all the societal, political and economic processes has immensely increased. 
This is particularly visible in the economic sphere: Putin's entourage has direct power 
over the state's biggest monopolies, main oil and gas pipelines, military-industrial 
complex and other strategic objects. A matter of concern is the National Committee on 
the Fight with Terrorism established in February 2006 under the FSB lead. In terms of 
its structure and authority, the Committee pretty much resembles the system that existed 
in the USSR; it will be entitled to supervise and intervene into the activities of regional 
and local self-government institutions. 
All these developments and the closing down of independent media but demonstrate 
regression of Russia's democratic status. In the view of Oksana Antonenko, Director of 
the Russia and Eurasia program of the London-based International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, Russia could not, according to the way her society is structured, and the way 
her history has been developed, create a democratic system even within 10-20 years. 
This is simply because the Russian system 'has never, since Ivan the Terrible unified 
Russian lands, been democratic at its core'. No single Russian historic figure nourished 
any democratic traditions or democratic values. 41 Therefore whereas some pockets of 
civil society have tried to resist authoritarian creep, the vast majority of Russian society 
has demonstrated little interest in Putin's antidemocratic reforms. 42 In Antonenko's 
view, Russians are much more used to the fact that the state runs their affairs, and it will 
take a long time until the mentality of society changes and democracy really starts 
developing from the bottom up. 
However, polling in Russia shows very clearly that the majority of Russians support 
democracy per se. As Michael McFaul, Associate Professor of political science of 
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Stanford University, put it, it is a 'convenient myth for the Kremlin to pretend that they 
do not', only right now Russian people are not willing to fight for their democratic 
rights: they are too tired of revolution, they are so disappointed in how it ended in the 
1990S. 43 The factor of terrorist threat also plays a role here: people tend to sacrifice 
some civil rights and liberties in order to have more security and stability within the 
state. This explains the big public approval for a 'strong hand' policy in Russia. There is 
no doubt that popular revolutions in neighbouring states, particularly Ukraine, are 
having a profound impact on the Russian population but it remains unlikely that any 
6colour revolution' could take hold in Russia due to Putin's overall popularity, 
continuing economic growth and increased control by security and police forces over 
political movements across the country. 
Nearly all mature democracies are based on a strong opposition and a large and 
enfranchised middle class that has rights and stakes it will defend against other entities. 
In Russia both these features are under-developed. Political opposition remains weak 
and divided. The current Russian socio-economic structure does not provide a solid 
foundation for the growth of the middle class. Civil society remains weak and does not 
have multiple channels for representation of its interests. NGOs were the last sector of 
civil society still not fully controlled by the authorities. But the Kremlin would like to 
get NGOs under its thumb, too. Initially, the authorities apparently hoped, by applying 
financial pressure, to divide NGOs into good, pro-state ones and bad, more oppositional 
ones. 44 In November 2005 the Kremlin inspired law to recast legislation on foreign 
NGOs operating in Russia to place them under the same legal and financial restrictions 
as domestic NGOs. In other words, they would no longer be able to operate through 
branch offices but would have to register as a specific form of Russian legal entity, 
imposing requirements such as the need for Russian membership that many would 
struggle to meet. 45 In effect, it would mean a ban on many foreign NGOs. The proposed 
restrictions on NGOs have provoked so much concern domestically and internationally, 
and legal experts say the measures contravene international human rights treaties. The 
Kremlin is determined to maintain the political status and pre-empt 'colour revolutions' 
supported by outside assistance of foreign-funded NGOs, which spearheaded popular 
protests that overthrew governments in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. 
To sum up, what is the nature of the new system established under Putin? Is it 
democracy characterised by adjectives, such as 'managed', 'electoral' or 'special'? Or is 
the system simply that of a conniving authoritarian? Above all, in Russia the meaning of 
'democracy' depends on who defines it. Putin's advisers used to have a term for the 
transformation of democratic practices without altering formal democratic rules - 'managed democracy'. Recently the Kremlin administration has introduced new terms 
- 'special' democracy and 'sovereign' democracy, roughly translatable 'we will do it 
our way'. 46 When assessing Russian democracy and its prospects, the real question is: 
compared with what? Compared with Western democracies today, Russian democracy 
has a long way to go. Compared with its own past of Soviet Communism or tsarist 
absolutism, the current system is vastly more democratic, albeit it lags behind the 
progress made during the Yeltsin regime. 
So far Russia succeeded in building some kind of electoral democracy, but not the one 
in which the rule of law and freedom of expression were deeply established. The 
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absence of a normal pluralistic election process undermines the legitimacy of the state 
authorities. It is obvious that Russia is increasingly becoming an autocratic state. The 
tragedy in North Ossetia has become a kind of milestone dividing Putin's rule into 'pre- 
Beslan' and 'post-Beslan' periods. 47 Putin's post-Beslan reform showed his 
determination to destroy the last vestiges of freedom of the Yeltsin era; even elections - 
the only remaining democratic element of the regime is likely to disappear. 'Russia has 
gone from partly free to non-free', as McFaul put it. 48 According to many experts, 
Putin's Russia is seeing the emergence of modem authoritarianism, which is a sort of a 
hybrid, involving both authoritarianism from the old school and certain elements of 
democraCy. 49 
3.2.2. Regime's intrinsicfeatures and shortfalls 
Russia's domestic politics under Putin is being shaped largely by the components of a 
social and political trend, which, along with the country's best economic growth since 
early 1990s, is responsible for most of President Putin's popularity. This trend, well 
familiar from the histories of other great revolutions, is a 'post-revolutionary 
"stabilizatioW' attendant with a conservative or even reactionary retrenchment', and a 
drift to the core of the national political and cultural tradition. 50 The phenomenon 
consists of two occasionally overlapping but distinct components. The first part is 
formerly dominant pre-revolutionary political and economic elites that seek to stage a 
comeback, to regain their power and possessions. These include the secret police 
(KGB/FSB), law enforcement functionaries, and the federal bureaucracy, i. e. the groups 
that effectively owned Soviet Russia's politics and economy. The other part of the 
(stabilization', well established by many polls and the parliamentary and presidential 
elections in 2003-2004, is an intense and widespread longing for predictability, security, 
51 and continuity after a decade of political and economic revolutions. 
As in all previous post-revolutionary restorations, there is a shift in popular sentiment 
from a near total negation of and shame for the old regime, to the desire for a partial 
recovery of traditional policies, institutions, and symbols. Unlike the radical liberal 
intelligentsia, 'a plurality of Russians over forty years old is not ready to dismiss the 
entire Soviet past'. 52 While condemning the crimes of Stalinism and the repression and 
corruption of the Brezhnev era, they continue to take pride in the Soviet Union's role in 
defeating the Nazis, in its nuclear parity with the United States, and the pioneering 
achievements in space. It is to his remarkable 'fit' into what amounts to a new national 
consensus that Vladimir Putin owns a great deal of his extraordinary popularity. 
Instinctively, or by design (or, likely, both), he has come to embody and symbolize to 
millions of Russians a unifying synthesis, a still 'very precarious balance between the 
old and the new'. 53 Following this logic, in the remaining time of Putin's second 
presidency, Russia's foreign and security affairs should be determined largely by the 
interplay of three sometimes overlapping but distinct and occasionally clashing factors: 
the bureaucratic reactionary 'restoration', a new national consensus on 'stability', and 
the President's interpretation of and mediation between them. 
It should be noted that within his first term Putin succeeded in bringing the country out 
of the revolutionary cycle that was artificially maintained by Yeltsin and in stabilising 
Russian society. But this stabilisation occurred not as a result of strengthening the state 
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as the totality of political institutions, horizontal networking and the expanding political 
government, but rather through increasing the power and 'personalised character of the 
presidency'. 54 This means a replay of Soviet times. And this logic is inbuilt in 
Putinesque concepts such as 'dictatorship of law', 'power vertical' and 'managed 
democracy'. 
Having considerably undermined the parliament and the cabinet, which had enjoyed 
limited power under Yeltsin, Putin's regime relies instead on the federal bureaucracy 
with the support of the power structures - the army, the Ministry of Interior, the Office 
of the Prosecutor General, the security services or siloviki. This is a tremendous force, 
which decides who will win elections and who gets to keep their money. It determines 
the direction in which society is developing. 
The Kremlin team apparently believed that through building a pyramidal state they 
would revitalise Russia. What they actually achieved was the strengthening of the 
elements of the 'Russian System' 55 based on highly personalised power that had begun 
fading under Yeltsin. Moreover, the centralisation of power through the vertical chain of 
authority has led to the weakening of the still immature system of local self- 
government. Above all, despite abandoning the most conspicuous elements of Yeltsin's 
(elected monarchy', the nature of Putin's political regime has remained the same. It fits 
within the framework of the 'Russian System': a personal ruling style, the concentration 
of power in the hands of an unaccountable president, and a weak role of other 
institutions. 56 
All in all, the new assertiveness of the regime has not produced a more effective state, 
but a weak, corrupt and unaccountable regime: 'authoritarianism without authority', as 
Michael McFaul put it. 57 Such a regime could not be consolidated; that is why this 
'outward stability was deceptive, hiding underneath incompatible trends and permanent 
conflicts' . 
58 This forced the leader to constantly monitor the political scene, leaving him 
no time to think on a strategic level. These are the limits of power of the 'power 
vertical'. Therefore it is more accurate to say that there is a strong presidential power in 
Russia but there is not a strong 'power vertical'. 59 The state apparatus' inability to 
respond to the growing frequency and brutality of terrorist acts and even to learn lessons 
from its own mistakes has proved this. 
Over the last four years, Putin's advisers have explained the rollback of democratic 
practices as 'part of a trade - less freedom for more security'. 60 But Putin has not 
delivered on his part of this deal, as Russians now have less freedom but no more 
security. There is a big gap in Russia between intensions and plans and their 
implementation. The current elite is able neither to fight terrorism nor to implement 
reforms. The post-Beslan reform has further enhanced state control, which, in turn, 
increases breeding grounds for corruption, i. e. decreases the state's capacity. 
3.2.3. Ruling elite 
There are three competing Russian power groupings within the ruling elite. None of 
them makes a reliable base for Putin, therefore he has been trying to strike a balance 
between them. The first group, consisting of businessmen, is not homogeneous. Within 
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this group oligarchs currently dominate. Some of them are part of the official Russian 
Union of Entrepreneurs and Industrialists (e. g. the former oil tycoon Khodorkovsky), 
others have developed clan-like connections, largely it related with the Yeltsin-era 
'family' (e. g. a former Head of the Presidential Administration, Alexander Voloshin, 
and a former Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov). The second faction is the so-called St. 
Petersburg group (or economic liberals) - Putin's colleagues from his hometown6l, 
including a few powerful regional governors, as well as liberals put in charge of key 
economic posts. The third group comprises the chekisty - Putin's former colleagues 
from the FSB and other intelligence and security organs and the siloviki at large. This is 
a political grouping with its roots in the security services and related structures, led by 
officials in the presidential administration. Chekisty and siloviki tend to value ideology 
and loyalty over rights and liberties. They had been largely under-represented in 
Yeltsin's apparatus, and their influx into positions of political influence (key posts in 
the government, presidential representatives in the federal districts, governors), as well 
as in state-run companies, constitutes a major departure from Yeltsin's times. The 
siloviki, albeit not acting in close concert, generally favour a strong central state, 
crackdowns on oligarchs, more assertive policy in the CIS, and oppose foreign 
investment in strategic sectors such as oil and gas. 62 As a group, to quote sociologist 
Olga Kryshtanovskaya, the siloviki are 'the part of society that lost out the most from 
democratisation'63 . Since they were privileged in Soviet times and were above the law, 
they want to return to 'fairness', which in their eyes means a strong state that gives them 
these privileges. 
These three groupings were responsible for designing the political structure of Putin's 
first presidency with the system of checks and balances. But the conflict of interests 
between the three was never resolved, and after three years of endless behind-the-scenes 
fighting this conflict exploded into a very public political crisis that has ended with a 
resounding victory for the siloviki. The Yukos affair64 has been the turning point. By 
attacking Khodorkovsky, Putin has signalled that the siloviki are really in control. Their 
tough stance answers to the widespread, popular Russian call for 'order' after the 1990s 
'wild West' and the anger felt by millions of poor Russians against oligarchs. On the 
other hand, the role of the siloviki should not be exaggerated. They have not coalesced 
into a coherent group and consolidated their authority - at least so far. They lack a 
leader, have no agenda, and failed to seize the power during Putin's first term. 65 The 
biggest concern about the siloviki is that they are now as powerful and unaccountable as 
in Soviet days. 
Modernization of the state is the motto of Putin's second tenn. Putin was likely to come 
up with a new system of checks and balances. By appointing Mikhail Fradkov, 'a 
technocrat with no political power or ambition' as a Prime Minister, Putin has signalled 66 that he intends to exercise full control over the government. Upon curtailing influence 
of oligarchs and removing all of Yeltsin's 'family' from his circle (Voloshin and 
Kasyanov were the last two to fall), for Putin remained to maintain a delicate balance of 
power between economic liberals and conservative siloviki. It seemed that this balance 
would be stabilised through the allocation of domestic economic influence to the 
67 liberals, and foreign and security policy influence to the siloviki. However, the latest 
development trends show that it is the siloviki who are prevailing over the St Petersburg 
economic liberals in every aspect of the state's life. 
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3.3. Economic and social situation 
The main 'achievement' under Yeltsin was oligarchic capitalism, as it is referred to in 
Russia. Russian capitalism, comparable to the type of capitalism in Indonesia under 
Sukarno, was the worst in the world. Liberalisation of the economy, which started in 
1992 and was accompanied by hyperinflation and corruption, brought social security 
close to collapse. But it should be noted that many things in Russia, such as health 
service or education system, are not the products of reforms. The Soviet economy began 
to fall apart in the 1960s when it stopped delivering high-tech material to civilian 
economy. 68 
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia's GDP shrank by a figure greater than her 
economic losses during the Second World War. As of 2001, its share of the world's 
GDP was only 3 percent. 69 The gap between a small group of people, increasing their 
wealth by various business practices, and a huge number of 'ordinary' people was 
growing. The country was sliding into the Latin American development model. On the 
whole, Russian economy has fallen by 60 percent in the last 15 years. 70 Russia is now 
an exporter of raw materials rather than an industrial giant. 
Organised crime and corruption - the fifth power in Russia - manifest themselves 
through illegal markets coupled with a power vacuum - abdication of power by the 
state, and excessive bureaucratic power; all these features are netted together very 
tightl Y. 71 In the last decade, criminals have penetrated major branches of the economy, 
as well as the political establishment, entering politics at both regional and national 
levels, let alone crime and corruption in the armed forces, security forces and military- 
industrial complex. 72 There are about 10,000 organised crime groups that, having 
divided the country into various territories, take 'protection' money from state and 
private enterprises and from foreign businesses. 73 According to Transparency 
International, in 2004, Russia came 86th in the list of 133 most corrupt countries. 
Corruption is estimated at approximately 10-12 percent of GDP. 74 Due to the 
pervasiveness of corruption, punishment becomes a deficit commodity, applied on the 
basis of extra-legal criteria. A Yuri Levada 
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poll showed that 93 percent of the Russian 
public believe law enforcement is selective. Therefore reforrns in the public sector and 
administrative reform are vital to curb these processes, which are the main obstacle for 
economic transformation in Russia. 
An alarming aspect is in the area of living standards, high unemployment, declining 
health and shrinking life expectancy, often a key indicator of where countries are. Life 
expectancy has declined for men by more than eight years over the last ten - the largest 76 decline in life expectancy among a significant population in peacetime ever recorded . 
In his State of the Nation speech on 26 May 2004, Putin stated that about 30 million of 
Russia's 144 million people live below the poverty line. 77 Emigration policy as such 
was non-existent until recent years. All these things are directly related to the 
demographic situation in Russia, which can only be described as catastrophic. During 
the last years, the country's population has been shrinking by almost 1 million people 
per year. A decline of comparable rates was recorded only during the world wars, 
repression or the famine of the 1930s. According to official data, Russia's population 
stopped growing since 1992 and fell by 4 million within a decade, making 143 million 
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in 2006 . 
78 And this is despite the fact that migration from Russia has decreased during 
recent years. In short, one could talk about an alarming trend of depopulation in Russia: 
her population is shrinking about 2000 people a day. Increasing drug use, growing 
incidence of AIDS, tuberculosis and other diseases, as well as people trafficking and 
slavery, contribute to this figure. 79 Moreover, the population is aging, and more and 
more vast empty territories are appearing in Siberia, which are being increasingly 
occupied by the Chinese. If the same tendency continues, Russia will have only 102 
million inhabitants by 2050.80 
Demographic decline has strategic implications for the state. When taking population 
size as one of the determinants of state power, then the protection and sustainability of 
the population is a litmus test for the effectiveness of the state. Russia's demographic 
situation indicates that she will have to adjust her foreign and security policy ambitions 
of being a 'great power' and refocus on domestic policy and the attendant consequences 
of population implosion - not least health care reform, pensions, internal migration and 
the expected ethnic, religious and societal security dilemmas. 81 
On the whole, the ailing infrastructure, failing social system, catastrophic demographic 
situation, and such other problems, all contribute to what is a systemic crisis. Russia's 
economic power does not amount even to that of a middle-sized country. Meanwhile in 
contemporary world economic strength is the basis of influence of great powers. Since 
the start of his presidency Putin has put economic reform at the centre of his domestic 
agenda. By this he sought to strengthen Russia and establish her independence in 
foreign policy through economic growth and modernisation. 
The nature of economic reform in Russia demonstrated that the restructuring was 
implemented first of all in the interest of federal bureaucracy and raw materials sector. 
Putin also preferred not to provoke powerful interest groups that could have felt 
endangered by the proposed reform. At the same time, he was using the period of 
relatively prosperous economic growth to implement a move towards more government 
control over the profitable strategic sectors of Russia's economy - mostly energy and 
some other raw material exports, and defence. The economic breakthrough of 2001 so 
far has proved that the Kremlin supports the pattern of 'state capitalism with a strong 
role for the executive', albeit more a pragmatic one than in Yeltsin's oligarchic 
capitalism. 82 Moscow has feared that without more direct economic control it will lose 
the ability to influence economic developments to serve its geo-strategic goals. 
President Putin's concept of 'state capitalism' has grown directly from this line of 
thought. 
Russia is the leading country in the world in terms of her huge natural resources, 
including vast oil and gas reserves. With few structural reforms or investment in non- 
energy sectors of economy like technology or manufacturing, Russia is essentially a 
'petro-state'. The backbone of her integration into the world economy, as Peter Rutland 
precisely put it, is the pipe (truba). 83 Despite the gradual diversification of Russia's 
economy, the raw materials orientation created a lopsided economy heavily dependent 
on exports of oil and gas. Russia remains essentially a resource-exporting economy: 
energy accounted for roughly 50 percent of Russia's total export earnings and 
government revenues in 2003 . 
84 In 1999-2004, Russian oil made up 48 percent of global 
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oil supply. 85 Just a1 USD rise in the oil prices on the global market would mean 1.5 bn 
USD in the Russian state budget revenues, while a decline would produce a reverse 
effect. 86 
So far economic stability in Putin's Russia has come from three bases of support: the 
fuel and raw materials sector, the activity of major financial-industrial groups and 
modernisation 'from above' with the use of authoritarian methods. 87 Retaining these 
bases of support deprived the economy of positive impulses and threatened to keep it 
lagging behind the post-industrial nations. Modernisation 'from above' was an obstacle 
to private initiative and free enterprise. 
The proposed goal of doubling Russia's GDP by 2010 is unattainable unless efficient 
anti-corruption measures are implemented alongside reforms aimed at reinforcing 
human capital and strengthening institutional capacity. 88 Russia's good record of 
economic growth in recent years is largely related to the high world prices of oil and 
Russia's growing oil production. 89 As a result of economic growth, Russian foreign debt 
decreased from 140 percent of GDP in 1998 to 35 percent of GDP in 2003.90 Not 
surprisingly, the Yukos affair had a negative impact on the overall economic situation, 
which was reflected in increased capital flight. According to the estimate of the Central 
Bank, legal capital flight had more than tripled (to nearly USD 8 bn. ) over 2004, whilst 
illegal capital had increased 50 percent. 91 In 2005, in the aftermath of Yukos 
dismemberment, capital flight returned to the highs seen in the 1990s - and this at a 92 time of rapid growth and high oil prices. 
Major obstacles to Russia's economic recovery are fundamental structural barriers: the 
perennial lack of separation between political and economic, public and private spheres, 
resulting in the merger between business and power, and in corruption (more on 
Russia's economic reform see Appendix A). Putin attempts to reinforce the 'power 
vertical' in order to strengthen the economy but authoritarian measures are hardly 
compatible with liberal economic models. Prosperity and freedom tend to go together 
because democracies have strong guarantees for these things. Economically successful 
authoritarian states (e. g. China) have generally provided similar guarantees not through 
democracy, but through well-run legal systems, an efficient bureaucracy and clear 
legislation. Russia has a corrupt legal system and largely an incompetent bureaucracy. 
The Kremlin has introduced a 'dictatorship of law' rather than the 'rule of law', 
whereby legal measures are instrumental in promoting a particular political agenda. 
Putin's plan to break the economy's excessive dependence on natural resources depends 
on fixing these failings. 
Finally, there is a close link between the economic and political system of any country. 
Russia's economic growth so far went in parallel with democratic regression, 
manifesting itself primarily by weakening democratic institutions. And while a 'petro- 
economy' can certainly be combined with a semi-authoritarian political system, the 
development of a broadly based, modem and competitive economy hardly can. The key 
to economic reform lay therefore not only in overcoming economic obstacles but 
radically changing the nature of the political regime. Although during the first Putin's 
term both the economic structure and the political regime pushed Russia towards 
stabilisation, the structural transition remained incomplete and many former 
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mechanisms were preserved. To borrow Shevtsova's phrase, 'this "stabilisation of 
, 93 incompleteness" indeed resembled Yeltsin's "unstable stability. 
Putin's increasingly authoritarian rule has had its negative impact on the economic 
reform. A worrying trend is that Russia is moving towards a model of state-controlled 
'champion' companies in sectors that are growing or where Russia has a competitive 
advantage, with a state-directed policy for each sector. Russia is likely to have not 
exactly the traditional state capitalism, but state capitalism with huge corporate 
concentration, similarly to Mussolini's Italy of the 1920s. It will encourage foreign 
companies to take minority stakes to import technology and expertise. 94 What is more, 
the increasing fusion between the bureaucracy and the big business, Kremlin's 
destruction of Yukos through decidedly non-market methods, the role of state- 
controlled Gazprorn in this process, and the growing fusion of the siloviki with the 
management of Russia's energy companies is a trend to use such companies as state 
foreign policy instruments. 95 
3.4. State control of the energy sector 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Russia lost political-military influence in 
international affairs, her major leverage became energy resources. In today's modem 
industrial societies energy resources are seen increasingly as a source of political and 
economic power. For Russia, which ranks second in the world to Saudi Arabia in oil 
production and exports, enormous energy resources play a crucial role in ensuring her 
regional pre-eminence and consolidating her importance as a European and world 
power. Thus, it is not surprising that Russia has now shifted to using the energy sector 
and energy companies as a strategic foreign policy instrument. Against the backdrop of 
high crude oil prices, rising world demand and instability in the Middle East and other 
oil producing regions, Russia has become an increasingly important player on the world 
energy markets. The main goal and priority of the Putin administration's energy strategy 
until 2020 is to use Russia's substantial energy resources as a base for expanding 
Russian political power. The government's white paper on the subject of energy 
recognises that the country's geopolitical influence will depend on her strong position in 
world energy markets. 96 
There is a strong Russian effort to consolidate state control over the energy sector 
seeking to neutralise Western influence and to pursue the expansion of energy 
companies outside Russia, first of all in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Moscow 
regards energy as a natural monopoly to be kept under state control. To fulfil this 
ambition, as well as the desire to integrate the energy infrastructure with at least the 
FSU countries, Russia primarily works through three state monopolies: Gazprom, 
Transneft and Inter RAOJES Rossff (Unified Energy Systems). Gazprom, the word's 
largest natural gas producer, a joint stock company with foreign participation but under 
state control, has almost total control over natural gas transport within and out of Russia 
and controls most gas production. A state-owned oil company Transneft, holding a 
virtual monopoly over the pipeline network from Russia, is known to be extremely 
inefficient. 97 In 2004, the Russian government announced plans for a merger between 
Gazprom and another state-owned oil company Rosneft, creating one of the largest 
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energy companies in the world. Inter RAOJES, a vertically and horizontally integrated 
natural monopoly in Russia's electricity, dominates Russia's electricity sector and is 
also active within several FSU countries. 
State-owned monopolies (Gazprom, Rosneft, Transneft) and private firms loyal to the 
Kremlin (Lukoil, Surgutneftgaz) have been granted export advantages over firms 
resisting Kremlin goals (Yukos, Sibneft, TNK-BP). Moscow, through issuing (or 
withholding) licenses to extract resources, maintains direct control of oil and gas 
production - giving the Kremlin a powerful 'carrot and stick' to influence a company's 
behaviour. Moreover, state control of all Russian export pipelines (via Transneft and 
Gazprom) can be used to further punish or reward firms. State-controlled energy 
companies are also being put under the personal authority of representatives of the state 
appointed to the boards of directors in capacities of chairmen or members. Since these 
representatives are generally Putin's men and come from the presidential 
administration, it is obvious that not only state control but equally direct presidential 
control over these companies is being strengthened. It could be said that currently the 
Kremlin is already able to control directly all the biggest national natural monopolies 
and the basic oil and gas pipelines. 98 
Most Russian commercial companies often resent an exclusive role played by the 
monopolistic Gazprom and Rosneft, since they find that their ability to export is 
dependent on the pipeline operators willingness to move their product. 99 But there are 
no signs of offering commercial companies rights to develop private pipelines for the 
export of oil. The shortage of pipeline capacity creates major hold-ups for Russian 
exports. 
To further ensure continued state control, Moscow has introduced a number of means to 
limit foreign participation in the sectors of strategic importance, i. e. those which 'ensure 
the security of the state, objects of infrastructure, defence suppliers, natural monopolies, 
and development of resources of strategic importance'. 100 In 2005, the Russian Energy 
Ministry banned foreign companies that hold a controlling share, including the Russo- 
British joint venture YYVK-BP (in which BP holds 50 percent of the equity), from 
entering auctions on a number of Russia's largest oil fields of strategic importance. 101 
However, the Russian energy sector badly needs more foreign investment to begin 
exploration of new oil and gas deposits; otherwise Russia may face a major economic 
crisis as her current deposits starts to decline. Russian gas production is already falling, 
and Russian gas imports now depend on gas imports from Turkmenistan to fulfil her 
domestic and export commitments. 102 
Maintaining a sustained Russia's economic growth will require strong export growth, 
which means the export of natural resources and, in particular, hydrocarbons. In the 
recent years, Russian GDP growth has been primarily driven by oil, and in particular 
due to efficient performance of the major private oil companies, such as Yukos, Sibneft 
and TNK-BP. Another important trend: despite the rising oil prices, Russia has in recent 
years seen a decrease in total growth. In addition, labour productivity has decreased in 
gas industry and, to a lesser extent, in electricity production. Russian state-owned oil 
companies have done far less well to compare with the private ones. 103 Thus, the state- 
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controlled monopolies are not contributing to economic growth, which prompts for a 
substantial Russian energy sector reform. 
3.5. Bargaining with oligarchs: the Yukos affair 
When President Putin inherited power in Russia political and economic trends were 
eroding the country's international influence: poorly implemented privatisation, 
growing power of oligarchs, who seized large chunks of the state's economy in the 
1990s, and capital flight were pushing Russia to the word's economic periphery. Direct 
Kremlin's control over some of Russia's most lucrative economic sectors was 
threatened by oligarchs and foreign ownership, and Moscow realised that without more 
control over certain key sectors, its ability to use economic dependencies for political 
leverage would be frustrated. Basically most of the economic assets available in the 
country have been privatised among a handful of spectacularly wealthy tycoons, 
particularly the 'family', who had seemed to dominate Russian politics during the late 
1990s. During the Yeltsin era, the oligarchs constructed lobbying networks that reached 
into virtually every state institution, from the Kremlin, the Duma and the federal 
ministries down to regional and local bureaucracies. It was this penetration of state 
structures at all levels that enabled the oligarchs to thwart the adoption, or at least the 
implementation, of unwelcome policy initiatives and prompted many observers to speak 
of their privatisation of the state. 
Tackling the oligarchs was altogether a more difficult business. When taking office one 
of Putin's key declared goals was to break the power of the oligarchs, to eliminate them 
as a class and to hold all businessmen at an equal distance. 104 Putin's background as an 
outsider from St. Petersburg, plus his tough reputation as a former KGB officer, led 
many Russians to hope that the new president would follow such promises. However, 
Putin recognised that he had to proceed with caution. A frontal assault on the oligarchs 
as a group would have led to falling tax revenues and rising capital flight, putting at risk 
both the economic recovery that was getting under way and Putin's own consolidation 
of power. 105 
Putin realised that if he had confiscated all assets from oligarchs he would have gained a 
large portion of the economy illegally. Then his policy aimed at attracting foreign 
investment and integration with the West would be severely damaged. 106 Thus, he could 
not choose that option. The second option was to completely legitimise those deals and 
try to run Russian economy in a more open and transparent way. This would create 
conditions for foreign investment to come and gradually, over the time, water down the 
power of oligarchy groups. This scenario did not suit Putin either because it implied that 
the role of the state would be diminished: if there is a transparent and open economy, 
the state can no longer control the economic sphere to the same extent. 107 
Putin came up with the third option. He sought, in the interests of stability, to tame 
rather than exterminate oligarchs, redefining and institutionalising their relationship 
with the state. Putin decided not to expropriate their capital but to legitimise it by his de 
facto personal deal with them. Thus, after a very brief period of harsh rhetoric about 
'law and order' the Kremlin was forced to find a compromise with the oligarchs, 
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regional bosses and certain support groups. This was the kind of bargaining and 
4political barter' typical of the Yeltsin years. 108 This deal did not have any legal basis 
because it rested on the mutual promise that President Putin and the oligarchs gave to 
each other. The essence of this bargain was clear and fairly pragmatic exchange of 
political restraint for secure property rights. The Kremlin let the oligarchs enjoy a few 
freedoms to pursue their own economic agendas and continue to increase their 
businesses provided they did not meddle in politics. For some time, this appeared to 
form the basis for a mutually acceptable modus vivendi between the new president and 
big business. Oligarchs have learned that while monopolistic practices are still tolerated, 
political disloyalty is not. 
However, in 2003 the cease-fire was broken when Russia's biggest oil magnate, the 
chairman of the Russian oil giant Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, stepped over that 
infori-nal agreement. From Putin's perspective, it was very important to penalise him 
openly and show other oligarchs that this informal mechanism was very finn. 109 As 
Alexei Kudrin, the Finance Minister, put it, the Yukos affair was 'inevitable ... in the 
sense of a clarification of the rules of the game'. 110 Many of the charges involved 
(fraud, tax evasion and embezzlement) were probably true, but there was no doubt that 
Yukos was the victim of politically motivated and highly selective law enforcement. 
Initially, perhaps, the aim of the assault on Yukos was to discipline Khodorkovsky for 
his political ambitions or to destroy him as a political force, but as the campaign 
unfolded, it became clear that Khodorkovsky's destruction was a means to a larger end - 
the re-definition of the Kremlin's relationship with big business. 
In Antonenko's view, the Yukos affair has many dimensions. First of all, it has a 
political aspect: Khodorkovsky tried very openly to challenge the power authorities and 
Putin's agenda. Putin's overall domestic policy is oriented towards suppressing 
pluralism and having full control over the entire political spectrum: from left to right. 
Khodorkovsky was trying to challenge the system and this triggered crisis. "' Secondly, 
there is the obvious economic-strategic dimension: the takeover of the energy sector by 
the state. At the time Yukos tried to sell a lot of its shares to a foreign company so that 
for the first time Russia's control over strategic assets, that is energy, would be given to 
a foreign investor. ' 12 Logically, the Putin administration is not interested in losing 
energy leverage and allowing any foreign company to have control over the state's 
strategic assets. ' 13 Finally, the authority of Khodorkovsky, who demonstrated his 
political independence and had a potential to become Putin's political rival after 2008, 
was expected to grow significantly because of huge financial flows and additional 
instruments of influence. It should also be noted that nearly four years after Putin's rise 
to power, both policy-making in the economic sector and the most important state and 
private companies remained overwhelmingly in the hands of holdovers from the Yeltsin 
era. While siloviki had increasingly colonised large parts of the state their economic 
influence was very limited! 14 Obviously they were very much dissatisfied with the 
situation and Putin had to restore this equilibrium! 15 Thus, the attack against Yukos 
reflects not only the Kremlin's desire to defeat 'bad' oligarchs but, much more, was a 
key element in Putin's plan to give control of strategic assets to the hands of the siloviki, 
ensuring the long-term financial independence of his supporters. 
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Pavel Erochkine, a researcher at the House of Lords, said that the course of the conflict 
highlighted what has been going in Russia since the early 1990s'; it is an illustration of 
the weakness of the rule of law, dependence of the judiciary on the executive, prevailing 
attitude within society, and so on. 116 According to the polls of the mid of 2004,80 
percent of Russians would actually support the expropriation of property from 
oligarchs, as well as imprisonment of Khodorkovsky and other businessmen. 
' 17 Robert 
Amsterdam, the human rights lawyer, termed the Khodorkovsky's trial and the 
persecution of other Yukos executives and shareholders 'a grotesque assault upon 
human rights in Russia. ' He described the Russian authorities' handling of Yukos 
executives as a form of hostage-taking, and the government's seizure of Yukos' assets as 
state expropriation. ' 18 This highlights a root cause of Russia's political deformation, 
namely, the absence of any concept of inalienable property rights -a concept that lies at 
the heart of Western experience. The debate on property rights centres on the high 
profile case of Yukos but includes the rights of all business, from monopolies to small 
and medium enterprises (SME). Property rights in Russia remain insecure since 
privatisation. 
To sum up, the Yukos affair demonstrated the selectivity of law enforcement, possibly 
suggesting an agenda for dealing with the highly uneven concentration of ownership 
and undermining the oligarchs. It gave Putin an opportunity to revise substantially the 
terms of his relationship with big business. But the affair appeared to be a show-case 
rather than the beginning of the hunt against all oligarchs, who so feared of a large de- 
privatisation campaign. Putin made it clear that the state expected big business to share 
the burden of tackling Russia's social problems. ' 19 In other words, Putin's message for 
the oligarchs was that they could hold on their empires if they invest in helping the 
president deliver on his economic promises. Thus, far from being the state's master, 
Russian private capital was to be its servant. Rather than setting big business against 
him, Putin is trying to co-opt it. 
Putin's overall strategy is to keep big business in limbo. Now, the prevailing line is that 
there will be no special relationship with big business. It is argued that keeping the latter 
off-balance will achieve political obedience among the Russian business elite that Putin 
seeks to establish. 120 Illegitimate wealth combined with arbitrary power has left 
business in a problematic position throughout both Putin's terms. Whilst having to 
retain the favour of government in order to prosper, big businesses must avoid any 
active involvement in politics in order to avoid becoming subjects of selective 
punishment, It can be argued that selective justice, coupled with the current propensity 
to manipulate formal rules for political reasons, effectively counteracts the broader 
political project aimed at establishing the rule of law in the country. 
All in all, despite several attacks on the oligarchs, Putin has not managed to eliminate 
the oligarchic system, but new 'barter-based' rules were set. Nor did this kind of 
bargaining significantly contribute to the increase of the autonomy of the state - 
relations between the regime and big business remain very tight. 121 It has to be pointed 
out that oligarchs are not a coherent, unified group. Putin's technique of divide and rule 
continues to work effectively. The state is increasingly using its power to redistribute 
wealth, rather than to increase efficiency. Clan politics continues to thrive. Under Putin 
it is not that the game has changed, but some of the players: Yeltsin's oligarchs are 
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being replaced with new ones. The major new players under Putin are the siloviki - the 
key opposing clan to the 'family'. For about six years of his rule, Putin, rather than 
reducing the power of such clans as promised, was manoeuvring between them, 'unsure 
whether to side with economic liberals or the security forces', in a manner reminiscent 
of Yeltsin. 122 There is little doubt that, like under Yeltsin, politics is dominated by 
subterranean clashes between competing groups that unite state officials and big 
business. 
3.6. Chechnya: state integrity 
Chechnya, in Anatol Lieven's words, has become the 'tombstone of Russian power' 123 j 
for a time in late 1999 the war in Chechnya was the main issue that propelled Putin to 
power. In his Millennium Manifesto Putin insisted that Chechnya was 'where the future 
of Russia is being decided'. 124 It was the sole means found by his regime and used in his 
election campaign for consolidating society. An effective consolidation, Boris 
Kagarlitsky, a political scientist and the director of the Globalisation Institute in 
Moscow, argues, would have required two things: 'either a clear victory, or for the 
enemy to be at the gates'. 125 Neither was achieved. 
In the 2000 election campaign Putin declared that his historic mission is to resolve the 
situation in the North Caucasus. For Putin, the war in Chechnya was about preventing 
the disintegration of Russia and the associated horrors that it would entail. In standing 
for re-election in 2004, he again pledged to resolve the problem of the Chechen 
separatism and the growing security threat it poses to Russian society at large. Hence, 
the Chechen problem is inseparable from his presidency and from his state building 
project. 
The situation in Chechnya is entirely based on'Russia's imperial legacy. The 
relationship between Russia and Chechnya, a small autonomous republic within the 
Russia Federation in the Northern Caucasus near the oil-rich Caspian Sea, and with a 
population of about one million people, has been poisoned during nearly two centuries 
by mutual animosities and outright hatred. In the recent ten-year war, about 250,000 
people died, exactly a quarter of the population. Of those deaths, an estimated 42,000 
were children. 126 
The roots of this open-ended campaign lie in Russian misrule and readiness to 
countenance a war against Chechnya for domestic political reasons. Although the terror 
acts of 9/11 have, in some ways, permitted the Russians to present the Chechnya 
situation in a more favourable light, it remains a contentious issue both externally and 
internally. The Chechen conflict has become multi-dimensional and remains a very 
black mark on Russia's record domestically and internationally. The Russian campaign 
in Chechnya has been incompetent, brutal, and 'replete with what can only be described 
as war crimes'. 127 
Putin's war on Chechnya has been characterized from the outset by a far more relentless 
use of force than that of his predecessor, not only in terms of troops and ordnance but 
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also cruelty to civilians from an army bent on revenge, and increasingly composed of 
kontraktniki, professional soldiers often recruited from Russia's prisons. In accordance 
with the data of 2002, Russia has lost from over 4,000 (official Russian statistics) to 
14,500 (according to the Union of Soldiers' Mothers Committee'28) troops in Chechnya 
just in the second war, which is comparable to total Soviet losses in Afghanistan (1979- 
1989)129. Since 1999,35,000 of Chechen civilians are reported to be missing as the 
result of infamous cleansing (zachistki) conducted by the Russian federal troops in the 
region. 130 
It could be said that Putin's handling of Chechnya as an international issue has been 
skilful enough. He has been playing the Chechen card and using the conflict as it best 
suits his own political agenda for as long as it is necessary. Putin would like everybody 
to treat the war in Chechnya as part of the war on global terrorism. For Moscow all 
Chechen resistance groups are terrorists, and a military response is the only strategy 
available for addressing the conflict. Putin managed to neutralise much Western 
criticism of the disproportionate use of force by arguing that 'Chechnya was the front 
line of an attack by political Islam on Russia and Europe as a whole', and that by her 
military action Russia was in fact fighting Bor European security as much as for her 
own. 131 Moreover, he ruled out the OSCE mediating role that was played in the first 
Chechen war, allowing only its Assistance Group to resume humanitarian operations, 
and tried to assuage the European Council's concern over human rights violations. 132 
Finally, since 9/11, Russian propaganda has been focussing on making a direct link 
between the long-standing issue of Chechen resistance and the Al Qaeda network. 
Moscow has largely succeeded in intemationalising the Chechen problem for the 
purposes of legitimisation of its brutal 'counter-terrorist' operation. Participation in 
U. S. -led anti-terrorist coalition provided Russia with the 'impunity' and justification of 
carrying on her misguided and failed policy in the rebel province. In general, 
Washington's support on a number of issues should be interpreted as the Kremlin's 
success. The U. S. State Department blacklisted some Chechen groups as foreign 
terrorist organizations. 
The truth is that under the cover of the 'counter-terrorist' campaign the Russian 
government is trying to tackle an issue that is 'extremely complicated and related to 
terrorism only indirectly'. While there is a terrorist dimension, cooperation fighting 
against terrorism must respect human rights and acknowledge the importance of 
addressing its root causes. Meanwhile the continuing bloodshed in Chechnya is only a 
'fear of admitting political fiasco'. 133 Moreover, Putin faces foes who are mostly 
citizens of his country and who have turned to terrorism in a struggle rooted in 
nationalist aspirations and centuries of repression. In reality, it has not been a war on 
terror but largely an 'anti-guerTilla campaign. 134 
By October 2002, Puties army had won the war militarily in Chechnya, through tactics 
that included the destruction of entire villages and mass round-ups of people suspected 
of separatist sentiments. But the enemy took the war to a new battlefield; Russia still 
faces the prospect of endless guerrilla warfare. In 1999, Putin promised Russians a two- 
week war that would crush the separatist enemy. Instead, he has given them an 'endless 
struggle that haunts his presidency, a guerrilla conflict generating a wave of terrorism' 
that has killed about 450 people only during August-September of 2004.135 
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The war waged by Russia during the last decade arguably more stimulated the rise of 
both 'terrorists' and of 'freedom fighters' than eliminated them. ' 36 So what is the 
rationale of Russian military actions in Chechnya? Russia's lack of a coherent policy in 
Trans-Caucasus contributed to growing instability in the region. For long on Russian 
part there has been no will for political solution to the conflict. Russian authorities used 
to claim that Chechnya is a failed state, her political set up was so disintegrated that 
there was nobody to negotiate with 137 . Putin repeatedly rejected the option of re- 
engaging with the elected President Aslan Mashadov 138 , as being compromised 
by 
terrorism. After the hostage drama in Moscow's theatre in October 2002, Putin 
completely ruled out negotiations with Chechen guerrillas. To quote Sergey Ivanov, 
Russian Defence Minister, 'Russia has never negotiated and will never negotiate with 
terrorists and bandits'. 139 For the Russian leadership, all Chechen resistance groups are 
terrorists, and a military response is the only strategy available for addressing the 
conflict. Yet, in fact, Russian forces are fighting several groups with different political 
objectives. Nor Moscow has learned lessons after countless terrorist acts, including 
Beslan. Russia kept choosing the same option - force, but force cannot work. 
Putin had perfectly realised that at presidential elections in 2004 he would have faced 
hard questions, if he had not convinced the electorate that the situation was better than 
the one he inherited in 1999.140 The obvious truth was that there was no military 
solution. In the end it had to be political. Thus a negotiated settlement was in desperate 
need for Moscow itself. With Russian casualties rising - the official figure for 2002- 
2003 was 4,749, the highest in one year since 1999, and the monthly average for 2004 
was higher than 
14 
American losses in Iraq - Putin started to adopt a strategy of 
'chechenization'. 1 The idea was to enlist loyal Chechens to serve in a puppet 
administration and to transfer the burden of war on to the local authorities. This meant 
troop reductions - around 60,000 Russian soldiers (from 100,000-strong in 1999) then 
faced an active resistance estimated at a maximum of 5,000 - and the delegation of 
many combat operations to militias under the control of the Kremlin's puppet 
governments under Akhmad Kadyrov and Alu Alkhanov. 
However, the Kadyrov government did not generate the legitimacy and credibility it 
needed with the Chechen people to bring about a political solution. Although after 
Kadyrov's election a brief pause in the fight followed, Putin's promises to rebuild what 
had been destroyed in Chechnya never materialized. 142 Soon the separatists turned 
almost exclusively to terrorism to wage their war. The campaign escalated on 9 May 
2004, starting with a bomb in Grozny that killed Kadyrov and shattered Putin's 
'chechenization' policy. 
Alkhanov, a former Interior Minister, who replaced Kadyrov after his assassination, was 
little able to alter the character of the quisling regime. Under the command of 
Kadyrov's son Rarnzan, the so-called kadyrovtsy have become infamous for their 
brutality, and have tortured and killed their countrymen no less assiduously than 
Russian forces. 143 In an attempt to promote a political settlement, the Russian 
government has drafted an agreement on division of power between Moscow and the 
Chechen Republic, offering the latter broad access to economic benefits from oil 
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exploration in Chechnya, but anchoring Chechnya firmly within the Russian Federation 
without the prospect of 'legitimate' secession. 144 
For all the talk of 'normalization', the Russian leadership constantly reiterates that 
Russia is fighting not Chechen separatists but international terrorists, and this has finally 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. According to Andrey Piontkovsky, Director of the 
Centre of Strategic Research in Moscow, due to the methods used in waging war in 
Chechnya Russia has turned practically the whole Chechen population into enemies. 145 
The Kremlin's refusal to engage in a dialogue with anyone inside Chechnya except its 
handpicked puppets has pushed the Chechen separatists into a comer and, as in other 
cases in the history of terrorism, extreme violence was their response. While resistance 
has predominantly taken the form of guerrilla actions inside Chechnya against Russian 
troops and pro-Moscow Chechens, the current war has seen the increasing resort to 
violence outside Chechnya's borders - including the previously unused tactic of suicide 
bombings. The most severe manifestations were the Moscow theatre attack, the 
downing of two airliners and the school siege in Beslan. Moreover, violence has gone 
beyond the territory of Chechnya; reports of subversive attacks and bloody clashes used 
to come from all over the Northern Caucasus almost on a weekly basis. The 
assassination of the legitimate Chechen President and a moderate leader, Aslan 
Maskhadov, who announced a unilateral ceasefire, offering to enter into talks with 
Moscow in January 2005, could hardly bring peace to Chechnya or help maintaining 
control over the North Caucasus; just on the contrary, it can only radicalise the 
separatist movement. 
in summary, after six years of rule Putin's regime was incapable of solving the situation 
in North Caucasus. The Kremlin's policy of brute force, no negotiations with rebels, 
and resistance to any international mediation has collapsed. The devolutionary policy of 
Thechenisation', albeit giving some semblance of stability, is not likely to last long, as 
the root causes of the conflict have not been addressed. It is clear, however, that without 
some negotiating framework it is hard to imagine any lasting settlement, an end to 
fighting and eventual disarmament. 
The Kremlin's handling of Chechnya has contributed a great deal to the growing 
instability in the entire North Caucasus region and in Russia herself. In addition to the 
attacks on federal targets, suicide bombings of civilian targets have became a main 
element of rebel action. Analysts say that there no possibility of peace in Chechnya 
anytime soon - the activity of the Chechen extremists will continue to be directed 
primarily against both Russian targets inside and outside Chechnya and the local pro- 
Moscow administration. The situation in Chechnya will continue to pose the most acute 
threat to Russia's domestic security. Hence, Chechnya has provided the springboard for 
Putin's ascent to power, and has become the trap he cannot escape from. 
3.7. Regional politics: state capacity and integrity 
Russia is a multinational, multi-ethnic state with over 100 nationalities and a complex 
federal structure inherited from the Soviet period. 146 As a result of confusion of the 
constitutional and contractual principles, Russia's existing territorial division was 
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preserved almost unchanged for more than six decades. It has no counterparts elsewhere 
in the world: eighty-nine regions, with an average population of 1.9 million per 
region. 147 At the time of Peter the Great Russia had only eight provinces; during the rule 
of Catherine the Great - forty provinces; in 1917, there were fiftymsix provinces and 
regions on the territory of present-day Russia. But fragmentation is only half of the 
problem. According to their status, components of the Russian Federation are divided 
into six different groups - from ethnic republics to autonomous areas. All of them have 
different power and status. The differing economic potential of territories results in the 
gap of living standards, already reaching the difference not tens but hundreds of 
times. 148 
This led to the so-called asymmetric federalism in Russia, with rather contradictory 
implications. The growing disparities between the members of the federation were a 
pennanent source of inter-regional rivalry and political instability in the country, which 
made the federative model of government fragile and vulnerable. Paul Goble, a senior 
lecture at the EuroCollege of the Tartu University, argues that the Russian Federation is 
not a federation. In many ways, it seems even more imperial than was the Soviet Union: 
Moscow decided on both the borders and the status of all the groups within it in an even 
more radical manner than was the case with the former Soviet republics. 149 
For Putin's Russia, the central question remains to be answered: how stable is the 
Russian Federation? The shift of power from the centre to the regions was part of a 
broader disintegration of the Russian state. The Yeltsin presidency did little, if anything, 
to remedy this state of affairs. Instead an 'undisciplined pluralism' emerged in which 
regional elites were able to ignore the attempts of the centre to enforce law. 150 This Was 
the legacy that faced the new president in 2000. 
The rebuilding of the Russian state has been a central feature of Putin's leadership, and 
his reforms of centre-regional relations should be seen in this context. Upon taking 
power, one of Putin's major moves was to strengthen the administrative vertical by 
reducing the powers of eighty-nine regional heads and practically placing them under 
the authority of seven presidential envoys, each responsible for a federal district made 
up of about a dozen regions. 151 According to Putin's decree'52 , confirming the creation 
of seven federal districts to increase control of the 89 regionsloblasts, the presidential 
representatives were part of the presidential administration. Their main tasks were to 
ensure the establishment, in their federal districts, of the main direction of the domestic 
and foreign policy of the state, as defined by the president. In short, they would ensure 
the primacy of federal law over the laws of republics and regions. This aimed at the 
creation of a single legal space within the Russian Federation. The federal leadership 
felt that effective economic reform could only be implemented if such a legal space was 
created. 153 
Putin's second important step was the reform of the Federation Council 154 , along with 
passing the law allowing the president to impeach regional governors. By removing 
them from the Federation Council, Putin destroyed their legal immunity. It may be to 
Putin's advantage to have a lower profile and possibly more flexible Federation 
Council, but this change undermined the development of the Federal Assembly as an 
effective check on the executive. Keeping governors in line remains part of Putin's 
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current policy, most obviously in the increasingly blatant meddling of the Kremlin in 
regional elections and the growing use of law enforcement structures against regional 
and local officials. 155 Hence, both these moves sought to reduce the powers of regional 
leaders and give more order and consistency in centre-periphery relations. How 
successful were they? Was it a genuine effort to replace the menace of an influence- 
based system with a rules-based system? 
This federal reform was first of all aimed at re-centralisation and elimination of 
asymmetric federation. Putin planned to achieve it smoothly through the federal district 
level. The reform sought to meet the challenges of the country's economic development 
and provide economically sustainable plans, as well as to respond to the challenges of 
globalisation. The major outcome of the federal reform was supposed to be 
simultaneous management of various issues, such as military reform, economic 
development and territorial-administrative reform. 156 In addition, Putin chose, like 
Nikita Krushchev, who tried much the same thing half a century ago, to make federal 
districts coterminous, with the country's military districts rather than its economic zones. 
As a result, the reform has backfired, undercutting the possibility of social mobilisation 
on a democratic basis and of economic growth in any rational, non-defence related way. 
Some have argued that the presidential representatives have achieved relatively little, 
some claimed that the overall reform amounted to a revolution in Russian federalism. 
While presidential envoys can be flexible in policy making, they have to adhere to four 
requirements: subordinating security services to the federal level; coordinating foreign 
direct investment with the federal authorities; neutralizing soft security concerns (crime, 
corruption, and irregular military formations); and creating a joint system of military 
command. 157 There are certain positive elements in this regional reform. Putin's 
undoubted historical achievement is averting the centrifugal trends in the Russian 
Federation that threatened the country's integrity. Russia has grown stronger and more 
consolidated. The federal authorities have supported new cross-border agreements for 
investment, transport networks, and even military cooperation. But although the tenor of 
relations between Moscow and the governors improved, the d6tente, Treisman argues, 
owed less to central pressure and institution building than to 'backroom deal making of 
the Yeltsin variety'. 158 The governors' key priorities have been to stay in power and 
keep their personal wealth, and Putin has granted them this at the expense of local 
democracy. 
By and large, the negative aspects of the reform prevail over the positive ones. Despite 
the somewhat heavy-handed nature of Putin's solutions to the breakdown of central 
state authority in the periphery, it is not entirely clear that these have actually done a 
great deal to challenge the heart of regional resistance. While he may have temporarily 
quelled the regions, without further institutional reform, it is entirely possible that when 
the economy sours, one could see the re-emergence of overt regional resistance to the 
centre yet again. Although Putin has rid some of the 'symptoms of what ails the central 
state in the periphery', he has not cured the disease. 159 
A factor that should not be overlooked is growing non-Russian population areas within 
the Federation. It is noteworthy that in 1989 only six of the twenty-two non-Russian 
republics had non-Russian majorities. 160 In 2004, more than a dozen did, and by 2010, 
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Most Will. 161 In future, these non-Russian areas may present a far greater challenge than 
they do now - especially given their diasporas in major cities like Moscow, which 
already is the largest Muslim city in Europe. These non-Russian regions are 
increasingly likely to challenge the centre, if not militarily than in other ways including 
simply ignoring what Moscow wants. 
Putin's remedies were simply Soviet solutions to post-Soviet problems. As a result, 
their depth and durability is questionable. In establishing federal districts, Putin has 
simply created an extra level of bureaucracy in the country but this has not necessarily 
increased state capacity. 162 The new presidential prefects had poorly defined 
responsibilities, unclear powers and few resources and faced resistance from the federal 
ministries, whose regional employees they supposedly co-ordinate. 163 It was unclear, for 
example, to what extent they were supposed to oversee the actions of regional 
governments in general or merely federal bureaucrats in the regions. Consequently, 
there were tensions inherent between the devolution of authority and central control. 
The presidential envoys had increasingly interfered in the matters that should be left to 
the regions, elections being only the most prominent example. This has led to the 
situation that at regional and local levels the majority of players are rather weak: self- 
governance is hardly functioning or almost non-existent. This merely confirms that a 
desire to control and manage everything weakens capacity of the state. 
The events in Beslan brought a tremendous shift in Moscow's regional policy. Justified 
as part of the war on terrorism, President Putin's plan to abandon direct elections of 
regional governors to endorse instead regional leaders in local legislatures upon 
Kremlin's nomination, is a rollback from democratic procedures in reforming regional 
government bodies. While aimed at 'strengthening the state' and imposing federal 
authority over the regions (many of which are governed by thoroughly corrupt 
apparatchiks), it would also risk undermining the democratic legitimacy of local 
authorities and would appear to hardly do anything in strengthening Moscow's hand in 
combating the terrorist threat (its nominal motivation). 
In fact, the attempt to halt democracy and replace it with an administrative hierarchy 
only creates an illusion of manageability. There have been governors who at least 
understood that they had to solve their problems by themselves. But if to place an 
official in charge of a governor, he simply extends the responsibility to Mr. Putin. This 
means that the power vertical or the pyramid will be in permanent crisis. 164 Hence, if the 
president is building up a hierarchy of the bureaucracy and controls bureaucrats this 
does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats themselves will be able to control the 
situation. Beslan and the series of earlier terrorist attacks proved this. Nor will the 
appointment of governors solve corruption problems in the regions, it will only take 
them one step higher. The ftu-ther enhancement of state control would, in turn, increase 
the breeding ground for corruption, i. e. decrease state capacity. What is worse, such 
Putin's plan is but 'the end of federalism' and a return to the Soviet system of 
governance. What is being created is 'a unitary state - an authoritarian state', to a 
significant extent. 165 But Russia is too big, and in a great many areas such a diverse 
structure cannot be controlled by harsh, unitary, hierarchical methods. 
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To sum up, although the balance of power has shifted somewhat towards the centre, 'the 
foundations of Yeltsin's neo-feudal system remain. 166 The problem of developing a 
more harmonious centre-regional relationship is to do with three structural factors. The 
first is the very system of Russia's asymmetric federalism. The second is related to the 
fact that Russia has an extremely large number - eighty-nine elements within her 
federation. 167 The third is the coming challenge from the growing non-Russian areas 
within the Russian federation. This does not seem to change without structural- 
territorial reform in Russia. That said, the Russian Federation cannot survive for long 
under current conditions. It is not possible to exclude that the combination of continued 
economic and social decline, the likelihood of political fragmentation and the growing 
pressure from external players eventually may lead the Russian Federation to repeat the 
fate of the Soviet Union. 
3.8. 'Managed democracy': state capacity 
Putin's modernization agenda, called authoritarian modernization, is pursued by 
administrative, bureaucratic and non-democratic means. The Kremlin has regarded 
Beslan as a convenient pretext to eliminate the last vestiges of pluralism: the single- 
mandate seats in the Duma, the governors' elections, and the relatively independent 
print media. 
Medvedev argues that authoritarian modernization is a recurrent model in Russian 
history, from Peter the Great to Lenin and Stalin. It also has quite a few contemporary 
parallels, from Pinochet's Chile and Park Chung Hee's South Korea to Nazarbaev's 
Kazakhstan. Yegor Gaidar, an architect of Yeltsin's economic reforms, postulated that 
the pattern of the Yeltsin-Putin era - disorder and economic chaos followed by 
authoritarianism and widespread imperial nostalgia - matches Weimar Germany in 
1918-1933.168 
Some Russian observers have expressed optimistic belief that 'managed democracy' 
makes economic modernisation easier. However, structural deficiencies make this 
regime vulnerable from within. First of all, stability in Putin's Russia, based on previous 
rules of the game, will not give the authorities a guarantee against failure. Moreover, 
any leader who relies not on institutions but on cadres is doomed to be dependent on the 
clans surrounding him, and to become a hostage to the next echelon of favourites, 
oligarchs, and perhaps even a new 'family'. This is inevitably the end of any 
patrimonial rule, even if a leader himself appears to profess functionality and 
pragmatism. 169 
A great challenge to the regime is its attempts to organise and control many processes, 
including centralisation of the Russian Federation, limiting self-government, controlling 
the parliament and the media, establishing a manageable multi-party system, creating 
NGOs loyal to the Kremlin, and so on. But the attempts to achieve full manageability 
undermine the efficiency of power. From a purely functional point of view, it focuses 
all responsibility for policy failures on Putin and his government. Moreover, without an 
effective system of checks and balances the government is increasingly unable to 
prevent and handle political, socio-economic and security crises within Russia, which 
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are set to snowball in the next few years. Simply put, a highly bureaucratised pyramidal 
authority structure makes the state and the system of power unstable, as was 
demonstrated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
To make matters worse, the post-Beslan reform is likely to further enhance state control, 
which, in turn, would increase breeding grounds for corruption, i. e. decrease the state's 
capacity. The current political initiatives undertaken by President Putin will 'gradually 
bring decline of political power and de-legitimisation of the presidency', the only viable 
and active political institution in the country. 170 The endgame of Putin's state-building 
project is likely to be not a harsh, authoritarian and effective power but, in Shevtsova's 
words, 'a pathetic, weak, impotent omnipotence'. 171 One could see its presence in 
Beslan, where nobody, neither at the centre, nor local authorities, dared to take 
responsibility for the anti-terrorist operation. 
Another problem that Putin will inevitably face is the question the continuity of power. 
Current opposition parties are in no shape to challenge Putin's succession, and quite 
possibly his successor's succession will be decided within the Kremlin. One should bear 
in mind that the operation 'succession' concerns much more than one person, it has to 
do with the reproduction of the regime. The successor chosen by Mr. Putin is likely to 
offer the same combination of prickliness and occasional pragmatism. 
Finally, due to the lack of opposition other threats are arising: the loss of initiative and 
the danger of hidden sabotage by certain groups within the state. The latter is especially 
clear when the regime relies on the bureaucracy, police and security structures, which in 
Russia have long been reactionary forces. 172 The campaign to impose 'managed 
democracy' has serious negative consequences for the quality of democracy. The 
mechanism of elections in Russia is turning into a mechanism of imitation that conceals 
the absence of real choice. Becoming a hostage to populism and his own team, the 
leader is finding it increasingly difficult to abandon the imitative model of behaviour. 
Moreover, the process if imitation is spreading to all spheres, giving illusion to 'a 
semblance of order, a semblance of a multiparty system, a semblance of a parliament, 
and semblance of civil society', and blurring the line between reality and the virtual 
political world. 173 
With regard to the future perspectives of the regime, among several possible scenarios, 
designed by American analysts, two options are worth mentioning, as they best 
correspond to today's realities. The pessimistic scenario - 'stagnation conservatism' - 
involves establishing a kind of the regime that will focus on 'prolonging its own 
lifespan' and redistributing property among the new 'family' members, and will try to 
'guard' Russia from the outside world as much as possible. This scenario repeats the 
common speculations regarding the possibility of amending the Constitution to extend 
Putin's time in power. 174 Development of a Pinochet-style system cannot be totally 
excluded. Russia does not have a politicised army, but she does possess a powerful and 
politicised secret police, which Putin continually strengthens through the reform of 
security services and centralization. Secret services are already active in the economy, 
via firms founded and headed by FSB and GRU members. Another scenario is 'creative 
conservatism'. It is called conservatism because of its central idea: 'no further retreat' in 
geopolitics or economy. A gradual increase of nationalist forces' popularity in Russia is 
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perfectly in line with this scenario. As a result, Russia is likely to take more hard 
decisions towards her 'near abroad'. 175 This scenario is called creative because Putin is 
obviously keen on reforming Russia and has his own vision of improvement of Russia's 
life. The main objective is transforming the economy into a 'two-foundation' model: 
one foundation being the oil and gas sector, the other being high-tech industry. 176 Most 
possibly, these scenarios will be mixed. 
In Shevtsova's view, in Russia today there are no mechanisms for relapsing into pure 
authoritarianism or totalitarianism. The logic is simple - the centre does not have the 
means to establish such a regime, since there is no effective and monolithic bureaucracy 
loyal to the centre, nor an army that enjoys high status and is ready to support a 
dictatorial regime. The same applies to security services: in their current state they are 
hardly capable of assuming the role of repressive instrument. 177 However, it should not 
be ruled out that, in case of social and economic troubles, some groups could support a 
hardening of the regime. At the same time, in the age of globalisation it is difficult to 
imagine such isolation of the country. Thus, to all appearances, Russia will have, to 
quote Shevtsova, an 'imitating authoritarianism instead of imitating democracy, i. e. the 
regime of total irresponsibility. 178 And how is it possible to implant authoritarianism 
when 45 percent of population do not need the guardianship of the state any more? 179 
This means that Russian society is gradually becoming prepared to reject the 'Russian 
System' and all the modifications of the Yeltsin and Putin regimes, and live in a modem 
society. It is the ruling class that still cannot switch to a new reality. 
3.9. Conclusions 
Vladimir Putin made state building and modernisation the central priorities of his 
presidency. He wanted Russia to become an economically powerful country, freed from 
the corruption, clientelism, and dependency of the Yeltsin years, politically stable and 
internationally respected. To Putin, the state is just 'one big bureaucracy'. ' 80 He seemed 
to believe that once bureaucracy was well ordered the system would work better. 
This has not come true, as under his rule the three major components of state building - 
state capacity, integrity and autonomy - reflect a state building failure, not a success. In 
2000, Putin was elected largely on the 'security and order' platform. However, since 
2003, Russia has witnessed growing insecurity both on the level of individuals and the 
state as a whole A series of terrorist attacks in Russia exposed flawed policies in 
Chechnya and have rocked the sense of stability and security. Thus, two major issues 
that propelled Putin to the Kremlin - the restoration of order in the country and the 
resolution of the Chechen problem - remain among Russia's biggest challenges. 
With world oil prices at historic highs, Russia is experiencing a period of economic 
growth and budget surplus. But Russia is essentially a petro-economy. This means that 
the current rosy scenario only highlights Russia's key economic vulnerability - her 
overwhelming dependence on her energy sector to generate both government revenue 
and economic growth. Therefore Russia's new-found economic 'prosperity' is fragile 
and requires deep and difficult reforms to sustain. This answers the main question of 
this chapter whether Putin's regime has been successful in strengthening the state. 
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From a positive side, whilst there are different opinions among analysts as to the sum of 
Putin's achievements, there is an agreement that he is a personal carrier of many 
policies and initiatives, both at home and abroad. As to their effectiveness, the results 
are mixed. By and large, the chaos of the 1990s has passed. Russia has acquired more 
weight in international politics. The state has become more manageable, and there is 
much more solidarity in the elite. The biggest Russian achievement under Putin is that 
the indulgent and humiliating world leaders' attitude typical of Yeltsin's rule is gone. 
Given the mess that Putin inherited and taking into account the collapse of his country's 
fortunes over the preceding 10-15 years, he has presided over a remarkable 
transformation. The most remarkable change, however, is not in Putin's policy but in 
his popularity. For the first time in more than a decade, Russia has a leader supported by 
the overwhelming majority of citizens. Establishing for himself a great deal of authority 
for both Russians and the West, Putin is a man who re-established the authority of a 
president - this is a very important thing. 18 1 The sources of Putin's appeal are complex, 
but growth in living standards has surely played a part. This points to the second major 
difference compared with the Yeltsin era: although poverty and inequality remain high, 
the upward trend has changed perceptions of the government markedly. 182 
From a negative side, though Putin succeed in dragging the country out of the chaos, the 
state that has arisen as a result of his presidency is basically identical to the one Russia 
had under Yeltsin - it continues to bypass laws without any principles. The key features 
of Putinism are but an extension of Yeltsinism. What is worse, pluralism and freedom 
with some elements of democracy that started to appear under Yeltsin are disappearing 
from today's Russia. There has also been much continuity owing to the fact that the new 
leadership failed to overcome the resistance of some groups of the elites, especially the 
siloviki. Putin's foremost mission is defined by the nature of the regime, and there has 
been no single attempt on his part to break free of this dependence. The Russian system 
is such that reproduction of the regime is the regime's first priority. The regime will 
seek to guarantee self-perpetuation of power, i. e. the implementation of the project 
4succession'. 183 
Evidence is mounting that Russia is moving in the direction of more 'state capitalism' - 
a strong state consolidating control over income generating sectors. The Kremlin is 
acting to ensure its control of 'strategic assets' through forced mergers, tightened limits 
on foreign ownership and abuse of Russia's judicial and legal systems. Moscow has 
placed former security (FSB, SVR, KGB) officers in senior posts in many of Russia's 
strategic enterprises, and insures compliance from 'independent' businessmen 
(oligarchs) through heavy handed tactics like prosecution of Khodorkovsky or 
bureaucratic harassment by the power organs (the tax office, police, intelligence and 
prosecutors). But it is not likely that the oligarchyper se will be ruined or dismantled. 184 
Moscow officially welcomes foreign investment, which is needed for the modernisation 
of the economy, but closely and suspiciously monitors foreign business interests. 
Some positive results of regional reform notwithstanding, Russia remains a very 
fragmented country. Putin's policies undermine not only the development of an 
effective federal system but also democratisation. Democratisation, federalisation and 
popular elections are an unbreakable triad. Power is not about the extent of authority but 
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about how much of that authority can be effectively implemented. At present, neither 
the centre nor the regions can exercise their authority effectively. The federal districts, 
established to effectively translate the policy of the federal centre to the regional level 
and to control the implementation of federal policy, have not fulfilled their tasks. 
Ultimately, the political centre of gravity should be in the regions. 
Putin's choice was between continuing his role as stabiliser, thus preserving the status 
quo of 'elected monarchy', and becoming a transformer, reorganising the way Russia is 
ruled - restructuring the 'power vertical' and 'purging insidious bonds between power 
and business'. 185 The Russian leader has chosen the first option. Putin's Russia 
continues to hang in the balance between the past and the future, between prioritising 
individual and social liberty and the concept of a 'strong state'. Under Putin, the number 
of independent political actors tremendously decreased, the remaining became weaker, 
losing their capability to exercise influence on the process of decision-making. This 
leads to the situation when the state is gradually becoming the only political actor. 
That said, it seems that the apparent strengthening of the Russian state is largely an 
illusion: Putin has strengthened the Kremlin (or the presidency) but not the state. 
Although Putin has been able to stem the disintegration of the state, he has not been able 
to build a state strong enough to implement reforms, starting from prosecuting 
organised crime and stamping out corruption. Above all, Putin's regime of super- 
presidentialism revealed itself as not only authoritarian but also dysfunctional. It has 
been too rigid and centralized to handle the crises, which always occur. Thus, instead of 
consolidating the state, super-presidentialism made it only weaker, bringing unintended 
consequences. 
The Putin regime has had an impact both on the economic area and the foreign policy 
field. First of all, the pulse of economic reform is likely to rise and fall with the world 
price of oil. Russia today, to borrow Medvedev's phrase, is a 'petrocracy driven by 
authoritarianism'. ' 86 Secondly, this regime increases the fusion between the bureaucracy 
and the big business. The redistribution of economic and financial resources has already 
begun. The regime is restoring to some groups what was stolen from them in the past, 
first of all, to the state bureaucracy, particularly the siloviki. Third, Russia's pro- 
Western choice is doomed to be fragile, as it is undermined by the logic of the 
traditional state that is reconstituted by Putin. 
The course of development Russia is taking cannot be called a Western path, even not a 
Chinese path, as there is neither political subjectivity nor ruling elite to implement a 
Chinese model of governance. Russia's development more resembles Latin American 
path. Is this path feasible? Possibly, for a certain time. But it does not offer a solution to 
Russia's major problems: building an effective market, bridging the gap between Russia 
and the industrial nations, and integrating Russia into Western civilisation. The 
transition to a post-industrial society requires the greatest possible economic and 
political freedom. The choice for Russia between a 'petro-economy' and a modem, 
broadly based economy is a choice of integrating and cooperating with the rest of 
Europe and a choice concerning the appropriate political regime. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY UNDER PUTIN (2000-2006) 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the development of foreign and defence policy 
during Putin's presidency since he took office in 2000 up to 2006. As the subject of the 
thesis is Russia's European agenda, this assessment tends to confine itself by the 
European context. However, Russian-European relationship has a very strong U. S. 
dimension; the United States is deeply involved in many European-based issues. 
Therefore it is impossible to analyse the trends of Russia's foreign policy without taking 
into account her relations with the U. S. 
In identifying the key trends of Russian foreign and defence policy the author seeks to 
evaluate policy changes by measuring the key aspects of the Putin administration's 
performance against that of Yeltsin. This is done through a search for answers to more 
specific questions. What is the strategic direction of Russian foreign policy? How does 
it interact with the goals of the two Western power centres - the United States and the 
European Union? What are the objectives of Russia's policy in post-Soviet space? What 
- convergence or alienation - does evolve Russia's dialogue with the West (EU and 
U. S. )? With regard to the evolution of Russian defence policy the following aspects are 
important: the perception of threats, the changes in the Russian military doctrine and the 
nature of military reform. 
4.1. Russia's power cycle (the Knudsen model) 
Foreign policy resources available for any state may be defined as material (territorial- 
geographic, economic, military) and non-material (social-psychological, ideological and 
informational). ' With reference to the Knudsen model, a sum total of a state's resources 
devoted to her external activities reflects a state's power cycle - the degree of 
extroversion/introversion in her foreign PoliCY. 2 The description of Russia's foreign 
policy resources, provided for in Table 1, allows us to make two observations. First, 
Russia has been in introvert phase during the whole post-Cold War period of her 
evolution. Second, although currently Russia has comparatively good potential, she 
does not devote many resources towards the realisation of her foreign policy. 
As the former great power, Russia is going through one of the most difficult periods of 
her development. Russia possesses a vast territory, but her borders are not safe: she 
feels increasing pressure from the South (Muslim world), the East (China) and the West 
(NATO expansion). Whatever the international structure, the ability of a state to play an 
active role is linked to its military and economic capabilities. Military power is 
traditionally assumed to be a prime shaper of foreign policy because it is the most 
immediately employable asset for protecting the population, controlling territory and 
coercing others. Russia's military capabilities permit her to dominate only at regional 
level, i. e. in the CIS area at the best. But as the war in Chechnya shows, Russia is 
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unable to cope with problems even there. Nuclear weapons, albeit favoured in Russia's 
political-military establishment, are losing their relevance in the contemporary world. 
As far as Russia's economic capabilities are concerned, her economic power does not 
reach the level of a medium state. Meanwhile in the contemporary world economic 
standing is the basis for a great power to demonstrate its influence. Russia's non- 
material foreign policy resources are also not in the best shape; they are in the process 
of continued transformation. Being unable to accept the changed geopolitical situation 
after the collapse of the USSR, Russia still finds difficult to define her place in the 
world. So far she has been trying to accommodate herself to the existing environment 
rather than to establish her own policy line. Moscow has worked out neither a long-term 
strategy for Russian foreign polic Y nor, even more important, a long-term strategy for 
her social-economic development. 
Table 1. Resources of Russian foreign PoliCY4 
Type of Description of resources 
resources 
Material 
Territorial- 1) Current Russia's territory is far smaller than that of the USSR; 
geographic 2) Limited access to the Black, Mediterranean and Baltic Seas; 
3) Inability to consolidate her influence in the former Soviet 
countries. 
Demographic 1) Decrease of population - from 288,6 million (1990) to the 
current approx. 143 million; 
2) Decline of birth rate and aging of the population. 
Economic 1) Limited economic possibilities (Russia's GDP equals that of 
small states); 
2) Economic vulnerability (Russia is energy resource-exporting 
economy); 
3) Business oligarchs and other clans; 
4) Problems in military industry (R&D resumed only recently; 
decreasing number of clients). 
Military 1) Declining importance of nuclear weapons on the world stage; 
2) Current level of development of military forces do not allow 
Russia to dominate on European or Asian theatres; 
3) There are neither strong allies nor system of legal agreements 
e CIS). 
Non-material 
Social- 1) Eclectic world view 
PýychologiCal 
Ideological 1) Russia is not able to offer a new ideology on world perception 
and order; 
2) There is no coherent foreign policy: neither Western liberal nor 
Eurasianist ideas were taken up in Russia. 
Informational 1) Russia increasingly becomes object rather than subject of 
intensive flow of information; 
I 2)Lagging behind in the development of information technologies. 
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Although Russia's power cycle during the entire post-Soviet period is characterised as 
introvert phase, it may be divided into shorter periods. According to Gilpin, as shown in 
figure 1, great powers seem to go through cycles of power, proceedinp 'from internal 
growth to external expansion to overextension and subsequent decline'. ' A great power, 
due to its accumulated internal strength, reaches the most extrovert phase - external 
expansion. In this stage, not only are small states squeezed, tension is also likely to rise 
between a great power and its rivals. Later on, a great power overextends (as it 
happened with the Soviet Union), becomes unable to meet challengers and gradually 
starts weakening. This also is the beginning of introvert phase, where a great power is 
weak. 
Extrovert phase 
-I OVEREXTENSION 
I Itovert phase 
EXTERNAL 
EXPANSION 
DECLINE 
INTERNAL GROWTH 
Figure 1. Power cycles of a great powe? 
Russia's post-Cold War evolution may be divided into two periods: the Yeltsin period 
and the Putin period. In Yeltsin's time there was an obvious weakening of Russia: troop 
withdrawal from the former Warsaw Pact and the Baltic countries, first round of 
NATO's expansion, the 1998 financial meltdown, and the Kosovo crisis. Under Putin 
Russia's policy became much more rational and pragmatic. But it needs to be 
determined whether this still constitutes the weakening of Russia or the beginning of 
internal growth. On the one hand, the biggest of Putin's achievements is Russia's 
stabilisation: the halted disintegration of the state; curtailed activities and influence of 
oligarchs, improvement of investment conditions, some degree of liberalisation of 
economy, big public support, and non-confrontational foreign policy. These positive 
developments may lead to a conclusion that Russia's weakening was stopped. On the 
other hand, this could be only a temporary improvement: economic growth is largely 
related to the growing world prices of oil as opposed to structural reforms, and Putin's 
romance with the West has proved short-lived, let alone authoritarian modernisation 
within the state, which pushes Russia back towards pre-modernity. 
To sum up, both international environment and Russia's own (material and non- 
material) foreign policy resources limit the development of the country's foreign policy. 
The parameters of Russian foreign policy actions were set primarily by her weak 
economy and the poor state of her military. To a large extent, Russia's economic 
problems explain why her government could not have pursued expansive neo- 
imperialist projects even if it had wanted to. Under Vladimir Putin, Russian foreign 
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policy began to take better heed of limits of its domestic material and non-material 
resources. As a result, Russia became noticeably more pragmatic in foreign affairs. 
4.2. Foreign policy priorities 
4.2.1. Defining the place in the international system 
Under Yeltsin, Russia had neither the resources nor the ability to pursue a coherent 
foreign policy, which lurched between accommodation and confrontation, with Moscow 
'gripped by wrenching domestic reform and anti-Americanism'. 7 Russian foreign policy 
had grown assertive, fuelled in part by frustration over the gap between Russia's self- 
image as the world power and her greatly diminished capabilities. 
Putin took office when the state's weaknesses were distinctly exposed, culminating with 
the Kosovo crisis and Russia's isolation at the OSCE Istanbul summit in November 
1999. Russia lacked faith in her own powers, inner confidence in the correctness of her 
own positions, and readiness to make serious foreign policy decisions with long-term 
consequences for the future of the nation. Moreover, Russia's weight as a regional 
power has been challenged not just in Europe. Russia has seen her influence diminish 
among the CIS states, and could hardly claim to be a major actor in the affairs of other 
proximate regions. 8 The sentiment, prevailing among Russian military and political 
elites, not least among the Russian population, was anti-Western and anti-NATO. The 
consolidation and expansion of Western structures were perceived as 'seriously 
undermining Russia's ability to influence developments in the Euro-Atlantic region', as 
Russia remained outside them, most notably the European Union and NATO. 9 
Furthermore, the growing anti-Western rhetoric was apparently leading to a growing 
isolation of the state and reinforced the tendencies of self-isolation. 10 Vladimir Putin, 
basing on the experience of his predecessors, could have drawn the conclusion: it is 
senseless to embark on a conflicting policy towards the West. 
It fell to Putin, as president, to define Russia's place in the international system, which 
is undergoing transformation. The international system, based on the primacy of 
sovereign states and the central role of the United Nations in governing international 
relations, is weakening. The UN itself, as the central organisation of the contemporary 
world order, has been facing a crisis. For Russia, the UN crisis is a challenge, since her 
membership of the UN Security Council is a principal source of political influence. The 
United States remains the world's leader in terms of economic potential, human 
resource quality, innovation capabilities and military might, including the readiness to 
use it. Globalisation was also developing in its myriad forms, widening the gap between 
wealthy and poor countries. According to Sergey Karaganov, Chairman of the Council 
on Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP) in Moscow, there are now three major groups of 
states in the world: core states, transitional states (which include Russia) and peripheral 
states and territories. The latter include failed states (numbering several dozen) and 
failing states (their number is greater). Russia is a borderline state, in the south 
neighbouring a group of failing or failed states in the former USSR. " 
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How can Russia accommodate herself to the current international landscape? Putin's 
Russia should have a more realistic sense of her own weakness: she is a global power 
only due to her vastness, and in the narrow sense - due to her 'decaying stock of all-but- 
unusable nuclear warheads'. 12 In every other respect, she is at best a medium-sized 
power. When the country's economy is of the size of the Netherlands and its budget 
(USD 55-60bn) is equal to that of Finland, she simply cannot afford imperial PoliCY. 13 
Who are the Russians, and where does the country belong - with the West, with the 
East or somewhere in between ('the West and the rest')? Russia is a very controversial 
country, nevertheless, some logic may be traced. Given that she is more or less 
ethnically a Russian state, Russia is not a nation state in a purely European definition. 14 
In contrast to many Russian leaders, who have subordinated the country's domestic 
resources to her imperial ambitions, Putin's foreign policy is dictated by internal 
demands, an awareness of the systemic crisis (the August 1998 financial crisis was only 
one year prior to his taking office), and a sense of a competitive pressure of 
globalisation. His approach was based on the link between domestic and foreign policy: 
Putin needed to solicit support of the West for his domestic reformist project, creating a 
friendly and predictable environment and demonstrating that Russia is trustworthy 
player in the world affairs. 
According to Medvedev, there are four imperatives shaping Russia's foreign policy. 
First, the resource imperative: Russia lacks resources to fulfil her traditional global role, 
while her residual global levers, such as nuclear weapons and the seat in the Security 
Council of the UN are becoming increasingly inadequate. Second, the domestic 
imperative: the necessity of internal reform plays a major role in formulating foreign 
policy. Third, the economic imperative: Russia is gradually becoming integrated into 
global markets. Fourth, the institutional imperative: Russia is increasingly compelled to 
shape her forelip policy in terms of international institutions, such as NATO, the EU, 
and the WTO. 
4.2.2. Economic or geopolitical priorities? 
Since his accession to power, Putin has been widely described as a proponent of the 
primacy of economic priorities. This thesis, nevertheless, needs clarification. Here it is 
important to 'distinguish between means and ends, and between presentation and 
substance'. 16 The most significant strategic feature of foreign policy under Putin has 
been, as Lo put it, its 'securitization'. In this context it has three things. First, literally, it 
means the enhanced role of the security apparatus in foreign policy making - both at the 
individual level and institutionally - and the impact it has on Russia's conduct of 
international affairs. Second, it emphasises the primacy of political-military over 
economic priorities. The latter's growing importance notwithstanding, it is the former, 
which is at the heart of the agenda. Although geopolitical triad - 'balance of power', 
4zero sum', 'sphere of influence- and other notions are abandoned in Moscow's official 
lexicon, their spirit permeates much of the current Russian foreign policy. Third is the 
assertive, albeit often 'disguised by a modesty of presentation', approach of the Putin 
administration. It is reflected in the interplay between explicit security objectives and 
economic interests, where the pursuit of supposedly economic objectives become the 
instrument for projecting Russia's strategic influence and even her revival as a 'great 
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power'. 17 Above all, the issues dominating Putin's agenda were hard security issues: 
first, terrorism, domestic and international, and its implications for territorial integrity; 
second, American unilateralism in developing a national missile defence system, 
implementation of the pre-emptive doctrine, as well as their impact on Russia's security 
and the overall strategic stability; third, Moscow's policy in the 'near abroad. 
At first glance, the existence of the parallel tendencies - the geopolitical and the geo- 
economic - might seem to signal normalisation of Russian foreign policy. Indeed, there 
has emerged, compared with the Yeltsin era, a more balanced foreign policy, but not in 
the conventional Western sense. The paradox is that this parallelism, rather than 
intensifying the process of economisation, in reality resulted in 'securitization' or 
(geopolitisation' of economic priorities. 18 There has been a pronounced shift towards 
economic priorities at home and abroad, driven by several reasons: the belief that Russia 
cannot be a great power without a strong economic base; the profit motive; the utility of 
economic means to achieve political and security goals, such as the projection of geo- 
economic power (through energy pipelines) and exercising influence in the FSU. 
That said, for Putin the prominence of economic factors does not mean that Russia must 
reconcile herself to modest international status - to become a merely 'normal' nation 
state. Although he seems to understand that currently the country's economic status and 
well-being 19 
of the Russian population are more important than its 'greatness 
syndrome' ,2 his hope in the long run is to see Russia being 'reincarnated as a 
superpower'. 0 To this end Russia is determined to use all available resources to become 
more economically competitive, precisely in order to be able to play her inherent great 
power role. Putin believes that Russia deserves grandeur: a long-term perspective is 
worth short-term sacrifices. 21 
In this sense Putin showed himself as a pragmatic modem realist, preparing a major 
conceptual change step by step. Unlike his predecessors, Putin is not satisfied only with 
managing Russia's decline. The fundamental goals of his foreign policy are to rebuild 
Russian economy and ensure Eurasian stability. He knows that the measure of 21" 
century's influence will be economic growth, therefore his strategic goal is to get Russia 
into the world's premier trading club - the WTO. He also realises that Russia needs 
good relations with the West to receive support in achieving this goal and to stand even 
a chance of gaining the investment and know-how necessary to catch up. This explains 
his efforts in expanding Russia's ties with Western Europe and the United States, but in 
any case not abandoning his long-term aim of undermining Western solidarity. For 
Putin and many in the Russian political elite, the stronger Russia is in Europe, the more 
diluted is the presence of the United States. Put another way, Moscow's objective is not 
a strong Europe per se but one which is able to counterbalance unilateral tendencies in 
Washington's decision making. 22 
Furthermore, in contrast to Yeltsin, the Putin administration has been successful in 
supplementing rhetoric with concrete policy action: be it American withdrawal from the 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) treaty, NATO enlargement eastwards, U. S. bases in 
Central Asia, and others. Certainly, Putin's most important foreign policy tactics has 
been to show Russia as a normal power with which, to borrow the phrase of the former 
23 British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, 'one can do business'. In other words, 
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Russia seeks to be a part of the solution rather than a part of the problem. Putin has a 
clear policy towards external relations - to avoid confrontation with the West, to make 
Russia immune from criticism and pressure from the West and to sell Putin's Russia to 
the West (without applying Western standards). 
As under Yeltsin, Russia's foreign policy has become an extension of domestic 
imperatives, but in a different way. By stressing the internal problems as an origin of the 
country's weakness and not putting the blame on the West but on Russia herself, Putin 
has contributed to a better understanding of Russia as a major regional power, and, in a 
sense, has abandoned the concept of Russia as a 'great power" pursuing global interests. 
All in all, Russian foreip policy, to quote Lo, 'reflects Putin's personal style, 
background and instincts'. 2 
Putin's overriding foreign policy objectives seems to be building a stable international 
framework for a pragmatic Russian foreign policy: 'to provide maximum guarantees for 
trade and economic activity through the network of international institutions and 
agreements'. 25 His policy is not pro-Western but pro-Russian and is driven by 
genlightened self-interest': he needs the West for Russia to succeed in a globalising 
26 world. It is not that under Putin a policy of 'national interest' based on 'pragmatism' 
has become more easily identifiable, but that the Kremlin pretends that this is really the 
case. In fact, Putin just modifies Primakov's multi-polar world strategy. The emphasis 
of Putin's political line points not towards the direct blocking of U. S. power but rather 
toward the diplomatic game in the concert of great powers, where Putin himself appears 
as a good player. 
It should be noted that for the first time in the Russian history, Russia's national interest 
is not directly linked to 'sheer power and territorial control' but rather to domestic 
reform. Some political scientists argue that Putin is trying to reverse the traditional 
paradigm (realist thinking) of Soviet/Russian foreign policy. The traditional paradigm is 
that control of national territory is the overriding strategic objective, and alliances, 
treaties and norms are tactical objectives. In their view, Putin is reformulating national 
interest from 'spatial to functional definition 27 , what the French analyst Paul Virilio defined as 'deterritorialisation'. 28 Medvedev claims that Putin sees territory as a tactical 
resource, and alliance with the West as a strategic goal . 
29 The thesis will show there is 
no such paradigm shift; the Putin regime in executing its external policy was not able to 
step across the boundaries of neo-realism. 
4.3. Multi-polarity and Eurasianism 
4.3.1. Schools ofthought ofRussian foreign policy 
Since the Soviet period, the three major schools of thought relating to external relations 
can be identified in Russia: AtIanticism (liberal Westernism), Eurasianism (pragmatic 
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nationalism) and neo-Eurasianism (fundamental nationalism). In order to identify the 
nature of Russian foreign policy, it is crucial to look at the domestic debate and ideas 
that form the line of foreign policy in today's Russia. 
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The postulates of Atlanticism were dominant in the Russian foreign policy thinking in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Gorbachev's doctrine of 'new political thinking' and the 
Kozyrev doctrine (see 2.4.2) are typical examples of this mindset. Its basic principle is: 
the Western model of liberal democracy and market economy, if adopted rapidly and 
decisively, should generate Russia's economic revival and attract foreign investments. 
Eurasianism has become very popular during the period of Russian society's painful 
transformation and search for its own identity since the early 1990s. After the 
disintegration of the USSR, the search for a new proper geopolitical paradigm of 
Russia's foreign policy became an essential element of most policy publications. The 
contemporary Eurasian vision - overestimation of Eurasia as an essential player in 
world politics - is based on geographical determination and political-economic mission 
of Russia to keep the balance between the West and the East. I 
Neo-Eurasianism combines ideas developed by Russian classical geopolitical authors 
with elements of traditional Western geopolitics. Contemporary neo-Eurasianists have 
significantly modified the model of the first half of the 20'h century, which artificially 
reducesed the world political process to a clash between adherents of Atlanticism and 
Continentalism. The current neo-Eurasianist model is in essence critical geopolitics. 
Albeit having strong anti-American perceptions, it allows a strategic compromise with 
Europe and other non-Slavic states, provided these states are anti-American. Critical 
geopolitics is based on the importance of political space, natural resources, military 
power and direct control of territory. It is possible to defend national interests by 
building military and political blocks. As the result, the trans-Eurasian geopolitical 
system is to be shaped either as a quadrangle, taking in the Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo- 
Tehran axis (A. Dugin's version) or as the Berlin-Moscow-Beijing -Tehran - Delhi axis 
(L. Ivashov's version). 32 
Although Russian foreign policy stays firmly in President Putin's hands the fact that 
elements of all traditional Russian schools of thought appear in his policies suggests that 
he does respond to domestic influences. Table 2 demonstrates that Putin's current 
foreign policy has elements of each of the three schools, though less from neo- 
Eurasianism. The rise and fall of each foreign policy orientation would be an interesting 
study on its own. Each of them has had its success and its failures. In Putin's foreign 
policy rhetoric Russian identity is linked strongly to European identity but it also 
acknowledged the importance of ethnic Russians and Russia's role of ensuring their 
minority rights (especially in the Baltic States). In his speeches targeted towards the 
whole nation Putin stresses historical aspects, which were absent in Yeltsin's time. 33 
As far as the break up of the Soviet Union is concerned, Putin does not much address 
this question but he does acknowledge that there was also something positive about 
Soviet society. His famous quote that the break up of the Soviet Union is the 'biggest 
geopolitical disaster 34 for Russia perfectly confirms this line of thinking. In fact, it 
poses two questions: does Putin want the Soviet Union to come back or does it mean 
that Russia is badly shaken by the collapse of the USSR and needs more time to 
resettle? 
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It is quite clear that in Putin's foreign policy the worldview and self-perception comes 
from Eurasianist school of thought. The balance of power is articulated in the Foreign 
Policy Concept (signed by Putin in 2000) by the notion of multi-polarity. 35 Regarding a 
foreign policy mission, it has been argued inside the Russian elite that Russia should act 
as an intermediary between Europe and Asia. 36 There have also been suggestions that 
the West should use Russia as mediator: Russia has diplomatic skills and good 
connections with states that do not even talk to Western countries. Today it is quite 
obvious that Russia is seeking to gain her influence in part through the role of a 
mediator. 
Putin's foreign policy line has laid strong stress on the Western orientation but 
following the cooling of Russia's relations with the West there has been more talk about 
Russia's 'own path'. Threat perceptions in Russia are also following the same trend but 
are leaning more towards neo-Eurasianist line with its anti-Western tendencies. Putin's 
official line does not seem to support these extreme views but sometimes still employs 
this type of rhetoric to shake the West. 
There appears to be a certain amount of rivalry between different factions in the 
presidential administration, one putting emphasis on the Western orientation, the other - 
on the FSU. 37 But there is also no compelling reason to suppose that these directions are 
in contradiction with each other. Russia wants to pursue closer relations and integration 
with the West and simultaneously to maintain a sphere of influence in the 'near abroad'. 
Table 2. Schools of thought of Russian foreign policy8 
Categories of ideas Atlanticism Eurasianism Neo-Eurasianism 
andforeign 
policies 
Identity (who are Civic: Russians Linguistic: Russian Union: ethnic 
the Russians? ) and Europeans speakers in the Russians or Slavs in 
FSU the FSU 
History No use Important Crucial 
Collapse of the Positive Negative Negative/ blame the 
USSR West 
Russia's borders Russian Federation Russia (and parts Russia including parts 
(size) of the FSU) of the FSU/RF 
Worldview Peaceful, Balance of power Hostile, surrounded 
non-antagonistic by enemies 
Geography West Eurasia Eurasia 
Self-perception Normal power Great power with Great power usually 
own interests with empire 
Mission (Russian No mission Unique geopolitical Historical divine 
idea) mission mission, civilisational 
I bridge 
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Categories of ideas AtIanticism Eurasianism Neo-Eurasianism 
andforeign policies 
Foreign policy West Own path Expansionism or 
direction isolationism 
Threats Communism Any which West/pan Ti ic 
threatens interests 
in the FSU 
(Russian diaspora, 
NATO expansion) 
Policy proposals Support of Protect Russian Future re- 
towards the FSU sovereignty, non- interests/support incorporation of 
interference rights for Russians certain FSU 
I in the 'near abroad' I areas/isolationism 
Irina Isakova, an Associate Fellow at RUSI and Specialist Adviser on Russia and the 
FSU to the House of Commons Defence Committee, argues that Putin's foreign policy 
model is marked as a revision of traditional Eurasianism. The traditional interpretation 
of Eurasianism sees Russia as the 'ultimate world-island state', apart from and hostile 
to the maritime Euro-Atlantic world. Meanwhile the current vision of the Putin 
administration of the 2lt century mission for Russia is based on a contrary assumption 
of critical geopolitics. It states that the unique geo-strategic place of the state provides 
conditions for its economic revival, opportunities for engaging in the regional 
institutions and security arrangements and, eventually, for the increase of the geo- 
economic influence of the state as a world player. 39 This school of thought argues that 
perception of relations between states matters more than actual territory. Thus, in the 21" 
century more than ever before Eurasianism becomes a version of the engagement 
strategy for Russia. Despite the fact that it has many similarities to traditional neo- 
Eurasianism, this model has one significant difference: their supporters do not have any 
political preferences towards potential allies; everything is determined by specific 
conditions and circumstances. 
4.3.2. Relevance ofmulti-polarity 
A theme, prevailing in Russian political discourse, is criticism of 'uni-polarity', which 
became particularly insistent after the Kosovo crisis. Since other Western countries 
tended to follow the American lead, Russians became extremely bitter about uni- 
polarity, which, they believed, 'the United States wished to impose upon the 
international system' . 
40 In Russia's Foreign Policy Concept of 2000, uni-polarity was 
defined as a world structured around 'the economic and power domination of the United 
States'. This contrasted to the multi-polar system that Russia seeks to achieve, which 
reflects 'the diversity of the modem world with its great variety of interests. 41 
Karaganov is of the opinion that first of all it would be advisable for Russia to follow 
more moderate policy, focussing on strengthening the economy, rebuilding the state, 
establishing favourable economic relations with the leading Western countries, and only 
then try to challenge the West. 42 Arguing largely against multi-polarity, he emphasised 
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that Russia's National Security Concept (see 2.3: National Security Concept and 
Military Doctrine) had not properly taken into account globalisation and geo-economy 
of the 21" century. What is more, multi-polarity requires Russia to pursue a great power 
policy that is beyond the country's economic resources. Such a political course may 
lead to confrontation with the West, first of all, with the United States, which would be 
counter-productive for Russia. Finally, he points out that Russia is the weakening pole, 
therefore by legitimising this fact even conceptually she only marginalizes herself. 4 
As an alternative to multi-polarity, Karaganov proposed a concept of 'selective 
engagement' or concept of 'concentration' that requires considerable revision of 
Russia's strategic priorities. 44 In his view, the first priority is economic growth, and the 
prerequisite for this is the integration into the world economy. Russia also should 
abandon her aspiration of being a great power, and her foreign policy should avoid 
confrontations, especially with countries which are important for Russia's economic 
development. 45 One of the key objectives of Russian foreign policy is to attract foreign 
investment, which, in turn, requires large-scale internal reform. By and large, 
Karaganov's ideas reflect a much more realistic view of Russia's place and the 
possibilities in the international system. This mindset, to a certain extent, is incorporated 
in Russia's Foreign Policy Concept. 
The Concept focuses above all on an economically driven set of priorities: to seek 
membership of the WTO, to take part in regional economic cooperation and the 
development of a dialogue with EU countries, and to attract foreign investment and 
Western technology. It considers a 'fundamental task' of foreign policy to be the 
'creation of favourable external conditions for the progressive development of 
Russia'. 46 Nevertheless, illustrating the impact of the Kosovo crisis, the Concept 
accentuates such themes as adverse consequences of U. S. uni-polar domination at the 
expense of multilateral structures and mechanisms, in particular the UN, and the 
corresponding importance of multi-polarity and collective security. On the whole, the 
Concept advocates a consistent and predictable foreign policy, based on 'mutually 
advantageous pragmatism' and a reasonable balance between objectives and the 
possibilities of achieving them. 47 
That said, is multi-polarity still relevant for Russia, taking into account the 
contemporary setting of the world, especially given other powerful factors at work, such 
as globalisation? If that is the case, is it a sign of how things stand, or a goal that Russia 
might seek to attain? Lo argues that Moscow seeks the formation of a world order based 
on 'cooperative multi-polarity' . 
48 This would resemble the 19th century 'Concert' of 
great powers whereby a few key players - the United States, Western Europe, China, 
Russia - would manage international affairs through institutions such as the UN 
Security Council and the Group of Eight (G8), as well as through bilateral 'strategic 
partnerships'. Judging from practical policy outcomes, one could hardly overlook the 
fact that Putin, albeit avoiding the rhetoric of multi-polarity, in many respects has 
pursued a far more diversified and multi-polar approach than his predecessor. Very 
illuminating in this respect are his reciprocal high-level visits and meetings, covering all 
the major centres of regional and global power: the U. S. and Western Europe, China, 
Japan, India, Iran. Moscow's whole approach has been about having as many options as 
possible. Putin managed to reject the notion that Moscow needs to choose between the 
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East and West, stating that 'a power with geopolitical position like Russia has national 
interests everywhere'. 49 Such supposedly 'globalist' view served Putin perfectly in 
conveying the message of 'normality and reasonableness'- what the West expects from 
Russia. 50 This tactic of Putin is in sharp contrast to that of Yeltsin, who was inclined to 
simulate the idea of Russia as a 'great power' as a reward for her no longer being one. 
On the whole, the Putin administration succeeded in pursuing a policy course similar to 
that of Yeltsin but in non-confrontational way: by minimising critical references to the 
West and referring to the processes of 'globalisation' or a 'multi-vector' approach rather 
than to 'multi-polarity'. According to Shevtsova, this notion means a few things: first, a 
retreat from integrating Russia into the Western community in the near term; second, 
further correlation of ambitions with limited resources; third, an unwillingness to have 
confrontations with the West; and fourth, an attempt to assure Russia a dominant role in 
the former Soviet space but by more flexible methods than under Yeltsin .51 All this 
shows nothing else but little altered Russia's self-perceptions and ambitions towards 
multi-polarity-, Moscow has only refined its tactics without revising its strategic thinking 
and objectives. 
President Putin's 'major diplomatic swing' through Central Asia in June 2004 was not 
only in line with the 'multi-vector' approach but it is also reveals a great deal more. 52 
The meeting of the heads of states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to raise the profile of this organisation, followed by the summits 
in Kazakhstans capital Astana of the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) to strengthen 
economic ties and expand military cooperation, was a perfect illustration of the 
strengthening of Russia's position in Central Asia. This confirms that Putin, while 
playing down the multi-polar world rhetoric, is in fact actively pursuing this objective, 
creating a system of counter balances to the American presence in Central Asia. The 
SCO, which includes a rapidly growing giant - China, is said to be a key element of this 
system. The CIS, and now the EEC, the SCO and the CSTO - all represent attempts to 
recreate the Eurasian heartland, which, in turn, implies the return of Eurasianism in 
Russia's foreign policy. 
It was already mentioned in this chapter that the top of Russia's intellectual elite, 
including the Kremlin, are enthusiastic Eurasianists. Suffice it to recall one of Putin's 
most popular expressions that Russia has always seen herself a Eurasian country. 
Eurasianism is a powerful concept capable of oiling the Kremlin machine for ages. It 
appeals to educated nationalists, and most of all it appeals to the vast majority of 
underprivileged voters, who want nothing but law and order, security, some prosperity 
and the sense of belonging to a great world power (all themes of Putin's platform). 
Eurasianism appeals because it is not xenophobic: it is inclusive. It is not anti-Islamic 
and not anti-Semitic. Putin is certainly clever enough not to pose overtly as an 
Eurasianist. But the fact is that his circle is incorporating the neo-Eurasianist 
worldview: the opinions expressed by such proponents as A. Dugin, L. Ivashov and Y. 
Tikhomirov have not lost their relevance in Putin's agenda. 53 
Eurasianists are more than glad that Putin's foreign policy has enshrined two central 
goals: to restore Russian supremacy in the (near abroad', and to balance international 
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relations by an Eurasian perspective, following the prescription by Primakov, much 
admired by Putin. This means closer relations with China, India and Iran, and a more 
incisive Russian presence in the Middle East. However, the Russian leadership has to 
deal with the world as it is, and to take into account the current balance of power 
between Russia and other major powers. A permanent balancing between the American 
and European directions answers the interests of the Russian Federation. The Russian 
leadership has had to accept that Moscow cannot control her traditional 'heartland'. The 
scolour revolutions' in some FSU states have fin-ther complicated the task of re- 
establishing the 'heartland'. The problem that Russia faces is that other states in Eurasia 
may not be inclined to share Russia's 'heartland' concept. At a meeting of Russian 
ambassadors in July 2004, Putin acknowledged that Russia did not have a monopoly in 
the post-Soviet space. 54 
All in all, Putin clearly realises the necessity to actively engage with the West, 
nevertheless, Moscow's dissatisfaction with Washington's unilateral attempts to deal 
with the world or EU's tough line on Russia have played a part in Russia's enduring 
emphasis on multi-polarity. However, Putin's endeavours, to intensify relations with the 
EU and its member states, his policy course towards NATO and the U. S., promotion of 
multi-lateralfora, redesigning relations with the CIS, as well as cooperation with China, 
55 India and Iran, have been different from his predecessors. Although partly continuing 
Primakov's foreign policy traditions of co-operation with 'non-Western' countries, 
largely as a counterweight to the Western direction, Putin's policies vis-a-vis them 
became more balanced: Russia today cannot afford to allow these relationships to take 
the lead. 
4.4. New Russian foreign policy? 
The task of this section is to discuss new aspects and features of Russia's foreign policy 
under Putin. Is it new in its substance, conduct or presentation? What are new driving 
factors in Putin's foreign policy? On the whole, to what extent is it important for 
Russia's international status? The answers to these questions will be evaluated in 
comparison with Yeltsin's foreign policy. 
This section will argue that the progress in Russian-Western relations is more evident in 
the way in which Moscow conducted policy towards the West rather than in terms of 
substantive action on contentious issues. It is the realm of style and presentation, where 
the differences between pre- and post-9/11 are considerable. This dissertation will show 
in later chapters that Russia's behaviour in the international arena and in post-Soviet 
space has perfectly validated the conclusion that Russia's rapprochement with the West 
in the wake of 9/11 is pure pragmatism rather than revolutionary change in her foreign 
policy. 
Broadly speaking, there are three interest groupings in Russia's political establishment 
that have their own perspectives in respect of the country's foreign and security policy: 
military/security establishment, economic/cooperative establishment and the 
Kremlin/presidential administration. 56 First, the security-based (realist) approach, 
represented by the siloviki, states that Russia's foreign policy is to be shaped by hard 
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security threats and concerns, and has the aim of balancing them. Second, the 
economic/cooperative (liberal) perspective, in contrast to the previous one, is seeking to 
make Russia a part of the global system of the world. Third, the Kremlin's view 
combines the previous two but is more under the influence of the siloviki. Albeit 
presenting a modem approach - building 'a strong and economically vigorous state with 
the clear aim of joining a globalised economic system', 57 it professes a security-based 
thinking. A key thing here is how Russia is seen in the eyes of the West. Put another 
way, Putin (the Kremlin) looks at selective integration on a case-by-case basis in 
becoming part of globalised economy. Globalisation brings new aspects to be followed: 
information, image, and cooperation. 
It should be stressed that the Putin's circle is far from sharing a liberal perspective based 
on institutional cooperation which increases absolute gains. Putin is a traditional realist 
in seeing security as essential to the vigour of the Russian state and central to the 
Kremlin's domestic and international priorities. More precisely, Putin's sophisticated 
understanding of security needs reinforces the emphasis on economic development that 
is a crucial factor in his state-building agenda. On this issue he shares the liberal 
economists' conviction that the best way forward for Russia is through an adjustment to 
and adoption of international market. In other words, Putin takes important elements 
from the liberal perspective but he factors them into a modem realist framework, giving 
considerable importance for Russia's international role. That said, Putin can best be 
characterised as a 'pragmatic modem realist' who thinks in power categories and sees 
the world as intensively competitive. 58 
In Professor Legvold's view, Russia's foreign policy is left without a solid conceptual 
foundation. The confusion, he argues, flows from documents, first and foremost, the 
official doctrine - the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept. 
59 According to Braithwaite, 'the 
muddle over the foreign and security policy concepts' is merely part of Russia's 
struggling with the 'difficult business of adapting itself to the aftermath of empire'. 60 
The Russians are by no means the first to go through this painful process. But Russia 
has gone through much more traumatic and humiliating upheaval than other previous 
empires (e. g. Britain or France) ever did: the Russians lost their empire much quicker, 
and they lost their political, economic and social system at the same time. 61 
The thesis that Russia has already made her strategic choice - to integrate with the West 
- has its specifics. Some observers defined Putin's foreign policy course as an attempt to 
find a 'third way' in international relations - 'one involving not integration but also not 
confrontation with the West'. In Shevtsova's words, 'together but separate' might be the 
motto for this period. 62 The new formula of Russia's international role could be 
described as greater interaction as opposed to greater integration with the West, 
provided this interaction is favourable for Russia. 
Decision-making under Putin inherited many features from the Yeltsin rule and took 
some new positive and negative trends. It has become less volatile in the personality 
sense, the circle of decision makers has become broader, but this has not brought 
substantive positive changes in policy-making, rather more bureaucratisation. Sergey 
Kortunov argues that crisis is institutional: there is no effective mechanism for 
preparing, making or implementing foreign policy decisions. Despite the fact that Putin 
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has been exercising enormous power, the situation has not improved; in some respects it 
has even worsened. 63 The two principal shortcomings, characteristic in Yeltsin's foreign 
policy-making process, are not extinct under Putin as well. First is the huge gap 
between policy formulation and translation it into substance. Second is the personalised 
management of state affairs. The principle of collegiality and transparency of foreign 
policy decision-making is being applied much less consistently than it was under 
Yeltsin. 64 This raises many questions about the rationale behind specific moves, while 
the responsibility for foreign policy activity rests just on one person - the Russian 
president. The lack of delegating mechanism and the resulting over-dependence on the 
Kremlin paralyses the introduction of new initiatives and decreases incentives for 
lower-level administrators to take responsibility for the policy. 65 Often the Foreign 
Ministry, the Security Council and even the Foreign Policy Department of the 
Presidential Administration have been sidelined, while the head of the state becomes a 
hostage to his inner circle -a circle that is not always very proficient. 66 Thus, there is in 
effect no foreign policy coordination on the state level. 
It is the institutional context of foreign policy making that has undergone the most 
significant transformation under Putin, more precisely, the ongoing 'securitization' of 
foreign policy, 'affecting matters of substance, as well as 'style'. 67 At the most literal 
level, the involvement of security services in policy formulation and implementation 
has increased enormously. Although one could not neglect their role under Yeltsin, (e. g. 
Primakov was the head of Foreign Intelligence Service before he became Foreign 
Minister), then it was far from co-ordinating intelligence and security influence as it is 
today. 
Under Putin, the security apparatus has 'emerged from its previous near-anonymity' in 
policy making to assume a much more 'public profile 68 : just to start from Putin himself 
-a former head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), or his closest confidant and 
former KGB/FSB colleague Sergey Ivanov, who is Defence Minister. Personalities and 
personal loyalties are central in the current policy making environment. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is, according to the Constitution, a power ministry. It has its own 
intelligence service and military personnel serve in it. All power ministries are directly 
subordinated to the Kremlin and do not report any of their activities to the Duma or the 
general publiC. 69 This literal securitization of the institutional context has undoubtedly 
had a huge impact on the execution of foreign policy. 
In few areas is the difference more pronounced than in the presentation of foreign 
policy. Whereas under Yeltsin, the Kremlin was notable for its extensive use of 
dramatic and symbolic language, Putin's approach is businesslike. As a result, although 
contradictions within the conduct of Moscow's external affairs remain, Russia today 
presents 'a broadly consistent face' to its various audiences. This is also to do with the 
fact that Putin exercises much greater control over foreign policy presentation and 
content, simultaneously avoiding 'damaging turnarounds' and leaving himself enough 
space for manoeuvre. 70 
To sum up, in comparison with the Yeltsin period, the results in the conduct of Russia's 
foreign policy are mixed. In some aspects, indeed, there is considerable improvement. 
First of all, Putin's firmer approach to power and institutional stability has generated a 
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more centralised and disciplined management of foreign and security policy. It is 
commonly stated that under Putin there is one foreign policy in Russia. There still exist 
competing agendas within the presidential administration, but Moscow presents a united 
face to outsiders. Secondly, although the system of policy-making remains over-reliant 
on Putin, there is a tighter nexus between the formulation and implementation of policy. 
Instead of the factionalism and sectionalization in Yeltsin's presidency the conduct of 
Russia's current external affairs has become much calmer. Finally, despite occasional 
downturns and minor crises over individual issues, for the most part Russian foreign 
policy will be characterized by a 'managed normality, 71 _ generally responsible 
behaviour and cooperation, based on numerous common interests, while underplaying 
the importance of diverging value-systems with the West. 
However, Putin's foreign policy became far more securiticized; this was particularly the 
case during his second term. This term is also marked by visibly declining 
international image of Russia, although during the first several years of Putin's rule it 
tended to improve. In the past couple of years, Moscow has been confronting a barrage 
of criticism from the outside world. The semi-feudal relations that still exist in a number 
of Russia's internal policy spheres and her assertive policy towards the FSU states are 
utterly incompatible with the post-modem architecture of the developed world into 
which Russia wants to integrate. 
4.5. Russia in the post-9/11 security environment 
It has become almost commonplace to consider the terrorist acts of 9/11 as a watershed 
in the Moscow - Washington relations or a revolutionary departure in Russia's foreign 
policy as a whole. However, one should not underestimate the fact that relationship 
between Russia and the West are neither entirely new nor rooted solely in the events of 
9/11; a more co-operative agenda has been unfolding well before it. 
The shift in Russian foreign policy started from the very outset of Putin's presidency: a 
pragmatist in foreign policy as in everything else, he had been avoiding confrontation 
with the U. S. and 'reaching out to Western Europe', as well as seeking a bigger role for 
Russia in international bodies. 72 A number of facts deserve mentioning in this regard. 
First of all, already in the beginning of 2000 the newly elected President Putin paved the 
way for more constructive cooperation with the West: in May 2000 the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council (PJC) resumed its work, which Russia had ceased in protest 
over NATO's air campaign in Yugoslavia, and finther on gradually expanded its 
agenda. 73 The opening of NATO's Information Office in Moscow in February 2001 
followed this. By mid-2001, the NATO-Russia dialogue has practically resumed in 
fUll. 74 Furthermore, Putin's numerous meetings with Western European and U. S. 
counterparts in 2001 serve as the reaffirmation of his desire for Russia to be part of 
Europe. Last but not least, Putin's view, expressed in many speeches during 2000-2001, 
showed that the most serious of Russia's security challenges lie not along her western 
border, but along its southern periphery. This was arguably one of the reasons for 
Russia to relax, perhaps for the first time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, its 
stubborn opposition towards NATO enlargement, replacing 'threats of an adequate 
response with arguments questioning the rationale of the enlargement'75 . 
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This is not to say that 9/11 did not cast a clarifying light on an area of overlapping 
interests between the Cold War foes. Both nations seemed to have found at least one 
common objective: fighting international terrorism. Right after the attacks on New York 
and Washington, D. C., the Russian leader showed ruthless pragmatism in siding with 
the West, particularly the United States. As a result of the change in U. S. security 
priorities and Russia's perception, there appeared a window of opportunity for Russia's 
progress in many areas of her relationship with the U. S., including NATO. 
4.5.1. Rapprochement with the West? 
In the wake of the events of 9/11, the change in Russia's relations with the West is 
widely viewed as historic. Political analysts portrayed 9/11 as a turning point in 
Russia's path to the West. To validate this approach, one should try to answer a 
fundamental question: whether what had happened was a 'revolutionary change' or just 
a 'pragmatic radicalisation of continuing trends'. 76 In the aftermath of terrorist attacks 
Russia faced a difficult choice. The dilemma was formulated simply - join the 
Americans in the battle, or sit it out. The stakes were high indeed. The 9/11 did not turn 
the world upside down. The issues of September 10 did not disappear on September 12. 
All the old problems, just to mention NATO's eastward enlargement, strategic arms 
cuts, Iraq and Iran, awaited solutions. 
Russia, like every other state, calculated how to pursue her interests in such a rapidly 
changing environment. In Trenin's view, Russia faced a choice of three options: self- 
isolation ('great Russia'), revision of the 'outcome of the Cold War' (the so called 
'Oriental choice'), or integration into Europe. 77 Putin's key desire was to improve 
Russia's relations with the West. Other strategic options - 'junior partnership with 
China' and 'international isolation' - had little appeal to the Russian public78. Russia's 
greatest problem with NATO enlargement was related to her inability to integrate 
herself in the Euro-Atlantic security framework. 
it is worth noting that during the 1990s, Russia's often-chaotic security policy had 
sustained two consistent themes: first, the failure of domestic economic reform that was 
the primary threat to Russian national interests; second, instability and terrorism in 
Eurasia. The 9/11 events provided a brilliant opportunity for Russia to capitalise on 
these most urgent security needs and maximise her weight on the global stage. The fight 
against international terrorism gives an opportunity for Moscow to assume a leading 
role in international affairs. Furthermore, it is a vehicle for Russia's integration into the 
civilized world, it merges with the Western-centric orientation of Russian foreign policy 
without undermining relations with non-Western powers (e. g. China and India), and it 
serves as an alibi both for Moscow's interventionism in the FSU and her 
uncompromising conduct of the Chechen war. 
Partnership with the United States and NATO paves the way to full-scale integration 
with the West on better conditions. It was clear that, if Moscow goes for it, it may 
expect to reinforce its positions with regard to NATO, make the United States more 
sensitive to Russia's security interests, but first of all, Russia's new image in the U. S 
and Europe will truly become her invaluable asset. Simply put, Russia's sudden 
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willingness to establish closer ties with the West was the result of strategic calculations 
aimed at modernizing Russia. What Putin did, in Trenin's words, was to start 'bringing 
his foreign and security policy in harmony with "Russia proj ect' 'at home'. 79 
Putin's plan was simple: to convince Russia and the West that they are on the same 
team on all the issues of importance. Certainly, the warming of relations between the 
U. S. and Russia grew out of a pragmatic realization that the two nations needed each 
other. First and foremost, global terrorism as a core threat brought into focus common 
interests, such as counter-terrorism, stability in Eurasia, and prevention of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 80 Washington needed Moscow's 
support in the war in Afghanistan because of Russia's geographical location, military- 
political positions and infrastructure in Central Asia, contacts with the Northern 
Alliance and her almost a decade experience of the Afghanistan war (occupation by the 
USSR in 1979-1989). For their part, Russian leaders were pleased to see Washington 
giving top priority to fighting terrorism, a long-standing problem on many fronts in 
Russia. Above all, after 9/11 the West, particularlr the U. S., immediately relieved 
pressure on Russia over her oppression in Chechnya. 8 
What was striking about Russia's collaboration in the aftermath of 9/11 was the extent 
of operational support involved. Putin was quick to express solidarity with the United 
States, and he raised no objection to the temporary stationing of American troops in the 
former Soviet republics of Central Asia and sharing sensitive intelligence with the U. S. 
Although this might indicate that the Russian viewpoint on this region became less 
zero-sum than in the past, in reality it was a greater appreciation that Russia alone did 
not have the resources to guarantee security and stability there. Moscow, nevertheless, 
remained sensitive to the possibility that Russia's influence would be seriously curtailed 
in this traditional 'sphere of influence'. 82 
New aspects of Russia's cooperation with the West led to the following explanation. In 
the first place, pragmatism or 'strategic opportunism' 83 was the main feature in 
Moscow's policy. Putin did not make so much of 'strategic choice' in favour of the 
West, but took advantage of the extraordinary set of circumstances to pursue objectives 
that were already in place but, for one reason or another, were difficult to realise. 
Secondly, the real shift was not in Moscow but in the West, particularly in Washington. 
In the U. S., the war against terrorism 'has taken precedence over all other foreign policy 
issues, even the promotion of democracy and free markets'. 84 The result was a greatly 
enhanced role for Russia, one that no amount of effort on her part could have produced 
independently. Many of the tensions that defined the U. S. -Russian relations after the 
collapse of the USSR had subsided. Taken as a whole, the 9/11 impact on Russia's 
policymaking environment had been catalysing of existing trends, rather than making a 
revolutionary change the way Russia's external relations were managed. Moscow's 
behaviour regarding the war in Iraq is very much in support of this conclusion. 
For Russians, the Iraqi crisis represented an opportunity. As Lo puts it, Russia has a 
taste of 'controlled tension': diplomatic situations short of conflict, in which Russia's 
membership of the UN Security Council gives her extra CloUt. 85 In the run-up to the Iraq 
war, Putin has been cautious not to place Russia in direct opposition to Washington. 
The Kremlin used constructive and balanced language, 'conveying an impression of 
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reasonableness and good sense'. 86 Moreover, Moscow, which had close ties with 
Baghdad and had pressed Washington not to launch an attack on Iraq to disarm Saddarn 
Hussein, especially without the authorisation of the UN Security Council, had also 
indicated it would not sacrifice improved relations with the U. S. should strikes take 
place. By this Moscow gave itself plenty of room for manoeuvre in the event that 
Americans and British would decide to attack Iraq - with or without UN approval. 
However, it soon became clear that Russia had no general strategic approach towards 
handling the Iraq crisis except, possibly, to be 'flexible above all things' . 
87 Putin 
miscalculated his balancing efforts between the U. S. and Europe. He was counting on a 
second UN Security Council resolution, authorising the use of force on Iraq, at which 
Russia could abstain. Moscow took softer and more amenable view than Paris or Berlin 
in order to have some protection from international isolation. As there was no second 
UN resolution, Russia was forced to change her position: to move from a mediator's 
role to a more determined role against war, and finally, siding with the French-German 
camp. According to Blank, Russians were not very successful in this deal because the 
French and Germans wanted Russia to turn against the United States for their benefit, 
whilst Moscow wanted Europe against America for its benefit; so there was asymmetry 
of objectives. 88 Consequently, once UN standoff ended, Moscow-Paris-Berlin alliance 
faded fast. Then Russia, together with the rest of the UN Security Council, wound up in 
the end supporting the U. S. -UK-Spain resolution on Iraq that ended sanctions and 
approved U. S. -UK control over Iraq. Russia not only decided not to use the political 
defeat of the United States in Iraq but even demonstratively stretched a helping hand to 
the U. S. administration. " In short, Russia's posture during the Iraq crisis is an act of 
pure pragmatism or even opportunism. 
This largely explains why Russia's honeymoon with the West was short-lived. Indeed, 
the window of opportunity started to close in 2003-2004. The global community was 
sobered up by the Iraqi crisis and the differences over the ways to resolve it; this debate 
involved, amongst others, Moscow. The U. S., and to a larger degree, Europe, no longer 
had grounds for an exclusive relationship with Russia - temporary conditions were 
lifted. Russia's anti-democratic management of domestic politics, the Yukos affair, 
assertive policy towards the FSU states, especially the Kremlin' clumsy interference in 
the Ukrainian presidential elections, tough approach to negotiations with Tbilisi over 
the withdrawal of Russian military bases in Georgia, and the ongoing disagreements 
over international issues, especially on Russian nuclear assistance to Iran - all these 
developments were again viewed from positions prior to 9/11. At the same time, hopes 
for a qualitatively new partnership in the areas such as the war on terror, non- 
proliferation of WMD and international conflict resolution remained largely unfulfilled. 
The combination of these multiple disagreements and missed opportunities has led 
many observers to speak of a profound crisis in Russia's relations with the West. There 
is much to support this view. Anti-Westernism has become increasingly fashionable 
within the Russian establishment, where there is a renewed emphasis on Russia's 
pursuing her own path rather than 'transplanting' principles of democracy, a free market 
economy and civil society. 90 Buoyed by the consolidation of his political power and 
Russia's high economic growth rates, Putin has become increasingly unapologetic about 
his domestic and foreign policies. Meanwhile, senior figures in his administration blame 
the West for outside interference in the FSU and 'double standards'. 
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Several observations could be made regarding Russia's 'pro-Western' course. Most 
important, Putin's main vigour is that he adopts his policy to reality. 91 His motto was to 
subordinate temporary losses for the sake of vision, 'not to waste momentum and 
withdraw tactically'92 in order to create image of Russia as a more credible partner. In 
the late 1990s, the concept of a 'multi-polar world' had been Moscow's favourite 
mantra, encapsulating the argument that the U. S. should not be allowed to dominate the 
world as a single superpower. However, in the wake of 9/11, the Kremlin presumably 
came to realize that building a multi-polar world as a counterweight to U. S. dominance 
has not really worked. 
According to Antonenko, there are clearly several gaps between Russia and the West: 
, in their world view, in the values and in their perceptions of today's realities'. 93 Russia 
is still very much caught in a geopolitical Cold War mentality. She feels very self- 
conscious, much weaker and very insecure about herself, meanwhile the West, and 
particularly Europe, is now much more post-modem. That is why Russia often 
overreacts when she believes to be infringements into the area where Russia thinks she 
has a legitimate role to play. 94 Here, the very 'securitization' of Russian foreign policy 
may become the greatest obstacle to a proper rapprochement with the West. 
To sum up, it is clear that Russia's rapprochement with the West after 9/11 was a 
mixture of pragmatism and radicalisation of cooperative strategy rather than a 
revolutionary phase. 95 The unity proclaimed between Russia and the U. S. in the cause 
of combating terrorism has not reduced their old differences. This conversion proved to 
be illusory, as Putin's basic position has not changed. Since taking office, his primary 
ambition has been to restore Russia's greatness, her leading role in the world affairs. 
Second is Putin's call, repeated on many occasions prior to 9/11, for a reordering of the 
strategic and security relationships between Russia, Europe, and the U. S. Russia's turn 
towards co-operation with the U. S. was likely a phase of a long-term geopolitical 
Eurasianist strategy being pursued by Moscow. Russia's cooperation with the U. S. in 
the war on terror has weakened the transatlantic link and has incited unilateralism of the 
U. S. and rivalry among Western European powers. First of all, U. S. unilateral actions 
prompted France and Germany to establish closer relations with Russia including her 
automatically in European affairs. 96 Such a development creates the possibilities for 
Russia to further weaken the transatlantic link and attempt to ruin the influence of the 
U. S. in the whole European sub-continent. All of the above, one should not look at 9/11 
as a revolution or a paradigm leap but just a logical continuation (evolution) of what 
was already in motion - Putin's push for Russia's modernisation and integration. 
Notwithstanding Putin's frequent resort to supposedly benign integration-speak, his 
administration continues to view the world in competitive terms, 'us' and 'them'. This 
means that Russia and the West subscribe to different values and interests, except their 
occasional coincidence over issues like international terrorism. Russia's perception of 
engagement with the West is very different. It emphasises the primacy of selected 
common interests, mainly in security and trade, while relegating normative issues to the 
margins. 
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4.5.2. Strategic partnerships with the key Western countries 
Russia's different approach to Europe and the United States could be explained by the 
fact that Europe and America are currently pursuing different security agendas with 
respect to Russia, employing different policy instruments and different institutions. 
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Moreover, according to Angela Stent, Director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and 
East European Studies at Georgetown University, American and European views of 
Russian security policy reflect 'a basic asymmetry': the U. S. evaluates Russian policy 
'in the context of her global interests and perspectives', while EU countries focus on the 
98 6security implications of Russia's actions for Europe'. Europe is much more 
multilateral, much more soft-power and much more understanding of different cultures. 
The United States is far more unilateral and hard power, and much less compliant with 
international law. 99 Equally, Russian policies toward the U. S. and the EU are based on 
different calculations: since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has not yet abandoned the 
hope of seeking recognition from the U. S. as an equal global partner, whereas her goals 
towards the Europe are more regionally focused. 100 According to Erochine, there is 
quite a big gap in the EU and Russia's perceptions of each other. What the Union is 
trying to do is to 'form a kind of strategic partnership between the EU and Russia, 
whilst Russia is trying to have more local relations based on specific issues, such as 
energy, steel, and small specific industries. 101 
It is important to note that since 2000 the most dramatic fluctuations have occurred in 
Russian-American relations. To begin with, Yeltsin's erratic foreign policy course was 
most evident in his dealings with the United States. On the one hand, Yeltsin tried to 
place Russia on an equal footing with the U. S., and when rebuffed, repeatedly resorted 
to threatening rhetoric. For many years, especially during the mid- I 990s, Russians were 
showing dissatisfaction with the growing tendencies towards the establishment of a 
unipolar world structure dominated by the U. S. On the other hand, Moscow constantly 
bowed to pressure from the Clinton administration. 
On the American side, in the 1990s, Russia became less central to U. S. interests than the 
Soviet Union had been. Yet developments in Russia were still important, as Russia 
remained a nuclear superpower, and could be 'cooperative, passive, or disruptive'. 102 in 
2000, the incoming Bush administration made clear its intention to downgrade the status 
of Russia to that of a mid-ranking country. In an interview with Le Figaro, Condoleezza 
Rice, then National Security Adviser to President Bush, even suggested that Russia was 
still considered a threat (mainly because of her policies, such as selling arms to Iran). 103 
The U. S. therefore was more interested in containing rather than engaging Russia. It 
was five months before Bush personally met Putin in Slovenia, when European leaders 
started to take measure of the new man from the Kremlin. 
Putin has fully understood that Russia's relations with the United States, the only 
remaining superpower, were the key to the achievement of Moscow's most significant 
ambitions, as well as to increasing global strategic stability. 104 Moreover, Russia 
desperately needed American investments and support in joining the WTO. Therefore, 
disparities in their relationship notwithstanding, the Russian leader was eager to 
cooperate with the U. S. 
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U. S. plans to deploy a National Missile Defence (NMD) system, coming on top of 
NATO expansion and Kosovo, has heightened Russian alarm about external threats. 
These received far more prominence in Russia's National Security Concept of 2000 
105 than in the 1997 version' , which gave precedence to 
internal threats. As a 
counterweight to NMD, Russia came up with a proposal for a European theatre missile 
defence system, using Russian and European technology, and an early-warning data 
exchange. The idea was firstly aimed at exploiting the difference between the U. S. and 
her European allies, particularly France and Germany, being sceptical about NMD. It 
should be noted that Russia succeeded in terms of postponing NMD plans pending 
consultations. 106 To put it plainly, the two biggest disagreements prevailing in U. S. - 
Russian relations were the second round of NATO enlargement and U. S. plans to 
deploy NMD (see Appendix B), which, many analysts believed, would never coincide. 
There were also opinions that Russians may trade off the process of NATO expansion 
against NMD, but probably even for them this option looked less than realistic. 
Reality turned out to be different from analytical predictions. Even prior to the events of 
9/11 it was clear that Putin and Bush, both being followers of realistic policies and 
preferring deals but not bargains, eventually started to find common ground on which to 
engage. 107 In 2001 Russia's incipient new policy was visible at the U. S. -Russia summit 
meeting in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in June 2001, and a month later at the meeting of the G8 
at Genoa, Italy, when, in Bush's words, he was looking into Putin's eyes and 'was able 
to get a sense of his soul'. 108 
The Ljubljana summit also proved to be the first test of Putin's pro-Western course. 
Both sides pledged to work on 'putting substance into the envisioned framework of their 
strategic relations'. 109 Despite Bush's NMD plans and his endorsement of NATO 
enlargement eastwards, Putin managed to maintain a rather mild and constructive 
stance. The Russian President reacted along similar line to the famous Bush speech in 
Warsaw in July 2001, where he presented his vision of a Europe 'whole and free', 
which was supposed to be implemented through robust enlargement of NATO. Just a 
few month later, terrorist attacks against the United States became the focal point in 
Russia - U. S. relations. 
However, common interest - international terrorism - does not seem to have the 
potential to lead U. S. -Russian cooperation into real partnership. The global war on 
terror, as Piontkovsky put it, is 'too vague a concept on which to build an alliance, and 
too prone to erosion'. ' 10 Both the U. S. and Russia were 'tailoring their chronic problems 
to fit the new slogan" 11. Russia used it to address her military conflict in Chechnya, 
which has reached an impasse, while the United States adapted the war on terror to 
apply to the overthrow of Saddarn Hussein. Each has her own list of favourite terrorists; 
they do not necessarily coincide. Cooperation in other areas does not look promising 
either. In the economic sphere Russia takes only 39 th place in the U. S. trade turnover. II 
As far as the energy dialogue is concerned, the countries have different points of view: 
Americans wish to become majority shareholders of large companies while Russia 
wants to make the U. S. the importer of Russian oil and energy resources. At present all 
these aspirations seem unreal. Hence, it is the nature more than the scope of Russia's 
rapprochement with the United States that is most important. Another point to be taken 
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into account is that the warmth between the two presidents has not spread to their 
broader domestic constituencies. 
Seeking to find her own way to Europe, Russia needs this alliance with the United 
States much more than the latter does. Major priorities for Russia are her entry into the 
WTO, securing Western support for her economic reforms, and institutionalising 
Russia's international role through NATO and the EU. 1 13 Among other needs, is also 
U. S. support in isolating Chechen rebels in the international arena. Meanwhile Russia 
matters for America mainly for the three reasons: her nuclear security, her close ties 
with the 'Axis of Evil' countries and her large energy reserves (it is the country best 
able to reduce America's dependence on oil from the Middle East). 114 In short, the 
improved relations rest on mutual convenience. 
There are several potential spheres of contradiction between Russia and the United 
States. For Russia the biggest question about the relationship is tied to the larger issue 
of the extent of unilateralism in U. S. foreign policy. For the U. S. it is Russia's policy in 
the post-Soviet space, her domestic agenda related to the economic and legal reforms, 
her use of energy as a foreign policy weapon and the fate of democracy in Russia. A 
recent manifestation of the assertiveness of Russian foreign policy is her intention of 
radically re-arranging the OSCE and changing the existing European security system. 115 
By initiating the OSCE reform, Russia demonstrates that she has not yet abandoned the 
idea to create a European security system independent of the U. S. Russia's key goal is 
to retain her influence in Ukraine, Moldova and South Caucasus states and preclude 
NATO enlargement to these areas. Iran's nuclear enrichment programme could also 
prove the next major crisis between the two countries. The U. S. has been worried about 
Russian supplies of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies to Iran and Moscow's 
recent refusal to halt the sale to Iran of an air defence system. Putin could expect a lot of 
pressure over Iran and energy supplies in the run-up of the G8 summit under Russia's 
presidency in St Petersburg on 15-17 July. 
However, according to many experts, a major crisis in U. S. - Russian relations in the 
near future is not possible. There is still a two-fold rationale for sustaining these 
relations. Firstly, both sides have accurately assessed the relative power relationship, 
116 and they both 'took U. S. security hegemony as a premise' . Secondly, both sides have 
agreed that what they have in common outweighs their differences. Therefore, although 
contentious discrepancies on the above listed issues will remain, the countries have 
learned how to compartmentalise disagreements so that do not sour relations generally. 
Russia-U. S. relations are likely to stay in a constant cycle 'from warming to frosting' 
and they will be based on a 'small amount of geopolitical interests, which will make 
them very unstable'. 117 
Russia's interests vis-a-vis Europe have always been diverse and substantial. However 
ambivalent Russian thinking about Europe might be, the arguments for considering 
Europe by far the most important region ('Europe first') in terms of Russia's 
fundamental interests in the international arena are compelling. Europe, according to 
, 118 this logic, is 'the main intended focus of Russia's long-term international strategy . Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's interests in Europe have increasingly focussed 
on economic links due to the imperatives of domestic reforms and to a desire to obtain 
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better positions in the world market. Beyond this, political interaction with Europe is 
essential if Russia is to achieve a respected international status. And obviously, the 
centrality of Europe has only been reinforced by the failure of '&ntente cordiale' with 
the United States. 119 
Russia has had, for historical reasons, important connections with certain states. 
Although the U. S. has remained the central country for Russia, the establishment of 
relations with European 'heavyweights' is crucial for Russia's attempt to promote the 
so-called 'pan-European security architecture'. 120 By the end of the Yeltsin presidency, 
France and Germany were considered to be Russia's major partners on the European 
scene; Vladimir Putin has 'upgraded' the United Kingdom to this status. It is worth 
noting that Putin has been extremely skilful in his personal handling of his Western 
counterparts. 
Germany, France and the UK - each of the three is attractive for Russia in her own way. 
The important element of strategic partnership with the United Kingdom is based on the 
joint ventures in the energy sector and the UK investment, as well as her political 
importance. The Iraq war in 2003 had a cooling effect upon what had been excellent 
relations between Vladimir Putin and Tony Blair, and brought Putin closer to Jacques 
Chirac and Gerhard Schr6der. France is valuable to Russia basically because of her 
independent policy and her reluctance to accept a 'submissive relationship' with the 
United States. 121 While the UK and France are important, Germany unquestionably 
occupies a primary place in Russia's European policy. 
Post-USSR Russia has always regarded Germany as a symbol of Europe for Russia. 
Putin's rise to power has seen an attempt to raise the Russo-German relationship to a 
new level. His affiliation with Germany is explicable by personal reasons: he spent a 
significant part of his KGB career in Eastern Germany (GDR), therefore he knows the 
country and German language. It is Russia's wish to develop a special relationship with 
Germany as a key part of her own objective in developing a strategic partnership with 
the European Union. During his visit to Germany in April 2002, Putin was quoted as 
saying that 'it is impossible to view the relations between Russia and Germany now 
beyond the context of Moscow's relations with the EU. Germany is one of the centres 
of European integration'. 122 Germany was and is Russia's main creditor and foreign 
trade partner. It should also be added that Germany is the 'old' European country that 
since 1970s has relied most heavily on Russian energy supplies. Presently Russia 
supplies more that 30 percent of the gas requirements of the German market. 
On 8 September 2005 in Berlin, top executives of Russia's Gazprorn and Germany's 
BASF and EON companies signed the framework agreement on the North European 
Gas Pipeline (NEGP) project. 123 Although both sides insist that the project is strictly of 
a business nature, the Kremlin clearly regards the project as a component of its strategy 
to leverage energy supplies into political influence in Europe's affairs. The choice of an 
offshore route to Germany, bypassing the Baltic States and Poland, also reflects 
Moscow's wedge-driving tactics, dealing with certain 'old' European countries on 
issues of concern to 'new' EU countries over their heads. 
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The overtures to Germany and France largely echo the desire of many of the Russian 
establishment to use a Franco-German-Russian axis to create a new balance of power. 
This remains true even after U. S. -Russia rapprochement in the wake of 9/11. And 
despite the fact that France used to be one of the strongest critics of Russia's war in 
Chechnya, both countries have had similar approach towards multi-polarity and shared 
similar opposing views on NMD or U. S. policy on Iraq. It is worth recalling in this 
context that in the mid-1990s Russian President Yeltsin started to promote the idea of a 
Moscow-Berlin-Paris axis. 124 The parallels with today are very obvious. During the war 
on Iraq, Russia sided with the biggest U. S. opponents, Germany and France, hoping to 
put into practice the idea of Moscow- Berlin-Paris axis, which, nevertheless, has not 
been formed. 
According to the former Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, one of the fundamental 
tenets of Russia's European policy is the expansion of bilateral relations with individual 
countries. 125 Russia views bilateralism instrumentally, as a conduit for advancing 
Russia's interests inside the EU and NATO. Bilateral cooperation is also considered 
important in its own right, especially for the trade and economic benefits it may 
provide. Moscow favours a bilateral approach to multilateral largely because it is easier 
to deal with major European capitals rather than with the whole EU institution as such. 
Therefore the institutional and bilateral trends are joined in Russian policy, each having 
specific significance in itself and wider importance in influencing the other. Here, the 
overriding point is that for all the twists and turns of Europe's turbulent history, bilateral 
ties have always been a positive stabilising factor in international relations in Europe. 126 
Another reason for this state of affairs is that the policy of the power game has not yet 
been abandoned both in Russia's concepts of international relations and in practical 
foreign policy. On the basis of such principles throughout the decade, Russia regarded 
the EU as a regional interstate organisation, in which the supranational element does not 
play an essential role, and all basic decisions are taken by the European powers 
independently. 127 
Moscow tried to exploit its preference for bilateral approach during the recent 
developments. For example, Putin drew on close personal ties to reinforce and exploit 
differences between EU countries in the final stages of negotiations with Brussels to 
find a solution to the Kaliningrad transit in 2002.128However, when Moscow tried to 
ignore what Putin has called 'Euro-bureaucracy' and to apply the same tactic in other 
areas, it became counter-productive and triggered a crisis in EU-Russia relations. In 
January 2004, the EU Council of Ministers called for more policy coherence among EU 
member states. This was a response to Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's 
initiative to grant Russia more support on Chechnya, the Yukos affair, and Putin's 
request for visa-free travel in the EU. This convinced EU members, including France 
and Germany, to seek for a more consolidated European policy towards Russia, which 
would be 'less susceptible to Russian manipulation and divide-and-rule tactics' . 
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EU was united in its opposition to Russia's refusal to extend the 1994 Russia-EU 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to the new EU members, which prompted 
Russia to back down. 
Various aspects of Russia's interaction with Europe's multilateral institutions - the EU 
and NATO - are analysed separately in chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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4.6. Retaining control in the post-Soviet space 
4.6.1. New view ofthe CIS 
Russia had been the third largest empire in human history, and the largest for most 
during the last four hundred years. She had also for centuries been an autocratic state 
and expansionism had been continuously present in her nature. The Soviet empire is no 
more but Russia still looms large over the former Soviet space. It is geo-economics that 
comes closest to the idea of empire. Anatoly Chubais' concept of 'liberal empire' is the 
perfect ideological tool for the Kremlin to exercise more power in what was defined as 
Russia's 'near abroad'. 130 
Putin's approach to the 'near abroad' rhetoric has been the opposite to his predecessor's, 
who asserted that the post-Soviet space was Russia's backyard - an 'area of vital 
interests' and 'exclusive sphere of influence'. Putin is not inclined to use such 
expressions in official statements at all in order not to irritate the former Soviet 
republics and send the wrong signals to the West. The 'passive-reactive approach' 131 
towards the FSU states (or the CIS), so common under Yeltsin, has given way to new 
actions on the ground, which in reality are far more serious in terms of exercising 
Russian influence in her periphery and treating the latter as a de facto sphere of 
influence. 
Under Yeltsin, Russia's policy towards her immediate periphery, to quote Pravda, 
, lacked drive and effectiveness'. 132 In other words, Russia failed to develop effective 
cooperation with the FSU states. With the exception of the Russia-Belarus Union, 
Russia's integration with the FSU states was more nominal than real, with economic 
and especially security interaction falling away, let alone falling the CIS as an 
institution' 33 . 
There was a tendency in Yeltsin's Russia, inherited from the USSR, to treat the CIS as a 
unified entity. 134 This is obviously the biggest error of Moscow's post-Soviet policy, as 
the CIS states are different in practically every respect and therefore need to be seen 
either on region-by-region or case-by-case basis. Russia's Foreign Policy Concept of 
2000 states that Russia will seek both bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS 
states. But under Putin Russia has largely been pursuing cooperation with the CIS on 
the basis of selectiveness. There is a segmented nature of Russian foreign policy with 
objective and capabilities in some sub-regions that are of special sensitivity for 
Moscow: notably Ukraine, the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia. In these sub-regions 
Moscow retains clear foreign policy interests and hegemonic ambitions, which it 
typically pursues proactively. 135 Where it is possible, especially in the South Caucasus 
and Moldova, Moscow is interested to keep' 'controlled' instability (for more 
information concerning Russia's bilateral relations with separate CIS countries see 
Appendix Q. 
Russia's military presence in the CIS states (Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) includes 14,000 soldiers. 136 Russia justifies her 
presence by the need to stabilize the post-conflict zones (in Moldova, Georgia and 
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An, nenia), or by agreements concluded with her allies (in Belarus). In Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine, the future of Russian military bases is uncertain because of these 
countries' demands for Moscow to withdraw them. 
Soon after becoming acting president, Vladimir Putin, like his predecessor, emphasised 
that the FSU states are an 'absolute priority' in Russian foreign PoliCY. 137 It was his 
decision that Russia's status as a great power would be better secured not by balancing 
other powerful states in one form or another but by gradually gluing a new power centre 
of the fragments of the Soviet Union headed by Russia, which would later help Moscow 
maximise its power. There appeared to be a growing consensus in Moscow that a 
finiher geopolitical retreat is impossible. Even more, to survive as a regional power and 
be able to defend her vast perimeter Russia must pursue at least a modestly expansionist 
policy. The revival of Moscow leadership's role in the 'near abroad' was an essential 
first step in restoring Russia's greatness. 
In 2003, Andrey Kokoshkin, the Chairman of the State Duma Committee on the CIS 
Affairs, talked about the 'Putin doctrine' in the CIS area that consists of the 
establishment of a highly integrated core of key states surrounded by the loose grouping 
of other CIS members. The components of this model are: the union of Russia and 
Belarus, the CSTO, the EEU and the CIS Anti-Terrorist Centre. 138 A year later all these 
components were strengthened, except the EEU, which was replaced by the Single 
Economic Space (SES). 
Many political analysts, especially those from the West, believed that the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks positively changed the context of Russia's interaction with the West. The 'red 
line', drawn by Moscow with respect to its 'legitimate interests' in the post-Soviet 
space, had been crossed: Russia provided significant support to U. S. operations in 
Afghanistan in 2001-2002, which included agreeing without fuss to U. S. deployments 
in Central Asia. But such a shift in Russian policy happened mainly because the fall of 
the Taliban regime was very much in Russia's interests. Russian policy makers realised 
that they could no longer afford to tightly control Central Asia, nor did Russia have the 
resources to combat radical Islam in the region. But at the same time, for the Russian 
political elite the appearance of U. S. bases in Central Asia was a painful concession, 
acceptable only on a temporary basis, as was the launch of a U. S. Train and Equip 
programme in Georgia. In this view, Russia was seen to be retreating in the FSU, 
leaving a vacuum that was filled by the United States. These views explain the deeper 
meaning of Putin's pledge to make Russia more competitive in the post-Soviet space in 
order to prevent its further erosion. 139 
Another aspect of this Russia's policy line could be read as its attempts to make use of 
overlapping spheres of influence between Russian and Western powers in South 
Caucasus and Central Asia. Although Putin allowed, as part as the anti-terrorist 
campaign, the establishment of U. S. military bases in the former Soviet republics, in no 
way does this move imply that Russia tends to reduce her influence here. It only means 
the weakening of the contraposition between Russia and the West, which by itself 
increases Moscow's room for manoeuvre in this region. In short, this is not to say that 
geopolitics is becoming of declining importance for Moscow. It only shows a 'cold- 
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blooded pragmatism' 140 that dominates the Kremlin's handling of relations with the 
cis. 
Russia's high policy profile towards the CIS has been maintained during both Putin's 
terms of office. But a significant and new turn was emphasised in President Putin's 
speech to the Federal Assembly on 16 May 2003. He underscored two points 
concerning the CIS: first, these countries are the priority number one in Russian foreign 
policy; secondly, they are in the area of Russia's strategic interests. 141 It was not simply 
a declaration because it was followed by the very high activity of Putin himself and 
other top state officials directed at strengthening Russia's role in the CIS area. 
In 2002-2004, the time became high for Moscow as the post-Soviet space entered a new 
phase in its development. The most important external factor was the eastward shift of 
the Western border, as a result of the integration of CEE and the Baltic countries into 
the EU and NATO. Consequently, the six FSU states (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and 
the three South Caucasus countries) emerged as Europe's new 'near abroad', prompting 
more active European engagement in their economic and security issues. These six 
countries comprise half of the CIS, and they were included in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). It was hard for Russia to accept these changes as the new 
geo-strategic reality. Sergey Ivanov's words: '... any change in geopolitical realities in 
the CIS is a threat to Russia' are very enlightening in this regard. Many Russians 
perceive this development as constituting an encirclement, which has not been 
accompanied by more vigorous efforts to integrate Russia into Western institutions or to 
assist her in addressing her own security concerns in the region where she has 
traditionally had special interests and influence. 142 Nationalist politicians, such as 
Dmitry Rogozin, the former Head of the Rodina party, advised assertive policy aimed at 
protecting the rights of Russian-speakers in the CIS as a means of re-creating Russia's 
greatness. Chubais has called for Russia to establish a 'liberal empire', which in reality 
means the regaining of political influence in the FSU through the expansion of Russian 
Capital. 143 
The process of loosening the geopolitical frontiers of the post-Soviet space, combined 
with the inefficiency of the CIS, forced Russia to put stress on sub-regional 
organizations. Today, integration has been made a priority in Russia's CIS policy. 
Russia's national interests in the CIS traditionally cover three major and mutually 
connected spheres - economy, politics and security. In the last few years, the context, 
instruments and concepts for implementing these interests have undergone change. 
4.6.2. Energy geo-politics 
Russia's energy leverage has the greatest influence in those countries that depend 
almost entirely on Russia for supplies of energy resources. The most vulnerable are the 
FSU countries that have neither the wealth nor enjoy favourable geographic location 
that would allow them to diversify their energy imports. Putin's administration has 
sought to consolidate Russia's predominant position in regional and world energy 
markets through acquisition of local energy companies in the FSU and beyond, and the 
pursuit of 'energy partnerships' with the EU and the U. S., which would increase 
Russia's market share in Western Europe and North America. In the FSU (and 
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throughout Central and Eastern Europe) Russian energy supplies and their local 
affiliates enjoy actual or near monopolies, while Gazprom provides approximately 25 
percent of Russia's federal tax revenues. Moscow is increasingly using its natural gas 
supplies as a weapon. It was particularly the case in the beginning of 2006 when 
Moscow punished Kiev and Tbilisi while providing cut-rate gas to the dictatorship in 
Minsk. 
In the FSU energy has been a dominant Russian factor in several ways. Russian control 
of the energy infrastructure in neighbouring states and Moscow's attempts to maintain 
monopoly control of pipelines that bring oil and gas from the Caspian Sea to Western 
markets are understandable in the country where win-lose (not win-win) is a deeply 
rooted business principle. In this way Moscow seeks to prevent the other littoral states 
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) from eventually challenging Russia's long- 
term market predominance. 
In the opinion of many observers, oil is the main cause of the Russian-Georgian 
conflict. The Baku-Thilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline will allow Georgia to achieve economic 
independence. What is more, this pipeline will allow pumping Caspian, and possibly (in 
the future) Kazakhstan oil to the global market bypassing Russia and acquiring another 
alternative to the Persian Gulf suppliers. Therefore this project received strong support 
form the United States and the EU. Russia, on the contrary, attempted to to hinder the 
pipeline's construction. Moscow has also thought that Ukraine's Odessa-Brody oil 
pipeline network would transport Russian oil to the Black Sea ports. Putin's government 
invested substantial effort in reaching an agreement on establishing a joint consortium 
to operate Ukraine's pipeline network. 144 Meanwhile Yushchenko's government is 
planning to return to the original idea of using the pipeline in the opposite direction, i. e. 
for transporting Caspian oil from the Black Sea terminal to Europe, with a branch-line 
to Gdansk (Poland) and bypassing Russia. 145 This causes a real headache for Moscow: it 
would become an alternative oil supply to Europe and would inevitably ruin the Russian 
monopoly. 
An important Russian advantage over the FSU states is the pipeline system inherited 
from the Soviet Union. It is for this reason Turkmenistan, although rich in gas 
resources, has no other way to sell its gas on the global market except via Russia. 
Gazprom purchases gas from Turkmenistan at USD 44 per 1000 cub. m., but sells the 
same gas, e. g. to Turkey, already at USD 150 per 1000 cub. m. 146 
Moscow continues to subsidise energy exports to its poor CIS neighbours, enabling 
them to procure oil and gas at prices well below the levels of the world market. Their 
absolute dependence on these discounted Russian energy sales provides Moscow with a 
powerful political lever, which has been used effectively to influence political decisions, 
particularly in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. It was conjectured that Gazprom would 
refrain from enacting the 2006 price rise if Ukraine made an unequivocal commitment 
to enter the SES or surrender a part of her gas pipeline infrastructure to Gazprom. A 
Russian objective of this strategic interplay is the control of the CIS oil and gas 
pipelines in order to impede a potential energy supply diversification among these 
states. This will enable Russia to exercise a long-term dominant presence in the CIS 
states as a result of their over reliance on cheap energy. 
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Since Russian gas production is already falling, Russia now depends on gas imports 
from Turkmenistan to fulfil her domestic and export commitments. Up to the Russia- 
Ukraine gas dispute in the beginning of 2006, Gazprom has maintained a monopoly on 
natural gas exports from the former Soviet states to Europe, and only Turkmenistan was 
allowed to export natural gas to Ukraine. This derives from Gazprom's longstanding 
position: because the company is required to supply natural gas to the Russian market at 
prices below the cost of production, Gazprom has jealously protected its monopoly on 
exports. Turkmenistan was granted an exemption to supply a few former Soviet 
republics, and Moscow, in an effort to maintain political allies, dictated that these 
supplies should be subsidized. Gazprom, therefore, let Turkmenistan sell to some FSU 
states for peanuts, while the company pocketed hard currency from European customers 
paying top dollar. However, Russian cooperation with Turkmenistan continues to be 
bumpy, as the Turkmen side halted as exports in 2005, protesting the low prices that 
Russia offered for Turkmen exports. 
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Most Russian state-controlled energy companies avoid adopting current international 
business standards that would require them to engage in greater transparency, 
domestically and overseas. Russia imposes no penalties on companies that interfere in 
foreign elections and corrupt foreign officials. Their funding of political groups in the 
FSU states has by and large been successful in buying influence for Moscow. The 
Kremlin's destruction of Yukos through non-market methods, the role of Gazprom in 
this process and the growing fusion of the KGB-bred state officialdom with the 
management of Russia's energy companies - it is a trend presaging the use of such 
companies as instruments for the state's foreign policy. I 
Chubais' energy conglomerate Inter RAOJES is involved in projects in Kyrgyzstan and 
TaJikistan. It controls 80 percent of Armenia's power market: Armenian power could 
soon be exported to neighbouring Azerbaijan. Chubais wants nothing else but to create 
a gunified energy system' in South Caucasus - Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 148 
Inter R, 40JES and Gazprom are out in full force to re-conquer the role for Moscow as 
the provider to the whole periphery of the 'liberal empire'. 
On the whole, Russia does not need military pressure to control and influence the FSU 
states, she can do it most effectively by softer means - by pursuing her economic 
interests. Moreover, Moscow can limit freedom of actions of the FSU states because of 
their dependence on Russia's energy. This happened in Georgia and Ukraine, this is 
equally valid in almost any other FSU state. Russia does not want to reintegrate these 
republics and to take physical control over them, as it would be extremely expensive, 
therefore not beneficial for Russia. What she really wants is indirect control to influence 
the developments in the FSU. Hence, Russia seeks to become an indirect empire 
('liberal empire') using economic as opposed to military means. 149 
4.6.3. Economic interests 
In the economic field, a key factor has become economic growth in Russia and other 
CIS countries, which are highly dependent on trade and economic ties with Russia. 'Me 
dependence is the highest in Belarus (90 percent), and the lowest in Kazakhstan (40 
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percent) and Ukraine (30 percent). 150 European CIS states play a strategic role in 
ensuring Russia's fuel/energy exports to the West and Russia's imports by railway, road 
and sea. As was shown in the previous section, they are critically dependent on supplies 
and the transit of Russian oil, gas and electricity. 
The events in 2003-2004 revealed a new vigour in Moscow's policy towards the CIS, 
which materialised in a double-faced project. On the one hand, Russia was seeking to 
ensure that the neighbouring CIS states would be loyal to her and would not submit to 
the influence of the West. On the other hand, these countries have become a zone for the 
expansion of Russian capital. According to Trenin, this was supposed to be a certain 
combination of the Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine and the 'liberal empire' 
project advanced by Chubais. 151 
To promote economic integration, in September 2003 Russia set up the SES, involving 
Russia's three major economic partners - Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Ukraine's 
participation here was vital. At least implicitly, this integration project institutionalised 
Ukraine's competition with European aspirations. When Kuchma's term of office was 
nearing its end, Moscow tried hard to 'help' Kyiv in ensuring the succession so that 
Ukraine's economic integration with Russia would not be jeopardised. However, seen 
as one of Russia's foreign policy successes, the project is under threat as Ukraine is 
likely to promote increased compliance with EU norms. This is not compatible with the 
SES, which requires harmonisation of legislation with Russia. 
Apart from 'pipeline diplomacy', another lever in Russia's economic policy in the CIS 
is large private capital. The effectiveness of this lever depends on how advanced 
economic reforms and privatisation policies are in the CIS countries. It should be noted 
that for the first time in her history Russia is engaged in capital expansion. Perhaps, it 
was why Chubais defined Russia's strategy as that of a 'liberal empire'. The 
effectiveness of Russian private capital in the CIS directly depends on the support of 
these states. It is thought that Russian private capital has an advantage over Western 
capital in that 'it better understands the ins and outs of doing business in the CIS9 . 
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However, as post-Soviet countries continue to make their economies open to Western 
companies, this advantage tends to diminish. Therefore the temporary nature of Russia's 
capital advantage, together with electoral considerations and the belated confidence, 
when she enjoyed freedom of action, prompts Moscow to use very actively, if not 
aggressively, its economic and diplomatic levers in the CIS. 
4.6.4. Political interests 
In the political sphere, during Putin's first term, Russia's approach towards the FSU was 
moderate and better balanced than in Yeltsin's time. It can be described, to quote Irina 
Kobrinskaya, Senior Researcher at the Institute of the World Economy and International 
Relations in Moscow, as a 'policy of the possible'. 153 As Pravda put it, Moscow 
behaved like a 'constrained hegemon', as its actions were curbed b awareness of 
resource limitations and 'caution about the costs of power projection'. Meanwhile, 
during the second term Putin's administration appeared to lose its nerve. Moscow was 
making repeated attempts to influence the balance of forces in the CIS countries and to 
strengthen the positions of pro-Russian politicians there. Russia has sought to support 
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Russia-friendly candidates in leading positions in neighbouring states by sending 
political 'technologists. ' 55 The activities of those Russian political consultants, 
especially in Ukraine, have initiated results opposite to what was expected, much to the 
irritation of Moscow. In summer 2005, Karaganov concluded that Russia's positions in 
all FSU countries was weakened, and the main reason for this were mistakes made by 
Russia herself. 156 
In 2003-2004, some alarming processes were reported all over the FSU countries. 
November 2003 witnessed the regime change in Georgia, the so-called Rose 
Revolution, which encouraged people in other former Soviet states to push for the 
wholesale change of political elites. Later on, there was unexpected pro-European 
opposition to Russia in Moldova; Russia's clash with Ukraine over a disputed border in 
the Sea of Azov (Kerch Straits) 157 ; Azerbaijan's readiness for active contacts with 
NATO and the latter's agreements on that score; opposition rallies in authoritarian 
Central Asian countries - all this indicated the approach of a new wave of democratic 
revolutions along the perimeter of the Russian Federation. But what took place in 
Ukraine in the end of 2004 was arguably more profound. The Ukrainian Orange 
Revolution not only highlighted complete failure of Moscow's efforts to influence 
presidential elections in this country but also shattered Putin's policy towards the CIS. 
Becoming directly involved, Moscow eliminated its chance to become an arbiter in the 
Ukrainian processes and narrowed its sphere of dominance on the post-Soviet territory. 
The Orange Revolution set shockwaves throughout the entire post-Soviet space. The 
events in Ukraine represent a revolution of a new type. The previous revolutionary 
waves in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union in 1991 were revolutions 
against totalitarianism. These events are a 'revolution against imitation of democracy' - 
it is a protest against Soviet apparatchiks and crony capitalism. ' 58 Georgia was the first 
to demonstrate the weakness of such a regime but the Rose Revolution was perceived as 
a local phenomenon. Ukraine suggests a trend. This is not to say that all post-Soviet 
states will soon follow the Ukrainian example, but the fact that they all have problems 
maintaining stable authoritarian systems is obvious. By and large, Ukraine demonstrates 
that for post-Soviet regimes the moment of truth comes with a change of a leader. 
Russia resolved the problem after Boris Yeltsin by naming his successor and strictly 
controlling the election. But Ukraine rejected the Russian way. Sooner or later other 
post-Soviet states may find themselves with the same choice: either real democracy or 
undisguised totalitarianism. 159 
The real reason why the emergence of true democracy in Ukraine is a threat to President 
Putin is that it will set an example to Russia's democrats as well. The presidential 
elections in Ukraine were less about where that country is heading than about where 
Russia is now under Putin's rule. Russia's future depends on whether she controls 
Ukraine: one could fully subscribe to Zbigniew Brzezinski's words that Russia without 
Ukraine will never become an empire. Without meaningful influence over Ukraine 
Russia has no reliable links to Europe, a pinched supply line to the Caucasus and, most 
importantly, for a country with no natural borders, significantly less strategic depth. 
With Ukraine in her orbit, Russia maintains strategic coherence and a chance of 
eventually re-attaining a status of a great power. 
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By and large, Russian geopolitical defeats in the past five years would pale in 
comparison to Ukraine, Russia! s ancestral home. The 10th- to 13th-century entity of 
Kyiv Russ' is widely considered to be the birthplace of today's Russia. But Moscow's 
loss of Ukraine is far from being merely an emotional detachment. The developments in 
Ukraine are pushing Russia to a breaking point: if she allows Ukraine to fall under 
Western influence, Russia will be finished as a viable geopolitical force. As 'Stratfor' 
argues, it would not take a war to greatly damage Russian interests, simply a change in 
Ukraine's geopolitical orientation. 160 The significance of the loss only magnifies the 
humiliation. Vladimir Putin has lost more than face; he also has lost credibility at home 
and the West in his wider foreign policy goals. On the other hand, a Russia that controls 
Ukraine will remain an authoritarian state but a Russia that deals with a truly 
independent Ukraine could become a democratic country. Moscow has, therefore, 
feared not so much to loose the territory but that it would mean that Russia would 
remain the only country (except Belarus), which pretends to be European without 
adequate values. The gas dispute in the beginning in 2006 but proved that the Kremlin 
has not accepted defeat in Ukraine. 
Different perceptions of events run deep in the South Caucasus. Russia is aware that her 
role in the South Caucasus is challenged by Tbilisi's repeated attempts to secure more 
international engagement in the region. A new coalition of Georgia and Ukraine now 
represents a powerful force, promoting closer ties with European institutions. Many 
analysts in Russia view strategic relations between Georgia and Ukraine, which are 
supported by new NATO and EU members, as a form of 'encirclement'. Unlike Central 
Asia, where Russia and the United States share an interest in regional stability and the 
non-revival of the Taliban in Afghanistan, active Euro-Atlantic, and especially U. S., 
policies in the South Caucasus have been deeply worrying in Moscow. While Russian 
and American interests have overlapped in Central Asia and Afghanistan, U. S. 
assistance in revitalising GUAM 161 has been perceived as a sign of Washington's push 
to develop 'geopolitical pluralism' in the FSU through a support to the organisation of 
which Russia is not a Member. 162 There is a belief that the revitalisation of GUAM on 
the basis of new strategic relations between Ukraine and Georgia may undermine the 
already weakened Russia-dominated CIS and exclude Russia from integration projects 
in Eurasia. 163 This raises concerns in Moscow over the long term, as these policies 
undermine Russia's control over events on her periphery and are seen to accelerate the 
diversification of security relations in the post-Soviet space away from Russian 
influence. 
Another concern for Moscow is security implication of the revolutionary changes in 
Ukraine and Georgia related to the possible spread of popular uprisings to other, less 
stable parts of Eurasia. In March 2005, such a change of regime, the so-called Tulip 
Revolution, took place in Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan. However it did not go 
for an abrupt rift with Russia. Kyrgyzstan is still a participant of the integration 
associations in the post-Soviet space under Russia's auspices, including the CSTO, 
which has acquired a clearly 'anti-orange' bent. Within the CSTO it was decided to 
form a peacekeeping contingent, which would provide assistance in conflict resolution 
in the territory of the member states, which in practice will make it possible to suppress 
potential revolutionary actions. 
121 
Kyrgyzstan's strategic resonance stems from the fact that it hosts both Russian and 
American military bases that operate some coalition missions in Afghanistan. While the 
key international players - Russia, the United States, the EU and the OSCE - have 
largely worked together to bring order and prevent a long-term crisis in the country, 
their long-term interests remain different. The EU and the U. S. are concerned that such 
events could provoke already authoritarian regimes in Central Asia to undertake further 
repressions and violation of human rights. Moscow, for its part, is deeply unsettled 
about the proliferation of 'popular revolutions' across the neighbouring states and is 
therefore likely to encourage governments in these states to take more drastic measures 
to prevent popular protests. These differences from Russian and Western perspectives 
could prompt Central Asian governments to seek closer ties with Russia, which supports 
the preservation of the current regimes in power. 
4.6.5. Security interests 
In the security field, Russia has several points of interest and concern. The first is 
related to the settlement of 'frozen' conflicts in Transdnistria (Moldova), South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia (Georgia) and Nagorno-Karabakh (a part of fon-ner Soviet Azerbaijan). 
Russia has been involved in Transdnistrian conflict since the armistice in 1992. 
However, Russia has committed herself, in the final document of the OSCE Istanbul 
summit, to withdraw her forces from Moldova and to liquidate her ammunitions stores 
by the end of 2002, but it was delayed for one year. Instead of seeking solution in the 
multilateral formats, in December 2003 Moscow attempted to circumvent the five-sided 
negotiating structure - Moldova, Transdnistria, Russia, Ukraine, OSCE - and came up 
with a unilateral initiative. The Russian scenario envisaged handing secessionist 
authorities a share of power in the country's central govemment under a federal formula 
and guaranteeing such a settlement through a predominantly Russian military force. 
Fortunately, the EU and OSCE prevailed on President Voronin not to sign this deal, and 
Russia's attempt to co-opt the Moldovan leadership failed. The change of government 
in Ukraine created momentum for the resolution of the separatist conflict in Moldova. 
After the change of Ukraine's policy Russia remains the only external source of support 
for the Transdnistrian leadership. Moscow continues to deploy troops in the region 
despite strong pressure form Moldova and the international community on Russia to 
fulfil her obligation to withdraw military bases. 
In Georgia, there have been Russia's ongoing attempts to change Georgia's political 
course through military pressure and by encouraging ethnic separatism in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. Reasons that have been advanced are related to the so-called 'Great 
Game' over the oil pipelines routes. Moscow capitalised on the Rose Revolution, which 
increased the gulf between the centre and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while providing 
Adjara with the pretext to break relations with the central authorities. 164 Following the 
Rose Revolution Moscow moved to establish closer ties with both separatist regions, 
which are likely to strengthen further as Georgian government battles Russia over the 
withdrawal of her military bases from Georgia on the basis of her 1999 OSCE Istanbul 
commitments. Old ideas of recognising the independence of the breakaway republics or 
associating them with the Russian Federation gave rise to an increasing concern inside 
and outside with the rebirth of neo-imperial discourse in MOSCOW. 165 This debate 
created a pretext for Georgia to complain about Moscow's policies of granting 
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citizenship to people living in the separatist areas and reopening land communications 
with them, while maintaining a visa regime for Georgian citizens. As a result, Russia- 
Georgia relations deteriorated, and this Ruffier complicated conflict resolution. 
Georgia signalled her intention to explore possibilities to replace Russian peacekeeping 
troops, which are stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by international forces. 
Georgia also requested the EU to provide a replacement for the OSCE border- 
monitoring mission on the Georgia-Russia border near Chechnya, which was pulled out 
after Russia vetoed extension of her mandate. 166 However, the Russian government has 
seen EU statements about the need for a multilateral approach to the 'frozen conflicts' 
as an attempt to ensure a predominantly European voice and weakened Russian 
influence. In contrast, Russia has shown a preference for bilateral relations with 
Moldova and Georgia, but not multilateral. 
The second concern is Russia's inclination to claim a free hand in the former Soviet 
space. First time in her post-Soviet history, in the so-called 'Ivanov Doctrine', adopted 
in October 2003, Russia is deliberating a possibility of preventive use of her military 
might against CIS partners (see 4.8.3 The Defence "ite Paper). This idea came into 
focus again after the Beslan tragedy, when Russia's military leadership reiterated its 
intension to deliver preventive strikes on terrorist bases anywhere in the world. The 
targets are said to be beyond Russia's borders but within her limited reach and not on 
the territory of states able to deliver a strong response. 167 The first candidate for 
preventive strikes seemed to be Georgia, which was a serious irritant to Russia due her 
forceful pressure on South Ossetia. In the past, Russia frequently bombed Georgia 
without admitting responsibility, meanwhile accusing her of harbouring Chechen 
terrorists in the Pankisi gorge. If implemented, such a scenario would be a very serious 
blow to the fragile processes of Russia's integration within the CIS. 
The third concern is related to complicated defence and security cooperation in the CIS 
framework. A majority of the agreements concluded in the CIS were neither ratified, 
nor came into force. In August 2005, the CIS finally ceased to be a forum for military 
cooperation. The meeting of the CIS defence ministers' council in June 2005 confirmed 
only the shift of the military cooperation to the CSTO. Georgia, Moldova, and 
Turkmenistan were absent at this meeting, and Ukraine declared lowering her level of 
participation to observer status. 
In October 2002, the creation of the CSTO, involving Russia's most faithful five allies 
(Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and TaJikistan) was the first Russian 
initiative on the road to changing the security system in the post-Soviet space (see 
Appendix D). By and large, the CSTO could be viewed as Russia's attempt to create a 
structure similar to the Warsaw Treaty's in the CIS space to counterbalance the 
increasing U. S. and NATO influence in Central Asia, South Caucasus and other 
regions. Russia's major goal in the CSTO is to strengthen her military presence in allied 
states. The priorities of the CSTO include: cooperation in air defence, manufacturing of 
weapons, preparation of military personnel, and peacekeeping activities. However, the 
CSTO members still remain weak states, which forces Russia to finance the 
modernization of their military forces. Some progress in the development of integrated 
air defence system and the creation of Common Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF) 
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notwithstanding, the limited military capabilities of separate countries have kept the 
CSTO mainly political in nature. The Central Asian RRF group, with its HQ in Bishkek, 
remains the only multinational CSTO force. 168 
It is very important for Russia to increase her military engagement in Central Asia. 
Since the dissolution of the USSR, Moscow focuses on maintaining the status quo in the 
post-Soviet space and is endangered by the inclusion of such powers as the U. S. and 
China. This explains Moscow's efforts in giving a new impetus to the activities of the 
SCO. It has tried to use the war on terrorism as a means of attempting to unite the SCO 
states around a common security interest. 
As far as military cooperation with other FSU (non-CSTO) states are concerned, 
prospects are gloomy indeed. Moscow's concerns regarding the change of the 
government in Kiev include the extension of an agreement with Ukraine on the leasing 
of naval infrastructure used by the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. Ukraine also 
plays a key role in the Black Sea region, where both the United States and NATO seek 
to increase their presence. Russia wants to keep NATO out of the Black Sea but after 
NATO enlargement in 2004 she remains the only Black Sea state opposing NATO's 
greater role in the region. To make matters worse for Russia, several CIS states started 
to adjust their military structures to NATO standards, as they began to see cooperation 
within the CIS as counterproductive. The NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program 
gained a new dynamic after 2004, and focused on the post-Soviet space, especially 
Ukraine and the South Caucasus states. Russia perceives these activities as preparations 
for the next round of NATO enlargement. 
On 28 January 2005, speaking in the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Putin 
emphasised that Russia would recommend NATO to establish a new format 26+6 
(NATO + CSTO) for the development of their further cooperation. 169 The reason behind 
this is obvious: expanding bilateral ties between separate CIS countries and NATO and 
opening opportunities for some of them to become NATO members is dangerous for 
Russia. She wants to be in control of these processes. In a newly proposed format, 
Russia would expect to retain a decisive role, and subsequent bilateral NATO-CIS 
relations would depend a great deal on Russia. 
4.6 6 Concluding remarks 
Under Putin Russian policy in the post-Soviet space has become much more realistic 
than in Yeltsin's time. Although Russia's geopolitical retreat has intensified in recent 
years, she still remains the leading country of the Commonwealth and will continue to 
affect developments in CIS countries. There is still one factor that holds the CIS 
together: it is the member-states long-standing ties with Russia. Majority of them 
depend on Russia for energy and trade. Russia is using all the political, economic and 
military levers she still has at her disposal in order to promote cooperation within the 
CIS. Russia's overriding concern is stability within the CIS, although she still tries to 
benefit from the unresolved conflicts in the region. 
The CIS turned out to be beneficial for a 'civilized divorce' but it did not prove suitable 
creating a new pro-Russian political-military bloc which envisaged to become a tool for 
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the reintegration of the post-Soviet space, and opposing NATO and EU expansion. The 
Russian defence analyst, Alexander Goltz, says that the CIS as an institution is a 'dead 
body'. It exists only to promote Russia's domination in that region. Russia simply needs 
this institution to show that she is the boss. 170 
One of the key flaws in Russia's policy towards the FSU is that she seemed not to take 
into account the changes that were occurring in the post-Soviet space in the last years. It 
was only after the 'colour revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine that made the Kremlin 
notice the need to reshape thoroughly the regional security system in the post-Soviet 
space. The pro-Western foreign policy orientation of some FSU states made military 
and security cooperation with Russia hardly possible. For instance, Georgia and 
Moldova concentrate on the Russian abandonment of military bases, while 
Turkmenistan, which declared neutrality, does not take part in cooperation at all. 
Russia retains a strongly patrimonial mentality regarding the FSU. There is considerable 
unease about U. S. presence in Central Asia and Georgia. Significantly, such Russia's 
concerns are expressed not just vocally, but also in her growing security engagement 
with CIS member-states, both at the bilateral level and in multilateral forums such as the 
SCO and the CSTO. 
On the whole, Moscow's tendency to view FSU countries as her 'near abroad' and as a 
military buffer zone remains unchanged. Tbis, in fact, reflects the absence of any real 
policy towards the post-Soviet states beyond the general belief that they remain within 
Russia's legitimate 'sphere of influence'. Moscow's approach, as such, is increasingly 
bringing defeat and humiliation to the Kremlin. Latest developments in the FSU, 
particularly in Ukraine, bear the evidence that Russia! s integrationist initiatives in the 
post-Soviet space are in danger. 
Russia's zero-sum mentality with regard to the CIS is unrealistic. Given the 
preoccupation with domestic reforms, Russia is not in a position to consolidate the CIS, 
reclaim a monopoly on the regional security agenda and promote regional economic 
development. 171 Thus, Moscow should recognise that Russia and the West share 
common concerns about stability in the CIS. It is likely that Moscow will pursue 
consolidation and cautious expansion of influence in the FSU, without risking military 
adventurism in places such as Georgia. Although a strong hegemonic mindset remains, 
the means to realize such ambitions are lacking and will remain so for the foreseeable 
future. 
4.7. The new quality of NATO-Russia relationship 
4.7.1. NATO enlargement and Russia: a declining problem? 
( ... ) perceptions are stubborn things, especially when they have a history behind them. They can persist long after the reality they once reflected has changed. 172 
The regime's transition from Yeltsin to Putin led to major changes in Russian foreign 
policy including Russia's attitude to the enlargement. Furthermore, 9/11 has created an 
entirely new context for NATO-Russia relations: confrontation and distrust were 
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replaced by a spirit of collaboration. The positive change in U. S. -Russian relations 
enabled Russia to stop seeing NATO enlargement as an insurmountable obstacle to 
closer cooperation with the Alliance. While in January 2001 President Putin warned in 
his speech that NATO's expansion into the Baltics would be a 'serious matter', right 
after the 9/11 events he toned down the Kremlin's objections, saying only that 
enlargement is pointless. Putin used to state that Russia and her European neighbours 
had to learn a new language of trust, and that Moscow was keeping a close watch on 
NATO's changing role as a more political body. '... one can take another, an entirely 
new look at this if NATO takes on a different shade and is becoming a political 
organisation, ' Putin said, adding that Russians would reconsider their osition with 
regard to such expansion if they were to feel involved in such processes. 173P 
In accordance with the plans of the Bush administration, NATO has expanded 
according to a 'Big Bang' scenario: at the Prague summit in November 2002 the 
Alliance issued invitations to seven new members, including the three Baltic States. 
That would have seemed impossibly provocative not long ago, but in 2002 Russia likely 
had less reason to mind even against the Baltic invitation to join NATO. By most 
accounts, enlargement was presented as a mistake but as an internal issue for the 
Alliance. For its own part, NATO took advantage of an opportunity to involve Russia in 
broader security issues by offering her a new format of cooperation aimed at widening 
the relations between Moscow and Brussels and giving Russia an equal voice in the new 
forum. New footing for NATO-Russia cooperation was expected to solidify a Russian 
commitment to Western values. 
What are the grounds for the changing Russian attitude towards NATO? The answer is 
complex, but certainly includes the following mutually reinforcing points. First, 
regarding NATO as a threat, the perception is clear: few believe that an enlarged 
NATO, even embracing the Baltic States, poses any kind of military threat to Russia. 
However, as Lo argues, one should differentiate between the 'notion of physical threat' 
and the more abstract idea of 'geopolitical disadvantage'. 174 The significance of the first 
declined during the 1990s, while the second, on the contrary, has retained its relevance. 
NATO is not seen as serving Russian interests in the region. Moreover, it is perceived 
as related to the risk of moving dividing lines ftirther East. 175 Being still a symbol of the 
Cold War, NATO yet has far less military strate than psychological importance. It is 
6not a question of danger but question of pride'. 
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Second, a key desire for Russia is to maintain good relations with the West. Russia 
under Putin has been looking for a pragmatic international role beyond NATO, a role 
that would help create Russia's new image in the West and gradually restore her 
prestige as an important player. For a nation trying to normalise its relations with the 
U. S. and Europe winning some kind of arrangement with NATO becomes of crucial 
importance. What is more, Russia's primary fear about the consequences of NATO 
enlargement is that Russia will be strategically isolated from Europe, East and West. 
According to Sean Kay, a former U. S. defence official, although Russians often have 
viewed NATO as a threat to their interests, currently they have realized that 'they have 
more to gain by not standing in the way'. 177 Russia's goal is to get as much influence in 
European institutions as possible, so why not to take an opportunity to achieve this. 
Therefore Russian leaders seem to distinguish between the specific problem of NATO 
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enlargement and the broader, more fundamental issue of Russia's overall relationship 
with the NATO member states. 178 To quote Robert Hunter, a former U. S. ambassador to 
NATO, Russia 'acquires opportunities to get engaged in the West with benefits that are 
larger than NATO': elevation of her status as an international player, Western expertise 
and technologies to fight common threats and fostering economic cooperation with 
Europe. 179 
The third factor is based on the recognition that Russia could neither influence nor stop 
NATO's enlargement. Russia's bullying in the past proved counter-productive. The 
more the Kremlin demanded that NATO should stay away from post-Soviet countries, 
the more it underlined their need for security. Given that NATO, first time in its history, 
moved beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union, the Baltic invitation to the 
Alliance was considered among NATO analysts as a failure of Russian policy. 
Therefore Putin needed to lessen the blow and take account of such events well in 
advance so that they would not be perceived as a defeat for him personally and a defeat 
for Russia. Step by step the Kremlin team started to accept Baltic membership of NATO 
as, in fact, a solved issue even before 9/11. Thus Putin's soothing line on NATO 
expansion reflects a bid to reconcile public opinion to a decision he is powerless to stop. 
Fourth, it should be said that NATO is increasingly viewed in Moscow as the only 
European organisation that has the means to guarantee security. 180 At the same time, 
Russian political elites realise that the Alliance will never be the same again. They 
perceive that NATO in fact no longer matters that much militarily anyway. Russian 
debate became centred on NATO's transformation rather than who was entering the 
Alliance. Russians now see NATO more as a political organisation rather than Europe's 
nuclear guarantor. 
Finally, neo-realist thinking plays not the least role here: one of the strongest arguments 
why Russia did not fiercely object to NATO's expansion in the former Soviet area 
(which has always been defined in Russia's foreign policy doctrine as a 'zone of vital 
interests') was that Russia realised that influence in new NATO countries would not be 
lost completely - only its nature would change. Being deprived of political influence in 
Central and Eastern European countries, Russia is seeking to dominate their economies, 
particularly in the energy sector. And despite Russia's changing perception vis-a-vis 
NATO, the latter's expansion is still probably the biggest and the thorniest issue in 
Russia-NATO relations. The lack of Russia's options does not means that she regards 
this state of affairs as satisfactory. Many officials in Russia, especially those from 
'power ministries', are deeply unenthusiastic about the sorts of cooperative policies they 
would have to implement to work with NATO. 
There is also growing dissatisfaction with more traditionally favoured European 
security and political bodies, including the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Putin 
called for a revision of Europe's security structures that would enable Russia and the 
West to work more closely together against outside threats. He spoke in favour of 
creating new security architecture in Europe, saying that the current security system 
does not ensure security at all. Putin knows he cannot block NATO's advance, but he 
can reasonably hope to change NATO itself into a more political organisation, which 
Russia might one day join (about Russia's theoretical and practical possibilities of 
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joining NATO see Appendix E). The more political NATO becomes, the more Moscow 
can influence decisions within the Alliance. Simply put, Putin and his national security 
strategists have changed their tactics: instead of unconditionally opposing NATO's 
enlargement, they suggest the creation of a united security system in Europe. 
4.7.2. NATO -Russia Council 
NATO and Russia face many similar challenges to their security, including trans- 
national threats, such as global terrorism and WMD, as well as continued dangers posed 
by instability in the regions of concern to them both. As regards Russia's perception of 
threat, what Putin has done is not so much to ignore 'hard' security (nuclear and 
conventional deterrence, geopolitical advantage) as to renew stress on 'non-traditional' 
security problems such as terrorism. In this sense one could say that NATO and Russia 
share similar perceptions of threats, and there is a number of areas in which they can 
work effectively together. Therefore, the logic runs, it is in their mutual interest to forge 
a new relationship based on true partnership that can help contribute to lasting security 
and stability for all in Eurasia. 
Since 2001, when Russia became an important partner of U. S. -led global anti-terrorist 
coalition, possibilities for NATO-Russia cooperation increased dramatically, 
culminating in the proposal made by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Lord 
Robertson, then NATO Secretary General, to include Russia in NATO decision making 
on certain issues. This was a new relationship giving Russia a unique status in a forum, 
initially dubbed 'NATO at 20' (19 NATO member states and Russia), officially called 
the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). In this structure, inaugurated in Rome on 28 May 
2002, Russia has a seat at the table for discussions and consensus building on specific 
issues of concern. The NRC was bound not to compromise the rights of NATO 
members to have autonomy in making decisions 'at 19', including admitting new 
members, sustaining NATO's integrated command, and maintaining the strong 
coherence of its common values and practices. Nor was it supposed to be a backdoor to 
Russia's NATO membership. The motto was not Russia to NATO but Russia with 
NATO. 
These details were the most critical, but keeping in mind the broader view was also 
important: the question of the NATO-Russia relationship was every bit as much about 
NATO's dilemmas as Russia's problems. NATO is not merely a pragmatic alliance of 
sovereign states. It is based on the trans-national values, practices, and institutions of its 
members that enable them to work together and to sustain a level of assurance about one 
another's intentions that makes meaningful security cooperation possible. NATO should 
take Russia seriously, but if the Russian leadership continues to approach NATO along 
the same lines as it did during the 1990s that will not suffice. As Alexander Versbow, a 
former NATO Ambassador in Russia, put it, 'Russia will need to develop a new culture 
of cooperation -a spirit of flexibility, understanding, and compromise' 181 that is 
essential for an organisation working on the basis of consensus. This is the way NATO 
works, and this is the way that NATO-Russia relations also will need to work. 
It should be noted that through the history of NATO-Russia relations it is the second 
rapprochement between the former Clod War foes. The first one was in 1997, when 
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signing Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO 
and the Russian Federation and creating the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) took place 
with the aim of developing strong, stable and enduring partnership. This was supposed 
to be achieved through the mechanism of consultation, coordination and, if appropriate, 
joint decisions and joint actions. In between these two rapprochements, NATO-Russia 
relations experienced their ups and downs. Just to mention a few of the recent pressing 
security challenges triggered by the Balkan conflicts, especially the Kosovo crisis, two 
Chechen wars, and the current U. S. -led international coalition's war against terror. 
The NATO-Russia PJC offered for Russia sought partly to assuage her anger over 
NATO's enlargement, there were regular, set-piece meetings between Russia and the 
Alliance on what is called a '19 plus one' basis. In other words, Russia sat at one side of 
the table, while 19 NATO allies sat at the other. What were the main reasons making 
both sides become frustrated with each other? Trenin argues that the Founding Act per 
se was 'neither fundamentally flawed nor necessarily doomed' but from the very outset, 
the partners' attitudes 'were not particularly conducive to success', as both sides were 
reluctant to overcome the Cold War stereotypes. ' 82 Russia, seeking to restore her great 
power status in a multi-polar world, tried to drive a wedge between NATO's American 
and European allies, i. e. to play Europe as an antidote to U. S. predominance in the 
world. NATO, in turn, being cautious that the Russia-NATO PJC might overshadow the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC), denied the opportunity for Russians to influence the 
Alliance's policies before decisions had been taken. That is to say, 'nineteen plus one' 
format turned into 'nineteen versus one, and the two years of the functioning PJC has 
not become a good working model for closer cooperation. 183 
Russia was determined not to find herself presented at meetings with 'take-it-or-leave-it 
outcomes' preordained by the 19 NATO members. NATO, in turn, was insistent that 
Russia would not be able to veto its independent action. The compromise was to set up 
a new body - the NRC. NATO started to include Russia throughout its deliberations, 184 
rather than presenting her with unchangeable policies before beginning the dialogue. 
This was the biggest difference between the NRC and the PJC. However, this is not to 
say that the NRC without the pre-conditioned Alliance's positions gives Russia a veto 
over NATO's decision making. The Alliance continues to function 'at 26' (since seven 
new members joined NATO in April 2004) by retaining its prerogative to undertake 
independent actions and decisions on any issue consistent with its responsibilities under 
the Washington Treaty of 1949. But it is also true to say that NATO and Russia have 
now reached a consensus that will allow Russia, albeit to a limited extent, to influence 
NATO's policy. 
There were expectations that the founding of the NRC and further strengthening of ties 
would eventually encourage Moscow to better understand the real meaning and purpose 
of NATO enlargement and thus avoid the wrong impression that its eastward expansion 
would mean Russia's political defeat. An important component of the NRC is 
communality of interests, first and foremost, counter measures against asymmetric 
threats and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) terrorism. Being fully separated 
from the NAC, the new Council focuses on a restricted list of 'softer' issues ranging 
from anti-terrorism, efforts to combat the proliferation of WMD and their means of 
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delivery, management of regional crises and peacekeeping to civil emergency 
planning. 185 
To sum up, during four years the NRC elevated NATO-Russian relations to a new level. 
Visible results have been achieved in the practical cooperation area. Russia's signing 
the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on troops temporarily deployed on foreign 
territory, her support in NATO's operation 'Active Endeavour' in the Mediterranean, 
Agreement on Political-Military Guidance towards Enhanced Interoperability between 
Forces of Russia and NATO, preparation of political conception of Russia-NATO joint 
peacekeeping operations, cooperation in responding to threats posed by the proliferation 
of WMD, international terrorism and other areas show that NATO and Russia can 
cooperate in building international security. On the other hand, one could see that 
NATO-Russia cooperation is over bureaucratised: seventeen different working groups 
in the NRC format make no significant contribution that would justify their functioning. 
There is almost no cooperation on Russia's defence reform despite that a working group 
for this purpose was established. 
4.7.3. Different views and challenges 
Narrowing of positions on a number of issues notwithstanding, opinions within NATO 
and in Russia vis-A-vis new format of cooperation are not in harmony. There appeared 
to be several contradictions for Russia to resolve: first, how to develop stronger ties 
with NATO without strengthening it politically at the expense of other organisations; 
second, how to pursue collaboration with NATO without direct military integration; 
third, how to come to terms with NATO's enlargement eastwards (Moscow tends to 
differentiate between states such as the former 'partners' in the Warsaw Pact and those 
like the Baltic States, which had been an intrinsic part of the Soviet Union). 
According to Chris Donnelly, the former Special Advisor to NATO Secretary General, 
currently Senior Fellow of the Defence Academy of the UK, two points concerning 
NATO-Russia relations should be taken into account. The first is that NATO and Russia 
today want to do different things with each other: 'NATO wants to convert Russia and 
make it a more European country', whilst Russia wants 'to restrain NATO, reduce 
186 NATO's strength'. The second is that NATO mechanism of consensus works in a 
very particular way. Consensus in NATO means that member states lay on the table 
those issues on which they can agree. Russians were never good at that, because all 
'they want is only to talk about issues on which they disagree'. This is simply because 
Russia, throughout all her history, has never been in a relationship with any other nation 
when she was able to build up an agreement. 187 
The new body fell far short of what the Russians had sought: real influence on a range 
of NATO's deliberations outside its core mission of collective defence. The Russians, 
nevertheless, have perfectly realised that the best way to deal with this is to get inside 
and try to work the system by pushing the process along. 188 For Russians, to have power 
on NATO is equivalent to having a veto in the NATO-Russia Council. They have never 
understood that to have influence in the Alliance Russia needs to have junior officers 
and junior diplomats working every day in NATO headquarters. 189 And there is one 
more point: Russians do not want to be considered equal among commonality of 
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European countries. In their view, Russia can only equal the whole of NATO. No way 
can she equal any separate NATO member. 190 
The major challenge for the effectiveness of NATO-Russia partnership is that Russia 
wants to cooperate with the Alliance on issues like terrorism and non-proliferation but is 
not willing to integrate with NATO and cooperate side by side. In short, Russia wants 
integration with but not into NATO (my italics). Genuine integration with NATO would 
mean the end to the idea of the Russian army as it is today. '91 Due to the reason that 
Russia wants to integrate on security issues but has no much interest in military 
integration NATO-Russia cooperation has been rather limited in the Alliance's main 
sphere of activity - the military. On Russia's part it is lack of trust in NATO that largely 
explains such an attitude: Russian military elite still regards NATO as a potential threat. 
Cooperation is equally restricted in the political area. Open discussions should evolve 
not only on broad international security issues but on issues which are sensitive for 
Russia and are also concern to NATO, such as Russia's relations with post-Soviet 
countries. This is to say that NATO should not only propose a 'shopping list' for the 
cooperation agenda chosen by Russia but try to work with her in the areas of NATO 
interest: the democratisation of Russia, defence reform, NATO-Russian interaction in 
post-Soviet space, especially in conflict regions. 
In general terms, over the four years since the signature of the Rome declaration, the 
NRC has evolved from an ambiguous political idea to an operational reality. However, 
as there is some mistrust on both sides, the NRC participants at the initial stage had 
deliberately gone on the route of developing a low profile, essentially symbolic 
cooperation, without counting on any serious breakthroughs in key areas. 192 Donnelly 
says that Moscow's position on this is that tactical NATO-Russia collaboration will not 
be allowed to grow up to strategic level. 193 It seems that the activity of the NRC was not 
so much aimed at achieving significant progress, but at preventing breakdowns of 
cooperation. 194 
4.7.4. Future perspectives 
There have been many debates going on about the NATO-Russia Council, whether it is 
continuity or dramatic change, and whether it will lead to new relations in the long run. 
it is worth bearing in mind that the creation of the NRC was, after all, the Allies' 
initiative, and it was NATO, with relatively modest input from Russia, who crafted the 
Rome Declaration and shaped the NRC's structure and agenda. Therefore the creation 
of the NRC represents more a shift in NATO's perception and policy in terms of 
security priorities than in Russia's course of action. 195 
Two questions arise with respect to arriving at some decision about further development 
of cooperation between Russia and NATO. First, why does Russia need to cooperate 
with NATO at all? Second, what practical results can be expected from this 
cooperation? Igor Ivanov talks about Russia's interest in 'the [NATO - Russia] Council 
becoming one of the basic elements in a new system of Euro-Atlantic security in the 
very near future'. 196 At the same time, Moscow is not rushing to put these intentions 
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into practice, rather it seems to be watching from the sidelines to see what will come out 
of NATO's transformation. 
Russia continued to promote security cooperation with the U. S. in the global war on 
terror despite Putin's objections to the Iraq war - the issue was not discussed within the 
NRC forum, but rather through bilateral discussions between Washington and Moscow. 
This means that the framework of Russia-U. S. strategic partnership rather than NATO 
organisation was favoured. In this respect, the question now is whether the 
preoccupation with the campaign against global terrorism will not precipitate 
arrangements that will in fact dilute the political cohesion of the integrated Atlantic 
Alliance. NATO's political organisation is likely to rest on three pillars: the U. S., the 
EU and Russia. 197 That said, the condition of Russia-U. S. relations as a whole will have 
an obvious impact on how Moscow deals with NATO in the future. 
Within four years of common activities, NATO and Russia started to see each other as 
partners: the NRC has spoken with a single voice on international terrorism, the Balkans 
and Afghanistan. While 2002 was mostly dedicated to getting the political structures 
right, most of 2003-2005 were dedicated to developing mechanisms of practical 
cooperation. Thus, within a short period the NRC has proven effective within its defined 
areas of cooperation-198 However, beyond these relatively easy initial successes, the 
willingness to have the NRC on harder political issues, for example, frozen conflicts in 
the CIS, would be a key test of its resilience. It is likely that NATO and Russia will 
continue to have serious differences on key foreign policy issues. 
Expectations that Russia might actually be starting the process of changing her attitudes 
toward NATO expansion, thereby changing her entire security paradigrn have not 
materialised. The fact that Russia has not yet amended her primary security documents - 
the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine - indicate that Russia may 
merely be engaging in rhetoric and opportunism to gain from NATO as much as 
possible. 
It is also apparent that Russia seeks to anchor in the NRC structure in order to influence 
NATO transformation from a military-defence bloc to a more political organisation and 
split it from inside. The key tactic to achieve this is to weaken Euro-Atlantic links, 
escalate tension between the United States and the European Union - this is already 
being done by pursuing a policy of establishing strategic alliances both with the U. S. 
and with Germany or France. 
4.8. Defence policy 
4.8.1. Key problems ofthe military 
The issue of whether Russia will strengthen democracy, the civil society and a law- 
based state depends to a great extent on how the government and Russian society shape 
relations with military circles within the state. By and large, militarism has traditionally 
been of key importance in formulating the idea of national statehood among the Russian 
public. Since Putin's rise to power in 1999, the influence of siloviki on the government 
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has gown: during Putin's presidency, about 6000 members of the FSB and the military 
have been integrated into the ruling elite. Most notably, the presidential administration - 
the power centre of the Putin regime - has been interspersed by up to 70 percent with 
officers from the secret services and the military. Almost all positions of deputy head of 
the Kremlin administration were taken over by them and their sphere of power 
expanded. 199 Now these people have hold over the parliament, oversee parties, 
governors, public prosecutors, mass media and many NGOs. According to 
Kryshtanovskaya, Russia today is 'militocracy': people with military and intelligence 
background make up around three quarters of Putin's top officials, as against just 5 
percent of Mikhail Gorbachev's Politburo. 200 They occupy 70 percent of seats in 
administrative structures of federal districts and 35 percent of deputy ministers' 
positions. 201 
Putin inherited an unreformed and undemocratic military and an incoherent defence 
policy. The Soviet Union's once mighty army has been in a state of accelerated decay 
since the early 1990s. The sinking of Russian submarine 'Kursk' in the summer of 2000 
revealed that the situation within the military could not be described otherwise than a 
shambles. More alarming than the situation created by severe resource constraints has 
been the erosion of professionalism and control that keeps military in check. Living 
standards and social security of the armed forces have declined significantly, weapons 
procurement has decreased sharply; consequently, military readiness, training, morale 
and discipline have suffered. In March 2001, the combat readiness level was estimated 
at 25 percent of all units. 202 Instead of a military ethos, there has been institutionalised 
corruption and politicisation. Goltz says that Russian society and the state per se are 
much more advanced than the existing military system, which remains stuck in Soviet 
times. 203 That creates a problem because the society does not want to participate in and 
support such armed forces. 
Defence reform has topped President Putin's agenda since he was first elected in 2000. 
From the start, Putin's team faced strong opposition from the conservative lobby inside 
the MOD and the General Staff (GS). A former intelligence officer and Putin's close 
ally and proteg6, Sergey Ivanov, was appointed with a mandate to push through the 
reform agenda within the MOD. However, he became 'too disposed towards the 
military viewpoint 9204 to make meaningful cuts in staffing or shake up military funding. 
He was also hampered by serious opposition from the GS headed by General Kvashnin. 
According to Denis Trifonov, special correspondent of Jane's Defence Weekly, between 
2001 and his dismissal in July 2004, Kvashnin blocked Ivanov's plans to create rapid 
deployment forces, develop professionalisation programme, make the MOD's 
procurement plans more transparent and shift to post-Cold war defence planning 
principles. 205 
As of 2005, the Russian Armed Forces numbered about I million (with a military 
budget around the size of Switzerland's), down from 4.3 million Soviet troops in 
1986.206 For more than a decade Russia had cuts in her military forces instead of reform, 
but not the cuts that would help with reform. Cutting numbers has not achieved savings. 
What is more, military obstruction and the leadership's neglect of reform has 'fostered 
the overt politicisation of the anned forces', greater corruption, a 'repeated resort to 
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internal war', and thus heightened insecurity. 207 As a result, the military were 
transformed but unreformed. 
Although many times plans have been announced about the creation of a regular anny, 
the Russian Armed Forces are still largely conscript forces. On the one hand, 
professionalisation is related to Russia's economic problems, on the other - the 
conservative military establishment does not want to abandon conscription system for 
obvious reasons. First of all, it is related to mass mobilisation. It is instructive in this 
regard that until the Chief of the GS, General Kvashnin, left his post (July 2004) 
Russia's military leadership was stuck in the Cold War mentality, advocating the need 
for large ground conscript forces and maintaining a deep-seated belief in the need to 
remain ready for a total war against Western Europe. 208 Consequently, defence planning 
continued to operate from just such a premise. Secondly, the majority of the military 
elite has a personal interest in keeping things as they are. A conscript army is a big one 
with many pretensions and a lot of generals. Most important, it is the conscription 
system that provides very favourable conditions for senior officers to handle soldiers 
deprived of their rights. And for those administering the draftees, corruption helps 
perpetuate the system. 209 The real victims are the conscripts themselves. Such an 
approach to 'human factor' is contrary to delegating authority to non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs) - the backbone of discipline and training in many Western countries. It 
should be said that Russian NCOs are just 'conscripts with chevrons'; the Russian army 
is the only army in the world that has no career sergeants. 210 
There is neither a lawful overall policy process nor a specific democratic institution 
legally ordained with regular and general oversight, and leadership of national security 
and defence policy. The lack of accountability extends throughout the entire military 
system. The Duma under Putin has had almost no influence whatever; on defence policy 
as a whole or the military budget. 21 1 The absence of accountability and legal control 
help perpetuate and instigate politicisation of the military and dedovshchina. 212 It is 
noteworthy that more than 2,000 soldiers die each year from accidents, murder or 
suicide. 213 
A major consequence in the absence of legal control is the trend towards a police state. 
Penetration of secret police into society is particularly visible in the military. In 
February 2000, Putin ordered the FSB, one of four KGB successor bodies (along with 
the SVR, FSO, and GUSP), Russia's domestic intelligence agency, to restore 
surveillance over political allegiance of military personnel and become, once again, a 
centralised organisation, unifying both counter-intelligence and the police within the 
arMy. 214 Reorganisation of security organs deserves special mention. In March 2003, 
Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) was 
abolished and its functions split between the MOD and the FSB; the Federal Border 
Guard Service (FPS) was incorporated into the FSB . 
215 The Kremlin's policies today 
emphasise the armed forces' internal security role as much as their task of defending the 
integrity and sovereignty of the Russian Federation. Yeltsin and Putin have actually 
erased the line between domestic and foreign threats and functions confronting the 
various police and military forces. 216 
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The biggest burden of the Soviet heritage is the military industry complex (MIC) within 
the state. The future of the armed forces and the future of the MIC are inextricably 
interlinked: the reform of either one depends on the reform of the other. Analysts point 
out that the declining MIC for long was sustained through sales of its earlier stocks and 
by limited upgrades, with research and development (R&D) almost defunCt. 217 The 
Russian military need an effective industry to provide them with weapons in the future, 
and the Russian military industry requires a substantial home market for its products if 
it is to survive. Up to 2005, the defence industry has largely relied on its enormous 
reserves of R&D from the 1980s and early 1990s for the current generation of 
weapons. 218 
4.8.2. The basics of military reform 
There is a great need for military reform in Russia - the Cold War model of the armed 
forces is no longer adequate. Military reform per se is a challenge for any country as it 
requires the revision of structure and nature of operations of the armed forces. Russia 
faces similar problems other countries have experienced, but the legacy of the Soviet 
Army makes these problems, and reform, more difficult. What complicates Russia's 
military reform is that she has to deal with the problem of the transformation of the 
large country from a totalitarian state to a democracy and from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economy. 
Donnelly argues that when assessing the factors influencing Russian military reform 
today, the Soviet inheritance plays just as large a role as do the basic requirements of 
the armed forces and the demands of the new security landscape. Russia's dilemma 
today is how to reconstruct, from her inherited Soviet military basis, new armed forces 
and security forces, which could be able to meet the following security challenges: the 
long-term neighbours to the south and the east; internal security threats caused by 
instability on Russia's periphery and the new security threats posed by the changing 
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It cannot be denied that security policy and military 
reforms in large part depend on the country's economic development. There are sharp 
contradictions between Putin's efforts to launch a functioning market economy on the 
one hand and the needs of the MIC on the other. As General Piskunov noted, 'if we arm 
ourselves without taking into account the cost, our army will destroy us - 
economicall Y9 . 
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President Putin has undertaken some measures to halt the decline of the armed forces. 
Although the military budget in 2004 more was more than quadruple compared with 
that when he first took office in 1999, it will take years of consistent increases to 
improve the conditions of the Russian military. 221 Given Russia's finances, the choice is 
either small but good or large and bad armed forces. Too many generals are wedded to 
the large. In his annual State of the Nation speech to the Federal Assembly in 2002 
Putin pointed out that one of the unquestionable priorities of the Russian military policy 
is keeping the reforin on track and the transition to the professional army by cutting the 
mandatory two-year conscript service to one year. 222 In 2003, in his address on the same 
occasion Putin said that 'Russia must become a nation with up-to-date, ... mobile armed forces, ready to defend Russia, ... its national interests and citizens'. He promised that 
the military should be nearly fully professional by 2007.223 
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Since 2003 the Russian political leadership has started to pay growing attention to its 
armed forces. Military reform has finally moved from its deadlock: the legal basis of the 
armed forces' development has been formulated and corrected, and new normative 
documents, including the Defence White Paper, have been accepted. 224 In 2004, Putin's 
administration undertook the reform of the main structures of military establishment - 
MOD and the GS. Putin's decree of June 2004 cut the powers of the GS and reduced it 
to a department of the MOD with functions of an advisory group, responsible for 
strategic planning. 225 For years, the two institutions had existed as rival centres of power 
and fought over operational control of Russia! s Armed Forces, which was finally 
transferred from the chief of the GS to the defence minister. 226 Subordination of the GS 
to the MOD, followed by sacking Kvashnin in July 2004 has arguably been the most 
important step taken by Putin. This was a sign that things at last started to change. It 
was Kvashnin who in 1999, at the end of the Kosovo war, ordered Russian troops to 
seize Pristina airport, provoking a stand-off which soured relations with NATO ever 
since. He failed to plan for new sorts of war of the high-tech or guerrilla varieties and 
instead ran exercises designed to repulse massive invasions from East and West. 
The GS responsibilities are now limited to research and planning, military education 
and intelligence gathering (Russia's defence intelligence agency, the GRU, is a 
directorate of the GS). Service chiefs and commanders of Russia's six military districts 
now report directly to the minister of defence and his staff. An essential element of the 
institutional reform has been stripping the GS of most management functions. 
Personnel, procurement, construction and finance have been transformed into 
independent services under ministerial control. The GS, which has been bitterly 
opposed to plans for all-volunteer force, no longer manages the system of compulsory 
national service. 227 
Together with the restructuring of the military establishment there was also a substantial 
increase in budgetary allocations for the development of the an-ned forces and other 
power structures. 228 As a result of the improved financial situation, the MOD no longer 
spends its entire budget on operations. Procurement programmes and equipment 
modernisation are in better shape than at any time in 15 years; Putin has consolidated 
the arms industry, brought the large sectors of it under the government's direct control, 
and has forced major exporters to reinvest part of their revenues into the production of 
weapons for the armed forces . 
229 The number of military exercises per year reached the 
level of Soviet times and tends to increase. 
But despite all that, in principle military reform has seen only marginal progress, and 
Russian Armed Forces have had a limited success in addressing the existing security 
needs. To respond to new threats, especially Islamic fundamentalism, and, in a broader 
sense, international terrorism, in the words of Steven Blank, Professor at the Strategic 
Studies Institute of U. S. Army War College, so far Russia's military capabilities have 
been, 'on matrioshka doll level': the deeper you look the less substance you find 
inside . 
230 There have been largely bureaucratic actions trying to get more control of the 
key military institutions, especially limiting independency of the GS. The latest 
reshuffle in the top military leadership is symptomatic of the way military reform is 
being carried out in Russia, which is from the top down, exactly in the wrong order. 231 
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The power ministries, security sector have not been subordinated to democratic control 
and the rule of law; they still are above the law. 
According to Donnelly, the issue of transforming the defence and security establishment 
in Russia, as in all post-Soviet states, can be broken down into several distinct, though 
inter-linked, areas: democratic control; civil-military relations; defence reform; 
industrial conversion. 232 A particularly vital issue remains democratic civilian control of 
the military. Whilst currently under civilian control, (the current defence minister and 
his deputy are civilians), this has not led to more democratic control over the armed 
forces. Democratic civilian control should be carried out by the Duma through 
monitoring the compliance of the government policy and the armed forces (and security 
forces). It seems unlikely that in the near future defence and security policy will be 
either transparent or fully accountable to the Duma and the judiciary. Civil-military 
relations in Russia today are far from European normative standards. There exists a 
severe democratic deficit in military policy, where senior people account only to their 
personal superiors, not to the law or legal institutions, and 'autocratic and patron-client 
relationship dominate the armed forces'. 233 
As in any other country, decisions on defence and security transfortnation in Russia, 
must be a joint responsibility of politicians and military experts. Moreover, the reform 
of the Russian Armed Forces should be considered as an integral part of the broader 
security sector reform, encompassing all power ministries, agencies and forces of 
national security, both internal and external: the Ministry of Interior, border troops and 
police forces, and other militarised agencies. The traditional split of military forces 
under three ministries - MOD, Interior and KGB (Border Guards) - was a specific 
feature of the Soviet system designed to prevent too much power being concentrated in 
one ministry and becoming a threat to the Communist party. This heritage of multiple 
militaries, ftirther complicated by Yeltsin, still plagues Russia. 234 Although this chaotic 
system has now been restructured, it is still far from satisfactory, 'resulting in widely 
differing standards of discipline, training, morale and competence'. 235 The current mix 
of military forces is costly and inefficient. Streamlining and rationalising this system 
would be basic to the success of military reform. 
Another problem is the enormous Cold War military infrastructure that Russia inherited 
upon the disintegration of the USSR. This infrastructure is unnecessary but it exits, 
consuming a substantial p 2 
! 4ft of military spending and obstructing the formation of a 
modem army in Russia. " To maintain this obsolete structure to the detriment of the 
reform of the military system as a whole has required the GS 'to maintain the image of 
NATO as a potential future threat', despite the positive changes in Russia's relations 
with the West and NATO, and the evident new threats that Russia faces today. 237 
Understandably, it is very hard for the Russian military leaders to admit that there is no 
longer a threat from the West. Donnelly argues that if the Cold War infrastructure were 
dismantled, the rationale for many officers' careers would be removed. The officer 
corps would have to be restructured and much equipment destroyed. To achieve this 
would require very firm control by the Russian leadership to overcome the 'deep-rooted 
interests and innate conservatism' of the GS and to force them to address the real threats 
to Russia's security. Most Russian analysts today assess that the current leadership is 
not capable of exercising such a degree of control, which would require not only to give 
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orders to the generals but also to have a mechanism to check upon compliance. This 
would require a high degree of understanding of the faults of the old system and a clear 
vision of a new system. 238 
Arguably the backbone in reshaping Russia's Armed Forces to meet the current security 
challenges is cadres. The most immediate issue to be solved regarding the personnel 
policy is organisational in nature. This concerns the process of career development 
inherited from the 'Soviet system of edinochaliye' - rigid command and discipline 
developed for and appropriate to wartime conditions. Such system has proved totally 
inappropriate in peacetime. Firstly, it has led to poor internal communication between 
ranks: 'top-down orders discourage bottom-up ideas', and resentment flourishes. 
Secondly, it resulted in the current military system's failing to develop a transparent and 
consistent system for officer evaluation and posting or promotion. 239 
As part of a plan to reclaim the country's great power status, Putin has a desire to 
restore Russia's influence across her 'near abroad'. Russia's National Security Concept 
and Military Doctrine (both of 2000) explicitly postulate military reintegration of the 
CIS as a goal. The plan of integration appears as an opposing model to the one of 
NATO and resembling a hegemonic system, where Russia retains control over the CIS 
states and their armed forces (see Appendix D: Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
in the post-Soviet space). A key importance is attached to the creation of Rapid 
Reaction Forces (RRF) of the CIS states and increasing of the interoperability between 
Russian and CIS forces. The most advanced case of military integration is clearly 
between Russian and Belarus forces. Putin's goal is to create unified CIS military and a 
uniform defence industry, shifting from nuclear deterrence to conventional forces. 240 
The main aim of a successful military reform should be not rebuilding 'muscle' and 
restoring Russia's ability to project power externally-, but optimising the existing 
military structures based on the economic potential and the real threats Russia is facing. 
To this end Russia needs genuine reorientation towards restrain and discretion in her 
foreign policy, materialised in a substantial and sustained reduction of her military 
engagements outside the borders. The most obvious cases for withdrawal are Moldova 
and Georgia. 
On the whole, failed democratisation and failed military reform are inseparable aspects 
of the same negative and regressive process. They both entail serious domestic and 
international consequences. Thus, the way in which the role of the armed forces is 
defined in Russia will have much to do whether Russia will manage to create a truly 
democratic society. Put another way, Russia will not have a normal military unless she 
has built a democratic state; and transformation has to be directed from the state to the 
armed forces, but not vice versa. A genuine reform must embrace the whole security 
sector, including the defence industries, and military science and education. As long as 
this failure persists Russia can neither be a fit partner for the rest of Europe nor conduct 
a truly European security policy. 241 
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4.8.3. The Defence "ite Paper., new trends 
In October 2003 Sergey Ivanov presented a report 'The Priority Tasks of the 
Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation', which was also called 
the Defence White Paper (DWP). 242 The document addresses the question of what sort 
of military Russia needs to fight modem wars, including how to project power abroad. 
Experts call the document the 'Ivanov Doctrine, to separate it from the official Military 
Doctrine adopted in 2000. In fact, the document does not correspond to the 
requirements of the military doctrine, according to the structure and level of its 
approval. It has only an interim character, and reflects how the Russian MOD sees the 
doctrinal problems and pressing tasks of armed forces development. 
At the strategic level, MOD sources indicate that military transformation is seen as a 
step towards achieving three objectives: enabling Russia to combat terrorism, restoring 
Russia's ambition to project power globally; and consolidating Russia's influence in the 
FSU. It should be stressed that the 2003 DWP reveals a much wider perception of 
military threats. Not only a direct military threat but equally all actions of foreign 
countries that may undermine Russia's interests, rights of her citizens residing in these 
countries, or even unstable or weak governments of neighbouring states are perceived as 
military threats. For instance, in the DWP some external threats are characterised as 
follows: 'the deployment of foreign troops on the territories of neighbouring states 
without Russian consent and without UN sanction; military deployments that change the 
military balance in countries along Russian borders and those of Russia's CIS allies; 
and the expansion of military alliances at the expense of the security of Russia and her 
allies'. 243 
In general terms, DWP makes a fundamental change to the system of military response 
itself. A major task fixed in the DWP is threatening by military force: Russia reserves 
the right to deliver preventive strikes at other countries. Moreover, the document allows 
Russia to be the first to use nuclear weapons (if and when the country is on the brink of 
defeat). This indicates an entirely new twist in Russia's national military policy. In 
addition to the two standard types of threats - external and internal - the document 
incorporates an unprecedented new threat - 'a trans-border' threat. The main threat to 
Russia comes from 'instability in countries along its borders 244 , which is caused by the 
weakness of the regimes in those countries. And that is precisely where the document 
proposes to aim preventive strikes, if those countries threaten Russia or intend to 
produce weapons of mass destruction. This implies that Russia has officially refused the 
traditional concept of deterrence and has chosen a considerably more aggressive version 
of military response. The DWP states: 'Understanding of the conditions necessary for 
the use of military might has changed ... a direct military threat to national security' is 245 no longer mandatory. However, in Ivanov's words, the document 'does not specify 
any preventive nuclear strikes... It merely implies that Russia retains the right to use 
military might for prevention, CIS countries included'. 246 Speaking at the conference in 
Reykjavik in October 2003, he added a key detail, saying that military force can be used 
'if there is an attempt to limit Russia's access to regions that are essential to its survival, 
247 or those that are important from an economic or financial point of view. Similar 
expressions were reiterated by Ivanov and the Head of the GS, General Yury 
Baluevsky, in the wake of the Beslan hostage drama. 
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These seemingly new additions to the National Security Concept adopted in January 
2000 (shortly after Boris Yeltsin handed over his presidential powers to Putin) and 
subsequently known as the 'Putin doctrine' codified what some observers might 
consider Russian claims to hegemony in the CIS. This is 'a significant new threat on a 
much broader scale' to retain the CIS under Russian control, as Braithwaite put it. 
248 In 
short, the 2003 DWP is the first Russian document that permits preventive use of 
military might and outlines the circumstances when it may be used. Moreover, 
according to Ivanov, doing this would not require the sanction of the UN Security 
Council or any other international organizations. Thus, the perception of Russian 
national interests and military threats has become so broad that, provided there is a 
political will, it is always possible to find a formal pretext for the deployment of armed 
forces on any state's territory. For instance, the DWP states that under the president's 
decision the armed forces may be used at any time when there is a need to safeguard 
security of economic activity. 
According to Goltz, from a legal point of view Russians have all legitimate powers to 
use pre-emptive strikes. Another question is the target and capabilities to perform such a 
type of operation. With regard to a target, Russia has to prove to the international 
community that there is a threat to Russia's national security. As far as capabilities are 
concerned, Russian Armed Forces are totally unprepared for pre-emptive strikes. Up till 
now Russia has been able to conduct operations of a type of the Second World War, 
involving massive armies and without paying much attention to civilian casualties. But 
if Russia tries to behave the same way, like she did in the Pankisi gorge, the result will 
simply be the spread of the conflict; it will be clear adventurism. Therefore, Goltz says, 
all the ideas about pre-emptive strikes on the part of Russia are complete propaganda. 249 
In Lo's view, Russia follows the U. S. and wants to establish a theoretical right for pre- 
emptive operations but she is not able to carry out them. 250 Blank thinks that Russians, 
at best, have capability to make quite a few strikes like in Pankisi gorge but they cannot 
make a successful strike in a strategic sense. Beslan perfectly demonstrated that military 
and security forces, intelligence, police, and border troops have no chance of achieving 
victory. They do not even know how to win the war in Chechnya except by destroying 
her. 251 
Although the overall tone of the 2003 DWP is more moderate than Russia's major 
security documents of 2000 and it is much more focused than previous military 
doctrines, it nevertheless contains a series of controversial provisions. First of all, it 
informs the reader that it is the 'potential of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 
that will be the factor preventing collapse of the system of international relations based 
on international law. 252 This is an odd conclusion on the calling of the army, 
particularly since the document goes on to proclaim unquestionable leadership of the 
UN, priority of international laws and political means of conflict settlement. Secondly, 
it includes objectives, which the Russian Armed Forces are simply incapable of 
achieving in the foreseeable future, like fighting in two localized conflicts 
simultaneously-, they cannot even cope with one. Thirdly, if the main contemporary 
threat is terrorism; not only to Russia, but to the whole civilized world, then fighting 
terrorism does not require a new generation of ballistic missiles, nor advanced air 
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defence systems. However, as it is stated in the DWP, there is pride in deploying new 
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and creating an extensive new air defence 
system. The overall impression created by the DWP is that the fundamental task of 
taking action against a country or territory that poses a threat to Russia would be a 
nuclear strike delivered by ballistic missiles. Above all, although nothing is said about 
any confrontation with the United States or NATO, an important reservation is made to 
the effect that if NATO remains as a military alliance with the offensive military 
doctrine that exists today, this will require a drastic restructuring of the Russian military 
planning and the principles of building Russian Armed Forces, including a change in 
the Russian nuclear posture. 253 The latter statement could be read as a warning to 
NATO, underlining that Russia expects that that the offensive entries will be removed 
from NATO's military planning and political declarations. At the same time, according 
to the specifics of military exercises and their tasks, it is fair to assume that Russia 
considers Western (NATO) and Far Eastern (China) strategic directions a priority. It is 
precisely in these directions that she foresees a possibility of using the armed forces for 
large scale conflicts. Hence, although that the Russia-NATO intercourse is officially 
treated as good, Moscow still perceives a threat of an expansion of military blocks and 
alliances, which may affect the settled balance of forces near Russia's borders. 
It is also worth noting that the DWP sets out a very rapid transition from 'no-contact 
warfare' to 'contact warfare'. 254 In other words, it bypasses the phase of warfare, which 
has been employed by the Americans over the past decade - months of air strikes on 
enemy territory with the aim of weakening the opponent as much as possible before the 
invasion. That what has happened in Yugoslavia and Iraq. But the new doctrine 
proposes quite the opposite: drawing the enemy into operations on the ground very 
rapidly. 
At the same time, the document reflects some encouraging trends. First of all, it 
contains a more realistic assessment of threats. Any threat of an attack by NATO and 
the United States is no longer treated as probable and reasonable, and at long last the 
numerous and diverse conflicts of different levels, mainly in the South, have been given 
priority. It also stresses that new challenges and threats, such as international terrorism, 
WMD and ethnic conflicts, points up 'growing importance of international cooperation 
of security structures, including secret services and armies'. To counter these threats 
Russia may join international operations led by 'provisional' coalitions, provided they 
promote the supremacy of international law. 255 Secondly, the document commends 
"strategic partnership' between Russia and the United States, and 'supports the war on 
international terrorism within the framework of the existing counter-terrorist coalition 
which is an element of global stability and a means of establishing a fairer world 
order'. 256 This is Moscow's wholly new rhetoric. Last but not least, it is encouraging 
that the military are talking about their problems, trying to gear the development of 
Russian Armed Forces to the global trend and comparing them to the armies of Western 
countries. 
Nevertheless, the traditional attitude, dominating Russian political and military 
establishments, that the strategic nuclear forces are the guarantee of national security 
and the status of the world power has not practically changed during the last decade. 
Russia finds that the weakness of conventional forces must be counterbalanced by a 
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robust nuclear posture. In early 2004 Putin was quoted as saying: 'The Soviet Union's 
military might, mainly projected through its nuclear forces, was a factor that balanced 
power in the world. We need to maintain this power and we Will. -)257 Therefore strategic 
and sub-strategic nuclear forces will continue to be the most important element of 
Russia's military strength but there will be a significant shift of emphasis from large 
scale/regional war to local war conflict. This commitment has been translated into extra 
funding for programmes to procure the silo-based and mobile versions of the SS-27 
(Topol-M) ICBM and develop the navy's next generation Bulava (SS-N-30) submarine- 
launched ballistic missiles. 258 At the same time, the DWP confirms the ground forces' 
supremacy and its commitment to develop the service's capabilities since the army 
would be expected to take a lead in any counter-insurgency operation. 
To conclude, major points of view of the 2003 DWP retains a moderately assertive 
attitude towards the West, a strengthening Russia's position within the CIS, as well as 
on the global level, and, most important, emphasises military means as an instrument of 
security policy by deliberating a possibility of preventive strikes at Russia's CIS 
partners. In the area of military policy, the DWP emphasises Russia's commitment to 
transform her military into a professional force capable of countering a variety of threats 
with fewer casualties and higher degree of sophistication. 
In Russia there is no clear mechanism by which Putin can reform the military according 
to Western standards. Unreformed Russian Armed Forces are increasingly becoming an 
obstacle for their cooperation with NATO forces on equal footing. It is indicative in this 
regard that upon Putin's request the working group was set within the NRC with the aim 
of assisting Russia to advance with her military reform. However, due to the reluctance 
of Russian military authorities to cooperate in this field nothing has really been 
achieved. 
A recurring concern is the 'intractability, of the Russian military. Therefore some 
analysts suggest that Putin may start military reform by focusing on a small 'embryonic' 
force situated within a larger unreformed military; historians point out that this was how 
Peter the Great 'inserted' his reform plans into the Russian military machine. 259 Such a 
new army is supposed to include autonomous systems of command and control, training 
and equipping personnel elements, supplying and provisioning troops, and so on. 
According to Arbatov, from the viewpoint of manpower and other resources, a 
'550,000-600,000-strong professional army could ensure the highest quality for 
Russia's armed forces for the next 10 to 15 years'. 260 
Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to state that Russian military reform is not taking 
place at all. Russia has recently begun implementing her long-delayed plans to end 
conscription, resume weapons R&D and the re-equipping all-contracted forces (around 
2010). The MOD's plans call for focussing its resources only on Permanent Readiness 
Forces (PRF) - some 20 percent of the force. The 2004-2008 military profesionalisation 
programme is designed to increase the performance and capabilities of PRF, first of all, 
their strategic mobility and flexibility. 261 It is noteworthy that since 1999 Russia's 
expenditure on national defence has increased significantly. The Putin administration 
has also made building a smaller but more effective military a high priority. The 
growing budgetary allocations stipulate increasing military activity, growing number 
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and scale of military exercises every year. Taking into account new military threats 
Russia seeks to reorganise the entire administrative-military apparatus and the armed 
forces as much as possible. 
4.9. Conclusions 
... imperial nostalgia 
dies slowly, and it certainly lingers in the principal institutions 
of Russian power, notably the military and security forces, and among Russia's 
foreign policy elite. 262 
Russia under Putin, albeit emerging from the effects of the Cold War, remains in 
transition. To paraphrase a prominent expert on Russia, Boris Kagarlitsky, Russia 
currently is at the parting of two unknown roads: neither is she capable of catching up 
with the West nor can she allow herself to remain in backwardness. 263 An important 
problem between Russia and the West has been 'incongruity and a-synchronicity' of 
development of the two civilisations. For most of her modem history, Russia has been 
emulating the West. However, since the Peter the Great, Russia's policy has been that of 
'belated modernisation, catching up, but always arriving too late'. 264 
Russia is no longer a superpower. Putin is apparently torn between his self-appointed 
mission to bring Russia into the Western world and the need to stop the West's 
geopolitical invasion, at the same time being reluctant to break with the West. Though 
he sees that the West is taking one position after another in Moscow's 'near abroad', he 
is likely to realise that Russia must choose between two evils - confrontation and 
submission. The former would require the complete reversal of all post-Soviet efforts to 
westernise Russia, while the latter - 'becoming one of the resource bases of the West 
and losing real sovereignty'. 265 Putin supposedly sees the latter as the lesser evil and 
hopes Russia will be able to buy the time needed to rebuild herself economically and 
eventually free herself from dependency on the West. In circumstances of uncertainty in 
world affairs, comparatively weak Russia has little choice but to pursue a status-quo 
orientated foreign policy that seeks to preserve as many positions of strength as possible 
from the previous system and to ensure a voice in the formation of a new world order. 
Russia's Western-centric orientation did not imply a structural change of her security 
and defence policy. The 2003 Defence White Paper makes a fundamental change to the 
system of military response itself. Russia reserves the right to deliver preventive strikes 
at other countries. It is the first Russian document that permits preventive use of 
military might and outlines the circumstances when it may be used. This implies a 
significant new threat on a much broader scale to retain the CIS under Russian control. 
Military reform in Russia has seen only marginal progress so far, and Russian forces 
have had limited success in addressing existing security needs. It is far from being a 
comprehensive reform, which should embrace the whole security sector, including the 
defence industries, and military science and education. A persistent Cold War mindset 
in the military establishment and the lack of transparency is counterproductive to the 
reforms. Intractability of Russian Armed Forces remains an obstacle for their 
cooperation with NATO forces on equal footing. 
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It has almost become a truism to consider that economic imperatives drive much of the 
decision-making in Russian foreign and security policy. Just as the demands of 
economic modernization led Mikhail Gorbachev to undertake perestroika in the late 
1980s, so much of Putin's foreign policy program is both motivated and constrained by 
economic factors. But it would be a serious mistake to conclude that economics are the 
whole story. Although building good relations with the West remains Russia's goal, 
strengthening those ties at the expense of perceived excessive concessions of Russia's 
national interests is not. 266 
Putin's realism and pragmatism is reflected in several key features of Russian foreign 
policy: an emphasis on action rather than rhetoric, most notably in the FSU; a reluctance 
to fight unwinnable battles, such as over NATO enlargement or abrogation of the ABM 
treaty; the realization that, as a relatively weak power, Russia is frequently less an 
6actor' than 'acted upon'. Hence, the Putin leadership accepts the reality of the current 
international system, namely that it is dominated by the U. S. Given the U. S. strength 
and Russia's weakness, Putin himself sees no point in opposing the status quo. 
However, this acceptance of the inevitable contains some paradoxes. Suffice it to 
compare Putin's current foreign policy with that of the Kozyrev period in the early 
1990s. 267 Whereas Kozyrev saw partnership with the West as a means for Russia to 
become an integral part of the Western community on the basis of shared values, Putin 
saw this partnership as simply a means of not being marginalized by U. S. -led 
globalisation. Marginalization would destroy any hopes of regaining great power status. 
Fearful that Russia may be marginalized and become an object of growing international 
indifference ('Russia-fatigue') the Kremlin seeks to position Russia in the Western 
mainstream as the epicentre of international decision making. This is a paradox, as Putin 
is pursuing a Westem-oriented foreign policy, but has no interest in westemising 
(democratising) Russia. This places limits on the extent of possible partnership between 
Russia and the West. It also carries the possibility that a stronger Russia may at some 
point turn her back on this partnership. Hence, under Putin, partnership with the West is 
not an end itself, but rather a means to an end. 
A more stable and controlled domestic situation has undoubtedly a positive effect on the 
conduct of foreign policy. The Putin administration's approach to many foreign policy 
areas, in comparison to that of Yeltsin's, contains elements of continuity, as well as 
transformation. The key difference is that Putin's foreign policy course has become 
more defined and better exercised. Under Putin, the focus on more concrete foreign 
policy priorities, security as well as economic issues, has led to the reduction of 
dogmatism in geopolitics, which is one of the most visible differences from his 
predecessor. This, in turn, has had an impact in shaping Moscow's threat perceptions. 
This is not to say that geopolitics is loosing its relevance under Putin but merely shows 
the degree to which the Kremlin subscribes to the current positive-sum rhetoric of 
cooperative security. What Putin has done is not so much to revolutionise Russian 
thinking as to introduce some sort of consensus between existing ideas, as well as 
consistency in their implementation. It could be argued that Putin's policies make more 
sense and seem less contradictory if they are understood not as 'revolutionary steps of a 
Russian Thomas Jefferson but as the more pragmatic efforts of a hard-headed former 
KGB officer 268 to restore Russia's influence in the world by all possible means. 
Without neglecting Putin's contributions, they are surely pale beyond Gorbachev's 
144 
initiatives on arms control and acceptance of freedom of Eastern Europe, or Yeltsin's 
tacit recognition of the independence of former Soviet republics. 269 Thus, foreign policy 
changes under Putin are merely evolutionary (rather than revolutionary), in which many 
elements of old security thinking survive. Furthermore, Putin's administration has tried 
to depoliticise the conduct of external relations. 'Economisation' and 'multi-vector' 
policy - these are the concepts driving Russian politics. 
Some new trends in Russia's foreign policy also appeared. In Yeltsin's era, Russian 
foreign policy often hesitated between a 'true embrace of the West and the desire to 
continue with Russian exceptionalism'. 270 Under Putin, the Kremlin gave up the 
dilemma - the West or the East. Russia's foreign policy is no longer one-sided. The 
upset balance in Russia's relations with the West and the East has been restored. 
Equally, the earlier debates about Russia's foreign policy design - America-centric or 
Euro-centric - are becoming apparently pointless. Putin has made it clear - Russia's 
foreign policy is going to be pro-Russian using the most effective instruments possible. 
Although in practice this translates into a Western-centric approach on many issues (the 
political elite continues to view the West as the main strategic reference point), the 
governing principle of Russian foreign policy remains pragmatism and the virtues of 
balance. 
Russia's international weight has increased owing to her economic growth, personal 
diplomacy of her president, and also to a number of objective factors, such as 
destabilisation of international relations, strengthening economic competition between 
the U. S. and Western Europe, and the increasing dependence of the world economy on 
energy. Despite Russia's negligible real economic weight, the combination of all these 
circumstances, especially the mounting influence of the energy factor, has considerably 
increased Russia's role in world politics. On the other hand, Russia's international 
image definitely needs improvement. Moscow continues to pursue foreign and domestic 
policies strongly at odds with Western interests and values. To have a respectable image 
abroad Russia must be attractive not just appear attractive. Thus, the main effort to 
salvage the country's image should be deployed at home, not abroad. 
Russia's rapprochement with the West in the wake of 9/11 appeared to be not a 
revolutionary change but pure pragmatism reflecting Putin's push for Russia's 
modernisation. Putin sees Russia's natural destiny as that of a modem great power: not 
only militarily powerful, but an influential political and economic actor. The rebirth of 
Russia's great power ambitions coincides with high and still growing world prices of 
oil, which makes Russia less dependent on Western economic support and gives her a 
positive long-term financial perspective. 
Despite the talks about integration and normalization, 'not-like-the-others' mentality is 
very natural for Russia. 271 In effect, Russia wants selective integration, considering 
herself to be 'special' and different. Russia has consistently conducted her foreign 
policy on the basis of a few key 'strategic' relationships between the major European 
powers, namely U. S., Germany, France and UK. These relations are not so much 
important in promoting bilateral interests, but much more for the forming of building 
blocks of the multi-polar world order sought by Moscow. Moscow looks for the most 
effective means of realizing its foreign policy objectives, and that means engaging with 
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powers and institutions (e. g. UN and NATO) that are most likely to advance Russian 
interests. 
Internationally, Putin's gamble on Western support has been driven more by the vision 
of long-term benefits, thus it remains essential for Putin to stay the course of partnership 
with the U. S. and Europe. Due to resource constraints Russian foreign policy will 
remain pragmatic and is not expected to challenge overtly Western interests. Therefore, 
although the West cannot expect Putin to be an easy partner, one could not anticipate 
that Putin's authoritarianism in domestic affairs will translate into an aggressive and 
confrontational foreign policy. Managing the new asymmetrical relationship with 
Washington is turning into a fine art for Moscow. In Europe, bilateral relations with 
major states are seen to have key importance but security and economic institutions, 
especially NATO and the EU, do matter for Russia. NATO enlargement has caused 
some concern but cooperation within the NRC framework is still a main priority. 
However, any future NATO enlargement into the FSU or more active engagement of 
NATO or the EU in the post-Soviet space would cause Russia's opposition and possible 
reaction. 
To conclude, Russia's integration with the West at large should not be judged on words 
but on deeds and on the coincidence of not only pragmatic interests but also basic 
values. However, Russian foreign policy is based on the convergence of selected 
interests, not values. It is important, therefore, not to retain any illusions that the West 
can gconvert' Russia to its system of values. In practice it means that Russia and the 
West will continue, to a certain extent, to make coalitions of convenience, when they 
seek common interests. There remains ample scope for Western cooperation with 
Russia in many areas of common interest: Afghanistan, Central Asia, Middle East, and 
so on. The area that Russia views pretty much zero-sum and where the problems are 
likely to be much harder to tackle is the 'near abroad'. Another aspect in Russia's 
relations with the West is globalisation, which is inseparable from domestic politics. 
Both aspects appear to be key influences on the formation of a new context for Russia's 
relations with the West, which today exist simultaneously on several levels: the 
domestic level, the traditional state level, and the trans-national global level. 
In the first decade of the 21st century, Russia is likely to concentrate primarily on her 
domestic agenda. Russia's international involvement will continue to be relatively 
modest, with the exception of the CIS countries. In this area, Russian politicians will 
need to balance their real economic and security interests with their historical 
geopolitical ambitions, which can distort and compromise their policies. Despite the 
Russian elite's growing confidence and some recent assertiveness, Russia remains a 
relatively weak player that should not overreach. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FOCUS UPON EUROPE 
Russia's entry into Europe cannot be negotiated with Brussels. It has to be made in Russia 
itself. ' 
5.1. Russian-European relations: brief overview 
The interrelationship of Russia and Europe goes far beyond the narrow focus of 
diplomatic ties and foreign policy. It concerns the question of the fundamental 
orientation of Russian society itself, encompassing a specific culture and civilisation. 
Geographically, Europe and Russia are overlapping entities. Half of Europe is Russia; 
half of Russia is in Europe. It is true that geography contributes to this political 
ambivalence. However, politics, in contrast to geography, does not necessarily take this 
as axiomatic - either in Europe or in Russia. Arguments about Russia's relationship to 
European civilisation always reflect the ongoing debates involving Russian-European 
interdependence, Russia's distinct national character and historic path of development. 
For most of their history, Russians have continually pondered the question: 'are we part 
of EuropeT Regardless of the answer, it is undeniable that the European vector has 
played the lead role in determining Russia's foreign policy for the past several centuries. 
Europe is Russia's most stable neighbour. Although Russia is not likely to be an easy 
partner for the EU to deal with, her participation in Europe has, by most accounts, been 
a positive one. At every major turning point in the continent's history - be it the defeat 
of Napoleon's empire or the formation of the Entente Cordiale - Russia has played an 
active and indispensable part in the European concert, and has been an integral part of 
the overall European balance. In the twentieth century Russia's role in European affairs 
increased even more, despite the ideological, military and political backlash throughout 
much of Europe in response to the tremors of revolution in Russia and the stormy events 
in the Soviet Union, resulting in its collapse. Gorbachev's use of the term 'common 
European home' dates back to the late 1980s, and similar expressions can be found in 
almost every important document signed by Western European institutions and Russia 
since that time. 
The questions that Russia faced in the early 1990s have re-emerged in the new 
millennium: what is the shape of the new Europe in the making? What is the place there 
for Russia? Throughout the 1990S Moscow pursued the same objective of seeking an 
equal voice in major security developments in and around Europe without incurring the 
costs of membership, which is seen to impose restraints on Russia's room for 
manoeuvre. However, the institutional spectrum has shifted since 1999, when the OSCE 
had pride of place in Russian policy, NATO was seen as the main problem and EU 
security policy hardly existed. By 2005, relations with NATO have become positive, 
while the OSCE has fallen by the wayside and the EU has assumed a primary 
importance. 
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Since the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation 4greement (PCA) between 
Russia and the European Union, the latter has shown considerable commitment towards 
2 engaging Russia, to help her transformation and to bring her closer the EU. In 1997, 
the PCA came into force, in 1999, a Common Strategy on Russia (CSR) 3 was added, 
and in 2000, the Northern Dimension (NDý Action Plan was approved. Russia, in turn, 
responded with her strategy towards Europe: The Russian Federation Middle Term 
Strategy Towards the European Union (2000-2010), which refers to Russia's 
commitment to cooperate in the building 'of a united Europe without dividing lines'. 5 
The Union's importance for Russia should not be underestimated: the EU is Russia's 
most important trading partner, an immense source of investment and know-how, a 
useful broker in helping Russia gain WTO membership and the only real political 
alternative to U. S. hegemony. The European Union accounted for 40 percent of her 
foreign trade before the enlargement and jumped above 50 percent afterwards. 6 In 2004, 
EU countries accounted approximately for 60-65 percent of all direct foreign investment 
in Russia. 7 Importance of the EU notwithstanding, relations between Russia and the 
Union have been quite formal for a long time. Despite the fact that summit meetings 8 
used to take place twice a year under the PCA between Russia and the EU, the Russian 
government and Putin personally attributed much more importance to bilateral relations 
with the key member states - Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy. 
The years 2002-2003 could be considered the beginning of Russia's attempts to develop 
qualitatively new relations with the EU. Over the past four years, the relations have 
moved from political declarations to practical cooperation. 9 Two projects have been 
identified as the main evidence of Russia-EU strategic cooperation. The first is the 
energy dialogue; the second - the concept of four 'common spaces' aimed at deeper 
integration in these areas: economics and trade; internal security and justice; science, 
education and culture; and external security. 'Common spaces', first announced in 
public at the Russia-EU summit in St Petersburg in May 2003, came to fruition two 
years later, at the EU-Russia summit in Moscow in May 2005. 
However, 'road maps' for the creation of four 'common spaces' agreed during the 
Moscow summit are vague; they contain neither deadlines nor plans for specific 
projects. What is worse, Russia and the EU have different ideas of the content of the 
&common spaces'. The EU seeks to lead Russia closer to Europe, thus seeking to impose 
its logic of expanding the integration space on Moscow according to the EU concept 
'Wider Europe - New Neighbourhood'. 10 Russia has adopted the opposite approach 
preferring to develop partnership on the basis of mutual rapprochement and proceeding 
from the fundamental interests of each party. As Russian Deputy Foreign Minister V. 
Chizhov put it, Russia understands 'the EU's desire to create a friendly environment 
around its new borders' but does not share the EU's wish to forge this environment into 
a common 'near abroad' that would be 'mostly oriented to EU standards'. " 
Nevertheless, the agreement on 'four spaces' is useful for both sides as a concrete step: 
useful for the EU because it sets down a sensible framework for the Union's future 
interaction with Russia, and useful for Russia because her reforms need broadly 
coincide with the steps that the 'road maps' suggest. 
155 
That said, notwithstanding Russia's 'Europe first' policy, EU-Russia relations still lack 
substance and are in the transitional phase. In his State of Nation Speech on 26 May 
2004, President Putin noted Russia's relations with the European Union as an 
independent and definite priority element of the country's foreign policy, saying that 
Russia will try to step up her cooperation in this area by 'the creation of the outline of 
an enlarged Europe as a prospect'. 12 
5.1.1. Economic interdependency 
Due to the primacy of economics in Russia's relations with the EU, effective 
arrangements with the Schengen visa regime and access to the European energy markets 
became front-burner issues. A key factor that makes relations with the EU salient to 
Russian policy makers can be described as interdependence: Russia's dependence on 
the EU markets and the Union's dependence on Russia's energy resources. Russia's 
very large energy resources, particularly oil and natural gas, is one of the major factors 
(in addition to nuclear weapons and Russia's seat at the UN Security Council), which 
basically define her status in global affairs. In the foreseeable future Europe will 
continue to depend quite heavily on Russia's energy, particularly on gas. Russian 
Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko predicted that by 2020 up to 70% of Europe's total 
demand for gas would be met by Russian supplies. 13 Some influential Western 
commentators appear to confirm the accuracy of this forecast. Therefore looking 
primarily at the energy dialogue, Europeans continue to view Russia as a strategic 
energy producer. 
Logically, Russia should not abuse her position. Much as Europe needs Russian oil and 
gas, Russia depends far more on Europe, where nearly all her important customers are 
located. Energy exports account for more than 60 percent of Russia's total export 
earnings, 30 percent of federal budget revenue and have been the main driver of 
economic growth under Putin. 14 Moscow is also in great need of European investment 
to develop its energy infrastructure and securing the demand over the longer term. Most 
Russian analysts specifically stress Russia! s growing significance for the EU not only as 
a key energy supplier, but, more importantly, as a principal guarantor of Europe's 
energy security. Moscow's pivotal role will only increase as the turmoil in the Middle 
East persists, and the offshore gas reserves in the North Sea continue to diminish. Putin 
himself alluded to Russia being an 'indispensable country, when he noted during the 
October 2005 Russia-EU summit in London that about one-third of Europe's oil comes 
from Russia and that some countries depend on Russia for 90 percent of their gas. 15 
Russia is perfectly exploiting her energy 'weapon' to drive a wedge between EU 
countries. A case in point is the North European underwater gas pipeline project 
endorsed by the EU, running from Russia to Germany. This was approved despite the 
overt, fierce resistance on the part of the East European countries and the Baltic States. 
The leaders from Eastern Europe - seen as irreparably Russophobes by the Kremlin - 
were conspicuously excluded from what is pompously billed as the EU-Russia energy 
dialogue. Russia's deft usage of her energy riches in pursuing both economic and 
political ends indeed poses a serious problem for the EU, as it reveals the Unions 
inability to fashion a coherent common foreign policy, including a common strategy 
toward Russia. Naturally, Russian strategists positively view the growing 
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decentralization of the decision-making process within the EU and the decrease in the 
European Commissions authority, interpreting these trends as the by-products of the 
current EU crisis. They believe Moscow's interests will be better secured if the EU 
continues to evolve more toward the liberal free-trade zone and away from the pan- 
European quasi-state model. 
EU's increasing dependency on Russia's natural energy sources means that it may pay a 
high price in the future. The Russia-Ukraine natural gas dispute is the most telling 
example of Russia! s ability to use Europe as a lever. Prior to the shutoff of gas to 
Ukraine on 1 January 2006 and, as a result, reduced supplies to majority of European 
countries, the Europeans had become complacent, unappreciative of the scope of their 
dependency upon Russia or how much they have taken a 'friendly' Moscow for granted 
since, or even before, the end of the Cold War. Energy supplies to Europe continued 
during the overthrow of Gorbachev, the Soviet break-up, the Chechen war, the Kosovo 
war, and the enlargements of NATO and the EU. The Europeans grew confident that as 
far as energy supplies were concerned, the Russians, while unpredictable in their 
rhetoric, were rock-solid in their reliability. 
One of Moscow's goals during this gas dispute was, arguably, to redefine European 
perceptions of Russia. With the Gazprom cut off and the diminished gas supplies Russia 
proved herself not only sufficiently erratic to be taken seriously, but also capable of 
inflicting very real pain with a modicum of effort. Did the Russians want to hurt the 
Europeans? The answer is probably not. Europe, particularly the 'old' Europe, remains 
a potential partner for Moscow, and there is no reason for the Kremlin to introduce spite 
into an already complex relationship. But Russians want the Europeans to know that the 
Kremlin has the capacity to turn the screws. This, of course, is not about establishing 
trust, but about establishing in Europe a respect for Russia! s strengths and an awareness 
of Russia! s concerns. 
5.1.2. The impact ofthe EU enlargement 
A key factor in Russia's relations with the EU is the robust enlargement of the European 
Union, including the Baltic States. The enlarged EU has come physically closer to 
Russia over a wide spectrum of relations: political, security and, perhaps, most 
intensively, in the economic area. These developments have already given rise to some 
tensions within the relationship but there will also be clear potential gains for both 
parties if cooperation can be strengthened. 
As noted in chapter 2, in the 1990s, in stark contrast to NATO's expansion, reaction in 
Russia to the EU enlargement, was largely relaxed and even quite positive, despite the 
widespread Western view that potential negative consequences of the latter process are 
much greater for Russia. However, as the EU approached Russia's doorstep such 
euphoric view of the Union became no longer valid. Further consolidation of the EU has 
made clear than the dividing line between members and non-members might become 
much more fundamental than in the case of NATO. Unlike NATO enlargement, which 
constitutes a largely psychological and emotional challenge for Russia, EU enlargement 
is starting to impose a real economic price on dealing with neighbouring states and the 
EU in general. In practice, the enlargement is affecting all of Russia, but especially 
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those Russian regions which border the enlarged EU. The Schengen regime and its 
impact on Russian mobility and trade, particularly in Kaliningrad, is posing a major 
challenge (for the Kaliningrad problem see 5.2). 
Despite the sincerity and friendliness of communication between Putin and the leaders 
of 'old' EU member states this proved to be not enough as Russia's relations with the 
EU became more diverse and important. Therefore the Russian government's attitude 
towards the EU started changing. What is more, Russia has now woken up to the fact 
that the EU-25 is markedly different from EU- 15, and not only because of its size. Eight 
of the newcomers, soon to include Bulgaria and Romania, were once dominated by 
Moscow. The 100 million or so 'new Europeans' tend to have a different, and often a 
dimmer, view of Russia's past and present. 
The signs of crisis became most apparent in the EU-Russia relations in 2004 - the year 
of EU enlargement. In February 2004, the European Commission issued a strongly 
worded communication asserting that the EU-Russia relations had 'come under 
increasing strain' on important issues from enlargement to energy and environment, and 
questioning Russia's conviction to uphold core universal values and pursue democratic 
reforms. 16 The European Union was irritated by Moscow's refusal to automatically 
extend the 1994 PCA to the ten new countries that joined the EU on I May 2004. EU 
foreign ministers even issued an ultimatum to Moscow extend the PCA to the new 
member states, or face the consequences in the form of economic sanctions. The EU 
also wanted Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and deregulate her gas sector, 
threatening to block Russia's accession to the WTO otherwise. In return, the Kremlin 
came up with its own list of demands aimed at securing Russia's economic interests in 
Central and Eastern Europe. It wanted compensation for EU expansion (for the effect on 
Russian trade with the new EU member states), unrestricted transit to Kaliningrad via 
Lithuania, status of the state language for Russians in Latvia and Estonia, and abolition 
of visa requirements for travel between Russia and the EU. 17 Politically, the list 
provided fresh evidence of Russia's concern that she would lose influence in the wake 
of EU enlargement - prompting Moscow to increase pressure on Brussels and the new 
member states. Economically, Moscow's demands illustrated the importance of trade 
and investment between the EU and Russia - Russia's continuing hunger for European 
capital to help build a more diversified economy. 
In general, mutual disillusionment appears to be the main feature of EU-Russia 
relations. Perhaps this was inevitable. When they started to develop their relationship, 
the EU and Russia knew little and expected much of each other. Before the 
enlargement, Russia-EU relations had seemed generally positive, if prone to friction. 
This has been reversed, with relations, in some areas, becoming generally frictional and 
occasionally positive. Real differences have arisen that feature as much misperception 
of the other's policies as genuinely divergent interests. The new neighbourhood that EU 
and Russia now share has become the front line in Russian-European relations. 
Nowhere was this more evident than during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in late 
2004. On the other hand, disillusionment does not have to be entirely bad. It provides an 
opportunity for a thorough reassessment of a new start. 
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5.2. The Kaliningrad puzzle 
5.2.1. Strategic and geopolitical significance ofKaliningrad 
Kaliningrad's (former K8nigsberg) situation is unique due to its history, geographical 
location and geopolitical significance; there is no parallel on the European map. The 
Kaliningrad region (oblast) -a small Russian enclave (15,100 sq. km in size) wedged 
between Lithuania, Poland and the Baltic Sea - is the only Russian region physically 
separated from the rest of its mainland and surrounded by foreign territories (see map 
3). The Kaliningrad oblast became Russia's exclave as a result of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union-18 Kaliningrad's native population is now overwhelmingly Russian. 19 The 
most direct land access from Russia to the oblast is via Lithuania. 
The source and uniqueness of the problem, which is often called the 'Kaliningrad 
puzzle', are geopolitical. The 'Kaliningrad puzzle' is the expression of relations 
between the Russian Federation and her territorial fragment - the Kaliningrad oblast - 
depending on the domestic and international factors. For more than fifteen years the 
combination of these factors have determined the variety of options, set by Russia to 
maintain the territorial fragment, to manage and control it efficiently, i. e. to preserve 
sovereignty and legitimacy. After the Second World War, the oblast performed two 
functions - outpost against the West and a barrier ensuring the dependence of the 
Eastern Baltics upon the USSR and its dominance in Poland. 
After Kaliningrad became an exclave, there were expressions of concern that the 
Germans would return to their lost territory, at least economically if not militarily, and 
once again dominate the region. 20 But this did not happen; instead the Germans have 
adopted a low economic and political profile in the oblast. The German government 
insists that their relations with Kaliningrad will be channelled throuP the EU or sub- 
regional bodies, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). 2 
Throughout the Cold War Kaliningrad was above all a huge military base, headquarters 
to the Baltic Fleet and more than 200,000 troops (strong army units, air and air defence 
forces, and border troopS). 22 It was one of the most highly militarised areas in Europe 
and sealed off to foreigners. 23 The region contained pre-positioned weapons, including 
24 nuclear ones, to allow a large number of troops to be sent there in case of war. As the 
region's civilian structures were adapted to military needs, this distorted the economy 
and hindered its development after the break up of the Soviet Union. 
With the end of the Cold War and as a result of the independence of the Baltic States, 
the Soviet Navy lost many of its bases in the region. 25 The collapse of the Warsaw Pact 
led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany, Poland and Lithuania, which 
were provisionally based in Kaliningrad. The region was also used as a collecting point 
for returning Soviet Army units. The oblast thus acquired a huge military force, which 
caused concern in Northwest Europe, especially in Lithuania and Poland. 
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Map 3. The Kaliningrad oblast and its neighbourhood 26 
In the 1990s, the real military significance of the oblast started to decline, and the 
garrison nature of Kaliningrad has become less pronounced. Economic recession in 
mainland Russia began to take its toll and the numbers of troops and major equipment 
stationed in Kaliningrad dropped significantly by 1998.27 In the mid-1990s, the idea of 
Kaliningrad - 'Baltic Hong-Kong' began to be developed as an alternative to various 
proposals to internationalise and demilitarise the region. The idea had to reveal the 
potential of the region as a possible economic bridge between the East and the West. In 
1997, the Kaliningrad Special Defence District (the only remnant of the fon-ner Baltic 
Military District) was abolished. The configuration of the region's military structure has 
become purely defensive. 28 Currently the Kaliningrad oblast hosts roughly 26,000 
servicemen. 29 
For obvious reasons strategic significance of the oblast for Russia is substantially 
greater than it was for the Soviet Union. The region's real importance to the Federation 
lies in its geo-strategic position, representing 'Russia's toehold in the Baltic region'. 30 
Russia has had a physical presence in this area for over 300 years, and is unlikely to 
accept the idea that the presence should disappear. The Kaliningrad oblast remains 
Russia's strategically vital 'Western outpost'. After the loss of the Baltic States, 
Kaliningrad is Russia's only remaining ice-free port, as well as her only naval base in 
the Baltic region. 31 Equally important is that the oblast is still embedded in a 
Europe/West versus Russia dichotomy and the tendency to measure Kaliningrad in 
terms of traditional security is still there. Moreover, using the oblast as a geopolitical 
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lever certainly helps to secure Russia's economic interests in the Baltic Sea area and, 
simultaneously, in Europe. Finally, one cannot rule out the possibility of a deterioration 
of the political and military situation in Russia and in her relations with the West. That 
said, the strategic significance of the oblast largely explains the Kaliningrad dilemma - 
the military outpost or the economic bridge between Russia and the West. The dilemma 
between the role, which in Moscow's opinion, belongs to it legally and the role, which 
external environment allows Moscow to play, creates complications. 
Being Russia's exclave in the Baltic region, the Kaliningrad oblast inevitably has been 
turned into a Russian exclave in the closed pan-European area. Seeking to impair 
Lithuania's Euro-Atlantic integration, Moscow was escalating the issue of military 
transit via Lithuania, making demands that the transit's regime should be reviewed. 32 
Following EU enlargement, the region's detached position has started to exacerbate 
various political, economic, security-related and psychological conditions that brings 
about what has been called the 'Kaliningrad puzzle'. 33 Logically, Russia has to adjust 
one or another relationship strategy with the exclave to the changing environment both 
in the oblast and around it. Failure to solve this problem could open up a real possibility 
for the oblast to distance itself from Moscow. 
All in all, it is combination of psychological, historical and, especially, geopolitical 
factors which determine Russia's approach to the oblast. The prevailing perception was 
that the exclave was encircled by two Western blocks - EU and NATO, viewing the 
latter basically as adversarial. What is worse, the oblast's energy supply and 
communication with 'big' Russia is carried out with the help of transit through the 
territory of 'other blocks'. This largely explains why the primary goal of Moscow's 
strategy is to maintain its control over and assure connection to Kaliningrad, whereas 
the oblast's social and economic development is of secondary importance. Such a 
policy line is based on the assumption that more openness for Kaliningrad would 
undermine Russia's sovereign rights over the region. Thus, in solving the problem of 
preserving sovereignty and assurances of connections with Kaliningrad, Moscow turned 
the oblast into a 'geopolitical hostage' - the territory which it seeks not only to maintain 
(internal aspect) but also to make other countries and international institutions 'abstain 
from any direct or indirect acts of liberating the hostage' (the external aspect). 34 
5.2.2. Domestic situation: between 'high'and 'low'politics 
The development of Kaliningrad and its status hinge on the general economic situation 
and political system in Russia, but, more than in other Russian regions, Western 
countries have various avenues of influence. This is due to the fact that Kaliningrad is 
an exclave that has recently become surrounded by NATO and EU countries. Therefore 
the Kaliningrad issue is considered in the context of dual enlargement of the EU and 
NATO. 
Kaliningrad's problems are manifold, but in general terms they can be divided into two 
groups. First and foremost, there are problems related to the internal specificity of 
Kaliningrad: the legacy of Potsdam, geopolitical situation, and social-economic factors. 
Due to this specificity the internal aspect, which is officially covered by the external 
one, is of greater importance to Russia. Officially, Moscow does not contradict, even 
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encourages treating the province as a specific region - 'pilot' region in EU-Russia 35 
partnership. However, it does not allow this peculiarity to manifest itself in practice. 
This largely explains an ambiguous political vision and strategy on Moscow's part, 
which has had a negative impact on the oblast's development. 
The main reason why Kaliningrad's economic situation has deteriorated more than 
Russia's since 1991 is 'Moscow's inclination to military-type rhetoric and solutions to 
Russo-Baltic security issues'. 36 A choice 'market or tanks' used to work in favour of the 
latter. In 1995, Russia started to play the card of demilitarisation to attempt to forestall 
NATO expansion. Sergey Krylov, then Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
even proposed the demilitarisation of the oblast as an alternative to NATO membership 
for Poland and the Baltic States. 37 
Furthermore, in 1999, when Kosovo crisis and Russia's second war in Chechnya soured 
her relations with NATO and the Baltics, one could also recall the largest Russian 
military exercise 'Zapad-99' together with Belarus, in which her nuclear forces were 
also trained. The exercise assumed a NATO attack on Kaliningrad. Russian military 
integration with Belarus was developed further, and Sergey Ivanov, then secretary of the 
Security Council, stressed the importance of Kaliningrad in this connection. 38 
The alarming news, according to U. S. intelligence reports, was about Russia's tactical 
nuclear warheads transferred to Kaliningrad in 2000. Russian officials denied the 
presence of nuclear weapons in the region and refused to allow inspections of military 
facilities in the area by concerned neighbour states. 39 The presence of nuclear weapons 
would have contravened earlier commitments, as well as the idea of a nuclear-free 
Baltic Sea. 
All these facts show that during the 1990s Russia tend to put in the first place oblast's 
military priorities ('high politics') rather than economic ones ('low politics), which 
inevitably shaped the Kaliningrad's present situation. The fundamental concem is that 
currently Kaliningrad does not play any significant role in the Baltic Sea region. As 
there is no firm structural basis for trade relations with other countries, trade patterns are 
diverted away from the oblast, and the main transport routes bypass the exclave. 40 
Neighbouring countries have developed far more competitive economies. Currently 
Kaliningrad is responsible for just 5 percent of the total turnover of goods in the Baltic 
Sea area, and this will only decrease after EU enlargement. 41 
The central authorities in Moscow have been worried about a significant expansion of 
Kalingrad's ties with the West, fearing that this could result in a loss of central control 
over the region and spur separatist tendencies. 42 Thus, Moscow has been unwilling to 
provide the region with sufficient economic assistance to deal with its mounting 
economic and social problems. As a result, the oblast acquired many disturbing 
features: high unemployment, a critical environmental situation, the intimidating scale 
of manifestations of organised crime, the highest percentage of HIV infections in 
Europe, the spread of tuberculosis, and isolation. 
It is important to note from the polls of 2006 that 53 percent of the oblast's residents 
identify themselves as Kaliningraders (40 percent acknowledge their Russian identity) - 
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the biggest percentage in the Russian Federation in terms of regional identity. 43 About 
46 percent of the enclave's population has never been to 'mainland' Russia. 44 
Kaliningrad's identity is built mainly on its unique exclave's location, which makes it 
very dependent on neighbouring states. In Trenin's view, the Kaliningrad people, albeit 
being Russians of the Russian Federation, have acquired Euro-centric regional 
mentality. 45 Europe has tremendous cultural influence on the region, and Kaliningrad 
people travel more to adjacent countries than to 'mainland' Russia. Many 
Kaliningraders, especially the younger generation, feel 'special', seeing themselves as 
Russians but also as more European and Western than Russian Russians. 
In accordance with public polls carried out in May 2001, concerning the status of 
Kaliningrad, 35 percent respondents would support the oblast within the Russian 
Federation, but would like it to have a specific status approved by the constitution; 26 
percent supported the idea that the region ought to acquire more economic rights 
without changing its status; 8 percent of respondents were in favour of Kaliningrad's 
secession from the Federation and becoming an independent republiC. 46 According to 
the polls in March 2002,60 percent of young people (up to 28 years old) supported 
secession from Russia. 47 These figures, to a certain extent, reflected popular 
disillusionment with Moscow's policy and the hopes for Western assistance in 
Kaliningrad. This is largely a consequence of metropolis inability to support the region 
economically, its restrictions on the oblast's foreign trade on the one hand, and not 
effective EU support on the other. 48 If the gap between the oblast and its neighbours is 
widened ftuther, it is possible that Kaliningraders may demand more freedom from 
Moscow, and these demands would be accompanied by attempts to get closer to the EU. 
If Moscow wakes up too late to the Kaliningrad problem, it is more likely to over-react 
and clamp down hard to re-impose its rule. 49 
The oblast has now become a source of concern for the EU (likewise for neighbouring 
countries), as it is turning into an enclave surrounded by the new member states of the 
European Union. Kaliningrad might be held back in its development by the Schengen 
regime and Russia's incapability, while Lithuania and Poland are inside the EU 
attracting new investments and structural funds. In short, the oblast is becoming 
peripheral in two respects: as an enclave in the enlarged EU and as an exclave outside 
Russia's mainland. There has been some fear that, if the solutions for the region's 
economic and social development are not found, it may become a source of instability 
for the entire Baltic Sea area. 
There is also a second group of problems, arising from the EU enlargement process 
which belongs to 'low politics': the movement of goods and people between 
Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia (including visa regime); energy supply in the region; 
trans-border cooperation; fisheries, and so on. It is also the case that 80 percent of the 
region's energy resources come from the neighbouring states5o (the situation will 
change with the opening of the North European Gas Pipeline under the Baltic Sea). 
These problems have to be solved by the EU and Russia with the participation of Poland 
and Lithuania. But it should be stressed that it is Russia who is primarily responsible for 
their successful solution. First of all, it is to do with the economic backwardness of the 
oblast. The obstacles of economic growth in the enclave largely stem from Moscow's 
ineffective rule and unrealistic perceptions. Russia's approach to Kaliningrad has since 
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1991 been ad hoc and top-down decisions, made primarily in Moscow and lacking 
continuity. As a result, the region has been suffering under the lack of reforms from the 
Russian administration and the generally wrong perception of how to extract the exclave 
from oblivion. 
5.2.3. Russia - EU dialogue: seeking common ground? 
Prosperity of Kaliningrad oblast is a common objective for Russia and the EU. The 
Union's enlargement has increased the region's economic vulnerability. Therefore more 
attention has been devoted to the social-economic development of the oblast, 
consequences of Kaliningrad lagging behind its neighbours and turning into a 'double 
periphery'. What options are open for Kaliningrad to exist simultaneously both inside 
and outside of the EU? Frameworks of interaction between Russia and the EU (see 
Appendix F) are aimed to find an acceptable solution to the 'Kaliningrad puzzle'. A 
genuine dialogue is to evolve to take into account the differences between Russian and 
EU policies and approaches concerning this issue. 
By and large, there have been two different views - optimistic and pessimistic - 
regarding Kaliningrad's future. 5 1 According to the optimistic view, the oblast is more 
likely to benefit from the EU expansion, as its neighbours should have a favourable 
influence on the socio-economic situation of the region. 52 Kaliningrad, with its central 
geographical location in the Baltic Sea area and in the centre of the Common European 
Economic Space (CEES), is particularly well placed to benefit from enlargement. Two 
conditions are necessary for the optimistic scenario to be realised. First of all, Russia 
has to do her homework: Kaliningrad's development should follow the market economy 
and permit the development of civil society. Secondly, the oblast has to become more 
open to cooperation. Finally, it will be no possible solution to the problem if its 
perception has not changed. Strong potential will, getting rid of stereotypes and new 
security thinking are of crucial importance. The Kremlin, however, remains inclined to 
use Kaliningrad oblast as a political card in its game with the West. 
From a pessimistic perspective, EU enlargement may lead to an aggravation of the 
situation around the oblast and, as a consequence, to the worsening of the external 
conditions for its basic survival, and thereby turning the oblast into a 'double 
periphery'. Both sides - the EU and Russia - use the word 'isolation'. For the EU it 
means isolation from the surrounding area in terms of its development, whilst for Russia 
the word 'isolation' carries a totally different meaning: isolation from the mainland (no 
important trade flows with Russia) and from Europe, i. e. 'double periphery'. This 
explains why it is not so easy for EU and Russia to find common ground. 
The oblast has been suffering from both a lack of flexibility shown by the EU and a lack 
of reform on the part of the Russian administration. Most important, there is no clear 
conceptual and resource-based Russian policy vis-a-vis Kaliningrad-related projects: no 
concepts, no money. Russia also needs to speed up the harmonisation of standards and 
regulations in accordance with those of the EU, or risk falling even further behind and 
becoming even more isolated. 
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It should also be noted that neither EU (or NATO) enlargement, nor the introduction of 
the Schengen agreement and its procedures vis-A-vis Kaliningrad is the real problem for 
the oblast. 53 A key obstacle, however, is that the oblast is not very attractive to investors 
because of internal reasons: small domestic market, high level of criminality, 
corruption, the absence of environmental measures against pollution, and the need for 
further Kaliningrad's demilitarisation. Whilst it is the case that the Kaliningrad visa 
problem needs to be resolved, it is minor compared to Russia's broader interests in the 
EU. Good relations with the EU are of great value for Russia in many respects. Russia's 
long-term aim is the creation of a common economic space 54 with the EU, the main 
element of which is a free trade zone. However, as the dispute over Kaliningrad shows, 
Moscow remains more concerned 'with damage limitation than with exploring the 
potential for development 55 , and this is not the way to forge a constructive partnership. 
The status of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) given in 1996, which replaced the 
previous status of a Free Economic Zone (FEZ), as a necessary precondition for the 
successful integration of the oblast into the world economic system, has not paid off 56 
Moreover, during a decade or so the Kaliningrad oblast attracted seven times less 
investment than the neighbouring Nizlmiy Novgorod oblast, which has not enjoy such 
status. 57 Even though the whole Kaliningrad region was SEZ, it did not even figure 
among the top 20 regions in Russia with regard to foreign investments. " In most cases, 
the minimum amount was invested, and part of the 'foreign' investments was in fact 
Russian money returning home after an earlier capital flight. 
Things have started to look brighter for the oblast since the end of 2000, when the 
governor Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, the former commander of the Baltic Sea Fleet, 
took over. He was widely regarded as pro-European and a reform-minded pragmatist, 
also one of Putin's favourite 'men in uniform'59, enjoying tacit support from the 
president. Already in 2001, Moscow started to pay more attention to the region: a new 
federal programme on Kaliningrad was adopted, and a special meeting of Security 
Council on the enclave was convened. But despite these efforts, within Yegorov's rule, 
difficult reforms were not tackled, nor had systematic changes been made. It is largely 
because the Kremlin did not give sufficient leeway to Kaliningrad to improve its 
administration. Beside this, Russia did not implement clear legislation that would take 
the interests of foreign investors into account. Only by establishing stability and 
predictability would the SEZ have a chance to become successful. 
Since Vladimir Putin took office in 2000 Russia has seen a quick re-centralisation of 
power, taking power from the regions and returning it to the Kremlin. Since May 2000, 
Kaliningrad has come under the North West Federal District, based in St. Petersburg 
and headed by presidential plenipotentiary to the federal district Viktor Cherkessov, 
another Putin favourite. 60 This reform had repercussions on the oblast's administration. 
For instance, it is worth mentioning that the Security Council proposed to assign a 
deputy plem otentiary for the Kaliningrad region alone, attached to and appointed by 
Cherkessov. 1 This proved Moscow's intent to create a parallel administration for the 
oblast and give the centre a greater role to the detriment of further democratisation. The 
appointment of a special presidential representative on Kaliningrad, Dmitriy Rogozin, 
in July 2002 signalled that Cherkessov's influence in the oblast's current affairs 
diminished. 
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In 2002, the relationship between Russia and the EU was particularly burdened by the 
problem of the transit visa for Russians commuting to and from Kaliningrad. The 
statement of the 2002 Russia-EU summit speaks about 'new problems', possibly 
created by the EU enlargement and about the need to reach mutually acceptable 
solutions for the Kaliningrad oblast. To quote the political analyst and the former 
member of the Kaliningrad Duma, Solomon Ginzburg, 'the results of the summit should 
more correctly be called not a "strategic success", but a deferred compromise'. 62 This 
posed a real dilemma: will Russia and the EU be ready and able to act jointly to resolve 
the internal problems of Kaliningrad and facilitate its inclusion into a broader area of the 
regional cooperation? 
By and large, the federal policy on Kaliningrad varied to a large extent according to the 
current power structure in Moscow and its ability to carry out its intentions. Putin's 
strengthening of federal control over Kaliningrad should be seen in the context of 
NATO and EU enlargement around the region. In negotiations with the EU, Moscow 
tried both to safeguard federal security interests and to get economic support for the 
region and Russia as a whole. 
During 2000-2002, President Putin repeatedly stressed the need to make Kaliningrad a 
fpilot' region in the framework of the EU-Russia relationship, presenting the oblast as a 
qualitative test' of Russia's relations with the EU. 
It is time to rethink the concept of the region's development in the light of the new 
European realities and the new potential of the Russian economy. Kaliningrad 
region may serve as a testing ground between Russia and Europe. 63 
This reflects how much importance Moscow attaches to its exclave: without 
Kaliningrad, Russia's presence in this part of the world would be seriously reduced. 
Moscow's approach is also accentuated in the ambitious new federal programme on 
Kaliningrad for 2002-2010, which envisaged a grand design for the reconstruction of 
the oblast. 64 The programme's key objective is to create conditions for the sustainable 
development of Kaliningrad on the basis of an expansion of the export-oriented 
industries and the attainment of living standards for the population comparable to these 
of neighbouring states, all through the improvement of the SEZ. Although one should 
acknowledge a new engagement with Kaliningrad from both the regional administration 
and Moscow, the programme was based on a weak and incorrect analysis, neglecting 
fundamental issues - the absence of essential legislation and effective mana ement. 
61 Consequently, it has not introduced crucial reforms, nor it has created openness. 
All in all, Moscow's treatment of the region as a 'geopolitical hostage' created the no- 
go situation, which did not give answers to the principal questions: what is the future of 
the oblast and where will pumping of funds and holding on a short leash the territorial 
fragment (exclave), which has found itself in a strange environment, lead to? It was also 
obvious that the key to these questions lies in Moscow, and namely the latter has to find 
a new approach to the oblast. The case of the 750th jubilee of K6ningsberg/Kaliningrad, 
which took place on 1-3 July 2005, demonstrated that the Kremlin has found new 
factors and new spaces in its policy towards the oblast. Russia's European rhetoric and 
attitude towards the historical heritage of the Kaliningrad region was well heard. The 
resolution to overcome the barrier - to break the Soviet tradition to treat the history of 
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the city only starting with 1945 and to recognise historical continuity was a significant 
signal that Moscow gave to the West. This signal was received in the West, first of all in 
Berlin. The response has acquired a material expression - building the North European 
Gas Pipeline under the Baltic Sea. Thus, Russia's attitude to Central and Eastern Europe 
and the role of the Kaliningrad factor in this regard came to light. Contours of the 
regional policy of Moscow framing the relations with its exclave were clearly seen. 
Not by chance did this celebration coincide with the Kremlin's appointment of the new 
Governor Georgiy Boos, the former deputy chairman of the Russian Durna and one of 
the leading figures of the presidential party 'United Russia'. It should be noted that this 
was the first time in Kaliningrad's history when the governor was not from the local 
elite but from Moscow. He did not only speak about the role of the outpost of the oblast 
in Russian-European rapprochement but also undertook, with the blessing from the 
Kremlin, practical steps to prepare the exclave for this role. Boos characterises it as 
'Russia's window to Europe' (here the parallel with Peter the Great should not be 
loSt)66. In his view, the Kaliningrad region must not be the territory, which Europe tries 
to exploit as a trump card while penetrating into the Russian markets but must serve as a 
jumping-off ground for Russian business to integrate into European and world markets. 
For that reason, the oblast must be rapidly modernised, i. e. a transparent financial 
system must be created, the budgetary process must be made public, energy capacities 
of the region must be doubled, infrastructure and logistics of transport must be 
developed. Finally, the law on SEZ must be drawn up so that all these measures should 
attract large and competitive Russian capital to the region. 67 His first steps indicate that 
the new governor has in essence completed the structural reform of the region. 
Preferences given to large capital of the Russian Federation and non-traditional 
solutions to modernise the Kaliningrad oblast are obvious. 
5.3. Russian-European security relations 
The European Union's approach to Russia's security question has been basically 
indirect: to assist the country's difficult transformation process with the hope that at 
some point in time this will also yield security benefits. Moscow has also been overtly 
reluctant to engage with Brussels on foreign and security policy issues, as it is 
distrustful of the EU's growing interests in Russia's supposed 'sphere of influence'. 
That is why the actual security agenda between Russia and the EU is fairly modest, 
especially in the hard security area. In the purely military field, Europe's direct 
engagement with Russia remains very limited due to the fact that the Russian military is 
not an easy partner for the EU to work with. Russia's record in civil military relations is 
another sensitive topic. 
For most of the 1990s, Russia did not regard the EU as a credible actor in foreign and 
security policy. Given the embryonic state of the EU's Common Foreign and Security 
policy (CFSP), this was not surprising. But Russia's attitude started to change when the 
EU took its first concrete steps towards the ESDP, following a Franco-British summit in 
1998. The Kosovo campaign in 1999, which led to Russia suspending her relations with 
NATO, accelerated the Russian reassessment of European security policy. Russia hoped 
that the ESDP would reduce NATO's dominance in European defence. 
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Putin's turn to the European Union was part of his recognition that the EU offers an 
opportunity not only in terms of economics and trade, but also in terms of European 68 
security. At first Moscow took a 'wait-and-see' approach towards the ESDP. In Igor 
Ivanov's words, the main goal of Russia's European policy is to work toward a 'stable, 
non-discriminatory, and universal system for European security'. This is what it would 
take to build a 'Greater Europe' with a unified area of stability and security, economic 
prosperity and permanent democracy. 69 In this sense, the ESDP is essentially an 
instrument to create a 'Greater Europe'. In other words, relations with the ESDP should 
advance Russian interests in Europe, which consist in creating a model of European 
security that ensures Russia an equal voice in all security dimensions. Moscow's 
perception of the ESDP as such, is in complete contrast to that of Brussels. For the EU, 
the ESDP is just a limited instrument of the Union's foreign policy, dealing solely with 
crises management, thus it serves the EU and not a 'Greater Europe. 70 
Throughout the 1990s, Russia's interest in the development of a 'pan-European' 
security architecture was accompanied by her efforts in trying to elevate the OSCE 
status as Europe's umbrella security organisation to which all other institutions are 
subordinate. Such a policy line was not extinct in the first years of Putin's tenure. 
Suffice it to mention his call, repeated on many occasions prior to 9/11, for a reordering 
of the strategic and security relationships between Russia, Europe, and the US, saying 
that the current security system does not ensure security at all. Later on, Putin gradually 
abandoned the idea of the primacy of the OSCE, relegating it to the margins of 
European security thinking. 
By and large, Vladimir Putin's re-engagement with European security organisations 
after the 1999 Kosovo crisis has had mixed results. Deepening ties with NATO have 
offered benefits but these do not ensure Russia an equal voice in European security. The 
OSCE has moved in Russian policy from being perceived as a potential solution to 
becoming a problem. This organisation has increasingly become seen as cumbersome 
and intrusive (notably vis-a-vis Chechnya), and incapable of serving as an effective 
instrument in promoting Russia's strategic goals - this was particularly the case in the 
OSCE Istanbul sunm-tit in 1999.71 Meanwhile, the EU has emerged as an important 
European security provider. 
Accordingly, Russia's perception towards the ESDP has changed. Under Yeltsin, the 
ESDP (and the EU) was looked upon as a counterweight to a 'NATO-centric' European 
security system and as a key 'pole' in a multi-polar world order. The Putin 
administration has been keen to establish cooperation in the ESDP area but in a 
different way. In the Kremlin's eyes the ESDP assumes a different function: that of 'a 
new channel' for Russia's inclusion in European policy-making processes. 72 
In 2000, at the Russia-EU summit in Paris there was launched a political and security 
dialogue with Russia and adopted the Joint Declaration on Strengthening Dialogue and 
Cooperation on Political and Security Matters in Europe. 73 Since then, meetings, 
commissions and agreements in the political and security area have proliferated. The 
2002 summit issued a joint statement, indicating that the EU and Russia agreed to 
deepen their 'political dialogue and cooperation in crisis management and security 
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matters'. 74 Beyond this, the Russian Federation came up with a Russia-EU Action Plan 
in the ESDP field . 
75 The same year a Russian liaison officer started to work with the EU 
Military Staff in Brussels. In a highly symbolic move, Russia sent a handful of officers 
to take part in the first operation of the EU - EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina at the start of 2003. 
Nevertheless, the political and security dialogue remained weak on substance; that is 
probably why the EU and Russia re-launched it at their November 2003 summit. 
Russia's initial enthusiasm for the ESDP has clearly diminished since 2001, party 
because of disagreements about the form and scope of cooperation, and partly because 
the EU has made little progress in driving the ESDP project forward. Furthermore, the 
deep intra-EU splits over Iraq have confirmed Russian view that the EU will not 
become a serious actor on the international stage any time soon. 
From the EU side, it has had considerable difficulties working with the Russian 
military. In the Russian security and defence establishment, there is still deep-seated 
mistrust of any military cooperation with the West. And even if the EU and Russia 
could agree on joint missions, the sheer disarray of Russian Armed Forces would render 
such cooperation difficult in practice. 76 Russia's political leadership has always been 
somewhat ambiguous about what it wants from security cooperation with the EU. 
Russia is still trying to exert some control over the development in EU's defence area. 
Moscow insists that the EU should not act without a UN mandate, requests the EU to 
clearly define the geographical reach of the ESDP - as a means of ensuring that EU 
troops do not turn up on Russia's doorstep in the Caucasus, and wants to be involved at 
the various stages of ESDP decision making. 77 The EU has rejected such demands. The 
EU consents to involve Russia in military planning and operations, if and when it is 
necessary and desirable, but it will not give Russia a regular and institutionalised say in 
a policy area. In particular, the EU has consistently dismissed Russian calls for a EU- 
Russia Council that would mirror the NATO-Russia Council. 
As far as practical cooperation in security area is concerned, the EU and Russia should 
concentrate on the agreed common space of external security. They could find much 
common ground in the fight against international terrorism. After 9/11, the two sides 
held several meetings on counter-terrorist strategies and agreed to share intelligence. 
However, the problem of Chechnya looms large in this area. The Russian authorities 
have classified Chechen rebels as international terrorists, and insist that the Chechen 
military campaign is just as legitimate as the West's action against al-Qaeda or Saddam 
Hussein. The EU, meanwhile, has repeatedly called on the Russian government to 
restrain its troops in Chechnya, safeguard human rights and seek a political solution 
through talks with the moderate Chechen factions. Although Western criticism of 
Moscow's Chechnya campaign died down after 9/11, the EU has always been 
somewhat more vocal. At the same time, Russia accused EU countries, in particular the 
UK, of double standards in the fight against terrorism, especially after a London court 
granted political asylum to Chechen leader Akhmed Zakayev in late 2003. 
The 'common neighbourhood' could be another area for Russia-EU security 
cooperation. In the view of Dmitry Danilov, Head of the Department for European 
Security Studies in the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian and 
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EU forces could jointly participate in crisis management operations in the former Soviet 
Union. He argues that it would be beneficial for both sides as it would strengthen the 
role of the EU, as a regional and international player, and Russia's influence in the CIS 
countries. 78 The EU has offered Russia cooperation in seeking solutions for secessionist 
conflicts in Moldova and in the Caucasus. However, the differences between the EU 
and Russia over settlement of the conflict in Moldova, which arose in late 2003, attested 
to persist unilateral approaches. Moreover, the EU has long called for joint EU-Russia 
peace initiatives and peace support missions in the region. 79 The Putin administration 
has been reluctant to discuss any possible joint initiatives with the EU. Russia is 
concerned that the ESDP, with EU forces deployed on her borders, may turn against her 
interests. Only in October 2005 the EU started a border-monitoring mission in Moldova. 
The EU plays a very limited role in the Caucasus and Central Asia, much smaller than 
the U. S. Russia had little chance but to accept U. S. military and political involvement in 
Georgia and some of the Central Asian states, but she is clearly concerned about the EU 
taking on any mediating or peacekeeping role in the 'common neighbourhood'. More 
importantly, while the Europeans are hoping for a lasting settlement of regional 
conflicts, the Russian political elite prefers a degree of 'controlled instability: it 
provides Moscow with extra leverage over fragile governments and secessionist 
movements. 
Finally, soft security is an important but often overlooked area of Russia-EU security 
cooperation. The Kaliningrad enclave, which is perceived as a litmus test of EU- 
Russian cooperation, provides a huge room for such activities. It should be noted that 
the issue of soft security cooperation has been discussed in Russia-EU meetings, 
agreements and joint statements. The PCA contains clauses referring to cooperation on 
environmental protection, customs and illegal migration, as well as cooperation against 
money laundering and drug smuggling. The strategic documents - EU's CSR and 
Russia's MTS further developed this background. To this end, a mechanism of 
consultations has been established, contacts have taken place regularly at different 
levels, and cooperative projects have been planned. However, a number of problems 
ranging from the lack or insufficient funding, the complexity of Brussels bureaucracy 
and legislation, to Russian irresponsibility and incompetence have prevented the soft 
security cooperation from developing effectively. 80 
The problem is also that Russia has its own meaning about soft' security. For example, 
one of the reasons why Russia is so opposed to NATO enlargement in the 1990s is that 
it simply did not believe in the notion of political security, and 'the idea of spreading 
81 stability has no meaning in Russia's strategic consciousness'. In many cases, the EU 
prioritises soft security questions and Russia does not. These questions have been 
simply been pushed down the agenda, by justifying that environmental security 
, remains the ideology of wealthy countries'. 82 Much the same has happened with 
HIV/AIDS problem in Russia. By and large, Russia's position on soft security matters 
has often fluctuated between interest and almost complete ambivalence, and often 
interest remained merely rhetorical. Military security remains the primary focus and will 
continue to be so in the near future. 83 
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On the whole, despite a noticeable rapprochement between Russia and the West, the 
'deterrence-cooperation' dichotomy has persisted in their relations and will survive into 
the foreseeable future. 84 The security field remains decisive for the content of these 
relations. A point that should not be overlooked in the EU-Russia security relations is 
the risk of contradictions arising between the European Union and the United States, 
notably on the prevailing themes 'unilateralism versus multilateralism'. On these issues, 
Russia comes closer to Europe on the common basis of non-acceptance of U. S. 
hegemonism. On the other hand, once Russia became a part of a U. S. -led anti-terrorist 
coalition, Russia is on some issues emotionally closer to the U. S. than to the EU. This 
creates a new temptation for Russia to try to 'play off its new closeness to America 
against Western Europe'85 in an effort to punish the Europeans for their arrogance and 
extract concessions from the EU. 
It is also clear that 'wedge-driving' between the U. S. and Europe would be dramatically 
counterproductive for Russia. The Iraqi crisis demonstrated that a split between Europe 
and the U. S. on security issues is the most unfortunate development for Russia. 
Although this crisis resulted in a new political phenomenon - the coalition between 
France, Germany and Russia - driven by an illusion to put a limit to U. S. hegemony, 
further development in the Iraq war proved a failure of this goal. This confrontation not 
only undermined the UN role and European positions; it also left Russia 'outside the 
European strategic power centre', which returned to being a partnership among the UK, 
France and Germany. 86 
The bottom line is that security cooperation requires common culture and confidence 
building. There are three major differences in security perception between Russia and 
the European Union: threat prevention in terms of using force in international relations; 
notion of power, i. e. notion of authority and its role; and the ways of crisis management. 
Moreover, the EU is a very complicated body, oscillating between a soft power (the 
German approach), a hard power (the French approach) or something in between (the 
British approach), let alone its new notions of nationality and sovereignty, whilst Russia 
is a nation-state and she is not going to delegate her sovereignty. There is also a big gap 
in the culture of Russian security services and those of the West. Above all, Russia's 
biggest concern is how far and how fast the EU will extend its influence into the 
common neighbourhood. 
5.4. Impediments in Russia's engagement with Europe 
Since Gorbachev unleashed glasnost and perestroika, it was tacitly understood that 
Russia's goal was to become like Europe. However, it is increasingly obvious that 
Russia is not developing in the direction that Russian and European liberals were 
counting on a decade ago. The hopes that Russia would increasingly resemble Europe 
have not come true. Quite the reverse, the more precise the contours that the Russian 
political system assumes, the greater the criticism comes from Europe, which is 
dissatisfied with the standard of the Russian democracy. The interdependence, which is 
objectively increasing, is contributing not to a diminution of tension, as was initially 
thought, but to an increased tension. 
171 
The logic of 'curopeanisation' of Russia loses its shine once it becomes understandable 
that the practical implementation of the course of 'European choice' means accepting 
some long-established rules that may actually damage Russia's interests. Russia is 
keeping her options open, renouncing obligations to bridge the gap between Russian 
and EU norms, and staking on selective cooperation in a handful of spheres where her 
resources are comparable (e. g. in the energy and security sectors). 87 Dialogue between 
Russia and Europe, which in practical terms have had virtually no success on questions 
of principle, reflects a conceptual crisis. It is already clear for Europe that this kind of 
Russia cannot integrate herself anywhere, she does not want to, and will not. But the 
framework of relations remains as before, which is provoking new conflicts. It is worth 
looking into the main obstacles in Russian-European interaction. 
The first obstacle is related to the absence of a strategic vision of future bilateral 
relations on both sides. For instance, the PCA framework, despite its stated objective of 
developing a political dialogue, highlights the deeply technical nature of Russia-EU 
relationship, which is overwhelmingly concerned with trade and economic issues. 
According to the PCA, the structure of the dialogue is 'more function of internal 
requirements of the EU than those of the relationship itself'88. For example, the six- 
monthly summits are determined by the rotating EU presidency and not by the need for 
continual high-level dialogue. The CSR has also a limited value, as it remains 
underpinned by the PCA, and no additional resources are dedicated to the development 
of relations with Russia. Furthermore, the comparison of the two framework documents 
- the European CSR and the Russian MTS towards the EU - reflects a big discrepancy 
between their definition of the scope of partnership. First of all, the CSR contains broad 
and vague provisions of Russia as an element of a United Europe, while the MTS is 
very specific. Secondly, the two strategies highlight diverging concerns of the parties - 
a strategic gap separating Moscow and Brussels. The EU focuses on values and the 
necessity of Russia's democratic reforms and building civil society, while Russia 
addresses her national interests and preserves the fundamental principle of sovereign 
rights. 89 Finally, the Russian MTS views the EU as an instrument for developing a 'pan- 
European' security system in accordance with Primakovian line of multi-polarity. 
Hence, as the security agendas of Russia and the EU are radically different, political and 
security dialogue has failed to progress. A point also to be taken into account: whereas 
the EU operates through institutions, Russia is governed by personalities. According to 
different estimates, in Russia's political establishment, there are only 20 to 25 highly 
skilled experts dealing with the EU, and only half of them work in the state apparatus. 90 
All these differences have rendered the development of 'strategic partnership' between 
Moscow and Brussels difficult. 91 The bottom line is that the two parties have different 
views on their mutual partnership, its scope and the commitment it entails. It must be 
remembered that Russia and the EU are caught up in their own transformation projects - 
the EU toward deepening and widening, and Russia toward state consolidation and 
economic revitalization. The different priorities of Russia and the EU dilute any 
urgency either party may feel in making significant efforts with the other. 
That said, the EU faces the challenge of seizing an opportunity in engaging Russia more 
effectively. Russia remains a prickly _partner 
for Europe, 'sometimes confused and 12 
confusing, certainly always defensive'. The issue is not whether Russia will become 
involved in the processes of European integration, but how this can be brought about. 
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Put another way, the main focus is how the relationship between the EU and Russia is 
developing against the backdrop of EU enlargement. The threat is that Russia tries to 
use the effects of EU enlargement as bargaining instruments by outsiders to pressure 
new members, particularly the Baltic States, on specific issues. 
The second obstacle is related to the internal reform process of the EU. The widening 
and simultaneous deepening Union represents a major challenge for relations between 
the EU and Russia. This allows us to consider that the real cost of enlargement has not 
93 been properly understood in either Russia or the EU. Since 2002 both sides have been 
engaged in active dialogue on the development of a concept of 'common economic 
space', but it is facing a lot of impediments when it comes to its implementation. But 
whatever have been the failings of the European Union, a considerable part of the 
problem in the EU-Russian relationship should be placed at Russia's doorstep. The 
central issue here has to do with the domestic reform challenge for Russia, particularly 
in three areas - security, border regimes, trade and economic relations. 
The EU enlargement has created new tensions between the EU and Russia, especially 
over the future of the Kaliningrad oblast. This issue was put on the European and 
international agenda suddenly and at a surprisingly late point of time. The problem 
existed throughout the nineties, but the perception of a problem did not. The debate over 
Kaliningrad has caused the EU and Russia to focus more heavily on the issue of their 
bilateral relations. Kaliningrad has repeatedly been seen as a 'litmus-test' of current 
Russian-EU relations. During 2002, the Russian government opposed EU proposals for 
even a relaxed permission regime for travelling to and from the Kaliningrad exclave on 
the ground that this would infringe the basic rights of Russian citizens to move freely 
within their own country, and thereby violate Russian sovereignty itself. 94 The matter 
was only resolved - for the time being - at the EU-Russia summit in November 2002, 
when Putin agreed reluctantly to a system of facilitated transit documents (FTD) for 
Russians, travelling via Lithuania to/from the exclave. 95 
The third obstacle is to do with the prevailing geopolitical mindset in Russia's foreign 
policy. Notwithstanding the raised profile of economic priorities, most of the big 
Russian foreign policy issues continue to be security and geopolitics. According to Lo, 
the pursuit of purely economic priorities gains momentum from the so-called 
96 conjunctural factors' - political and strategic development. Accordingly, Moscow's 
heightened interest in relations with the EU is only partially driven by economic 
considerations: the Putin administration continues to view the EU predominantly 
through a political prism. It is indicative of this mentality that the main agenda item in 
the Russia-EU relationship has become visa-free access for residents of Kaliningrad and 
other Russian citizens transiting Lithuania, rather than an opening opportunity for 
Russia to benefit economically from the EU enlargement. Putin's tough stance on the 
Kaliningrad visa issue has often undermined his integrationist policy vis-h-vis Europe. 
This means that one could not have any illusions that Putin looks at economic priorities 
and interests in the same way as his Western European counterparts. It is inevitable that 
Russian thinking still remains influenced by the Soviet past, excluding certain notions 
that are integral to Western understanding, such as the interdependence between 
economic growth, dernocratisation and the development of civil society. 97 Russia 
acknowledges that she has not resolved the principal question concerning her future 
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relations with the EU. Moscow is unable to choose between the four possible solutions 
- 'membership, the definition of special relations, association by common law, or the 
establishment of a independent, or competing, pole'. 98 
The fourth considerable obstacle is Russia's domestic politics. Russia is acquiring the 
image of an undemocratic country that is unwilling to reform herself efficiently. In 
respect to the developments of last years, critics expressed concern over Moscow's 
handling of the December 2003 parliamentary and March 2004 presidential elections, 
further limiting media freedoms, 'selective justice' towards Yukos and its chairman 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and sweeping corruption. A number of European states and 
institutions, including the OSCE, renewed their criticism of Russia's policy in 
Chechnya, especially after series of terrorist acts in Russia in late summer 2004 
culminating in the Beslan tragedy. Chechnya has become the largest source of asylum 
seekers in Europe-99 All these factors contributed to the image of Russia as alien to 
Europe -'Europe's Other'. 
Finally, it is the overlapping 'near abroad', where the interests of Russia and Europe are 
clashing. The general denominator of this obstacle is EU enlargement, the outcome of 
which is the 'common neighbourhood'. Once EU enlarged, Russia's 'near abroad' - 
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the three South Caucasus states - became one vast 
shared neighbourhood. In this 'common neighbourhood' there is competition for 
integration between Russia and the EU. Russia herself now is the Union's 'near abroad'. 
Russia regards the European Neighbourhood Policyloo (ENP) as too condescending and 
too competitive with its own perceived interests in the common neighbourhood. 101 
When the EU became active beyond its eastern borders - notably during the 2004 
election crisis in Ukraine - Russia expressed her concern. The reality is that Russia may 
be retrenching only reluctantly, but she is not advancing. In Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova Russia is engaged in rearguard or holding actions. Throughout its 
neighbourhood, Moscow has attempted little more than to preserve the status quo in the 
face of Western-oriented change but often to no avail. These countries have not 
gravitated towards Russia, with the notable exception of Belarus. Many observers 
expect a growing rivalry between the EU and Russia over Ukraine, the Caucasus 
countries and Moldova. For the Russians this poses a dilemma. The more pressure they 
apply on neighbouring countries the more these countries look towards the EU as a 
political safe haven. 
It should be stressed that Europe's multilateral institutions tend to take a more critical 
line on Russia than some of their member states. 102 The OSCE was concerned about 
Russia's reluctance to implement her 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit obligation to 
withdraw troops from Georgia and Moldova, as well as Russia's unilateral move to 
mediate an ill-considered power-sharing agreement between Moldova and her 
breakaway republic of Transdnistria, which was effectively vetoed by the OSCE and the 
EU. In turn, Russia's resentment towards European politics has been apparent. Putin 
angrily labelled Western criticism of his Chechnya policy as a double standard that 
would ultimately weaken Russia by encouraging separatism. 103 Russian political elites 
have criticised the EU for ignoring Russia's concerns regarding her residents, who now 
are required visas to travel to new EU countries and a special permission to travel to 
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Russia's Kaliningrad exclave. Moreover, in spring 2004, the Duma adopted a resolution 
protesting against NATO's inclusion of the three Baltic States and especially the 
Alliance's decision to patrol the Baltic air space along Russian borders. This wide range 
of mutual concerns indicates not only diverging strategic interests between Russia and 
Europe but also a widening gap in their worldview. 
To sum up, the key obstacles in Russia-EU partnership come primarily from their 
different value systems. EU concerns relate to a perceived incompatibility between the 
democratic and human rights principles underpinning the EU and Russia's ambiguous 
commitment to these values. The war in Chechnya remains Russia's wild card. Solving 
the Kaliningrad problem is also a test of Russia-EU relations. The pressure on the EU 
from the Russian side is not so much to emphasise values but more to focus more 
seriously on selected common interests: political, strategic, security, and economic 
ones. Russia is not going to subordinate herself to a value system essentially dictated by 
the European Union. 104 But despite the growing acrimony between Russia and Europe 
they remain independent in many areas of vital mutual interests and therefore are bound 
to cooperate. In a broader perspective, success or failure in Russia's rapprochement with 
Europe will primarily depend on the pace and depth of Russia's political, economic and 
societal transformation and her policy in the former Soviet space, especially in the 
(common neighbourhood'. 
5.5. Russia between the U. S. and Europe 
Since his advent to power Putin has been described as a euro-centrist. Consequently, it 
has become commonplace to consider his foreign policy more 'European'. There are 
two main explanations of his 'euro-centrism'. Firstly, Putin's Euro-centric approach is 
related to his working experience in Europe: his background as a KGB officer in former 
East Germany and as a deputy mayor of St. Petersburg with responsibility for the city's 
relations with the outside world. Secondly, it highlights the importance of closer 
Russian cooperation with the EU with the aim of enlisting European support for 
Moscow's positions on strategic international issues. 105 After all, Moscow stressed its 
strategic relations with Europe, putting a reduced emphasis on the U. S., probably as a 
response to the Bush administration's initial downplaying Russia. Putin realised that 
especially after the Kosovo conflict Russia needed to re-establish a functional 
cooperative relationship with the West, and the only West that was available then was 
Europe. 106 
In the aftermath of 9/11, things have changed: Moscow has started to emphasise its 
strategic partnership with both the EU and U. S. On the one hand, orientation to Europe 
is of great importance for Russian self-identification as a significant Euro-Asian 
regional power and for overcoming Russia's superpower syndrome. 107 On the other 
hand, Russia's orientation to the U. S. arguably reflects her shifting priorities shaped by 
the 'calculus of international power politics' - and this presupposes a fundamentally 108 America-centric approach' In this respect, several points should be taken into 
account. 
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First and foremost, a fundamental question in Russia's Westem-centric course has been 
which West to join. The answer is ambiguous, as dualism is very obvious in Putin's 
approach: pursuing an essentially post-modem agenda - adaptation to globalisation - he 
takes traditional means - resurrecting Russia as a great power. Everything that Putin 
wants for Russia - integration into the world economy, support in the fight against 
Islamic terrorism (Chechnya) and international status - are entered through a door to 
which Washington holds the key. What is more, in the purely European context, 
Moscow is continuing to assume that, when it comes to the difficult decisions, Western 
Europe tends to follow Washington's lead - even such countries as France or Germany, 
which are very critical about U. S. policies. 
The United States is unquestionably the dominant geopolitical and security player. 
Beside this, the U. S. is an embodiment of all strategic culture and all the key 
dimensions of power - political, military, economic and technological. The U. S. is 
number one external actor in nearly all of Russia's key foreign policy priorities. Even in 
the economic sphere (albeit Russia has much more trade with Europe) the United States 
is still the most important economic player in the world. In short, the U. S., as Lo put it, 
is 'a more complete power'. 109 Thus, the United States rather than Western Europe is 
much more Russia's geopolitical competitor. This is not to downgrade the importance 
of Europe for Russia but it means that Russian foreign policy naturally gravitates 
towards the U. S. even in dealing with Europe. Obviously, Russia takes the EU very 
seriously as an economic and trading partner but far less seriously as a political or 
security actor. According to Russia's mindset, the EU does not do security. Europe (or 
the EU) is a one-dimensional power, while the United States is a multi-dimensional 
power, 'not just more powerful but powerful in all areas'. ' 10 Therefore Russia tends to 
forgive more U. S. than European criticism. 
The bottom line is that Moscow is reluctant to accept a diminished, regional role for 
Russia, as just another important European power; the global approach, including the 
idea of the U. S. as Russia's primary point of strategic reference, remains overriding. "' 
There is also a 'natural confluence' between the continuing primacy of geopolitics in 
Russian foreign policy and America-centrism. 112 Russia and the U. S. even speak a 
common neo-realist language, i. e. their mindset is pretty much realpolitk. 
On the other hand, when shifting towards United States, Russia can be only a special 
partner of America, but not an equal one. The biggest obstacle for Russian-American 
relations is a deep power asymmetry. Moscow has never been comfortable with this, but 
the choice of options has been limited by Russia's weaknesses, both economic and 
military. When seeing Russia realistically, Putin perfectly realises that in traditional 
power terms his country could neither challenge nor compete with the U. S. Russia may 
only hope to become America's smaller partner, a kind of 'senior among the juniors'. ' 13 
Moreover, the U. S. does not need a universal partnership with Russia, except in some 
spheres, such as terrorism and nuclear disarmament, but in the area of global security 
Russia can only be an assistant, not a partner. Although U. S. -Russian relations became 
warmer after 9/11, Russia and America are far from being allies. The Iraq war did show 
that Russia had not become an indisputable partner of the United States in the 
antiterrorist coalition, but only as a partner in ad hoc coalitions. ' 14 In short, the two 
countries 'can best be described as partners' - albeit very unequal ones - 'that share 
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considerable interests and can help advance each other's national interests'! 15 Therefore 
'issue-focused partnerships' 116 , such as 
international terrorism, would be appropriate 
labelling of U. S. - Russia relationship. 
The second aspect is that the United States is a unitary actor, while the European Union 
consists of different countries with different sizes, objectives, worldviews, which Russia 
finds much more difficult to deal with. Thus one could assume that as long as the U. S. 
remains the sole superpower, Moscow will look at Washington as the first resort. And 
as long as economic priorities are pursued 'not simply for their own sake, but as 
instruments for geopolitical power projection', there is little prospect that this attitude 
will change. ' 17 Only lack of U. S. reciprocity is likely to push Russia to pursue a 
practical 'Europe first' policy. On the whole, the extent to which Russian foreign policy 
can become 'europeanised' and Russia a part of Europe, largely depends, according to 
Lo, on a strategic choice between two diametrically opposed tendencies - securitization 
and normalisation. The former entails further Moscow's reliance on, though 
repackaged, but essentially old ideas and concepts, while the latter changes the 
paradigm and moves 'beyond the parameters of current Russian foreign policy 
thinking'. 118 
It should also be stressed that under Putin, Russian foreign policy has made a marked 
departure from the Primakov doctrine, not least in renouncing any challenge to the 
dominance of the U. S. and any confrontational stance towards the West over issues such 
as NATO enlargement. Putin seems to resist playing off the U. S. against 'old' Europe. 
The essence of Russian foreign policy is to become an acceptable rational partner for 
any coalition, provided it is useful for Russia. Therefore it would be wrong to interpret 
Putin's foreign policy priorities purely as zero-sum, whereby an emphasis on, say, 
Europe unequivocally means reduced interest in the United States, or vice versa. What 
is evident from Putin's rule is that he tries to have them both - to seek Russia's 
integration with Europe and improve her relations with the United States. This is the 
essence of Putin's pragmatism, which is in harmony with Putin's state building project 
and Russia's international image. 
Improving mutual trust and developing cooperation with existing institutions, notably 
NATO and the EU, has been chosen as the most prominent way in avoiding Russia's 
marginalisation from security decision-making in the European continent. The 
emergence of the EU as a new security player has presented Russia with a range of 
opportunities relating both to continuing efforts to strengthen Russia's voice in 
European security affairs and to Putin's emphasis on a closer partnership with the EU. 
With all this in mind, Moscow has striven equally to upgrade Russia's relations with 
Europe, as well as with the United States, having understood that most EU countries 
would be more inclined to treat Russia as a reliable partner if Russia's relations with the 
U. S. were stable and constructive. 
At the same time, Moscow would also welcome a looser relationship between the 
United States and 'old' Europe, with Russia in the long-term becoming a more 
important partner of the major European powers. The possibility of the U. S. stationing 
her forces in some former Warsaw Pact states makes the development of Russia's ties 
with 'old' Europe an important counterweight to the U. S. focus on 'new' Europe. 
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However, Russia is unlikely at present to wish a major rift, as she would be compelled 
to choose between the two. A stronger Russia, in the long term, is a European power, 
and therefore has more in common strategically with 'old' Europe than with the United 
States. 119 
over the Iraqi crisis Russia's approach was to keep options open on both sides. First, 
Russia resolutely opposed American intervention, for a number of reasons. Secondly, 
she did not want to alienate the U. S. too much but equally she did not want to alienate 
France and Germany. The question for Russia was how to find a more or less middle 
road. Putin made some tactical mistakes but in general he performed well. What he did 
do, 'he always had French and Germans in front of him to face the American bullet' so 
that Moscow's positions would always appear more flexible, more accommodating, 
particularly his own position. 120 Moscow also benefited due to the fact that U. S. level of 
expectation was lower for Russia than for France and Germany. And it was Russia that 
became more flexible on the issue that the U. S. regarded as extremely important. 
To sum up, it seems that Russia has been seeking acceptance by Western Europe as 
much as United States. What she wants to achieve is an equal partnership between the 
three powers - U. S, EU and Russia. To this end Russia pursues different agendas with 
different parts of the West - Europe and the U. S. - and tries to gain advantages on both 
sides. On issues like terrorism and homeland security Russia's policy seems to be closer 
to the U. S. than to Europe. Meanwhile, with Europe Russia places her emphasis on 
energy, trade, investment and institutional dialogue. Hard security issues in partnership 
with the U. S. and soft security dialogue and institution building with Europe - such are 
the two faces of Putin's Westernisation. 
There is a growing feeling that the European Union lays Russia aside, being focused on 
expansion, and that the large project of the 'common European geo-economic and geo- 
strategic house' with Russia is postponed indefinitely. 121 It has turned out that Russia 
still has practically no efficient mechanism of influencing of decision-making in the 
European Union. Moscow started to understand that despite the intensified dialogue, 
loud statements on creation of 'common spaces' the matter does not go any further than 
ordinary rhetoric. Russian leadership appears to regard the U. S. under the Bush 
administration as a more predictable, pragmatic and beneficial partner. 122 The key point 
is that the Russia-EU relationship is an 'organic relationship' 123 , related to its immediate 
neighbourhood. Therefore Russia's problems with Europe are more fundamental than 
those with the U. S.; apparently, it is more difficult to tackle them. 
In overall terms, the three key players - Russia, U. S. and Europe - are inclined to 
cooperate, they can help each other and this may have potential for the future. Being 
neighbours, Europe and Russia are condemned to have a close relationship. Europe is an 
entity with which Russia could change the political environment. Meanwhile the U. S. 
without Russia on board will never shape Europe. How close Moscow's cooperation, 
whether with Washington or Brussels or both, becomes in the longer term 'depends on 
fundamental issues of compatibility' between Russia and the leading states of 
international community. 124 It is not simply a matter of Russian competing effectively 
on world markets. In order to become an integral part of that community, Russia needs 
to become a state of pluralist democracy that entirely contradicts Putin's political 
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agenda. It does not appear that Russia intends to play according to the rules suggested 
by the West 
5.6. Conclusions 
Russia has entered the 21st century as an autonomous international player -a partner 
with the West but not an integrated member of Western security institutions such as 
NATO or the EU. There appeared two troubling trends in Russian-European relations. 
Firstly, while Russia and Europe drift closer to one another due to mutual economic 
interests, the two sides' understanding of basic democratic democratic values and rule of 
law continues to diverge. Secondly, it is obvious that in the wake of the dual 
enlargement Russia finds it more difficult to defend her interests in Europe, as she has 
to deal with more cohesive international organizations rather than relatively small 
separate states. Therefore Russia seems as eager as ever to resort to the old tactics of 
divide-and-rule: even when Putin meets with the EU as a single entity, he still prefers to 
do business with the European leaders one-on-one, cutting advantageous bargains with 
individual EU countries. 
The EU enlargement has changed the essential parameters of Kaliningrad's political and 
economic environment, thus creating a pressing need for rapid in-depth modemisation 
of the oblast. The scenario of 'double periphery' is not acceptable for Russia and 
equally for the European Union. Hence, mitigation of direct effects of the EU 
enlargement, as well as overcoming of the socio-economic lagging behind the 
neighbouring countries, should be an important interest for all regional actors. In other 
words, in all sensitive issues related to the solution of the 'Kaliningrad puzzle' the co- 
operative approach should take preference over confrontation. On the part of the oblast 
this requires, first and foremost, its openness for co-operation. Moreover, in order to 
attract foreign investments of vital importance is the demilitarisation of Kaliningrad and 
tackling of environmental problems in the region. The oblast may become a part of a 
united Europe even if Russia does not join the EU. Despite visa troubles, the European 
integration offers - for the first time in history -a chance to make the region a hub of 
growth and stability. If properly utilised, Kaliningrad will greatly benefit from positive 
consequences of Poland and Lithuania's membership of the EU. 
It is apparent that in many aspects policies inside the Kaliningrad region, and 
particularly the policies conducted by the Russian Federation, will have a greater impact 
than the effects of EU enlargement. How economic policies are devised and carried out, 
and how market economy is established there is of vital importance to the region. 
Economic prosperity of the oblast requires successful projects and financial injections 
but, most importantly, Russia herself has to decide with regard to the region's 
specialisation. The final responsibility for Kaliningrad remains with Russia. 
The fact that the EU accounts for half of total Russian trade is key to Putin's 
integrationist agenda with Europe, while Russia's position as a global energy producer 
affords her a level of international consideration unattainable by more traditional 
instruments. Russia's immense energy resources are likely to increase her influence in 
the coming years, as consuming nations seek to secure sources of oil and gas imports. 
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The increased role of Russia as an incremental, and possibly sustainable, supplier of 
energy to the Northern hemisphere will put Russia in a stronger position to resist 
pressure to conform to desired policies of the West. This could potentially thwart U. S. 
and European efforts to prevent Russia from pursuing policies that endanger the 
political or economic sovereignty of countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. 
Formally, Russian-European security cooperation has been growing during the last 
several years. On the part of Russia, the main reason for this is not Russia's intention to 
create an atmosphere of mutual trust and equal partnership with Europe but her new 
tactics towards a long-term perspective. It is aimed at receiving as much as possible 
political and economic benefit, strengthening Russia's status in international politics, 
restoring her image as a strong state, and, simultaneously, retaining her influence and 
interests in some new NATO countries or even in the entire Central and Eastern 
European area. The widening gap between Russian and Western political priorities and 
values is emerging as a constant theme, and is likely to become increasingly 
problematic for future strategic relationships. In this context, a famous quote of Lord 
Palmerston that Russia will go as far as lack of Western firmness will allow her sounds 
absolutely true. 125 
As far as 'wedge-driving' between the United States and Europe is concerned, it has 
never been completely outdated in Russia's foreign policý-, Moscow is certainly trying, 
albeit not openly, to play Europe against the U. S. 12 The Iraq conflict perfectly 
illustrates this. Another thing is that Putin seems to perfectly understand that Russia 
simply does not have the capability to drive an effective wedge: if one is going to drive 
a wedge one must have the power to do so effectively. 127 
Vladimir Lukin says that Russia, being positioned in the inter-Atlantic space 'between 
the two Atlantic poles' could take the niche of an 'inter-Atlantic integrator', assuming 
the 'mission of eliminating the political gaps', and be an active participant or even 
catalyst of 'concerted tripartite actions' (Russia, the U. S. and the EU). 128 This is also the 
most effective way of establishing favourable international political conditions for 
modernising the country and turning it into a 'subject' (as opposed to an 'object') of the 
world economy of the 21't century. 129 This implies that Putin's foreign policy is to be 
inscribed into a new regime's 'philosophy', which should go beyond the neo-realist 
view, the core element of which is the idea of building a strong state - functional, viable 
and sustainable, leading Russia's integration into the world economy. Russia's pro- 
Western orientation will only become sustainable through much more intensive 
interactions with key Western multilateral institutions - NATO, the EU and the WTO. 
Deeper integration, in turn, will require Russia to continue to reform her domestic 
institutions that underpin market economy and democracy. This is by far the most 
important component and super-task of state building, based already on a neo-liberal 
view, a long way for Russia to travel. 
A more sensible and moderate approach would be for Moscow to acknowledge that 
NATO and EU enlargement have prompted a major change in the strategic environment 
around the CIS that makes it impossible for the U. S. and Europe to avoid involvement 
in the countries with which Russia shares a common border. Moscow should understand 
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that Rose Revolution in Georgia and Orange Revolution in Ukraine are not anti-Russian 
but pro-democracy and pro-stability moves. Russia must either cooperate with new 
regional actors or find herself further marginalized from key political, economic and 
security processes in the CIS states. Europe, in turn, has to acknowledge that the FSU 
area cannot be stabilised without Russia's constructive involvement. All in all, cooling 
relations between Russia and Europe notwithstanding, they both could not afford to 
implement new containment policies as they remain interdependent in many areas of 
vital mutual interests. Russia's economic modernisation project requires closer 
integration with Western institutions, whilst the current phase of global instability still 
makes it costly for the West to lose Russia as a partner in energy relations and in 
counter-terrorist efforts. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE RUSSIAN FACTOR IN BALTIC SECURITY 
6.1. Introduction: approach to the Baltic security 
To understand the lingering concern of the Baltic nations in respect of ensuring their 
security, one must take into account their turbulent history. The historic destiny of the 
Baltics was to a large extent determined by their unfortunate geographic location in- 
between two belligerent nations to the West and to the East - the Germans and the 
Russians respectively. Since the early 1300s there was hardly a century in which the 
three Baltic nations were not caught up in a war with either or both of the two 
neighbours. Only Lithuania experienced a long period of statehood before being 
swallowed up by the Russian empire at the end of 18thcentury. 
In the 2& century the Baltic States experienced the whole cycle of the development of 
small states: liberation from the suppression of the big neighbour Russia after the First 
World War; independence period between First and Second World Wars; 50 years of 
occupation (1940-1990) by the Soviet Union and Germany (1941-1944), restoration of 
independence after the end of the Cold War and democratic development since 1990. 
The evolution of the Baltic States is related to the stages of development of great 
powers: their status (dependence or independence) coincided with the phases of 
strongest collision between great powers - the wars. Due to their geo-strategic position 
the Baltic countries, as small states, were often victims of the policy of great powers. 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, a number of historical and cultural differences between 
them notwithstanding, are often not differentiated in the context of international 
relations but treated as a whole - the 'Baltic States'. Accordingly, the history of the 20'h 
century provides some justification for this treatment. They are of a traditional small 
state nature and sharing common geo-strategic environment. Having (re)established 
their independence at the same time (1918) upon the collapse of the Tsarist Russian 
empire, they embarked on similar roads of development. The three nations had 
relatively a short period of independence, though very important for building their 
respective national identities. They were forcefully incorporated into the Soviet Union 
in 1940, occupied by Hitlerite coalition during the Second World War and re-emerged 
as Soviet republics in 1944. Hundreds of thousands of Estonians, Latvians and 
Lithuanians fell victim to the Nazi and Soviet occupations. The Soviet regime deprived 
the Baltics of their political, business and intellectual elites by imprisoning or deporting 
to labour camps some 90,000 people from Estonia, 200,000 from Latvia and 300,000 
from Lithuania. Many of them died from torture, famine or were executed. Tens of 
thousands of people fled to the Western countries or were repatriated. In the post-war 
years, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania put up fierce armed resistance against the 
occupation. ' 
Inspired by national uprisings in the countries of the Warsaw Pact and seizing the 
opportunities provided by Gorbachev's perestroika, Estonians, Latvians and 
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Lithuanians started their own 'singing revolutions' in 1988-1989. The three nations 
became the first republics of the late USSR to declare their independence in spring 
1990. While Gorbachev 'let go' the Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet elite had clearly 
different plans with regard to the Baltic sovereignty. The myth of the bloodless break- 
up of the Soviet Union is not quite accurate - it did cost lives. 2 Western powers were 
anything but ready for the events unfolding within the USSR. It was one thing to take 
the iron Curtain down and dismantle the Berlin Wall, but seeing the Soviet Union 
tumble altogether was quite another. International recognition of the Baltic States 
started with Yeltsin's Russia herself. In summer 199 1, the three countries signed treaties 
with the Russian Federation whereby each side recognised the other's international 
status and established bilateral relations. The failed coup detat in Russia in August 
1991 opened the way for further international recognition of the Baltic States. The 
change of relations between the West and the USSR/Russian Federation, the elimination 
of suppression, and the new regional security dynamics made a direct impact both on 
the reviving of the Baltic States and the attempts to establish themselves into 
international community. 
Contemporary foreign and security policies of the Baltic States are essentially similar: 
they are full-fledged members of Euro-Atlantic structures - NATO and the EU, and 
they are cautious in their relations with Russia. This is understandable, as, apart from 
sharing common geo-strategic environment, the three Baltic States have similar limited 
capabilities, similar concerns and perception of threats. In this sense, the Baltic States 
represent a 'security complex', defined as 'a set of states whose major security 
perceptions and concerns are so interlinkcd that their national security problems cannot 
reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another'. 3 Nonetheless, their 
interdependence does not imply that that the Baltic States actually interact as a regional 
security system. The relationship between different national security strategies and 
international strategy (i. e. security regime in the Baltic region) is playing a part. These 
two components of security policy should be treated as coexisting. 
According to the definition of the prominent representative of neo-realist school, Barry 
Buzan, national strategy attempts to increase strength and to reduce vulnerability, thus, 
joining alliances would be part of a national strategy. Therefore national security 
strategies are seen as a 'self-help' approach which, in Buzan's words, 'makes less sense 
for lesser powers', given their lack of sufficient resources. 4 An international strategy 
'focuses on the sources and causes of threats, the purpose being not to block or offset 
the threats, but to reduce or eliminate them by political action'. 5 
Security concepts establish aims and main guidelines how to achieve these aims. In 
principle, small states can either opt for an isolationist policy of neutrality, ally with a 
great power or seek inclusion in larger alliances. In the early 1990s, with sovereignty 
still fragile, some among the Baltic political elites contemplated returning to the 
neutrality policy of the interwar period. With Russian troops still on the soil of the 
Baltic States and the Western countries reluctant to issue any security guarantees not 
many options were available. Since the mid-1990s, security orientation of the Baltic 
States has been more or less stable and undisputed; one could even argue that 
discussions about possible alternatives have been lacking. Whenever security concerns 
have been discussed during the last decade, a potential Russian threat has figured as a 
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key concern of Baltic security policies. History figures as a prominent guideline for 
Baltic security conceptions. The main lessons are seen in preventing a repetition of the 
mistakes made in 1940. 
According to the Knudsen model of relations between great powers and small states, the 
historical past is a serious obstacle in building mutual trust. The impact of historical 
experience on the relations between a great power and a small state is identified through 
the level of distrust in the policy of a small state. Distrust between states changes from 
conflict (maximal) to abstention to reconciliation (minimal). In the case of the Baltics 
and Russia, historical past has played a very significant role. Throughout the nineties, a 
prevailing image of Russia as a potential enemy is explained by three key reasons: 
Russia's Soviet nostalgia, her unpredictability and desire to retain her status as a 
superpower. 
Despite the end of the Cold War and the significant demilitarisation which occurred in 
Europe during the 1990s, military threat and risk rhetoric have dominated the Baltic 
security discourse up to the beginning of the 21" century. Russia's assertiveness, as well 
as the often slow pace of her economic and political reforms, contributed to the 
persistence of such rhetoric in Baltic policies. This was the main driving factor for the 
consistent efforts of the Baltic States in their integration with the West, placing priority 
on NATO membership. It can be stated that the pursuit of NATO membership for the 
6 Baltic States has been 'geopolitically and structurally determined'. The perception of 
Russia as a threat has usually been combined by the use of heavily loaded metaphors 
such as 'no man's land', 'security vacuum', or 'grey zone', which, in turn, intended to 
validate the quest for security guarantees from NATO. 
For a decade the Baltic States had regarded the security situation in Europe as based on 
the assumption that the Baltic sub-region is a bridge between East and West, and that 
they are two mutually opposed entities. In order to eliminate strong power asymmetry in 
their geopolitical situation, they have sought integration with the West. Due to the 
primacy of their security concerns, the Baltic States granted priority to NATO 
membership. Moreover, issues of national sovereignty and distinctiveness, a complete 
and irreversible breakaway from their Soviet past, as well as any risk of being 
submerged in a new Russian sphere of influence have, for the Baltics, become the 
measure and substance of statehood. The intensity of their security preferences and the 
'resulting strategic behaviour' are distinctive from that of the remaining CEE countries. 7 
In theoretical terms, Baltic accession strategy was one pertaining to the neo-realist 
approach. Due to the perceptions of the direct security threat from Russia and in order to 
enhance their position as independent states, their motives for accession were concerned 
with relative gains. The Baltic States expected NATO to solve their security dilemma. 
They further expected the EU integration process to account for absolute gains, based 
on perceptions of their legitimate power in Europe. The logic of separating military 
security and general welfare objectives was apparently not in line with the current stage 
of European integration in which security, identity and integration form one coherent 
complex. The sustaining factor of the Western European security community 
(integration itself) was 'different from the "formative" logic of the acceding countries'! 
The fact that membership implied the overall process of national adaptation, in which 
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certain conceptual foundations of public policy of the Baltic States had to change, bears 
evidence to the difference in their assessment of the geopolitical situation in Europe. 
The specific security problem of the three Baltic States is that they are caught between 
the strategy of the West and that of Russia. These strategies are opposing and 
incompatible: a Western strategy places emphasis on the cooperative security structures 
of NATO and the EU, whilst a traditional Russian power-based security strategy seeks 
strategic influence through power projection and intimidation. Using a traditional small 
state analysis, the Baltic States face two choices: either to adapt to this Russian strategy 
or seek to disengage from Russia by out-balancing her through alliance with other major 
states. 9 However, the latter option contradicts the co-operative security strategies of 
NATO and the EU, the basic argument of which is that all European security 
arrangements and regimes are to a great extent 'dependent on Russia remaining engaged 
as a partner'. 10 
From the Western point of view, both in terms of policy making and academic analysis, 
Baltic security rested on three main premises: first, security in Europe is indivisible; 
second, there is no military threat; third, the Baltic region is not a security vacuum. II 
The first notion of indivisibility of security implies that security problem of any state in 
Europe would automatically be regarded by all other European states and institutions as 
their problem. In other words, a threat to any of the Baltic States would be a common 
European concern. This assumption obviously is an extrapolation of the collective 
security concept underlying the collective security system. 
The second notion is derived from a widely accepted approach that there is no real 
military threat against Europe in a short or medium term perspective. Security threats 
are becoming more of a structural nature, such as economic, political and social 
disorder, regional conflicts based on ethnic and religious rivalries, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and so on. One could argue, however, that this was true 
when the focus was on an actor threat against the EU and NATO. Was this judgement 
valid for the Baltic States prior to their joining NATO? On the one hand, Russia 
remains a major regional military power and, judging from her strategic documents, she 
is inclined to use her military machine. 12 On the other hand, taking into account that the 
Baltic States were soon to become full-fledged members of NATO, they could better 
rely on the Alliance's collective security guarantees rather than on insignificant national 
military deterrent capabilities of their own. 
The third assumption resulted from the fact that the Baltic States had already been 
incorporated in the very complex European co-operative security architecture. The 
Baltic security relations took place in a densely institutionalised environment. Many 
organisations and institutions, overlapping in terms of their goals, are based on the 
concept of engagement and cooperation between all actors. A number of security 
frameworks and initiatives were employed for shaping Baltic security, such as PfP, 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), CBSS, Northern European Initiative 
(NEI) 13 , and so on. 
In the beginning of the 21't century, especially after the 9/11 terrorist acts, two 
developments have had a major impact on the geopolitics of the Baltic region: Russia's 
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rapprochement with NATO and the United States, and the dual enlargement of NATO 
and the EU. This, in turn, has contributed to the evolution of the meaning of security in 
the Baltic countries. Baltic political elites have started to expand their security 
perceptions: threats are located less in the military domain than in the so-called 'soft' 
security sector which embraces a wide range of political, economic, as well as 
environmental and societal aspects. However, military security is still identified with 
national sovereignty. Some part of the Russian political and military elites still harbours 
intentions to turn the Baltic States into 'their own tool in the Euro-Atlantic institutions 
or at minimum into a neutral buffer'. 14 The common position of the three states has 
been that sovereignty can be consolidated only with military-political support from the 
West. A strong Western European identity and the idea of historical and legal continuity 
of their nation-states are central elements of the political thinking in all three countries. 
This chapter aims to address the evolution of Russo-Baltic relations. It analyses the 
main changes in perception and politics of the three Baltic States since the restoration of 
their independence in the early nineties to their full-fledged membership of NATO and 
the EU and afterwards, and their eventual transformation from factors to actors in 
regional and international relations. 
6.2. Russia's geopolitical and strategic studies 
With reference to the Knudsen model, the strategic significance of a small state is 
identified by the ruling elite of a great power. Knudsen introduces the variable 'great 
power pressure': strategic actions of a great power aimed at curbing the independence 
of a small state. 15 In operational terms, the variable 'great power pressure' is perceived 
as the combined diplomatic and military activity of a great power directed at a smaller 
neighbour within a given period of time. 16 This part of analysis presents a vivid 
illustration of how the strategic significance of the Baltic States is reflected in Russia's 
geopolitical and strategic studies and what policies toward the Baltics are designed. 
For the Baltic States, which gained independence after the break-up of the USSR, the 
direction and nature of Russia's foreign policy became a matter of high importance in 
their effort to secure and consolidate sovereignty. By the end of 1993, Russia adopted 
policies aimed at restoring her influence in 'near abroad' in order to preserve the great 
power status which she had been enjoying for centuries. Labelled as 'neo-imperial' 
(aimed at restoring the empire under different guise), this posture escalated into security 
concern of the FSU states. 
Russia's military diplomat, General Leonid Ivashov, says that the science of geopolitics 
'has flourished in the post-communist period, and this is a natural and objective 
response to the circumstances'. 17 Although these studies, further discussed in this 
section, belong to the so-called national-patriotic trend of ideas, they are becoming 
increasingly relevant among a number of Russian intellectuals, strategists and 
politicians, and therefore cannot be left without comment. Their common ground is 
Eurasian orientation and anti-Atlanticist ideas, as well as an intention to form a Russian- 
German axis for the division of Europe! 8 Another typical feature is the sincere belief of 
the authors that Russia is still a great power. 
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One of the most prominent representatives of the Eurasian mindset is Aleksandr Dugin, 
an intellectual and the leader of party 'Eurasia' (previously - 'Eurasian Movement') in 
Russia. If for much of the 1990s Dugin was known only as an ideologue of a marginal 
party (National Bolsheviks) later he became widely read and influencial: he managed to 
become an adviser to a former communist speaker of the State Duma Gennadiy 
Seleznev. Beside this, Dugin and his 'Eurasian Movement' up to 9/11 were famous 
supporters of Vladimir Putin, whom Dugin identified as the 'embodiment of the 
"Eurasian capitalist" model of statist development'. 19 Whether Putin has embraced 
Dugin's Eurasian ideology remains unclear. 
The relevance of Dugin's writings lies in the formulation of the geopolitical doctrine of 
Eurasian defence against American 'open door' expansionism. His ideology combined 
'an anti-Western interpretation of geopolitics with mysticism, Aryanism, conspirology, 
authoritarian statism and Eurasianism. 20 Dugin is in favour of the establishment of a 
new 'Grossraum' (an area dominated by the power representing a distinct political idea) 
in Europe, 'Pax Euroasiatica, opposing Pax Americana', and based on the coalition 
between Russia and some European powers, such as Germany and France -a new 
geopolitical continental block2l. Prior to the dissolution of the USSR there was the 
bipolar world of two superpowers, and existed two competing 'Great Areas', each with 
its sphere of influence and ideology: the 'Atlantic Grossraum' dominated by the United 
States and the 'Eurasian Grossraum' dominated by the Soviet Union. The end of the 
bipolar world and the emergence of the uni-polar New World Order, proclaimed by 
President Bush, 'is a blow to Eurasia, a blow to continentalism and to the future of all 
Eurasian countries'. 22 
Dugin's book Osnovy Geopolitiki [The Basics of Geopolitics] advocates the rebirth of 
the Soviet Union and the creation of a continental block of anti-American Eurasian 
states that would remove U. S. influence from the Eurasian landmass. 23 In his view, the 
U. S. has the intent to dominate globally and could assert control over the heartland by 
controlling a buffer zone or a huge 'cordon sanitaire'. Therefore the main task for 
Russia is to prevent this from happening. The 'cordon sanitaire' consisted of the Baltic 
States, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. 24 In Dugin's study, paramount significance is attached to the Baltic States due 
to their strategically important location. In his view, the best outcome for Russia would 
be the creation of a strategic block of Baltic Sea States, comprising Norway, Sweden, 
Germany, Finland-Karelia, Denmark and Holland. Poland, Lithuania and Latvia would 
be given special status . 
25 Lithuania's situation is very specific here, as she is the 
northernmost fragment of the catholic world, separating the Russian space from the 
northern part of Central Europe. 26 Lithuania, as Dugin put it, has always played a dual 
role in the geopolitics of CEE: with respect to Russia, she was a carrier of Western 
culture whilst in respect to Central Europe, on the opposite, Lithuania, together with 
Poland, manifested herself as an Eastern Bower, defending the independence of Balts - 
Eastern Slavs - against German influence. 
Dugin's ideas are interestingly reflected in Aleksey Mitrofanov's report 'Anti-NATO: 28 The New Idea of the Russian Geopolitical Tactics and Strategy at the Present'. In his 
view, the contemporary world is in a very important stage of its new re-division. Russia 
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is being isolated from Europe, and along Russia's perimeter a 4zone sanitaire', 
consisting of Russia-unfriendly states, integrated into a system of U. S. and her allies' 
blocks, is being formed. Mitrofanov suggests a radical change of course - to officially 
declare that NATO is an antagonist organisation to Russia and denounce all border 
agreements. 29 
In 1995-1996, two important Russian security studies were conducted on the Baltics and 
Ukraine: one appeared relatively moderate; another definitely was not. The first, 
published under the provocative title 'Vozroditsya li soyuz? Budushchee 
postsovietskovo prostranstva 30 [Will the Union Be Reborn? The Future of the Post- 
Soviet Space], was sponsored by the prestigious Council on Foreign and Defence Policy 
in Moscow under chairmanship of a leading Russian analyst of the realist school, 
Sergey Karaganov, then one of Yeltsin's advisors. The second called an 'alternative 
national security doctrine 01 by one of its main authors, Anton Surikov, and was 
published only in excerpts in the Russian press. 32 The Surikov report calls for 
$stationing nuclear weapons in Belarus, putting troops in the Baltics if they try to join 
9 33 NATO . However, the Karaganov study, albeit of much more reserved wording, in its 
essentials confirms rather than denies Surikov's thesis. For instance, among Russia's 
vitally important interests - those the state must be ready to use all means, including 
force to defend, is 'preventing the formation of coalitions hostile to Russia, including 
34 those in response to Russian actions in the former USSR'. To put it plainly, there was 
an implication that this would amount to military action against the Baltic States if they 
joined NATO. The Karaganov report also postulated that 'the resurrection of the 
[Soviet] union in the shape of a confederation is reasonably realistic'. At the same time, 
Karaganov was not very hopeful about reabsorbing the Baltic States: 'Latvia - 
[reintegration] improbable, but not completely impossible', 'Estonia and Lithuania - 
[reintegration] almost excluded (pocht! isklyucheno)'. 35 
6.3. What makes the Baltic region important for Russia? 
The Baltic lands have always been a zone of interaction - either in peaceful or 
confrontational form - between Russia and the external world. For a number of historic 
and geopolitical reasons Russia's perceptions of the Baltic Sea have always been 
influenced by security considerations. Since the times of Kievan Russia (9th century), 
when Lord Novgorod the Great gained a limited opening to the Baltic Sea (around 
today's St. Petersburg), to the present Russia has been concerned with strengthening her 
positions in this area and preventing the rise of hostile powers. It should be remembered 
that from the late 18th century onwards the Baltic States had been part of the Russian 
empire. In the 18th century the Baltic region began to function as a literal and 
metaphorical 'window to the West' for a Russian imperial elite dominated by Peter the 
Great. This helped Russia to acquire a status of a great power and increase her influence 
in Europe. In the 20th century, the Baltic region has been used as one of the main axes 
of attack against the Russian Empire/Soviet Union in the two World Wars. 
Consequently, Russia retained her perception of the Baltic Sea rim space as a frontline 
against Western expansion. Moscow's diplomacy, military doctrines and armed forces' 
posture in the area were subordinated to the objectives of global confrontation with the 
West. With the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the most dangerous 
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threats from the West, Russian policy makers suddenly realised that Russia is neither 
geopolitically nor militarily able to dominate the Baltic area any longer. 36 The 
independence of the Baltic States meant not only the loss of 'window to the West' but a 
great deal more - the removal of one of her features as a superpower. 
It is difficult to define the place for the Baltic States in Russia's foreign policy concept: 
the Baltics do not fit in a traditional doctrine of 'near abroad', nor they correspond to 37 
the postulates of policy of 'far-abroad'. Nonetheless, geopolitical pressure, originating 
from the doctrine of 'near-abroad' was applied against the Baltic countries. For the 
Russian part, it manifested through accentuating legitimate freedom of actions in the 
Baltic region, as well as attributing this region to the vital sphere of Russia's interests or 
assessing actions of the West in the Baltics in terms of geopolitical interests. 
Professor Alexander Sergounin argues that there are at least four dimensions which 
make the Baltic region important for Russia: geopolitical-strategic, political, economic, 
and humanitarian. 38 In geopolitical and strategic terms, there have been major changes. 
With the collapse of the USSR, Russia's access to the Baltic Sea area was significantly 
reduced to the small areas around Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. Russia lost 
approximately two thirds of the former Soviet Baltic coastline. The total length of the 
outer boundary of the country's territorial waters is now only just over 200 km. 
Moreover, Moscow lost its strategic allies from the adjacent regions. The feeling of 
increasing isolation from Europe was added by expanding the 'buffer zone' between 
Russia and Central and Western Europe as a result of secession of Belarus, Moldova 
and Ukraine in 1991, which made Russia's access to the Western European countries 
more difficult than in the recent past. Above all, geopolitical importance of the Baltics 
was related to the retaining of Russia's influence in the region. In line with zero-sum 
mentality, the increase of Western influence equals the decrease of Russia's control. 
Paradoxically, the same 'geopolitical catastrophe' which reduced Russia's influence in 
the Baltic Sea rim made the latter rather attractive for Moscow in terms of economic 
cooperation with Europe. Russia's CIS partners were less preferable than the Visegrad 
countries and the Baltic States: the latter were ahead of other post-Soviet countries in 
conducting reforms; they were economically viable and potentially welcome to the 
European 'club'. The region is also an important transport junction by sea, land and air. 
As a result of Russia's loss of her main ports on the Baltic Sea - Klaip6da, Riga, Tallinn 
and Ventspils - which formerly connected Russia with the West, the role of the 
Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg harbours has become crucial. On the Baltic Sea, as much 
as 56 percent of the 3 
former Soviet harbour capacity reverted to the control of the newly 
independent states. 9 Finally, the new geopolitical situation has posed not only 
economic but also political, military and even psychological challenges to Russia. The 
Kaliningrad problem exemplifies such a combination of different factors. 
Politically, the Baltic region is equally important for Russia. Moscow's approach to the 
three Baltic States and the other countries of the region is different. The Baltic countries 
are vital if Moscow is to keep its influence in the region under the guise of protecting 
the Russian speaking minorities. Beside this, Russia has also wanted to demonstrate that 
she was a major player in this part of Europe, a player which is able, for instance, to 
regulate the pace and scope of Baltic accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
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Economically, Moscow views the Baltic Sea countries as promising trading partners, a 
possible source of investment and know-how, as well as training assistance. Being 
geographically closer than other Western countries, the Baltic Sea countries may serve 
as contributors to the development of regions adjacent to them: Kaliningrad, St. 
Petersburg or Kola Peninsula. With regard to the Baltic States, Russia expects them to 
be a promising market for Russian industrial goods and hopes to retain them dependent 
on Russia's natural resources . 
40 With regard to humanitarian and cultural issues the 
most acute is the rights of the Russian diaspora in the three Baltic States. This is 
important in relation to both foreign policy and domestic policy. 
6.4. Russo-Baltic relations in early 1990s: troubled neighbourliness 
In 1988-1990, even before the declaration of independence, the Baltic republics tried to 
define their identities and dependence in respect of the West-East axis. Westward 
orientation was acknowledged as a paramount strategic goal. Its implementation was 
connected with the following directions of domestic, foreign and security policies of the 
Baltic States: social-political integrity of the state; escape from the post-Soviet zone; 
adoption of an active actor approach in international relations; search for regional 
identification. 41 All these directions were closely related. Nevertheless, their overall 
expression has been reintegration (return) to Europe, perceived as accession into Euro- 
Atlantic security community characterised b 
41 
the 'development of transaction flows, 
shared understanding and traditional values'. 4 
In 1989-1991, against the background of degradation and the resultant deep crisis in the 
Soviet Union, the struggle for political democratic reforms and independence 
increasingly gained expression in Russia. This new emerging Russia was eager to 
establish her relations with the independent Baltic republics. The Baltic States base their 
relations with Russia on the treaties of inter-state relations concluded in 1991 between 
Russia and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These treaties declare full recognition of the 
restored independence of the Baltic States, condemn the 1940 Soviet annexation of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and emphasise the importance of adherence to the norms 
enshrined in the instruments of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE, currently the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe - OSCE), 
including commitments to the principles that every state has the inherent right to freely 
choose or change its security alignments. 
Tbroughout the 1990s, analysts have identified the key issues that purported to 'the 
main dynamics with a Russian 'Baltic policy'. 43 They have argued that there are three 
periods characterised by the dominance of different issues and policies. The first (1991- 
1994) was primarily concerned about dealing with the legacy of the collapse of the 
USSR. The second period (1995-mid-1997) was largely dominated by Russia's reaction 
to the prospect that the Baltic States would integrate rapidly into the Euro-Atlantic 
structures, first of all NATO. From the start of the third period in 1997, there emerged 
the tendency of 'a new Russian strategy of counter-engagement' - the combination of hard and soft security strategies to balance Western initiatives in the region. 44 
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Prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, in opposition to the Soviet centre, the Russian 
Federation, presenting herself as a sovereign state, started negotiations with the 
independent Baltic republics on the principles of inter-state relations. Talks with Estonia 
and Latvia were concluded in January 1991, and in July with Lithuania herself. Russia 
accepted that the troops stationed in the Baltic States had to be withdrawn, and that a 
solution to the Baltic problem had to be found at an international level. The culmination 
of Russo-Baltic friendly relations was on 20 September 1991, when, amidst the power 
struggle in Moscow, Yeltsin announced recognition of the Baltic States. 
It is important to recall that from the very beginning of his career as a Russian leader, 
Yeltsin's policy toward the Baltic States differed from that of Gorbachev. With the 
Atlanticists occupying key positions in his entourage, Yeltsin chose a co-operative 
strategy. In 1991-1992, the Russian President played down the importance of military 
force in safeguarding the security of Russia in Northern and Eastern Europe. He and his 
Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev argued that international cooperation and non- 
military power instruments were important elements in guaranteeing security for the 
country and its international status . 
45 Moscow's new co-operative strategy in the Baltic 
area was aimed at expanding relations with the countries of the region, as indicated by 
Russia becoming a member of the CBSS when it was established in 1992. 
However, an unfavourable geopolitical situation after the collapse of the USSR, as well 
as international and domestic developments, caused a crisis in the AtIanticist school of 
thought, stimulating its shift to traditional strategic concepts. They claimed that the 
West was not really responsive to Russia's demands for substantial economic 
assistance, her participation in European economic and political-military institutions, 
and ignored Moscow's position toward critical security matters, e. g. pace and condition 
of Soviet military withdrawal from the Baltic countries, national minority rights, and so 
on. 
The decline of the AtIanticists was followed by the rise of the Derzhavniki - proponents 
of strong power. 46 This was a powerful centrist alliance, uniting three major political 
forces - the industrial lobby, federal military and civilian bureaucracy, and moderate 
Democrats. 47 Karaganov was one of the most prominent ideologists of this school of 
thought. The Derzhavniki were influential not only in the theoretical debate; they were 
able to exert a political pressure upon the Yeltsin government. They criticized 
Kozyrev's policy of ignoring violations of minority rights in the Baltic States as 
4amoral' and 'short-sighted', since it is Russia's duty and mission to defend the rights of 
all ex-compatriotS. 48 At the same time, Russia's assertive policy in the 'near abroad' 
should not mean open imperialist policy. The Derzhavniki realised that any attempt to 
forcibly re-establish the Soviet Union (or the Russian Empire) would overstrain 
Moscow itself and lead to international isolation. 49 
These developments had a direct negative impact on Russo-Baltic security relations. 
Despite the friendly rhetoric, Moscow did not give up a geopolitical leadership role in 
the Baltic region. Instead, Moscow proclaimed itself a guarantor and protector of 
security in the entire post-Soviet space. It was in relation to the 'near abroad' that the 
Russian leadership started to define its 'strategic interests' and to speak of 'spheres of 
influence'. Apart from this, the Kozyrev Doctrine, which became a symbol of the 
Derzhavniki foreign policy concept5o, stated that the vital strategic issue for Russian 
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diplomacy was the defence of Russian minority rights in the 'near abroad' .51 Above all, 
the concept of 'enlightened post-imperialism' was adopted as a guideline for Russian 
policy in the post-Soviet space. 52 For obvious reasons the Baltics made clear that they 
would not follow Russia in their foreign policy orientations. A majority of the Baltic 
political elites and the public at large transformed their negative attitudes toward the 
Soviet Union to anti-Russian sentiment. The Baltic countries were inclined to view 
post-Soviet Russian intensions through the prism of the past. 
Thus, in theoretical terms, the neo-realist perception of Russia was dominant in the 
Baltics in the first half of the 1990s. Extending the 'democratic peace' argument to 
Russia, it was assumed that Russia represented a potential danger to peace due to her 
shaky democratic credentials. From a liberal perspective, the main obstacle to 
cooperation with Russia was seen in the 'lack of shared values and opposing national 
interests'. 53 
As the Russian Federation became the legal successor state to the USSR, the majority of 
the issues which dominated Russo-Baltic relations were integrally linked to the legacy 
of fifty years of sovietization. This was particularly true regarding three key contentious 
points that characterised inter-state relations in this period: Soviet troop withdrawal, the 
rights of the Russian minority in the Baltic States, and the absence of agreement on 
border delineation. To make matters worse, at the same time the Russian Federation was 
facing a challenge to create a new non-Soviet foreign policy whilst simultaneously 
adapting Soviet institutions and decision-making practices to the realities of the post- 
Cold War international environment. The difficulties faced by the Baltic States were 
arguably more challenging. Albeit having restored their independence, the Baltic 
countries had not pursued for fifty years an independent foreign and security policy and 
lacked the institutions, personnel and expertise to bridge this shortfall easily. 
It is worthwhile noting that the civil rights of the Russian minorities in the Baltic States 
and border disputes represented the two lasting issues of contention, which became a 
driving dynamic in Russia's Baltic policy. Russia played this card very successfully for 
more than a decade, starting from Soviet troop withdrawal in the early 1990s to the 
Baltic accession of the Euro-Atlantic structures and even afterwards. The withdrawal of 
the former Soviet military and their replacement by national armies featured high on the 
Baltic agenda. The CSCE, the UN General Assembly, as well as Western pressure, 
supported the Baltic quest for troop withdrawal - the issue had been internationalised. 
The CSCE also played a crucial role in monitoring Russian troop withdrawal. 
In the early nineties Russia faced a huge strategic task - to ensure stability and security 
of her borders, i. e. the borders with the former Soviet countries. Russia feared that 
newly established states might become points of conflicts or wars. In this sense, 
ensuring security in the Baltic States, as part of a buffer zone surrounding Russia, was 
of great importance to Moscow. At the same time, it was an opportunity for Russia to 
retain her influence in the region and find her place in a new international environment. 
To this end, Russia put geo-strategic pressure on the Baltics, which was the most 
obvious during the process of negotiation on troop withdrawal. This pressure 
manifested in three areas: ensuring of stability, seeking guarantees with regard to the 
rights of Russian-speakers in the Baltic States and negative consequences of Russia's 
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strategic retreat. The latter meant that Russia lost access to her former strategic military 
bases, she needed to re-deploy her forces in the St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad) 
Military District in compliance with the restrictions of the Treaty on Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) and had difficulties related to the military transit to Kaliningrad 
region. In short, troop withdrawal for Russia was her retreat from strategically 
important points, which caused many problems, bringing not only economic but also 
social costs. 
The speed and the manner of military withdrawal became linked to the thorny issue of 
rights of Russian-speakers, including a large number of retired Soviet military 
pensioners. Before the Second World War, the three Baltic States were relatively 
homogeneous in terms of the ethnic structure. 54 During and after the Second World 
War, the Baltic States lost approximately a quarter of their population (Estonia lost 
some 200,000 inhabitants, Latvia - 500,000, Lithuania - 1,000,000)55. These losses 
opened the way for massive voluntary and forced migration of Eastern Slavs (primarily 
Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians) into the Baltic States, which continued 
throughout the Soviet era. The ethnic population in Estonia fell from 94 percent prior to 
1940s to 61.5 percent by early 1990s, in Latvia from 77 percent to 52 percent, while in 
Lithuania from 84 to 80 percent respectively. While Lithuania also received sizeable 
numbers of migrants, repatriation of some 200,000 Poles from Vilnius and rather rapid 
natural growth rate allowed Lithuanians to retain a rather significant majority in their 
own country. 56 
Largely due to the reason that Lithuania adopted the Gzero option' 57 of citizenship 
legislation, which satisfied Russia, Moscow and Vilnius reached an agreement on 
withdrawing residual forces relatively quickly. 58 Russia completed withdrawal of all the 
military formations of the former Soviet Army from Lithuania on I September 1993, 
the year before they left Latvia and Estonia, or Germany. Estonia and Latvia were in 
great deal worse position. With much higher proportions of ethnic Russians in native 
populations they have chosen '1940 option'. Such legislation granted citizenship to 
those who were Baltic citizens before the occupation, and to their descendents, but 
insisted that for those Russians who arrived during the Soviet period, residency and 
language requirements had to be fulfilled before citizenship would be granted. 59 Given 
that the overwhelming majority of Russian-speakers had migrated during the Soviet 
time, these two states were accused of implementing 'ethno-nationalist post-Soviet 
state-building projects' . 
60 The regulation of the citizenship issue for Russians in the 
Baltic States - under the mediating influence of the OSCE missions in Latvia and 
Estonia - has defused the minority question, particularly with regard to retired Russian 
servicemen. 
Although troop withdrawal was agreed in principle for Latvia and Estonia too, Yeltsin 
justified the postponement of this process by claiming discrimination against local 
Russians in these two countries. The tactic of linkage between Russian military 
presence and the status of Russian-speaking non-citizens clearly interfered in the 
sovereign affairs of the Baltic States and exacerbated inter-state tensions. This was one 
of the forms of geo-strategic pressure on the Baltics. The occasional playing national 
minorities 'card', combined with a lack of real interest in the resolution of the problem, 
was continued. Overall, a pattern of Russian behaviour emerged in the course of troop 
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withdrawal - 'differential treatment'. 
61 Moscow used to employ tactics to 'divide and 
rule' among the three countries; Lithuania was usually treated as a 'good guy', mainly 
because of her more favourable demographic situation. But she also had difficulties 
with Russia over the Kaliningrad transit arrangement (see chapter 7). 
It should be noted that troop withdrawal from the Baltic States occurred in the period 
when Russia enjoyed good relations with the United States. This is well in line with the 
Knudsen hypothesis, stating that small states may enjoy more freedom of action and 
suffer less pressure from a big neighbour, provided there is low degree of tension 
between great powers. Being preoccupied with her strategic partnership with the United 
States, Russia was very interested in maintaining a low level of tension with the U. S. In 
reality, for Russia the greatest benefit from this partnership was U. S. economic, political 
and military (solution of the problems related to nuclear weapons in the CIS countries) 
assistance. What is more, it helped Russia not to feel as if she was the complete loser of 
the Cold War. Such status of relations with her former rival perfectly suited Russia's 
interests: to stabilise situation after the collapse of the USSR, to take part in the creation 
of a new international order and to regain strength - first of all, to become stronger 
economically. In this context, the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltics was a 
real litmus test of sustainability of this partnership. Further development of Russia's 
relations with the United States depended on its outcome and demonstrated the 
reliability of Russia's new policy: whether Russia was to remain an occupation power, 
or she was able to fulfil the commitments. 
Apart from the minority issue, Russia had border disputes with Estonia and Latvia. 62 
The two Baltic countries requested the recognition of the post-First World War borders, 
based on the original Peace Treaties of Tartu and Riga in 1920, whereas Russia stuck to 
the borders of the former Soviet republics. This revealed a subtler series of 
interconnected political issues: Russia's unwillingness to recognise that the Baltic States 
were illegally occupied (although this was already done even in Gorbachev's time in 
1989), a desire of the Baltic countries to internationalise inter-state disputes, and 
Russia's refusal to address the Baltic States as equal partners. Given the lack of any real 
political support from other European countries behind the attempt to redraw the 
boundaries in Europe, in 1995 Estonia began to give in over the border issue, and Latvia 
followed her. Moreover, NATO and the European Union decided that countries wanting 
to join these organisations must not have unsettled territorial problems. Since 
membership of these organisations was the most important objective for Estonia and 
Latvia, they wanted to solve the border issues quickly, to demarcate the borders and to 
impose strict border control. But despite the fact that the bilateral Russian-Estonian and 
Russian-Latvian border treaties were prepared and agreed in 1996 and 1997 
correspondingly, they were not signed; Moscow wanted the territorial disputes in the 
region to keep a low profile to settle them later through bilateral channels. After all, 
Russia considered this issue to be a powerful tool against the Baltic membership of 
NATO. Lithuania was the most fortunate of the Baltic countries. But although the 
border treatY63 between Lithuania and the Russian Federation was signed in 1997, the 
Russian Duma delayed its ratification until the autumn of 2003, i. e. when the leverage 
on Lithuania's NATO integration was lost. 
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On the grounds of these developments, it is possible to say that, according to Knudsen, 
legal 'de-occupation' of the Baltics by the mid-nineties was well underway. The legacy 
of the Cold War was gradually eliminated in the Baltic region; by 1994 mechanisms and 
frameworks had been set in place, which aimed to ensure peaceful and negotiated 
resolutions to these most contentious problems. First of all, the Russian Federation 
officially recognised the independence of the Baltic countries. Furthermore, although 
the border issues were not resolved, progress was made in other aspects of inter-state 
relations: Soviet troops had been largely withdrawn from all three Baltic States by 
September 1994, and the Russian minority issue was intemationalised with the 
introduction of OSCE missions to Latvia and Estonia. On the whole, up to the mid- 
1990s Russian policy towards the Baltic States was reactive, receiving its direction and 
drive from external influences, particularly the Euro-Atlantic response to the strategic 
reorientation of the Baltic States themselves. Moreover, Moscow's policy toward the 
Baltic States increasingly became a hostage to the domestic political debate. 
6.5. Security cooperation versus security confrontation 
Russo-Baltic relations, as Nikolay Sokov, Senior Research Associate of Monterey 
Institute of International Relations, put it, were almost 'unique in displaying the new, 
emerging features of Russian foreig Ii ' with the aim of adjusting it toward new 
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realities of the international system. The main feature of this new policy was the 
separation of issue areas, meaning in particular that economic relations develop almost 
independently from other aspects of Russo-Baltic relations (military, political, ethnic 
and territorial). 
For quite a long time in the 1990s Russia was convinced that she did not really need a 
policy towards the Baltics. Russia thought that everything would be determined through 
Russia's relations with the great Western powers. The problem was that in no way did 
Russia want to accept small states as equal partners; this was reflected in Russia's 
official policy in 1997 towards the Baltic States. However, by 1998 Russia had 
constructed a viable policy towards the Baltic countries, when soft security strategies 
were placed firmly upon the inter-state agenda. 65 Sokov argues that the ability to put 
issue areas in different compartments is 'the first condition of stability and integration 
into interfiational community': conflicts are inevitable but they do not have to engulf the 
whole scope of relations. 66 
in the mid-nineties, within the Russian business community there were two main 
lobbies interested in the maintenance of good relations with the Baltic Sea countries: the 
gas-oil lobby and businessmen specialising in export-import operations. The former was 
a key supplier of energy to the Baltic States and Kaliningrad. It opposed economic 
sanctions against the Baltic countries and pressed the Russian government to normalise 
its political and economic relations with them. 67 Thus, while in general relations 
between Russia and the three Baltic States remained tense, the maintenance of a 
significant level of economic interdependence ensured that conflicting issues would take 
place within a broader range of economic and political links which provided an 
imperative for cooperation. Indeed, Moscow seemed to calculate that if good relations 
could be developed with the Baltic States, then their eventual membership in the EU 
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would serve to give Russia an economic foothold in Europe. 68 In this regard the Baltic 
countries had the capacity to act as a 'gateway region' in facilitating the development of 
economic relations between Russia and the West. 69 These calculations may help to 
explain why Russia's response to the Baltic States' efforts to develop links with 
Western institutions other than NATO have been so positive. What is more, Russia 
herself sought an interim trade agreement with the EU and applied for membership of 
the Council of Europe. Postponed by the EU because of Russia's brutal behaviour in 
Chechnya, the trade agreement was finally signed in Brussels in July 1995 by Kozyrev 
and his fifteen EU counterparts. Russia's application for membership in the Council of 
Europe, presented in 1992 (but supposed to be deferred until the end of the Chechen 
operation), in fact was accepted in January 1996, prior to the termination of Russia's 
war in Chechnya. To reflect new realities, from 1995 onwards there appeared several 
studies on changing Russia's view toward cooperation with the Baltics. 
6.5.1. New Balticpolicy in Russia's political studies 
A study called Russia and NATO, prepared in 1995 by the CFDP - an advisory group 
headed by Karaganov has played an important role in conceptualising the external 
policy of Russia in mid-I 990S. 70 The authors conclude that Russia has twofold interests 
towards the Western world: partnership with the West is necessary from the economic 
point of view, but NATO enlargement may have negative consequences for Russia. Not 
so much the geo-strategic aspect of NATO expansion is emphasised, but its 
psychological impact on Russia's internal policy. The analysis revealed the broad 
Russian consensus against NATO expansion but warned against Soviet-style rhetoric of 
confrontation that would endanger Russia's national interests in all aspects. The study 
assumed that in the context of NATO enlargement Ukraine and the Baltic States would 
become zones of particularly acute competition, having the potential to produce 
international crises. Seeking to avoid this, it is essential for Russia to resort to 
preventive diplomacy. To this end, more active cooperation with the Baltic countries is 
of critical importance. Simply put, the paper recommends not to oppose Baltic 
membership of NATO by extreme means and sanctions, but to use more 'constructive 
engagement': less noticeable political, cultural, economic and other levers. According to 
this study, Russia had to initiate rapprochement with the Baltic countries with a view of 
establishing good neighbourly relations, given that the Baltic States would successfully 
solve national minority issues and would not join political-military blocks. What is 
more, Russia was concerned with the prosperity of the Baltic States and supported their 
aspirations to join the EU . 
71 This was one of the manifestations of Russia's geopolitical 
pressure on the Baltics: Moscow used to emphasise Baltic membership of the EU as an 
alternative to expansion of NATO. 
Another CFDP study Russia and Baltic Countries 
72 
and Dmitry Trenin's Balti kiy 73 
Ys 
Shans [The Baltic Chance] clearly revealed an emerging new Russia's Baltic policy. 
Both papers stressed that despite the existing good neighbourly relations between 
Russia and the Baltic countries, the instinctive Russian wish to play a leading role in the 
post-Soviet environment, as well as the inherent inclination of the Baltic States to move 
away from Russia, remained. According to the CFDP study, the fact that the Baltic 
States saw their security guarantees only in the West and rejected those proposed by 
Russia contradicted reality, since only a friendly Moscow was able to provide real 
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security assurances 74 . To avoid a 
direct conflict with Russia, the West was gradually 
implementing the policy of pushing Russia out of the Baltic States and taking them in 
its sphere of influence. Both papers concluded that the principal Russian policy goal 
was to 'soothe' the Baltic States. It was necessary to act quietly, promoting mutual 
cooperation, shelving discussions about NATO, but if the Baltic States started to 
increase their efforts to join the Alliance, Russia's reaction must be firm. 
The year 1997 was a major breakthrough in Russia's Baltic policy. The ground for it 
was laid by two key developments. First, the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in 
Paris on 28 May 1997 and the decisions adopted by the Madrid summit seemed to 
generally satisfy the Russian political elite. Moscow was particularly delighted with 
NATO's decision to limit the first round of enlargement to the three Visegrad countries 
only and delay the admission of the Baltic States to NATO for an indefinite future. 
Second factor was related to the business lobby, particularly the rising role of Financial 
Industrial Groups in shaping Russia's foreign and economic policy following the 1996 
privatisation programme of strategic economic assets. 75 The following two studies are 
very enlightening in this respect. 
The central message of Baltiyskiy Shans was the need to change angle when looking at 
the relations between the Baltic States and Russia. The paper proposed a new method: 
to focus on the opportunities that exist and thus try to turn the situation around. In this 
view, Russia's policy towards the Baltics should be given a more balanced and less 
impulsive character: positive stimulation of the Baltic States would bring better results 
rather than trying to penalise them for their 'disloyal' behaviour. Trenin argued that the 
opportunities - chiefly, but not exclusively, in the economic domain - were wide enough 
to ensure a win-win outcome for all those involved. 76 Of key importance was EU 
enlargement to include the Baltic States. Trenin held a strong belief that post-Soviet 
Russia, while going through a painful and difficult process of adapting to the new 
international environment, was gravitating towards Europe. There was no model in sight 
for the future relationship between Russia and the rest of Europe, and the Baltic Sea 
area appeared to offer a unique opportunity to develop a scaled-down version of such a 
model. Displaying a pragmatic approach, the study presented a set of recommendations 
for Baltic, Russian and Western decision-makers with a view towards turning the Baltic 
problem into a Baltic chance. 77 
A real 'roadmap' for Russo-Baltic relations was 'Strategicheskaya Liniya Rossii v 
Otnoshenii Stran Baltii' [Russia's Strategic Line towards the Baltic Countries], prepared 
by the presidential office and approved by Yeltsin. 78 It set Russian long-term policy 
guidelines towards the Baltic States, outlining Russia's strategic goal in the region - the 
consolidation of good relations with the Baltic States, promotion of bilateral and 
multilateral economic cooperation, indivisibility of regional security and protection of 
human rights. The document strongly argued that the notion of Baltic neutrality was by 
no means becoming obsolete, it was actually becoming more rational, due to the 79 disappearance of the global military threat and development of a multi-polar world . In 
essence, it was a promotion of the policy of 'constructive engagement'- a much more 
purposeful and co-ordinated Russian elaboration of hard and soft security strategy in the 80 
region, from geopolitics to geo-economics. It was the first time when, in dealing with 
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the Baltic States, Russia so explicitly applied a differentiated approach: relations with 
each country depending on the conditions provided for towards the Russian diaspora. 
6.5.2. Regional security guarantees 
Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement was initially characterised by 'a twin-track 
approach'. At first, Russia adopted the policy of 'conditional enlargement': former 
Warsaw Pact countries could be integrated without tough opposition providing key 
conditions were met (i. e. non-deployment of NATO troops and tactical nuclear 
weapons, and an obligation not to create infrastructure and reinforcements in the new 
members' territories). Above all, neither the Baltic States nor other former Soviet 
republics were to be integrated under any circumstances. The negative consequences of 
tunconditional enlargement', portrayed in all speeches of Russian officials and in 
diplomatic meetings, supposed to include 'strident militarism' within the 'near abroad', 
political instability in Russia, and so on. 81 
Concurrently Russia proposed alternative 'non-NATO' mechanisms to oversee 
European security. First of all, Russia tried to argue that international organisations, 
such as the EU, OSCE and UN, should provide the framework within which European 
security was guaranteed. In February 1997, Yeltsin's government formally announced 
its Baltic policy - Russia's long-term policy guidelines towards the Baltic States, 
addressed in the previous part of this chapter. 82 The policy document outlined six inter- 
linked Russo-Baltic issues and supposedly aimed at promoting mutual friendship and a 
model of relations based on economic integration and bilateral cooperation. Russia, 
nevertheless, had strange ideas about achieving these goals. Were the Baltic States to 
join NATO, Russian sources asserted, it 'would have lasting and seriously negative 
effect on relationships with Russia'. Conversely, the preservation of the Baltic States' 
non-block status' would be able to create a basis for bilateral and unilateral steps ... 
capable of dispelling the apprehension for security' that was still lingering in the Baltic 
States. 83 
Additionally, protecting Russian minority rights in the Baltics remained a fundamental 
long-term policy goal. It was particularly the case in Latvia and Estonia, where Russia 
dictated the conditions for citizenship that Russian minorities must receive. Latvia and 
Estonia were told that progress on the treaties for delimitation of their borders with 
Russia would stall until the protection of compatriot rights was guaranteed. 84 AsNATO 
and the EU had told candidate countries that they must first resolve border issues, 
Russia, seeking to halt the enlargement process, tried to blackmail the Baltic States by 
illustrating that they had not met the conditions for enlargement. 85 This insistence that 
Moscow 'can rightly intervene in the Baltic States' domestic and foreign policies owing 
to alleied discrimination against Russians' remained a critical element of the Russian 
policy. 6 
According to Dr. Graeme Herd, a Faculty Member at Geneva Centre of Security Policy, 
Russia's position was locked into 'self-defeating and self-sustaining dynamic' 87 : the 
louder she protested against the Baltic inclusion, the more vigorously the Baltic States 
strove to achieve NATO's security guarantees, the more Russia increased traditional 
diplomatic and other economic pressure to halt this integration. By and large, it only 
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displayed Russia's inability to conduct a policy based on the European and Baltic 
realities. Apparently, this suicidal course of action did not prevent NATO from 
enlarging or Russia from continuing to risk exclusion from the European security 
agenda. A new Russian approach was needed. As a result, Russia started to transform 
her assertive Baltic policy into 'constructive engagement'. 88 
First manifestation of a new policy was in 1997, when Russia attempted to create some 
kind of security arrangement with the Baltics - multilateral security guarantees with 
Russian participation - that would pre-empt NATO membership. The new tactic aimed 
at three objectives: first, to preserve Russia's status as a regional player, which was 
important at a time when Russia felt increasingly isolated from the European and global 
security politics; second, to provide 'protection' of the Baltic countries from NATO 
members, particularly the U. S., which could possibly remove their need for formal 
NATO membership; third, with the help of multilateral guarantees to prevent the 
deployment of NATO troops, weapons and infrastructure in the Baltic States. 89 
At a series of conferences and in diplomatic notes, ending in Yeltsin's visit to Sweden, 
where he formally outlined Russia's new stance, Moscow offered the Baltic States, 
Finland, Sweden (and implicitly NATO) a regional security package. Russia's proposed 
a so-called three-tiered policy intended to create 'a regional model of interaction that 
would fit Europe's security architecture and regional specifics'. 90 However, this Russian 
initiative received little international support and was too late. 
For the first time, the idea that security of the Baltic States could be guaranteed in a 
multilateral context rather than by NATO membership was seriously voiced by Boris 
Yeltsin in March 1997 at the Helsinki Summit meeting with the U. S. President Bill 
Clinton. 91 At that time NATO enlargement was already underway and the real questions 
were whether the Baltic States would be included into the first wave, or postponed until 
later and when the second wave would take place. However, the lasting and successful 
Western orientation of the Baltic States seriously undermined Moscow's efforts to 
extend its influence on Baltic security arrangements. Russia's twin-track opposition to 
NATO enlargement failed and the chances of 'dissuading the Baltic States and NATO s92 
proved to be slim. 
Since the NATO conferences in Paris and Madrid in May-June 1997, which created a 
NATO-Russia Joint Council and ratified NATO enlargement, Russia has started to 
modify her Baltic policies. Moscow talked about settling border issues with all three 
Baltic States and the need for economic partnership. Even Russian criticism of Baltic 
national minority policies became noticeably milder. 93 This indeed demonstrated the 
correctness of the expansion of the Alliance. NATO enlargement, as Blank put it, 
obliged Russia to 'find a modus 
4 
vivendi with the Baltic States and to develop a more 
restrained policy in the West'9 even if these were only tactical steps to prevent 
subsequent enlargement of the Alliance. 
In September 1997, Victor Chernomyrdin, then Russian Prime Minister, repeated the 
regional security proposal in Vilnius, claiming that Russia could provide any security 
guarantees the Baltic States might want in exchange for not joining NATO. He also 
warned over possible attempts to change the status of Kaliningrad oblast. This proposal 
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95 
was soon followed by the notion of a 'regional zone of security and stability'. A new 
strong impulse was made by Yeltsin personally a month later during a summit with the 
Lithuanian President, Algirdas Brazauskas, when signing a 'big' treaty on the state 
border between the two countries. According to Reuters, Yeltsin declared that Russia 
was prepared to guarantee security of the Baltic States if they ever came under threat . 
96 It 
was more like a joke, as the Baltic States were seeking security guarantees against 
Russia rather than from Russia. 97 
These proposals were seen in the Baltic States as Russia's attempt to suggest a security 
alternative to NATO membership. Lithuania, as well as Latvia and Estonia, found them 
a priori unacceptable. In their view, this initiative conflicts with the basic premise of the 
indivisibility of European security, and 'regional security' per se is non-existent. 
Moreover, there were no real stability problems in the Baltic region, therefore there was 
no need to create any artificial 'stability zones'. The Baltic States' security requirements 
did in no way differ from those of the other CEE states. 98 
The formal response of the Baltic States came in November 1997 at the Baltic 
Assembly and at the meeting of the three Baltic presidents. Baltic reactions were 
unfavourable. Russia was accused of attempting to regionalize security and re-impose 
what the Baltic Assembly referred to as 'Russian patronage' within the region. 99 It was 
stated that Baltic security would be better guaranteed in a broader European context and 
it was only by NATO that the Baltic security could be shaped. 
In December 1997, the nature of hard security guarantees became apparent when in 
Stockholm Yeltsin proposed Russia's 'Northern Bridge' initiative. These new proposals 
were based upon regional co-operative models that explicitly supported the preferred 
Russian policy of non-NATO Baltic integration. 100 The contents of the Russian plan 
represented a multi-layered structure: first, bilateral Russian security guarantees to each 
Baltic State; second, agreements based on a three-plus-one formula; third, the regional 
level, including Nordic countries; and forth, Europe as a whole. The bulk of security- 
related arrangements, including confidence building measures, was to be concentrated on 
the second and third level, which, taken together, was an interesting attempt to 
compromise between earlier Russian, Baltic, and Nordic proposals. The fourth, pan- 
European level, opened a way for NATO to play a role in providing security assurances 
along with the OSCE and other European organisations. '01 
Yeltsin also announced a plan for a 40 percent cut in infantry and naval forces in North 
Western Russia, including Kaliningrad, the creation of a confidence building regime, 
establishment of a hotline between the military command in Kaliningrad and those in the 
Baltic States, joint control of Baltic airspace, joint military exercises, and so on. 102 It is 
important to note that the force cuts in North Western Russia, though welcomed, clearly 
owed little or nothing to Baltic security issues and much to the bankruptcy of Russia's 
military machine, which finally began to undergo systematic downsizing. 103 
The Baltic States, Finland and Sweden immediately rejected these suggestions for a 
regional security system. In the Baltic view, no circumstances necessitated a special 
confidence-building regime for the Baltic region because it would presume that this 
region was less stable or treated as a special case for European security, which did not 
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correspond to reality. 104 All in all, Russian security guaranties, multilateral or unilateral, 
for the Baltics or for all of Northern Europe, 'point to a division of Europe into rival 
spheres of influence'. 105 Such guarantees would 'legally' confirm a subordinate place 
for the Baltic States as part of Russia's sphere of influence. 106 
It is worth stressing that the initiatives to regionalize Baltic security were also 
sometimes raised in the West. 107 These were the ideas to institutionalise some security 
negotiations with the Russian presence at a Baltic round table, or to design special 
confidence and security building measures (CSBM) for the Baltics. In the context of 
Russian ambitions to preclude the Baltic States from ever joining NATO such efforts to 
apply special CSBM in this region became in themselves 'risk factors for Baltic 
108 security'. The Baltic States wanted that any CSBM would be compatible with their 
national security objectives. 
It should be noted that supporting the idea of the strengthening of regional transparency, 
predictability and co-operation within the overall framework of the OSCE 
commitments, the Baltic States have been participating in the verification regime under 
the Vienna Document (VD). But they were against any pressure on them to take part in 
regional CSBM, which could only strengthen the Russian impression that the Baltic 
States presented a 'special case' and should not be admitted to NATO. The Baltic 
approach to CSBM was based on the principle that those measures should complement, 
but not duplicate, the already-existing ones, such as the CFE Treaty and the VD. 
6.5.3. Remaining tensions in Russo-Baltic relations in late 1990s 
By 1998, Russia had constructed a viable policy towards the Baltic States. As the 
importance of NATO enlargement process was partly downgraded after the Madrid 
summit, Russian political priorities shifted from hard to soft security initiatives during 
1998: from geo-politics to geo-economics, focussed on domestic structures and 
economic interests rather than military threats and territorial control. 109 By and large, 
Russian economic interest in the Baltic States has been centred upon the transport and 
transit of Russian goods and energy through this region to European markets. 110 In 
December 1997, Russia signed the Partnership Cooperation Agreement with the EU 
and, by January 1998, at both the CBSS and the Barents-Euro-Arctic Council meetings, 
Russia introduced a series of soft security initiatives, which were generally well 
received by the Baltic States. These initiatives centred upon the integration of transport 
infrastructures and a common market in communications, services and business 
information. "' They were discussed at the Russia-EU Moscow summit held in February 
1999. This summit illustrated the growing role of the EU as an interface between Russia 
and the aspirant EU Baltic States, particularly in non-traditional security sectors. 
Moreover, Finland introduced the ND Initiative in 1997 which had an important impact 
on shaping Russia's role and policies within the region. Ultimately, major financial and 
economic 'meltdown' in August 1998 had seriously impaired the sustainability of the 
federal power structure, which, in turn, had a spill-over effect on the coherence and 
management of Russia's Baltic policy. The systemic shock transformed the content of 
Russia's Baltic policy and finther emphasised the soft regional security agenda to cover 
new issues. 112 
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In the late nineties, the Russian government took numerous steps which caused a good 
deal of unease and acrimony in its relations with the Baltic States. It was Russia's 
economic pressure, which manifested itself mainly by threatening to withhold oil and 
gas supplies, and by the construction of oil-loading facilities at Primorsk and other 
Russian ports of the Gulf of Finland that would bypass the Baltic States and thereby 
deprive them of at least some of the lucrative transit fees they collected since 1992 from 
Russian exporters. ' 13 In addition, Russia occasionally resorted to indirect military 
pressure, most notably by conducting military exercises near the borders of the Baltic 
countries. Russia placed exceptional importance to the exercise 'Zapad 99' ('West 99') 
near the Belarus-Lithuanian border in July 1999, when nuclear weapons were used as a 
response to conventional aggression. 114 'Zapad 99' meant a warning to the West 
following the Kosovo campaign, as well as manifestation of Russia's military might as 
a major power. 115 The growing integration of Belarus with Russia, and the fortification 
of garrisons in Kaliningrad have sparked further anxiety in the Baltic capitals. 116 Ali 
these examples demonstrate Russia's efforts to put geopolitical and geo-economic 
pressure on the Baltics in the process of consolidation of their independence. Logically 
enough, the periods of pressure coincided with high degree of tension between Russia 
and the United States during and after the Kosovo crisis. This by most accounts itself 
confirms one of Knudsen's hypothesis: high level of tension between great powers 
manifests through pressure on neighbouring small states. 
Another source of discord in Russia-Baltic relations was the resurgence of disputes 
about the Soviet past. In June 2000 the Russian government declared that the Baltic 
countries had 'voluntarily' joined the Soviet Union 'in accordance with international 
law' and had 'invited' Soviet troops to occupy their territory at the beginning of the 
1940s. In a formal statement that was reaffirmed in the spring of 2001, the Russian 
foreign ministry claimed that 'assertions about "occupation" and "annexation" of [the 
Baltic countries] by the Soviet Union ignore the political, historical and legal realities 
that are therefore devoid of merit'. 117 These declarations triggered counter-statements 
from Baltic leaders. In 2005, in the run up to the May 9 festivities, the refusal of the 
presidents of Estonia and Lithuania to attend the Victory Day ceremonies in Moscow, 
celebrating the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, marked the 
climax of the ongoing 'battle over history' between Russia and the Baltic countries. 
Moscow's stance on the Baltic history has been motivated in part by a desire to avoid 
any liability for reparations (which all three Baltic States have been pursuing), but this 
does not wholly explain the comments. After all, the whitewashing of Soviet rule in the 
Baltics is instead symptomatic of Russia's broader failure to come to terms with the 
Soviet past, and it also reflects a widespread sense in Moscow that the Baltic States 
should remain in Russia's 'sphere of influence'. Russia's misinterpretation of the past, 
along with many other points of contention, has given even greater impetus to the 
efforts by Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania to join NATO. Their desire for membership in 
the Alliance does not reflect sense of immediate threat. Baltic officials have often said 
that they do not expect Russia to attack their countries or to undertake other malevolent 
actions in the near future. Nonetheless, as long as the Russian government fails to 
acknowledge that the Baltic countries were victims of Soviet rule and not voluntary 
participants, suspicions of Moscow's ultimate intentions will persist. Baltic leaders see 
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NATO membership as the only reliable way, over the long term, to allay those 
suspicions and to hedge against a turn for the worse in Moscow. 
6.6. Intra - Baltic security interaction 
Common values, external threats or economic interests usually encourage and reinforce 
regional integration. This process implies pooling values and goals, interests and 
resources for common purposes. The foundation for Baltic security integration lies in 
their geographic proximity and shared threat perception. Furthermore, the Baltic States 
represent similar political regimes and exhibit comparable security policy 
orientations! 18 Conditions which support regional cooperation of the Baltic States 
might be seen in their geographical location and small size, their joint past as part of the 
Soviet Union, as well as similar political agendas, comparable problems in constructing 
security policies, and the outside view of the Baltic States as an entity. 119 
As a matter of fact, the Baltic States have established a wide array of common 
institutions: the inter-Parliamentary Baltic Assembly, the Baltic Council for Foreign and 
Security Policy Cooperation, the Council of Baltic Presidents, and the Council of 
Ministers of the Baltic States. However, these trilateral institutions were active only in 
the transitional period - until mid 1990s. Later on, they often became semi-dormant, 
and their decisions have only been partially implemented, if at all, despite their wordy 
declarations and intentions to cooperate. The Baltic experts themselves are of the 
opinion that the dividend from Baltic institution-building is only marginal. 120 This 
means that by implementing their basically similar foreign policies aimed at 'returning 
to Europe' the 'Baltic States have by the same time regressed on the issue of their own 
mutual integration'. 121 
In the defence area cooperation among the three Baltic States has been effective indeed. 
The presumption at the very start was that the Baltic States do not need to create 
separate three Baltic projects but they rather need to look where EU and NATO are 
going and to create structures and procedures that would eventually be easy to plug into 
wider European and Euro-Atlantic structures. These BALT-projects helped Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia to improve personnel training according to the Western standards, 
prepare units for participation in international operations and spread the Western 
experience through the national forces. The multinational units, infrastructure facilities 
and training institutions created under these projects were purposefully developed by 
the Baltic States as a future regional extension of NATO's integrated military structure. 
The BALT-projects have been the following: the Baltic peace forces battalion 
BALTBAT (the project was terminated in August 2003); the Baltic naval squadron 
BALTRON; the Baltic air space surveillance and control network BALTNET; and the 
Baltic Defence College BALTDEFCOL (for a detailed description of these projects see 
Appendix G). All these common projects are highly visible examples of co-operative 
efforts, but to what extent are they symbolic and to what extent substantive? At times, 
BALTBAT had been portrayed as a major contribution to regional security, as well as to 
peacekeeping operations. Yet the project's visibility did not adequately correspond to its 
actual security value. BALTBAT had contributed to common Baltic training methods, 
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operating procedures, and interoperability with NATO forces, but it did not have a 
considerable impact on the development of self-defence capabilities. The battalion's 
utility for peacekeeping had been also limited - it had never been deployed 
independently. The BALTBAT, especially in its early stage, depended on outside 
support. The same was true for the other projects. 
BALTRON activities are centred around high readiness mine counter measures and 
patrol craft capable of participating in various international missions including 
collective defence. Each Baltic State owns a small number of warships, usually without 
meaningful armaments and communication systems. These limitations in terms of 
capability and resources notwithstanding, intra-Baltic military cooperation has been 
widely perceived as the most successful, interoperable (personnel, materiel, 
infrastructure) and effective model of practical and meaningful cooperation. NATO 
experts recognise that, despite small size of the Baltic States, they could provide 
capabilities that would enhance NATO's military capabilities. Most important, their 
inclusion has extended NATO's air surveillance system to cover the entire Baltic Sea 
and large part of North Western Russia. Another aspect of the integration of BALTNET 
into NATO air defence system is that all three Baltic nations comprise a cohesive 
strategic space that has particular relevance for integrated air and missile defence 
operations and the defence-in-depth of Northern European Alliance territories. 122 
Moreover, common projects helped the Baltics not only to develop their forces in 
conformity with NATO standards and to receive significant support from the Western 
countries, but also to acquire experience in cooperation, project coordination and 
management and to demonstrate to the West that they are ready to act together on the 
international stage. What is more, the Baltic States have already started to share the 
experience of their joint military cooperation with other regions, primarily with the 
South Caucasus and the Balkans. 
Securi cooperation is usually embedded in broader areas of interaction. At the end of 
the 20 century, the Baltic Sea countries repeated the Hanseatic success by opening 
their borders and liberalising trade and travel conditions. However, economic 
interdependence, for example, has only developed on a small scale among the Baltic 
States. Energy, transport, telecommunications are the main fields of engagement. Rapid 
economic growth will require reconsideration of energy strategy. It is also crucial to 
implement integration of the Baltic electricity market. Equally, small trade turnover 
between the three Baltic countries remains problematic. 
Thus, Baltic security cooperation is more or less a kind of 'window dressing for 
Western consumption. 123 Without underestimating its importance for Baltic solidarity 
and joint operational skills, for the most part it is limited to the defence area. If defence 
remains the only significant sphere of close cooperation, it lacks reinforcement from co- 
operative practices in other fields. The reality shows that all these commonalties - the 
common Soviet past and comradeship between the independence movements, common 
values, similar political systems and homogeneous foreign policy orientations - are 
clearly not sufficient for institutionalised security cooperation. An answer, why Baltic 
integration is so limited in substance and in scope, can be found in structural 
constraints, limited interests and, to a certain extent, the content of their security 
concepts. Cooperation generally requires investment both in manpower and financial 
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resources for joint capability building. The resources of the Baltic States, particularly in 
the defence area, are very limited, and it would not make a major difference if they were 
put together. The relative gains of cooperation seem to be low. The main point here is 
that Baltic integration cannot produce hard security on its own. Therefore it was more 
reasonable to project Baltic cooperation as a means to another end - rapprochement with 
Euro-Atlantic institutions and a return to Europe. The common interests for the Baltic 
States pertained to their membership in the EU and NATO, not to Baltic integration per 
se, and cooperation was instrumental in reaching these goals. Furthermore, it should not 
be overlooked that their ethnic composition and treatment of their Russian minorities 
differ, and pre-Soviet models of the inter-war period point them toward different states. 
Apart from the Soviet experience, there are no shared historical legacies, which form a 
common identity for the Baltic States. A negative image of Russia, which served as a 
consolidating factor upon the restoration of their independence in the early 1990s, has 
not proved to be a sufficient stimulus for Baltic unity later on. Above all, the Baltic 
States were afraid that regional cooperation could become a substitute to their 
admission to NATO. There was always some caution that their mutual cooperation 
should not de-emphasise moves towards EU and NATO membership. 
The political elites of the Baltic States, competing to be the first country to accede to the 
EU and NATO, aimed to have their countries treated as distinct entities by the West 
rather than a single geopolitical unit. Professor Vytautas Landsbergis, the former 
Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliament, urged the Baltic people to break free from the 
'Baltic ghetto'. 124 The tendency toward differentiation was equally clearly expressed in 
pronouncements by Estonian and Latvian authorities. 125 This suggests that being 
'Baltic' is not a significant part of the national identities of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. The term 'Baltic' is associated not so much with Europe as with the former 
Russian and the Soviet rule. 126 
That said, with regard to Western security guarantees, cost-benefit calculations speak in 
favour of outward orientation rather than intra-regional cooperation. This also explains 
why intra-Baltic cooperation remains competitive in many respects - individualistic 
behaviour is seen as a more favourable strategy than joint cooperation. Baltic defence 
cooperation was additionally inhibited by keeping open the option of individual NATO 
membership instead of joint inclusion. Therefore, since 1995, the dual nature of Baltic 
cooperation became increasingly obvious. Alongside the demonstration of Baltic 
solidarity there appeared separate efforts and independent tactics for reaching the 
foreign policy goals of membership into the EU and NATO. Estonia decided to rely 
more on Finland's wide-ranging assistance and support, while Lithuania moved towards 
Central Europe, and especially Poland. From the logic of a small state's national 
interests and the protection of its physical existence, it was very reasonable - they were 
looking for more powerful partners. Latvia was a different case. Being sandwiched 
between Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia did not have any other options to rely on. 
Therefore, she pursued a policy of intensive intra-Baltic cooperation. 
Thus the reasons for weak Baltic security integration largely refer to domestic causes. 
From a Baltic point of view, there is no particular interest in Baltic security cooperation 
per se. What the flaws in Baltic security cooperation indicate most, is the lack of 
urgency. Problems de facto are not perceived as pressing. Whereas the presence of 
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Russian troops boosted Baltic efforts to co-operate and provide support one another 
unconditionally, the eventual troop withdrawal and decreasing pressure from Russia 
afterwards reduced the urgency for security cooperation. Rather than solving problems, 
the Baltic States give priority in preserving their individual power status. 127 Simply Put, 
there have been a number of occasions when Baltic solidarity has been threatened by the 
Baltic countries themselves. These cases are largely related to the issue of natural 
resources. Suffice it to recall the dispute between Estonia and Latvia over fishing rights 
in the Gulf of Riga 128 or the dispute between Latvia and Lithuania over the question of 
oil exploration rights on the continental shelf129 . For the time being, 
both disputes 
remain unresolved and refer to a bigger issue - the settlement of maritime boundaries 
between theses states. 130 Nevertheless, despite the unsettled points of contention, the 
efforts of Baltic politicians to maintain Baltic cooperation, deserves appreciation. 
Membership of the EU has opened new opportunities for Baltic interaction. First of all, 
EU membership is an incentive for them to co-operate - the voice of three countries will 
be more easily heard in Brussels. Although fifteen years of Baltic cooperation is rather a 
short period, it is based on a common understanding and is a perfect background for 
further activities. 
All in all, the interaction between the Baltic States is solid evidence that the process of 
their cooperation, albeit limited in scope, gives positive results. At present, however, it 
is difficult to predict its future development and principal contradictions. Even in the 
most successful military sphere cooperation seems to have become more fragmented. 
The Balts had to demonstrate a cooperative capacity as a precondition of NATO 
membership, but once integrated, leverage to enforce cooperation is lost. At the time of 
writing, the Baltic States themselves are still unsure what type of regional framework 
would be best. The present degree of intra-Baltic security interaction suggests that the 
ideas alone are far too weak to motivate institutionalised cooperation: 
institutionalisation depends on a clear assessment of national interests and their 
potential common denominator. 131 It should be noted that the stimulus for Baltic 
security cooperation has not come from national political actors but from outside: first, 
as a reaction to Russian pressure and then the international requirement to come forth as 
a united regional player. 
6.7. NATO in the Baltics 
The outcome of the NATO Prague summit and the significance of the invitation to the 
Baltic States to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation first and foremost implied a 
conclusive consolidation of their independence. The invitation testified that the Baltic 
States were firmly anchored in the community of Western states and were no longer 
hostages to the changing Eastern-Westem winds. More importantly, membership of 
NATO meant a totally new quality of security and stability for Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania that allowed them to focus their attention and efforts on a more rapid solution 
of economic, social, environmental and other issues. Membership also meant obligation. 
If the Baltic States are part of the new system, they have to take responsibility not only 
for themselves but also for the future of Europe. 
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With the accession of the Baltic States to NATO, 'the most challenging part of NATO 
enlargement puzzle' has also been solved. 132 The issue of the Baltic security has thus 
been removed from the top of the agenda of NATO (and the EU) and lost the urgency of 
'high politics'. In other words, the Baltic security question has been 'desecuritized 9133 
and became a matter of normal day-to-day politics. 
This section will explore arguments related to the security dilemma in the Baltic Sea 
region, factors which guided NATO enlargement, Russia's impact on the process of 
enlargement and her shifting position vis-a-vis this issue. It will also look into new 
Russia-related threats and challenges the Baltic States are facing today and conclude on 
future perspectives for Russo-Baltic relations. 
6.7.1. The security dilemma in the Baltic Sea region 
The most frequent arguments against a Baltic dimension in NATO enlargement 
stemmed from considerations over Russia. In geo-strategic terins, NATO enlargement 
for Russia was related to changes in the military balance and the Alliance's geo- 
strategic approach to the borders of Russia or Russia-friendly states. While NATO and 
indeed the Baltic States themselves would portray the Baltic dimension as firmly 
cementing Northern European stability in a coherent Baltic Sea region, of very low 
tension, Russia is likely to view it as an encroachment on her 'sphere of influence' by a 
politically and militarily superior alliance with unclear future intentions. This argument, 
which was heard even in the West, was based on the assumption that NATO 
enlargement in the Baltics would bring little benefit at great cost, as it would exacerbate 
existing tensions with Russia, thereby dissuading her to play her role as a partner in the 
cooperative security framework offered by the West. 
The core of the argument was that the relative enhancement of the security of NATO 
members would be negative because it would substantially undermine Russian security. 
This certainly was the position of the Russian security establishment. Suffice it to look 
at the 2000 Russian National Security Concept and the 1999 Russian Military Doctrine, 
which both explicitly warned against a NATO enlargement with a Baltic dimension (see 
2.3 of chapter 2). 
It was evident that Russia with respect to NATO expansion indeed drew a 'red line' in 
the area of the former USSR and in particular regarding the Baltic States. In the 1990s, 
the obvious Russian claim used to be that Russia has a 'legitimate sphere of influence', 
including the Baltic States, in which Moscow had the prerogative to make security 
policy. Although Putin and other Russian officials tried to use a milder vocabulary, in 
reality this notion, like other geopolitical constructs, has not lost its meaning. 
The logic of the argument rested upon a geo-strategic perception that is contradictory to 
the whole paradigm of cooperative security, which NATO has adopted since the end of 
the Cold War, most explicitly with its Strategic Concept of 1999. And that is here the 
logic fails. The liberal paradigm underlying cooperative security rejects balance of 
power as a fundamental prerequisite for stable security. Seen from the cooperative 
security perspective of the West there can be no real reduction of Russian security with 
the three Baltic States inside NATO. There is no power in the Baltic Sea area that 
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Russia needs to balance by establishing 'forward naval bases', or that could use the 
Baltic rim as a 'platform for massive land offensive'. 134 
At the level of practical politics, NATO members cannot logically on the one hand 
argue for cooperative security and then on the other accept a traditional geo-strategically 
based document about a Russian 'sphere of influence'. This contradiction between the 
Russian geo-strategic perspective and NATO's cooperative perspective on security 
strategy was further witnessed in Russia's protests against NATO's deployment in 
Lithuania in April 2004 following the Baltic accession to the Alliance. While Moscow 
has resigned itself to NATO's expansion, albeit grudgingly, the reality of four F-16 
NATO fighters being deployed in Lithuania to patrol Baltic airspace has deeply 
unsettled and angered Russian politicians and commanders, prompting some of the 
sharpest criticism of the Alliance since its air raids against Serbia in 1999. It was stated 
in the Duma: 'A further advance of the NATO infrastructure towards the Russian 
borders is at variance with the new relations between Russia and NATO, established 
over the past few years'. 135 Russia's Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov used even more 
heavy-loaded language: 'Should NATO's infrastructure be set up in the Baltic States 
any military-political steps by Russia will be in self-defence. 136 
Russia considered the action to be counterproductive in the context of rapprochement 
between NATO and Russia. In its own right NATO justified the move as a routine 
implementation of the Alliance's air defence policy: the security of the airspace of all 
NATO members (including those that do not have their own aircraft) is ensured 
collectively. Finally, the public of the Baltic States perceived the deployment as a 
symbol of 'hard' security guarantee acquired with NATO membership. 
One can draw an interesting conclusion from this case. Viewing her relations with 
NATO as a zero-sum game, Russia considered protection of the airspace above the 
Baltic States is a major political and military blow to her national security. The Russian 
rhetoric, in turn, revitalized suspicions in the capitals of the Baltic States about the 
dormant revisionism of Russia. Realist school of thought would be happy to conclude 
that the security dilemma has not been removed from the Northern Europe by NATO 
enlargement to the Baltic States. However, from a liberal or constructivist perspective, 
one can see an entirely different picture. NATO enlargement (and even the deployment 
of aircraft in Lithuania) has been driven not by military goals, but by common Euro- 
Atlantic values, ideas of cooperative security and moral restitution of injustice 
committed after the Second World War. The harsh reaction of Russia was not a 
rationally calculated play in the spirit of realpolitik. It was rather a highly emotional 
rejection of reality stemming from psychological stereotypes engrained within the 
Russian elite towards the Baltic States as former Soviet republics, which broke from the 
Soviet Union for apparent no reason. The Baltic States themselves took NATO 
enlargement as a solution to their long sought guarantee of security against the big 
neighbour. By the same token NATO has demonstrated that it is still a reliable 
collective defence alliance capable of providing appropriate security measures to all its 
members. 
A further often-heard argument was that, given Russia's worries over the Baltic 
membership, NATO should not provoke Russia by accepting all the three countries at 
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the same time. It was argued that adding one Baltic country would accomplish a Baltic 
dimension, at the same time demonstrating the point that no external actor had the right 
of veto over NATO membership. It would, on the other hand, be a minor provocation 
compared to accepting all the three Baltic States. On the practical level, this argument 
was often followed by the claim that Lithuania would then, because of her best relations 
with Russia, her location and her superior preparedness, be the logical top candidate 
leaving Estonia and Latvia to wait for membership. This line of argument obviously 
gave Estonia and Latvia reason to fear that they might be uncoupled from the 
enlargement process and that they might be further subject to Russia's pressure and 
intimidation. 
The key problem with this argument was, by most accounts, contradictory to NATO's 
ambition of furthering North Eastern European stability by expanding into the Baltics. 
There has been a common tendency in the West to view the three Baltic States as 
making a coherent security area, even if it is accepted that the states indeed are very 
different. An enlargement with all three Baltic countries was intended to maintain and 
safeguard the stability of this coherent and interdependent security area. If the region 
were to be clearly split on the way to NATO, stability might just not be preserved, let 
alone the negative effects on the societies and governments of Latvia and Estonia, who 
made difficult economic and political sacrifices to prepare their states for NATO 
membership. After all, the fear by some NATO members of overly provoking Russia by 
accepting the three Baltic candidates rather than one seems based on a flawed logic. If 
NATO decided to cross the 'red line' drawn by Russia it would probably have no 
difference whether this line was crossed more or less. 
It could be argued that NATO enlargement to the Baltic Sates is actually in Russia's 
best interest, even though this is by no means admitted in Moscow. By this enlargement 
NATO effectively rejected the conceptual notion of Russia's 'spheres of influence' 
thereby forcing Russia into accepting the logic of cooperative security policy making. 
There is little sense in claiming a 'sphere of influence' to exist if nobody else accepts 
the claim or even the concept. Furthermore, the region, which then was considered by 
Russia to be one of low tension, would be further cemented as part of a European zone 
of stability and growth. As Baltic long-term institutional security status had been 
resolved, Moscow was likely to show greater interest in strengthening its ties with the 
Baltic States, as it happened with Visegrad countries after they entered NATO in 1999. 
At the same time, NATO membership has solidified the self-confidence of the Baltic 
governments and enabled them to further explore their bilateral ties with Russia. The 
Baltic States are determined to encourage cooperation between Russia and Euro- 
Atlantic structures. 
Summarising the security dilemma in the Baltic Sea region, it might be concluded that 
although NATO enlargement does not mean automatic 'de-securitization', a 
6securitization' shift has nonetheless taken place in this region. Rationality, scarcity of 
means, as well as strategic considerations induced the former opponents to adopt a 
cooperative stance in the Baltic Cold War contact zone. For the moment, this approach 
corresponds to a win-win situation for both sides. The inclusion of Russia into NATO 
structures and the enlargement of the Alliance undoubtedly brings the NATO-Russia 
partnership closer to the cooperative security model. Upon joining NATO, the Baltic 
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States became members of the NATO-Russia Council. Therefore, their security 
relations with Russia acquired a new ýuality, which could be called the 'embodiment of 
the new security regime in the region . 
137 Above all, the main parties to the conflict line 
in the Baltic Sea region - Russia and the Baltic States - are finally placed in a wider 
international context, which, in its turn, should provide conditions for final 
normalisation of their relations. 
6 7.2. Factors and their interplay in the process ofNA TO enlargement 
The decision on NATO enlargement was always political, i. e. enlargement is impossible 
without a clearly stated wish by NATO members to enlarge. However, the process of 
enlargement itself is a whole package of various factors: it entails the political will of 
NATO to expand, global geopolitical developments, political and military qualifications 
of aspirant countries and their domestic policy reforms. The development of some of 
these factors was beyond the aspirants' will but affected the enlargement process, other 
factors pushed the aspirants to search for solutions, i. e. to do their 'homework'. 
However, even decent homework could not guarantee automatic acceptance to the 
Alliance, though it was closely related to NATO's political will to enlarge. 
The obvious will of the Alliance to enlarge was confirmed by the Washington 
Declaration adopted at the NATO Heads of State Meeting on 23-24 April 1999. 
Looking back at the path of Baltic integration into NATO, one could say that the 
biggest achievement was that the Baltic countries had not become the 'special case' of 
Europe. The majority of politicians, diplomats and political scientists in Europe and the 
U. S. used to say that the Baltic States' membership of NATO might destabilise security 
in the Baltic region and Europe. It should be noted that NATO enlargement is not about 
relative benefits, but about absolute gains: the expanding zone of stability and Western 
values equals the expanding zone of the Western influence. NATO is getting stronger, 
and the security of its individual members - both current and new - is enhanced. But a 
key point in the debate on NATO enlargement obviously was Russia and her particular 
sensitivity to this issue. The logic of the 'Russia first' approach assumed that the 
invitation of the Baltic States could have negative consequences for democracy in 
Russia, and would bring Russia back to authoritarianism or even confrontation between 
the former Cold-War adversaries. 
Hence, there was the only one fspecial' item in this case - fear that inviting the Baltic 
States to join NATO could trespass across the mythical 'red line' drawn by Russia. This 
made the Baltic case 'special'. The key to the success of the Baltic States was to prove 
to NATO members, over fourteen years of independence, that they are predictable 
states. The time factor was also highly important. Indeed, time was needed to build up a 
political and economic context, as well as to change stereotypes of thinking of their 
Western partners. A positive development of Russo-Baltic relations, particularly the 
constructive Lithuanian policy towards Russia, was of great significance in avoiding the 
6special case' scenario. One can fairly reasonably state that among the Baltic States 
Lithuania played a key role in persuading NATO member states that good relations with 
Russia was her aim rather than a political show. 
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In each phase of NATO debate, the most important venue was Washington. Without the 
lead of the United States, frankly, there would never be as much certainty in the NATO 
enlargement - or even the much heralded 'open door' policy over the past few years. 
After all, the Baltic 'cause' remained popular in Washington over the years, with 
widespread support for their membership in NATO. 138 In a landmark speech at Warsaw 
University in June 2001, President Bush demonstrated that the U. S. administration had 
already made the strategic decision concerning the further enlargement of NATO. He 
pledged 'to erase false lines that divided Europe for too long'... No more Munichs. No 
more Yaltas... All of Europe's new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and 
all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom ... ' 
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. The U. S. administration's determination to embrace large-scale NATO enlargement stirred 
up discussions in the European countries, followed by positive developments in this 
regard. 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in fact speeded up positive trends, making it finally clear 
that enlargement was essential. If NATO is going to meet new threats to its security, it 
needs to build the broadest and strongest coalition possible of the countries that share its 
values and are able to act effectively with the Alliance. Most important, the events 9/11 
served as a symbolic turning point for Moscow, as they opened up an opportunity for it 
to develop relations with the West in a new way. Both Washington and Moscow started 
to see each other as partners in dealing with a more pressing threat, that of Islamic 
fundamentalism. Though there were earlier hints about Russia's softening stance over 
the Baltic NATO issue, 9/11 was a powerful stimulus to proceed with plans for 
developing NATO-Russia cooperation from theoretical to practical dimension. 
Consequently, this considerably increased chances for the Baltic membership of NATO. 
It is also indicative that the second round of NATO enlargement coincided with a low 
degree of tension between the great powers - Russia and the United States. In 
accordance with the Knudsen model, low level of tension implies decreasing pressure 
on small states, which was evident in Russia's softened attitude towards Baltic 
membership of NATO. On the other hand, shifting Russia's approach does not 
necessarily mean Russia's intention to decrease pressure on the Baltics: it might be read 
as Russia's rational move in seeking to attain her geopolitical objectives. One should 
bear in mind why Russia has chosen a course towards rapprochement with the United 
States. First of all, this was driven definitely not only by the appearance of the common 
enemy - international terrorism, but to much greater extent - by the necessity for Russia 
to increase her profile in relations with the West. What Russia wants to achieve is an 
equal partnership between the three powers - U. S, EU and Russia. Finally, Russia's 
negative attitude towards enlargement has not changed, only softened: Russia accepts 
the enlargement as long as NATO evolves to become a more political organisation. 
Moscow expected compensation for the second round of enlargement and received it - 
the NATO-Russia Council. This seems not only helping Russia to augment her leverage 
on decision making within NATO, but also to increase her international weight. 
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6.7.3. Russia's impact on the enlargement process 
The inability of the Yeltsin administration to prevent the first post-Cold War 
enlargement, proved Moscow's inability to determine the fate of its fort-ner empire. 
Nevertheless, one must admit that Russia's influence has been considerable during the 
whole process of Baltic integration into NATO. By labelling the three Baltic States as 
, territories of the former Soviet Union' Russia managed to derail their NATO aspiration 
for a length of time. Although Russia never enjoyed the right to veto decisions on 
NATO enlargement, her direct influence could always be felt - during numerous 
international conferences, consultations and negotiations there would always be an issue 
on what had to be done to make Russia feel comfortable with regard to NATO 
enlargement and help Russia 'save face'. 
The Russian government tried to prevent the progress of NATO enlargement into the 
Baltics by employing various means: open protests against Western integration; raising 
the issue of Russian minority rights in Latvia and Estonia; refusing of signing border 
treaties, and so on. With regard to Russian speakers in Latvia and Estonia, the OSCE 
High Commissioner on National Minorities confirmed that these countries met the 
requirements set by the OSCE, which closed its missions in Tallinn and Riga at the end 
of 2001. Although the situation in Estonia and Latvia is far from perfect, the potential 
for ethnic discord nowadays is not greater than in many other NATO states. 140 As far as 
the border issues are concerned, both administrations of Yeltsin and Putin, with the 
support of the Duma, were using the non-existing border problems to maintain pressure 
on Latvia and Estonia (for more detail on minority and border issues see 6.4 and 6.8.9. 
of this chapter). Moscow had the clear purpose of maintaining this instrument, which it 
believed would formally preclude the expansion of NATO to the countries in question. 
Although such territorial regulations are normally required for any NATO admission, 
NATO did not accept this kind of linkage and expression of power politics. Thus, a 
precedent was created with the accession of states without ratified border treaties. 
It should be stressed that Russia's geo-strategic pressure was reflected in the provisions 
of her Military Doctrines of 1993 and 2000. Both doctrines foresee situations, which 
permit Russia deploying forces to neighbouring states: first, if Russia's military objects 
in these states are under attack; second, if there is an expansion of unfriendly military 
blocs. This, nonetheless, reflected fixed, albeit theoretical, threat against the Baltic 
States. These ideas came into play through Russia's threatening that NATO expansion 
into the Baltics would provoke the deployment of nuclear weapons along their Western 
borders, sending Russian Army to the Baltic countries and exploiting the means of 
political and economic pressure. 
According to the Knudsen model, a great power's urge to control its neighbours is a 
consequence of its tension with other great powers. 141 When great-power elites perceive 
an increased external danger, they 'become wary of a small neighbour for possible 
deviant policy'; hence there is an increase in a great power's pro ensity to put pressure 
on a small neighbour and demand compliance from its leaders. 12 One could identify a 
period of high-level tension in Russian-U. S. relations during the Kosovo crisis, which, 
in turn, led to more assertive Russian policy vis-A-vis the Baltic States. It could be 
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interpreted, first of all, as a manifestation of Russia's insecurity. In the sphere of 
international politics, Russia finally lost her influence of any kind: the UN Security 
Council, the main tool of Russia's influence, was marginalized; Moscow clearly 
perceived that it had no adequate means to respond to Washington's actions and that the 
1997 NATO-Russia agreement in fact was not working. Beside this, Russia was still in 
economic crisis, and was facing external treats (first and foremost, Islam) and internal 
threats (shifting power from the centre to the regions and pushing the state towards 
disintegration). 
Russia's increased pressure on the Baltics can be interpreted as her growing opposition 
towards NATO enlargement. The NATO Alliance was seen as an antagonistic military 
block, acting unilaterally, and its expansion was perceived as an approach of an 
aggressive bloc to Russian borders. It is important to note that in the wake of the 
Kosovo crisis Russia's approach towards NATO enlargement had changed: in Russia's 
view, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined more or less a defensive alliance, 
whilst the Baltic States were entering an aggressive and offensive NATO. It was largely 
the Alliance's bombing in Serbia that provided Russia with additional arguments why 
NATO's expansion was a threat to Russia's security. 
As a result, the period from the first wave of enlargement in 1999 till the middle of 
2001 was extremely difficult for the Baltic States. Seeking to prevent the realisation of 
the scenario of the second enlargement, Moscow pursued a policy leading to direct 
pressure on the Baltics. Russia aimed to achieve a consensus among the great powers 
and to discredit her small neighbours. In the dialogue with NATO member states Russia 
adopted the 'Cold War' approach, underlining categorically her emphatic 'no' to NATO 
expansion, particularly involving the Baltic States. 
On the whole, these developments are well in line with Knudsen's hypothesis about a 
degree of tension between great powers. However, it should be taken into account that 
high degree of tension between Russia and the United States was not the only reason for 
Russia to increase pressure on the Baltics during this time frame. Moscow's hostile 
position with regard to the Kosovo crisis reflected Russia's geopolitical aim to elevate 
her role internationally. It was an excellent opportunity for Russia to take benefit from 
this crisis: to discredit NATO's authority in the eyes of the international community and 
to challenge its unity. 143 At the same time, Russia made every effort to encourage anti- 
Western mood in the countries which had recently been under Russia's dominance. In 
fact, an increased pressure on Lithuania also reflected Russia's intention to have an 
impact on Lithuanian foreign policy priorities. Fortunately, these geopolitical aims of 
Russia had not been realised. Moscow had to change its tactics and to move towards 
decreasing the tension. 
It is indicative that over a considerably short period of time, Russia's position has 
undergone a remarkable evolution from open confrontation to a relatively calm 
resignation about NATO enlargement. This tendency pre-dated the 9/11 events and 
became more firmly established thereafter, when U. S. -Russian relations quickly improved. It should not be underestimated that the changes in Russia's attitude were 
considerably influenced by the strong and consistent commitment of the U. S. and other 
NATO member states to the 'open door' policy. This facilitated understanding among 
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Russian political elites that NATO enlargement would happen anyway and that the 
Baltic States would eventually join the Alliance regardless of what Russia did. On the 
other hand, aside from rhetoric, Russia had no means to prevent NATO enlargement. As 
it became clear that by bitterly opposing Moscow would not win anything, strict anti- 
NATO rhetoric was set on a milder tone, though it has never been abandoned altogether. 
Signs of progress on this issue were evident as early as in March 2001 during the 
official visit of the Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus to Moscow. With 
considerable fanfare, Adamkus and Putin signed a joint declaration pledging that each 
side 'recognises right of every country to choose the way to ensure its security along 
with the commitment not to strengthen its own security at the expense of security of 
other countries'. 144 In separate remarks, Adamkus stressed that 'no one will lose from 
NATO enlargement. ... Lithuania's membership in NATO is not directed against any 
country'. 145 In the wake of the Adamkus visit, Russian policy continued to shift in a 
more accommodating direction. Although Putin and other Russian leaders voiced 
conflicting statements about NATO enlargement, the main message that came through 
was relatively simple: Russia is still against the admission of the Baltic States into 
NATO, but neither would she 'waste political capital' to oppose it, nor would she stake 
the whole relationship with the West on this issue. 146 The NATO summit in Prague 
made clear that the worst-case scenario for the Baltic States had not materialised. Quite 
the reverse, the developments in the Baltics were according to the best case scenario: 
the fear concerning Russia's veto has vanished, and NATO's 'open door' policy has 
proved to be real. 
Referring to Knudsen, the process of political 'de-occupation' of the Baltic States, 
related to the consolidation of their political independence in international arena, was 
over. This process was perceived as the realisation of the key objectives of the Baltic 
States - their membership of NATO and the EU. Political 'de-occupation' started in 
1994, when the Baltic countries declared their Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and took a 
decade to come to fruition. 
This is not to say that Russian concerns about this matter have ceased altogether. 
Moscow has been worrying not so much about the enlargement per Se but that four new 
NATO members, including the three Baltic States, are not signatories to the adopted 
CFE Treaty. 147 in Russia's view, this treaty, aimed at establishing a stable and balanced 
level of conventional weapons between NATO and Russia in Europe, thus solving 
NATO enlargement and security dilemmas, became a bone of contention between 
NATO and Russia. Following the logic of neo-realist thinking, the first wave of NATO 
enlargement was set in a frame of arms control, whereas the second wave diverted the 
balance of power since four NATO countries are not bound by any of the limits 
stipulated by the CFE Treaty. Hence, with the second wave, including the Baltic States, 
NATO has significantly improved its geo-strategic position: it acquired the possibility 
to establish an 'offensive front' against Russia from the Baltic States in which 
conventional arms control does not apply. What alarms Russians most, from the point of 
view of their own security, is the 'NATO deployment of means and forces on the 
territory of its new members'. They say that it may become an obstacle for further 
development of cooperation between Russia and NATO 'if in the ftiture these sensitive 
relations are not solved on the basis of mutual benefit and equality'. 148 
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It is noteworthy that the treaty itself is not in force. The West's argument is that the 
fulfilment of Istanbul Commitments 149 - Russian obligations to withdraw the forces 
from Georgia and Moldova - is inseparably linked with the CFE Treaty's ratification by 
the state-parties, and the accession to it of the three Baltic States. With its forces in 
Moldova and Georgia the Kremlin, nevertheless, wants to speed up the CFE Treaty's 
ratification to have an insurance that Russia would not be faced with 'an uncontrolled 
zone, a kind of legal "black hole" in which there would not be restrictions on the 
deployment of NATO forces and equipment'. ' 50. Russia wants speedy ratification of the 
treaty and Baltic accession to it with the aim of constraining provisions both in the CFE 
framework and outside its scope and in this way restricting allied defensive 
deployments in the Baltic States. Moscow has tried hard to gain influence by requiring a 
linkage between NATO's admission and the CFE Treaty. Yet this linkage was refuted 
by NATO, as it was a clear attempt at pressuring sovereign states. The Baltic States 
consider accession to the CFE Treaty and NATO enlargement as two independent 
processes, which were not and should not be linked. 
On the other hand, the Baltic States are preparing for the accession to the CFE treaty 
once it comes into force, provided the satisfactory conditions are met for their security 
needs. It should be stressed that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have created their annies 
from scratch, and possess almost none of the heavy weaponry in the CFE Treaty-limited 
categories (tanks and armoured combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft). They 
have neither the means nor the wish to acquire those types of weaponry. For their 
defence, the Baltic States rely mainly on small, well-trained, lightly armed infantry units 
and on NATO allies' ability to bring in reinforcements in times of crisis. Like all NATO 
member countries, the Baltic States will be covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty - the bedrock of NATO's credibility, which provides guarantees for member 
countries against a possible aggression. This is why in the interest of the Baltics (and 
equally in NATO's overall credibility) that the CFE Treaty's constraints must never 
impair the Alliance's ability to defend Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In short, the 
accession to the CFE Treaty first of all should serve the Baltic interest for ensuring 
NATO's capabilities to defend the Baltic States. 
6 7.4. Baltic-Russian interaction after the dual enlargement: viewfrom the Baltics 
In 2001, President Adamkus stated that Lithuania and other Baltic States have a Vision 
and a strategy concerning further development of their cooperation with Russia. This 
vision encompasses four points, on which rests the whole philosophy of Russo-Baltic 
dialogue. First, 'we are prepared to build on our successful cooperation with the 
neighbouring regions of Russia and make it a priority'. Second, 'together with Russia 
we have a common interest in regional and economic growth and prosperity'. Third, 
4we are committed to promote cooperation between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions even after NATO and EU expands'. Finally, 'Russia should come to peace 
with her history, and we are ready to help her in this uneasy process'. 151 
The Baltic States support new positive trends in the development of NATO-Russia 
cooperation. In no way does this new partnership compromise security interests of the 
Baltic States. On the contrary, engaging Russia in the specific areas of mutual interest 
218 
should serve not only the purpose of confidence building between NATO and Russia 
but also of increasing stability in the region. This is also an opening opportunity for the 
Baltic States to advance their relations with Russia in accordance with NATO and EU 
policies and to make their contributions to the dialogue between NATO, EU and Russia. 
The confidence provided by the Alliance's security guarantee boosts the willingness and 
possibilities of the Baltic States to engage Russia more widely. Therefore it is fair to 
assume that it is the Baltic membership of Euro-Atlantic organisations that should 
substantially change the quality of their cooperation with Russia. The Baltic States are 
prepared to build further cooperative ties with Russia based on the rock-solid 
foundation - equality and partnership in relations with Russia - that NATO membership 
has sealed. 
It should be noted that the Baltic countries possess a rather unique knowledge and 
understanding of Russia, which could not be found elsewhere in the Euro-Atlantic 
community. Lithuania has a good record of dealing with Russia on a number of issues 
including troop withdrawal, settlement of the border, military transit, cross border 
cooperation, and so on. This kind of expertise may indeed become a valuable asset both 
in NATO-Russia and EU-Russia relations. On the whole, the Baltic States seek to 
reinforce the effort of Euro-Atlantic community to bring Russia as close to NATO and 
EU, as Russia wants to come. 
Russia, however, does not seem to share similar approach towards the Baltic States. 
Although NATO enlargement did not evoke the widely anticipated (but rarely specified) 
hostile reaction of Russia, the progress of bilateral relations over the past years has been 
stagnant at most. Beside this, strengthening authoritarian trends and the growing profile 
of special services manifest themselves in Russia's domestic politics. This gives enough 
ground to think that in the medium and long-term view the Baltic States may face 
Russia-related threats and challenges. When analysing these threats, two perspectives - 
'high politics' (hard or traditional security threats) and 'low politics' (soft threats) - 
should be taken. 
in terms of 'high politics', relations between Russia and the Baltic States since 1991 
have never descended into any armed conflict with human casualties. In the official 
national security strategies of the Baltic States there are no direct references to Russia as 
a military threat. Nor there is direct or indirect mention of Russia as a threat in NATO's 
strategic concept of 1999 or in any of NATO's subsequent communiqu6s. The 2003 
Defence White Paper of the Russian Federation also states unambiguously: 'a global 
nuclear war and large-scale conventional wars with NATO or other U. S. -led coalitions 
have been excluded from the list of probable armed conflicts for which the Russian 
Armed Forces are prepared'. 152 A more ambiguous statement indicates that 'the 
expansion of military blocs and unions to the detriment of the military security of 
Russia or its allies' is an external threat 'whose neutralisation is the function of the 
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. ' 153 
The Baltic States maintain that the likelihood of a military conflict between Russia and 
the Baltic States is nil for the foreseeable future, unless some dramatic changes would 
take place within the Kremlin, along the lines of a military coup. No one could 
reasonably expect Russia to try to use military force against the Baltic States. However, 
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it does not mean that 'low politics' is tension-free. Russia-related threats and challenges 
to the Baltic States in 'low politics' are provided for in the next part of this chapter. 
6.8. Russia-related threats and challenges for Baltic security 
The Baltic States became predictable and safe countries of market economy, the rule of 
law and Western values. They enjoy peace, sustained economic growth and cooperative 
relations with neighbours and foreign partners. Upon their accession to the Euro- 
Atlantic structures, the current state of security affairs in the Baltic States is arguably 
the best ever achieved in history. Tberefore, the further steps of the Baltic States should 
be guided by the need to stabilise and make these historic developments permanent. 
These major achievements notwithstanding, the Baltic countries are facing a great 
variety of threats and challenges. As the subject of this study is Russia's politics, the 
author intends to confine herself to the discussion of Russia-related threats and 
challenges. Henry Kissinger claimed that despite NATO enlargement Russia would 
seek to retain her influence in the regions, which are of geopolitical and historical 
importance for her. 154 Since the 1990s it has became apparent bow Russia is achieving 
this goal in CEE states, including the Baltic countries. 
6 8.1. Energy dependency 
It should be stressed that energy-related risks stem from the fact that Euro-Atlantic 
integration of the Baltic States does not guarantee their all-round geopolitical 
gravitation towards the West. This is well in line with the Knudsen model that the 
process of political 'de-occupation' does not necessarily go hand in hand with economic 
Ide-occupation' - the consolidation of economic independence. 
What one can see in the Baltic States (and CEE countries) is, in a sense, a division of 
geopolitical influence by sectors between the West on one side, and Russia on the other. 
A new trend has become apparent in recent years - decreasing U. S. business interests in 
CEE and withdrawal of American companies from this part of Europe. The most glaring 
example was the retreat of U. S. oil-processing company Williams International from 
Lithuania in 2002, enabling Yukos to occupy all the positions. After Kremlin's 
expropriation of Yukos in 2005 the dominating players in the energy sector of the Baltic 
States became Gazprom and Lukoil. Thus, after the dual enlargement, the Baltic States 
(and the whole CEE region) experience the dilemma of double asymmetry: the U. S. and 
NATO dominate in military and political spheres, whilst Russia is penetrating in the 
economic field, especially in the energy sector. An affirmation that there is a new 
division of geopolitical influence between the West and Russia and that economically 
the CEE and the Baltics are 'handed over' to Russia as a compensation for the loss of 
geopolitical influence should not be completely discarded. 155 This is perfectly in line 
with Chubais' idea of a 'liberal empire' to be embodied through the expansion of 
Russian energy corporations. By this Russia is out to regain her geopolitical standing, at 
least on post-Soviet territory. 156 
The main goal of Russia's geo_energY157 politics in CEE is the integration of their 
energy sectors into the Russian energy system, by restricting the CEE region's 
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possibilities to become a subject of energy politics. Russia seeks to make CEE a 
bridgehead of her energy politics. By taking control over the energy sector of this region 
Russia may: first, to negotiate directly with the zones of realisation of production; 
second, to make Western Europe more dependent on supply of Russian energy 
resources; third, to reduce economic and political independence of CEE countries and 
increase their economic vulnerability. 
Ever since the collapse of the USSR the Kremlin has used its energy monopoly to 
influence policies in the Baltic States. Already in the early 1990s, the Kremlin exploited 
energy dependency and vulnerability of Eastern European states, including the Baltics, 
to exert pressure on them through threats and cut-offs of supplies. Since the beginning 
of 21st century, a more sophisticated approach has been adopted. Russia's national 
security interest, as defined by Putin and a large part of the Russian power structures, is 
to re-establish Moscow's control over strategic assets in neighbouring states. Russian 
energy companies purchase strategic sectors of the local economies with the aim of 
gaining full, or at least partial, control over the oil and gas sectors of all the transit 
countries. By obtaining key segments of the oil and gas industries in the Baltics, Russia 
simultaneously is seeking to gain here a political leverage. Moscow uses its intelligence 
assets and its ties with wealthy members of the former leaders of the Soviet era 
nomenclatura in the Baltic States to supplement the monopoly power of its energy 
supply relationship. Such a projection of economic power demonstrates 'neo-colonial 
characteristics' of Russian energy policy in the Baltics. 158 
The Baltic States are particularly tied to Russia by Soviet era pipelines, rail lines and 
refineries, and Russia also enjoys a near monopoly of energy supplies to these countries. 
Refineries in the Baltics were designed to process heavy Russian crude oil, and power 
plants - to use gas from Russian fields. Even if the long dependence of the Baltic States 
on Russian technology and infrastructure is discounted, geography alone dictates that 
Russia will probably remain for them the nearest and cheapest supplier of oil and gas. 
After all, the growing European dependence on the Russian energy resources only 
exacerbates the difficulties confronting Baltic quest for alternative supplies. This 
dependence does not only weaken the security of the Baltic States but also that of the 
EU itself 
In the Baltic States gas imports from Russia amount to a 100 percent, and oil imports 
stand at nearly 90 percent. "9 Tbus, if in the oil sector the Baltic States do have some 
space for manoeuvre by buying more expensive crude oil from other suppliers, in the 
gas sector the dependency on Russia's supplies is total. Gazprom already has a strong 
foothold in all three national gas distribution companies of the Baltic countries. 
Gazprom has effectively used partnership deals with Germany's Ruhrgas to gain equity 
foothold in the Baltics. 160 Besides, there is no crucial gas transit infrastructure in the 
Baltics, which further diminishes the chances of the Baltic governments to rebalance 
their dependence on Russian gas supplies. The two largest Russian energy companies, 
Gazprom and Transneft, are operating as government-run monopolies. Although Lukoil 
and Rosneft are allegedly privately owned, independent companies, they behave as 
state-owned enterprises rather than the commercial ones. It is usually impossible to 
separate the commercial activities of Transneft, Gazprom and Lukoil from Russia's 
foreign policy objectives. Transneft is the 'company of first choice' when the Kremlin 
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wants to enforce its energy policy abroad. 
16' Today Transneýt 9 Gazprom, Lukoil and 62 Rosneft are home and funding sources for much of the siloviki. 62 
The Baltic States are losing the only leverage they probably have vis-a-vis Russia in the 
energy sector - the transit of oil. During the Soviet era, key oil export terminals were 
located in Baltic ports: Ventspils (Latvia), Tallinn (Estonia), and Klaip6da (Lithuania). 
As a result, after the break up of the USSR, Russia became dependent on the Baltic 
countries and had to pay them significant fees for the oil transit (about 16% of net crude 
Russian oil exports) to the West. 163 Being an important transit location for the Russian 
export system has given the Baltic States flexibility in their bilateral relations with 
Russia. To reduce this dependence, Russia undertook a twofold strategy: building new 
terminals and pipelines bypassing these countries and recapturing control over existing 
infrastructure. By 2001, Transneft finished a major project encompassing a new system 
of oil pipelines in the Baltic Sea and a new export terminal in Primorsk. This project not 
only reduced Russia's dependence on the Baltic terminals but also enabled Moscow to 
exert pressure on the Latvian government (Russia stopped shipping her oil through 
Ventspils) to give preference to the Russian companies in the privatisation of Ventspils 
Nafta, Latvian oil transit company. Soon to be opened a port in Ust-Lugoje (St. 
Petersburg district) and a North European Gas Pipeline to be commissioned in 20 10 will 
further undermine competitive capabilities of the Baltic ports. 
Since 2001, seeking to escape from transit dependence on CEE states, Russia has started 
to fin-ther expand her gas and oil pipelines by bypassing CEE area. A clear 
manifestation of this Moscow's strategy is a joint Gazprom-BASF (Germany) project - 
North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) under the Baltic Sea - launched in September 
2005. It is planned to run 1200 kilometres from Vyborg (St. Petersburg district) to 
Greifswald (Germany) as early as 2010, bypassing the Baltic countries, Belarus, 
Ukraine and Poland'64. The NEGP will be the first gas pipeline directly connecting 
Russia, as a producer, with recipients - Western European markets. Although the 
environmental aspect of the pipeline project is of great importance, it is the political 
aspect that creates the most controversy. 165 The construction of this pipeline will 
diminish the strategic importance of the transit infrastructure of CEE and will 
significantly strengthen the negotiating position of the Russian government with the 
Baltic States (as well as Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus), through whose territories 
Russian gas now passes westward to Europe. Russia will no longer need to negotiate 
transit fees with these countries. More important, the elimination of the Baltic States 
from the NEGP project shows Russia's desire to leave them in isolation from direct 
energy distribution channels. The Baltic countries proposed an alternative project -a 
cheaper and more ecologically secure 'Amber' route above the ground through their 
territories. 
A major reason why Russia is so successful in using her energy card in CEE is the 
West's, especially the EU's, inadequate focus on this issue and the absence of a 
common and coherent strategy on its relations with Russia. A prime example of the 
ineffectiveness of the EU policy is that there is no consensus as to whether the Russian- 
German pipeline project should fall in the framework CFSP or should it be based on 
bilateral agreements. As the Union cannot define its common interests in the field of 
energy supply, it is incapable to transform Russia's energy policy in CEE and mitigate 
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its consequences. As a result, the Baltic States become, to a certain extent, hostages of 
the energy dialogue between Russia and the EU. 
At the same time there is a growing recognition in the West that expanding exports from 
the Caspian Sea region is, to a great extent, held hostage to Russia's control over the 
pipelines to Europe. Russia largely succeeds in applying political and economic 
pressure on producers, such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan not to 
develop independent energy ties to the West. The Russian-Ukrainian gas war at the 
beginning of 2006 added a new angle to Russian energy policy. This move triggered an 
uproar in quite a few European countries, including France and Italy, because as much 
as 80 percent of supplies to Europe transits through Ukraine. The Kremlin has shown 
that it may use its gas weapon even if this jeopardizes Russian-European relations. 166 
Paradoxically, this crisis may also benefit the Baltic States, as it has prompted a debate 
on the need to create a common EU energy policy. 167 
Could anything be done on the part of the Baltics to break free of their dependency on 
Russia's energy? The Baltic States, with the help of Euro-Atlantic institutions, must 
work together to implement policies of diversification of suppliers that would provide 
greater energy security to them and other European countries which are overly 
dependent on Russia for their oil and gas. First of all, Euro-Atlantic institutions should 
pay due attention to the de-monopolisation of Caspian oil and gas, which now is totally 
concentrated in Moscow's hands. With regard to the Baltic States, the EU should 
address the issue with more urgency. The current policy of the EU calls for closing the 
nuclear power plant in Lithuania, for drastic reduction of emissions from oil shale in 
Estonia and the burning of coal in Latvia. New domestic energy resources should be 
developed with the help of the EU. No less important is the need to further increase 
business transparency in the Baltics. 
The European Union upholds the view that oil and gas supply has to be diversified at 
least from three independent sources. To realise this attitude there was accepted the 
special EU programme INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) 
responsible for the diversification of supply of energy resources. After EU enlargement, 
the situation has completely changed: new members import about 75 percent of Russian 
energy resources as against about 20 percent of consumption of 'old' Europe. 168 
Correspondingly, for the EU, significance of the INOGATE programme has increased. 
A part of this programme is related to the oil supply from alternative sources - Caspian 
Sea oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. After launching the Baku-Thilisi-Ceyhan and 
the Odessa-Brody (with the possibility to extend it to Gdansk (Poland)) oil pipelines 
alternative options will open for the Baltic States. Under Yushchenko, Ukraine attaches 
particular importance to the possibility to return to the original Odessa-Brody project, 
i. e. to turn the flow of crude oil northwards, in this way procuring herself with 
alternative Kazakhstan oil and providing such an opportunity for the EU. In terms of 
diversification, stable South Caucasus countries may play a very important role as a 
zone of extraction and multi-directional transit of raw materials. Equally, expanding 
relations with Ukraine as a pivotal transit state, without whom the creation of an 
alternative network of gas and oil pipelines is hardly possible, would help secure oil and 
gas transit from Caspian Sea basin to the Baltic States. 
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It is noteworthy that, in addition to searching for alternative suppliers, Central Europe 
undertook a task to create a united energy coi 
minimising its energy dependence on Russia a 
domination of Russian oil and gas corporations. 
Orlen, Hungarian MOL and Austrian OMV, al: 
smaller Central European oil enterprises. 
Lcern. (conglomerate) with the aim of 
id protecting regional states from the 
The companies, such as a Polish PNK 
eady for several years are purchasing 
Lithuania's dependency on Russia's energy resources is further developed in chapter 7. 
6.8.2. The activities ofRussian special services 
NATO and EU membership of the Baltic countries does not mean 'the end of history' in 
Russo-Baltic relations. Quite the reverse, upon Baltic accession to NATO and the EU 
there have been amplified activities of Russian special services in the Baltic States. One 
of 'special' activities took clear shape across the entire area from the Baltic States to 
Georgia. It stemmed from the Kremlin's efforts to attack or distort electoral processes 
and constitutional set-ups, with a view towards regaining influence and control through 
the use of local Russia-connected politicians. In 2003, in Lithuania elements of Russia's 
intelligence services and organized crime (interrelated factors in Russia) infiltrated the 
electoral campaign of a presidential candidate, Rolandas Paksas, and later also his staff 
during his short presidency. Lithuania experienced months of political turmoil before 
the country's democratic institutions proved their strength in 2004 by impeaching and 
removing Paksas from office. 
Almost every year Russian 'diplomats' are expelled from Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius for 
spying. Moscow wants to use the Baltic countries as a bridgehead for its intelligence 
activities against the Alliance and as influence agents within the EU and NATO in 
particular. Frequent flights of reconnaissance aircrafts at the boarders of the Baltic 
States and constant violations of Baltic/NATO airspace perfectly fits in this context. An 
accident of September 2005 did cause a tension when an armed Russian fighter Su-27 
made an unauthorised incursion into Lithuanian airspace and crashed on her territory. 
Lithuania tried not to overstate this case: the Lithuanian investigation commission 
concluded that this was not a deliberate provocation but an accident caused by human, 
technical and procedural errors. 
It is worth stressing Moscow's successfully applied the tactics of small violations. For 
instance, deliberate violations of the Baltic borders often are insignificant; blame can be 
put on bad weather conditions, old equipment, or Moscow may not accept that there 
was a violation at all. Such a 'war of nerves' between Russia and the Baltic States 
recurs from time to time. By these actions Russia is checking capabilities and reactions 
of the new NATO countries and collecting intelligence information about their military 
infrastructure. What is more, in this way Russia is testing NATO's 'tolerance limits'. 
demonstrating to old NATO members that the Baltic membership of the Alliance, as 
well as the protection of the Baltic airspace, is of lower standards: Baltics (and NATO) 
are unable to react adequately and swiftly to minor violations. Moscow's argument is 
that it is unreasonable for NATO to patrol the Baltic air space, this questions the sense 
of the Baltic membership of NATO per se. Russia perceives inadequate or absent 
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reaction from the Baltics (and NATO) as their weakness, which encourages her to 
expand the size of violations. 
68.3. Growing Russian military activity in the Baltic region 
Substantially increased Russian military activity during the recent years is being noticed 
not only in the CIS countries but equally in the Baltic region. Having officially reduced 
the number of the armed forces in Kaliningrad oblast, since 2003 Russia has rapidly 
optimised and modernised her forces in this region. During 2003-2005, the military 
activity of the Baltic Fleet has substantially increased. And this has taken place under 
Moscow's attention and supervision. Large-scale joint military exercises, using the most 
advanced military equipment, were observed by top military leadership including Putin 
himself. 169 
Since the middle of 2003, activities of Russia-Belarus military grouping in the Western 
direction have also considerably intensified. During 2003-2004, a common air defence 
system, including the joint anti-aircraft system, was created and the legal base of 
military cooperation was developed. Programmes for weaponry modernisation are being 
pursued, including the deployment of cutting-edge Russian operational tactical rocket 
complexes Clskander') on the territory of Belarus. 
It should be stressed that there is a new important trend in the development of Russian 
Armed Forces: they have been intensively developed and modemised with the aim of 
growing military activity in the Western direction. Moreover, there is ongoing intensive 
and purposeful creation and development of Russia-initiated new military political and 
economic blocks (see 4.6 and Appendix D). Incidentally or not, these processes 
coincide with the increasing economic interests in the Baltic States and intensifying 
intelligence activities directed against them. Russia's political and military leadership 
upholds the view that Russia cannot abandon her interests in this region. Protection and 
implementation of these interests, which, according to Russia's Defence White Paper, 
could also include military instruments, is postponed till 'better' times. That said, there 
remains, at least theoretically, a possibility of Russia-related military threats for the 
Baltic States in a medium and long-term perspective. 
68.4. Russian mass media and cultural expansion 
Moscow's continued propaganda and disinformation campaign vis-&-vis the Baltic 
States includes several aspects. First, there is a growing number of articles in Russian 
media about 'anti-Russian' policy of the Baltic States, their negative impact on 'old' EU 
and NATO countries. By this Russia aims to create a generally negative image of the 
Baltics, trying to portray them as fascist countries, pursuing destructive policies which 
impedes Russia's rapprochement and cooperation with the West. The Russian media 
keeps 'informing' the Russian public about the severe conditions of the Russian 
minorities in Latvia and Estonia, isolation of the Kaliningrad region, Baltic attempts to 
'rewrite the history of the Second World War', neo-fascist demonstrations in the streets 
of Riga, even support for the Chechen terrorists. 170 Many Russians still blame 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for the break up of the Soviet Union. The Baltic States are 
thus handy scapegoats to divert public attention from Russia's own numerous domestic 
225 
and international problems. Not surprisingly, polls indicate that Russians consider the 
Baltic States as the most hostile countries: Latvia is perceived as a hostile country by 49 
percent of Russians, Lithuania - by 42 percent, Estonia - by 32 percent (Georgia, the 
U. S. and Ukraine lag further behind). 171 
The second aspect is related to Baltic-Soviet historical past. The Baltic States continue 
to view Russia as trying to regain her geopolitical presence in this part of Europe. The 
celebration of the 60'h anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Moscow on 9 
May 2005 was a manifestation of Russia's unfaltering imperial nostalgia. Despite 
different responses of the Baltic Presidents regarding Putin's invitation to this 
ceremony, Russian officials and the media castigated all three states for anti-Russian 
inclinations, support for fascism, disrespect of the fallen Second World War heroes and 
other alleged sins. 172 These accusations reinforced suspicions held in the Baltic States 
that the 60th anniversary was intended to justify the occupation rather than to offer 
reconciliation. Russia is still not ready for a national reassessment of her imperial past. 
By and large, this reveals Moscow's revisionist policy towards the history of Soviet- 
Baltic relations. Information campaigns against the Baltic countries trying to revise 
common historical past, by rejecting, first of all, the fact of Soviet occupation of the 
Baltic States but proves that Russia today is a revisionist state. 
The third aspect reveals cultural pressure: Russia openly, declares that, seeking to 
implement goals and protect interests of her compatriots, she is ready to more actively 
manipulate the Russian-speaking population residing in the Baltic countrieS. 173 The fact 
that in March 2005 within the Russian presidential administration there was established 
a board of interregional and cultural relations with foreign countries, which is 
responsible for the strengthening of influence in the former Soviet states, particularly in 
the Baltics, speaks for itself. 174 
By actively spreading propaganda directed against the Baltic States and creating a 
negative image, Moscow seeks to show a distinction between them and the rest of Euro- 
Atlantic community, thus, to undermine the solidarity of NATO and EU countries. One 
of the key goals of the Kremlin's tactics is to achieve that the Baltic States would be 
perceived as qualitatively 'different' NATO and EU members and, therefore, would 
accept specific political, legal and military commitments. This would make easier for 
Russia to to maintain and increase influence in the Baltic region. 
68.5. NATO-Russia rapprochement 
The NATO-Russia Council, inaugurated at the Rome summit in May 2002, significantly 
elevated Russia's role within NATO. This implies that the Baltic States, even as NATO 
members, could remain partly in the sphere of Russian interests. Therefore the Baltics 
view with caution such developments which may lead to NATO's transformation into 
an organization of political security. The Baltic countries need assurance that in the 
immediate future the defensive functions of the Alliance will not lose their importance 
and Russia will not be provided with significant influence in NATO decisions that 
would affect Baltic security. 
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The NATO that the Baltic States joined was definitely not the same NATO that existed 
5-10 years ago. But in moving eastward and closer to Russia, the NATO Alliance must 
take care not to undermine its great strength, its cohesion and military backbone. 
Membership and the pledge of mutual defence, as stated in Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty, must be taken as seriously as before. As for Russia, NATO has a reason to treat 
her carefully. The current enlargement is a test of a new NATO-Russia relationship 
regarding the way Russia treats the Baltic States and other new NATO members. 
6.8.6. Soft security threats in the Kaliningrad oblast 
It should be stressed that soft security threats are no less worrisome than hard ones 
because they go hand in hand. The most important soft security threat for the time 
being, and in the context of the war on terror, is certainly the anachronistic control of 
the Russian border with Kaliningrad and the lack of cooperation in this respect. A 
related concern is the flow of drugs and diseases (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis) which 
threaten to become pandemic in this region, and the trafficking in persons that Russia 
cannot stop. 
In the Kaliningrad region the EU faces a dilemma between the external security issue 
and the internal one. An isolated, socially and economically backward region could well 
become an external source of instability in the middle of the EU. On the other hand, 
loosening border control and allowing more mobility could boost the internal threats of 
illegal migration, organized crime, the spread of HIV, and so on. While positive 
changes can only occur with constant, pro-active and all-around engagement of the EU 
and its members, Russia does not seem to be ready to loosen her centralised grip on the 
oblast. A solution has to be found not only in terms of access to the enclave but also in 
terms of the transparency of the circulation of goods and people in the region as a 
whole. The function of the Baltic Sea region as a bridge between East, North, and West 
will depend on the successful and common establishment of control mechanisms. 
It is also worth noting Lithuania's environmental concern in relation to Kaliningrad - 
oil field D-6, situated only 7 kilometres from the Lithuanian-Russian border and 22 
kilometres from the Curonian Spit, a unique natural reserve protected by Unesco. 
Although currently the exploitation of D-6 is going without problems, nobody can 
assure that any accident is impossible. This would have disastrous consequences on the 
nature reserve. So far Russia has refused to negotiate the agreement of damage 
limitation in case of an accident. 
68.7. Eastern (shared) neighbourhood 
Russia is opposing to the Baltic outreach activities in the CIS European countries or in 
the shared neighbourhood between the EU and Russia (for more detail see 5.4). The top 
priority of the Baltic States is to shape their policies towards these countries in such a 
way that would contribute to their stability, security and economic prosperity. By this 
the Baltic countries diversify their foreign policy away from focussing solely on Russia, 
while at the same time, they help their major interest to see Russia becoming a non-nal 
country. 
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The Baltic countries have a natural interest in trying to make a difference in this Eastern 
neighbourhood and in some respects they have already delivered. First of all, the Baltic 
States brought a critical mass of knowledge and expertise about the new EUs 
neighbours. Their dedicated interest in stability, economic and social development of 
the Eastern neighbourhood prompted the EU to pay more attention and make practical 
efforts in this region. Moreover, the Baltics are trying to draw the attention of 
Washington and Brussels as to how Moscow treats these states. Finally, the Baltic 
States have already done a great deal to implement models and frameworks of 
cooperation in some of these countries. By sharing the experience gained from their 
trilateral and regional cooperation, they have been supporting and promoting democratic 
transformation and defence reform in the South Caucasus countries. Lithuania and 
Poland claim to have put Belarus, Ukraine and Kaliningrad oblast on the EU agenda 
long before they themselves became members. 
Such Baltic activities irritate Moscow. This especially applies to Baltic activities in 
Ukraine and Georgia. Georgian president's initiative, comprising the United States, 
Ukraine, Georgia and the three Baltic States (the so-called format 3+3), is seen in 
Russia as the emergence of a new regional anti-Russian and pro-American organisation. 
The Russian press accused the Baltic States, who, being NATO and EU members, are 
trying to impede Russia-EU rapprochement, and that an anti-Russian bloc is being 
created in a large area from the Caucasus to the Baltics. 175 
68.8. Bilateral tensions 
There remain tensions related to the rights of Russian diaspora in Latvia and Estonia, 
their not ratified border treaties with Russia and the civil and military transit to 
Kaliningrad via Lithuania. Moscow keeps playing the 'ethnic card' against Estonia and 
Latvia in attempting to change legal set-ups of these countries. Russia obviously would 
like to turn them into bi-national states with parallel societies - by deepening and 
legalizing the ethno-linguistic divide - instead of promoting integration of local Russian 
communities into the Baltic countries and Europe. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
European Union finds Latvia's and Estonia's legislation on citizenship, language, and 
education fully in compliance with the EUs criteria, Moscow continually attacks these 
countries in international forums, as well as continues spreading its propaganda to local 
Russians to pressure Latvia and Estonia into changing that legislation. It hopes that 
preserving and codifying those ethnically-based societal divisions would provide scope 
for manipulation of internal politics of these countries. However, the Russian 
government's attempts to 'securitize' the minorities issue in Latvia and Estonia have 
failed: Moscow has not gained the political leverage to influence the strategic policy 
choices of Riga and Tallinn. Nor have minority movements turned into separatist 
movements. Today the procedures of the naturalisation process in Estonia and Latvia 
are similar to those of many other European countries. For instance, persons seeking to 
acquire Estonian citizenship must have been permanent residents of Estonia for at least 
five years, have basic knowledge of the Estonian language, be familiar with the 
Constitution and the Citizenship Act. Complete removal of the minority issue from the 
agenda of Baltic-Russian relations depends on the ftirther pace of naturalisation in 
Estonia and Latvia. 
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On the long-standing issue of border treaties, Russia, Latvia and Estonia have gone back 
to the drawing board. Although Russia finally agreed to sign these treaties in May 2005, 
she then refused to ratify them when both countries added references to bilateral treaties 
which date back to 1920.176 The documents (preamble and declaration) attached to the 
ratification law make reference to the legal continuity of the Estonian and Latvian states 
proclaimed in 1918, their constitution and the uninterrupted validity of the 1920 Tartu 
and Riga Peace Treaties (between Russia-Estonia and Russia-Latvia), which is a legal 
cornerstone of their states' continuity, and the 1991 restoration of the states' 
independence. However, both documents do not challenge the existing borders, contain 
no reservations to the border treaties' terms and no demands of any kind as signed with 
the Russian side. These Estonian and Latvian documents are of a type that many 
countries attach to multilateral or bilateral treaties, without prejudice to implementation 
of treaties. 
By and large, Moscow has stonewalled the border treaties with Estonia and Latvia using 
similar pretexts, despite Estonia! s insistence on having the treaty signed. On the legal 
level, Moscow continues to insist that the Tartu and Riga Peace Treaties lost their 
validity and that the events of 1940 meant that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the 
Soviet Union legally. Russia does not recognise the legal continuity of the Baltic States 
during their de facto incorporation into the USSR. Thus, Russian accusations that the 
documents attached to the border treaties pave the way towards Estonian and Latvian 
territorial claims on Russia can only be seen as part of Moscow's continued political 
campaign against the Baltic States overall. 
All in all, the mentioned tensions are likely to emerge from time to time in bilateral 
relations between Russia and Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. The issue of the accession 
to the CFE Treaty is also coming up for the Baltic countries. As these bilateral issues 
are defacto part of NATO-Russia and EU-Russia relations, it would become a major 
foreign policy challenge for the three states to remain steadfast on matters of vital 
importance to them. 
6.9. Conclusions 
The change in the relations between the West and the Russian Federation, the 
elimination of suppression and the new regional security dynamics made a direct impact 
both on the revival of the Baltic States and the attempts to establish themselves in the 
international community. EU and NATO membership were clear strategic landmarks 
that drove the foreign and security policies of the Baltic States during the past decade. 
Russia's policy towards the Baltic States since the nineties has been confrontational in 
some respects and cooperative in others. When analysing the main developments in 
Russo-Baltic relations in accordance with the Knudsen model, the following 
observations could be made. Firstly, the factor of the historical record, manifesting itself 
through the image of Russia as a potential enemy, did play a part in Russo-Baltic 
relations. In the Baltic countries, this was evident through solving their legal problems 
(Soviet troop withdrawal), consolidating their political independence (integration with 
the West), and in the economic area (fear of the expansion of Russian capital). The 
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degree of distrust between Russia and the Baltic States has been fluctuating around a 
middle level, never reaching highest or lowest points. Therefore their relations might be 
called abstention, i. e. the parties have abstained from both complete reconciliation and 
conflict . 
Secondly, strategic importance of the Baltic States for Russia has manifested in 
geopolitical, geo-strategic and geo-economic aspects. Not only was this reflected in the 
Russian mainstream discourse but equally in Russia's pressure on the Baltics. All this 
but confirms the validity of Knudsen's hypothesis: strategic importance of small states 
has the biggest impact on their relations with a big neighbour. But although this implies 
that small states remain in the field of interests of a great power in no way does this 
guarantee that these interests will be effectively and successfully implemented. The 
reality speaks for itself. Regardless of the fact that it was crucially important for the 
Russian army to stay in the Baltics, it nevertheless had been withdrawn. Moreover, 
despite Russia's assertive rhetoric and geopolitical pressure directed against the 
aspirations of the Baltic States to join NATO, they eventually managed to become fall- 
fledged members of the Alliance. This leads to the conclusion that small states, their 
strategic importance for great powers notwithstanding, are able to conduct policy 
beneficial for them. This shows the limits of the Knudsen model. 
Thirdly, it is worth looking at the correlation between the degree of tension of the great 
powers - Russia and the United States - and the level of pressure on the Baltic States. 
The lowest pressure was when the degree of tension between Russia and the U. S. was 
low (1991-1993 - troop withdrawal, and after 9/11 - softening Russia's opposition 
towards NATO), and the highest - when the level of tension between these two powers 
was high (e. g. the Kosovo crisis). However, it would be misleading to relate the changes 
of pressure on the Baltics solely to the degree of tension between Russia and the U. S. 
There are facts that do not fit in this Knudsen's hypothesis. For instance, although in 
1991-1993 the tension was low, Russia, nevertheless, made tactical steps to stop her 
troop withdrawal from the Baltic countries. An increased pressure on the Baltics in the 
wake of Kosovo crisis (high tension) may also be related to growing geo-economic 
significance of the Baltic States and other Russia's aims. Equally, a decreased pressure 
in the aftermath of 9/11 (low tension) could be explained by Russia's geopolitical 
intentions to show herself as a reliable partner of the West. It is also important to bear in 
mind that the change of geo-strategic environment upon the Baltic accession of NATO 
and the EU alters the character of Russia's pressure on these countries. 
This is to say that Knudsen clearly overestimates the role of a neighbouring great 
power. This model does not properly take into account that small states, due to their 
efficient policies, increased structural power (in the case of the Baltics, due to their 
accession to NATO and the EU), and positive changes in the international environment, 
may influence developments in a direction favourable for them. Moreover, the model 
does not include such an important factor as power asymmetry between great powers. 
This is particularly the case of U. S. - Russian relations. In every respect, the United 
States is far more stronger than Russia, which allows us to explain why the latter's 
pressure on the Baltic countries has sometimes given opposite results (as it happened 
with the Baltic accession to NATO). Finally, Knudsen identifies only high and low 
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levels of tension without taking into account their interim stages. However, the level of 
tension is a dynamic variable and it is necessary to foresee the process of change. 
The domineering nature of Russian policy has been largely responsible for the vigorous 
efforts that made Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia seek NATO membership. Russia faced 
the 'Baltic dilenima': the more she wanted to retain control in the Baltic region, the 
more she felt pressure of the international system, which, in turn, weakened Russia's 
influence in this region. Due to unsettled matters with their Russian neighbour the 
Baltic States had been particularly anxious to join NATO since the early 1990s. They 
had little faith in the assurance that EU membership alone would provide them with 
sufficient security. They were satisfied with no less than the Article 5 commitment from 
NATO involving the United States, which they saw as the main country capable of 
defending them in a time of crisis. Russia has missed many opportunities to reassure the 
Baltic States that old conflicts are history and that Moscow now wants nothing but good 
neighbourly relations. Unresolved border issues with Estonia and Latvia is a case in 
point. 
The Baltic States are keen on building their neighbourly relations with Russia based on 
mutual trust and benefit with the aim of increasing regional security and stability. At the 
same time, the Baltic countries have also to identify changed situation in their 
interaction with Russia and create a new strategy for a mutually acceptable modus 
vivendi. The Euro-Atlantic integration of the Baltic States is a factor number one having 
a positive impact not only on security of their own but also on the region as a whole. 
The longstanding fears that the membership of the Baltic States in NATO will cause a 
major crisis between the Alliance and Russia have proved to be hollow. The Baltic 
membership of NATO and the EU finally put an end, at least theoretically, to the 
speculations that the Baltic Sea region still depends on the balance of power. It is meant 
that for an unlimited period of time the Baltic States are withdrawn from Moscow's 
expansionists plans. Although inside the Russian political elite a discourse 'NATO 
coming closer to Russian borders' prevails a discourse 'Russia coming closer to the 
Alliance', the NATO enlargement in 2004 became an important st towards de- 
securitization of NATO and the Baltic States for Russia and visa-versa. IP 
To sum up, the threats that the Baltic States face in their Eastern neighbourhood are no 
longer of a traditional military nature. Paradoxically, the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Baltic States - 'the pillars Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians so 
anxiously sought to defend from the "Eastern" threat' - are not at stake today. 
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this does not mean that Russo-Baltic relations are tension-free. The tensions do remain 
in their interaction in 'low politics'. There is more than enough evidence to believe that 
Russia seeks to retain her political, economic and cultural influence in the Baltic States. 
Russia will hold her various tools of influence, primarily by using economic levers and 
Baltic dependence upon Russia's energy supply. 
In low politics', there are a few causes that make Russo-Baltic relations so strenuous. 
For the Russians, it is the Baltic membership of NATO - the former Russia's foe, 
alleged mistreatment of Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and the isolation of 
Kaliningrad region by Lithuania. The Baltic decision makers cannot persuade the 
Russians that they are willing to cooperate, and explain to their European allies and 
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partners that they are not inherently anti-Russian. For the Baltics, it is Russia's 
unwillingness to acknowledge and apologise for the crimes of the Soviet occupation and 
the imperial nostalgia towards the territories she once subjugated. Russian political and 
military leadership upholds the attitude not to abandon interests in the Baltic region. 
Russian government is unwilling or unable to understand that it cannot treat the Baltic 
States as her 'near abroad', and hence a legitimate 'sphere of influence'. Russia's 
economic appetite in the Baltic States is growing, and intelligence activities directed 
against them, as new NATO and EU members, are increasing. 
For the Baltic countries, it is essential that Russia is engaged into the integration 
processes with NATO and the EU. In fact, since the re-establishment of independence 
the Baltic States have tried to prove that they have the will and the capacity to build a 
region that is open, friendly and cooperative. The Baltic States are very eager to take on 
the task of building bridges between NATO and the EU on the one hand and Russia on 
the other. This is already taking place in Lithuania's productive cooperation with 
Kaliningrad. 
If the Baltic States are to fulfil their role as mediators between Russia and the West, 
they must normalise their relations with Russia and make sure that the vestiges of 
mutual mistrust are finally laid to rest. There has never been a greater need for all sides 
to shed historical burden and move instead to an issue-based rather than stereotype- 
based approach to mutual relations. The emphasis should be placed on concrete and 
achievable objectives, e. g. on the unsettled border issues and remaining problems of 
Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia. Once these issues are settled, the 
Baltic States' accession to the EU and NATO will provide optimum conditions for 
economic growth and cooperation in the entire Baltic Sea region. The Baltic EU 
membership is opening new opportunities for the direct trade between Russia and the 
EU (via the Baltic countries). 
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CHAPTER 7 
LITHUANIA'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA: A CASE STUDY 
7.1. A great power - small state context 
The key factor in Lithuanian-Russian relations is big power asymmetry, which allows 
Russia to consider herself a great power and defines Lithuania as a small state. 
Although Russia has lost the superpower status in the international arena, she remains a 
great power in relation to neighbouring small states. 
Hans Mouritzen, the author of the 'Finlandization' theory, singles out four scenarios of 
coexistence between a great power and a small state: domination (full dependence on 
the influence of a great power); isolation (self-reliance of a small state, e. g. 
Switzerland); balancing among various influences of great 
I 
powers and, finally, 
obedience to a great power (e. g. Finland during the Cold War). In her relations with 
Russia, Lithuania had to implement one of these scenarios. Having experienced 
Russia's domination during the Soviet occupation period, Lithuania tried to avoid the 
first scenario. Equally, due to historical experience and geopolitical situation, 
Lithuania's isolation was almost implausible, and would produce no benefit in the 
future. In 1994, officially declaring herself set on course of Euro-Atlantic integration, 
Lithuania rejected the scenario of an adaptive policy to her great neighbour Russia. 2 
Thus, the remaining option was one of balancing between different power centres - 
Russia, Europe and the United States. 
Differently from Latvia and Estonia, because of the high level of homogeneity of her 
population, Lithuania has been free to concentrate on other important issues instead of 
being preoccupied with the ethnic one. This also gave Lithuanian politics a high degree 
of coherence and stability. These circumstances have significantly contributed to the 
process of fairly successful cooperation between the two countries. This chapter 
presents a case study of Lithuanian-Russian interaction focussing on two key areas: 
Lithuania's cooperation with the Kaliningrad oblast and her dependency on Russian 
energy resources. 
The Kaliningrad oblast plays an important strategic role in the policy pursued by Russia 
with respect to Lithuania. Just as the Russian minority issue was Moscow's tool to exert 
pressure on Latvia and Estonia, the question of civil and military transit to the 
Kaliningrad region was a tool Russia sought to change Lithuania's pro-Western 
geopolitical orientation. Meanwhile, Lithuania took a cooperative approach to the oblast 
and, with the help of the international community, successfully tackled this problem. 
Since 1997, Lithuania has been deliberately working to make the Kaliningrad oblast to 
be seen as an example for regional and European cooperation. Lithuania has been able 
to reshape the image of Kaliningrad: the emphasis laid on cooperation in the economic- 
social area has neutralised the focus on the military dimension. 
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The second topic - Lithuania's energy dependency on Russia - is a major weakness for 
the country. Although membership of NATO and EU brings much higher degree of 
security to Lithuania, her dependency on Russian energy resources gives Moscow an 
opportunity to wield not only economic but also political influence, which, arguably, is 
even more dangerous. Lithuania's energy dependence has a direct impact on halting her 
economic 'de-occupation', which, in turn, precludes full 'de-occupation' of state. 3 Even 
if legal and political 'de-occupation' (i. e. legal and political independence) of Lithuania 
is achieved, the continuing economic dependence means that full 'de-occupation' of the 
state is still not complete. Economic independence of a small state is diversification of 
economic relations, when a bigger neighbour no longer dominates a smaller state's 
economy, particularly in strategic spheres such as the energy sector. In respect of 
Lithuania, economic 'de-occupation' began after the restoration of independence with 
the turning points during Russia's financial meltdown in 1998 (after which Lithuania 
restructured her trade) and the beginning of the privatisation of strategic objects in the 
Lithuanian energy sector. It is the latter processes that opened out Russia's striving to 
maintain her economic influence in the territory of a smaller neighbour. This chapter 
looks into consequences for Lithuania's national security in relation to her energy 
dependency on Russia. 
7.2. Lithuania - Kaliningrad dialogue 
7.2.1. Geo-strategic context: key parameters and players 
The common problems that are characteristic of territorial political anomalies, which a 
home state, an exclave/enclave and a host state or states surrounding a territorial 
anomaly encounter, are: the administration and security of an exclave/enclave, its 
economic situation, the identity of its residents and communication with a separate 
4 home territory. Home states usually seek to neutralise threats to preserve sovereignty 
by all possible means, to establish administration of an exclave/enclave without 
prejudice to the principles of political-territorial control prevailing in a home state and 
ensuring effective relations with it. The role of a host state manifests itself in the 
reaction to the actions of a home state seeking to ensure communication with an 
exclave/enclave. With regard to Kaliningrad, one has to deal here with a triangle: the 
home state (Russia), the host state 5 (Lithuania) and the exclave/enclave (the Kaliningrad 
oblast). A major role in this triangle is played by Russia (home state) through her 
strategy and tactics. If one asks the question what kind of role the Kaliningrad oblast 
plays in domestic policy of Russia, the answer is obvious: the motive of 'non-self- 
6 determination of the home state' prevails. In relation to foreign and security policies, 
the oblast performs several tasks: maintaining military balance and safeguarding 
Russia's political-economic interests in Northern Europe, serving as a constituent part 
in Russia's Western strategic direction and being an essential component of the Russia- 
Belarus military grouping. It should also be noted that the EU and NATO enlargements 
has brought additional sensitivities of the Kaliningrad problem. 
The Kaliningrad exclave is of the very exceptional nature: its link with continental 
Russia has a historically determined limited context. In fact, former Eastern Prussia, 
including K6nigsberg, was ceded to the Soviet Russia in the aftermath of the Second 
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World War to ensure the temporary subordination of the Eastern Baltic region to the 
USSR. 7 Moscow has never had any other historic rights to that territory. Hence, any 
references today to the allegedly existing past link between the oblast and the 
motherland would concurrently imply the continuing dependence of the Eastern Baltic 
region to Russia. 
Since the early nineties the Kremlin has had two major strategies with respect to 
Kaliningrad. According to the first strategy, the oblast is seen as an outpost or a peculiar 
strategic region ('high politics'), according to the second, the oblast is an experimental 
platform of economic reforms ('low politics'). It should be stressed that throughout 
fifteen years Moscow has never formulated a real policy towards Kaliningrad and often 
oscillated between these two options. On the one hand, in Russia's geo-strategy 
Kaliningrad is a tool for her to carry on the tradition of a great power. On the other 
hand, it is the interior aspect, i. e. social-economic development or low politics', that 
might be of more significance to Moscow but it is pre-empted by the exterior one. 8 In 
fact, Moscow does not oppose or even encourages that the Kaliningrad oblast should be 
treated as a peculiar region of Russia but at the same time it prevents this peculiarity 
from being realised in order to firmly tie the exclave to the home state. The federal 
centre, while granting the Kaliningrad oblast the status of a special (extraordinary) 
economic zone, demanded that all the actions in the exclave should be coordinated with 
it. Hence, the peculiarity of the oblast 'manifested itself in its closeness' and the terni 
4zone' had to be understood in the most primitive sense of the word. 9 
Lithuania, for her own part, has been concerned about the place of the 'host state' in 
Russia's dual strategy projections. Apparently, in solving the problem of preserving its 
sovereignty and assurances of connections with Kaliningrad, Moscow turned the oblast 
into a 'geopolitical hostage'. 10 Russia was seeking to take advantage of the issue of 
communication, i. e. military transit from the Russian Federation to the Kaliningrad 
oblast via Lithuania, visas and civil transit, by trying to stop the process of Lithuania's 
Euro-Atlantic integration. In this respect, the assessment made by the famous RAND 
Corporation analysts, Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick, is very instructive. They stated 
that the Kaliningrad oblast is an advanced strategic military post, a concentration of 
Russia's huge military power, which turns the Baltic States into a 'special case'. 11 
Taking into consideration the intensity of diplomatic pressure exerted by Moscow on 
candidate counties, particularly Lithuania, and on the European Union, it is difficult to 
deny that the Kaliningrad issue is not a 'self-contained goal but onl Y2 a measure taken by 
Moscow to influence the development process' of the Baltic States. 
In geo-strategic terms, for Russia NATO enlargement to the Baltics implied a number 
of things: the encirclement of the Kalininingrad oblast by NATO countries; NATO's 
ability to use the former military bases of the USSR (Zokniai airport was of particular 
significance for Russia 13); isolation of Russia's Baltic Military Fleet in the gulfs of 
Finland and Kaliningrad; increased vulnerability of the Leningrad Military District. 14 
Ultimately, it was Russia's geo-strategic retreat. The approach of NATO military forces 
would threaten Russia's defensive power - her defensive line is 1500 krn closer than 
that of the USSR. In addition, NATO enlargement went parallel with the downsizing of 
Russia's Baltic Fleet in the region, as well as the weakening of the entire Russian 
Armed Forces. To minimise the threat resulting from NATO enlargement, Russia 
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indicated that one of the possible solutions would be the revival of Kaliningrad in the 
role of a military outpost or the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the oblast. 
Due to Lithuania's membership of NATO Russia used to emphasise the potential 
problem of isolation of Kaliningrad. " 
The following two parts of this chapter will analyse Russian efforts aimed at 
undermining the implementation of Lithuania's key national interests - her integration 
in the EU and NATO - and how Lithuania managed to respond to these challenges. The 
three central topics here will be addressed: first, the success story of Lithuania's 
cooperation with the Kaliningrad oblast, which largely laid good grounds for the 
solution of sensitive issues with the Russian Federation; second, the analysis of factors 
whose interaction enabled the solution of the visa problem; third, how Moscow seeks to 
politicise the issue of military transit to/from the Kaliningrad oblast via Lithuania. 
7.2.2. Pragmatic neighbourly relations 
Lithuania was one of the first states which adequately understood the problem of 
Kaliningrad oblast, and the first of foreign countries to propose a most rational 
principle of cooperation - the one of transforming problems into advantages. 16 
The Kaliningrad oblast is the only Russian region that has a direct border with 
Lithuania (see map 4, p. 242). At the same time, Lithuania is the only EU country 
bordering Russia to the West. It is largely due to this circumstance that Russian- 
Lithuanian relations to a great extent have a Kaliningrad-related content. 17 Because of 
geopolitical, political, economic and cultural reasons Lithuania is concerned with the 
prevailing trends in the oblast's development. The direct contact with Russia 
strengthens some threats to Lithuania: military threats due to the militarisation of the 
oblast and military transit via Lithuania; social threats because of the region's poverty 
and economic threats because of the competition between the ports of Klaip&da and 
Kaliningad. Most important, the Kaliningrad region creates conditions for Russia to 
control or at least to have an impact on the states that separate the oblast from 'big" 
Russia. This prompts Moscow to treat these 'transit' states in her foreign policy as a 
sphere of Russia's vital interests. 
To escape from this zone of interests Lithuania's policy model vis-&-vis Kaliningrad 
should be focussed on two directions. The first should be aimed at the demilitarisation 
of Kaliningrad or, at least, the decline of the influence of the military sector to the 
functioning of the oblast. Other Lithuania's major tasks is, by supporting Kaliningrad's 
status as a 'pilot' region in Russia's relations with the EU, to integrate the oblast in 
Central and Eastern European sub-region. 
The enlargement of the European Union creates a pressing need for in-depth 
modemisation of the Kaliningrad oblast, the implementation of which Russia is not 
ready and lacks capacity. Moscow has limited itself to seeking 'special solutions', being 
concerned that EU enlargement might lead to the isolation of Kaliningrad. Since neither 
Russia nor the EU are interested in the potential worsening of the socio-economic 
situation in the oblast, successful crisis prevention should be of interest to all regional 
actors. Lithuania, sharing the same attitude as Russia towards regional economic 
growth, has been trying to find a solution to the Kaliningrad problems after EU 
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enlargement, and is a dedicated player in the region. " It is in Lithuania's interest to 
contribute to the smooth development of the oblast by engaging it in cooperative 
projects, regional and cross-border activities, and promoting people to people contacts. 
It was expected to help mitigate emerging Russian fears that the oblast might become 
closed or isolated. Starting from the mid- I 990s, joint efforts resulted in the fon-nation of 
a solid legal framework to regulate the Kaliningrad-related Russian- Lithuanian 
relationship in various spheres on the basis of good neighbourliness and mutual benefit. 
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Map 4. The Kaliningrad enclave within the European Union' 
The regionalisation of Russia provided opportunities for Lithuania: chances of 
involving Russian regions on a micro-level in a cooperative framework are higher than 
on a macro-level (directly with the Kremlin). A number of smaller regional projects 
have been made in the border areas in the Baltics, as well as on the Lithuania- 
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Kaliningrad border. Lithuania has been participating in three Euro-regions - 'Baltika', 
'Saul6' and 'Neman', where Kaliningrad is involved as well. Moreover, in 1999, a joint 
association of NGOs and academic institutions was created; in 2000, the Cooperation 
CounCil20 between Lithuania and Kaliningrad was established; and in 200 1, a join inter- 
parliamentary forum was formed. Finally, in March 2001, the Moscow summit meting 
between the Lithuanian and Russian presidents gave a major boost for Lithuania's 
cooperation with the oblast. 
Lithuania agreed to apply the same railway tariffs for Russian transports to Kaliningrad 
as for Klaip&da, to introduce automatic cargo control, which would speed up customs 
clearance considerably, and offered to sell electricity to Kaliningrad at a minimum 
price. This friendly policy towards the oblast can be said to have 'killed four birds with 
one stone': it satisfied economic interests, made Lithuania's accession to the European 
Union (and NATO) more palatable to Russia, established Lithuania as a channel for EU 
support for Kaliningrad, and contributed to Lithuania's own EU accession. 21 
Lithuania's relations with the Kaliningrad oblast are concentrated on three levels: 
governmental, parliamentary and regional. Vilnius promoted the idea of Kaliningrad as 
an economic bridge for the development of East-West relations. Lithuanian politicians 
argued that the 'Kaliningrad problem' should be seen as a 'window of opportunity' to 
improve Europe's relations with Russia by engaging her in a common endeavour. By 
and large, cooperation with the oblast in the areas of trade, transport, infrastructure, and 
so on, has been successful, gradually turning the enclave, economically and politically, 
into a part of the Baltic region. Lithuania is one of the main trade partners and among 
the major investors in the oblast, holding the third position after Germany and Cyprus. 
It is noteworthy that Lithuania's investment in Kaliningrad constitutes some 20 percent 
of the total amount of Lithuanian foreign investment abroad - the largest Lithuanian 
investment in the world. By the end of 2004, more than 650 joint ventures or Lithuanian 
owned companies had been established. 22 
Another important direction of Lithuania's activities in the region is the consolidation of 
a pro-European social-political elite and promoting the formation of Kaliningrad 
identity. These activities include maintaining regular contacts between parliamentarians, 
NGOs and journalists, and Lithuania's launched training courses for local 
administration officials and businessmen. These undertakings have helped considerably 
improve mutual confidence and understanding. What is more, the emphasis laid by 
Lithuania on cooperation in the social-economic area has neutralized the focus on the 
military dimension solely. In other words, it helped to shift the Kaliningrad problem 
from 'high' to 'low' politics. More generally, by these actions Lithuania aims at 
creating preconditions for her closer cooperation with Kaliningrad, promoting 
tendencies of political autonomy within the oblast and its integration into the Baltic 
region. 
The Communication of the European Commission on Kaliningrad largely reflects 
Lithuania's attitude and the degree of cooperation with the oblast. However, Moscow's 
stance remains an obstacle to further strengthening cooperative relations. The new 
amendments of the law on the SEZ in the Kaliningrad oblast established preferential 
treatment for 'large-scale' (read Russian) capital at the expense of small and mediurn 
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enterprises (read Polish and Lithuanian), which now dominate in the region. 23 In 
addition, the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has warned the leaders of the 
Russian regions not to pursue any relations with the Baltic States that would not be at 
first endorsed by Moscow. 24 A telling fact is that the Kremlin did not invite the Polish 
and Lithuanian presidents to the celebration of 750'h anniversary of the establishment of 
Kaliningrad (K8nigsberg) city on 1-3 July 2005. 
It should be noted that a strategically new perspective of the Kremlin's policy towards 
Kaliningrad has appeared with Putin's appointment of the ambitious and energetic new 
governor of the oblast, Georgiy Boos. If earlier temporary obstacles, neighbouring 
Lithuania in particular, has complicated Moscow's attempts to draw a geopolitical line 
with the oblast, now concrete directions to the West opening up possibilities to 
neutralise inten-nediate factors have been found. One of the most visible directions is the 
North European gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea. Thus, the Kaliningrad oblast is 
actually becoming geopolitically connected to Russia and is very important to the 
development of her strategic relations with the Western Europe. 
7.2.3. Cooperation in multilateralfora 
By the end of the 1990s, Kaliningrad finally found its way on the agenda of the EU and 
the CBSS. Following this line, Lithuania took part in many frameworks addressing the 
Kaliningrad oblast: first and foremost, the EU'ND Initiative, the CBSS and the NEI of 
the U. S. It is during Lithuania's presidency in the CBSS in 1998-1999, Kaliningrad 
became a priority area with the aim of promoting regional and cross-border cooperation 
projects with the enclave. Since then, Lithuania has constantly been contributing to the 
development of Kaliningrad in the framework of the CBSS. 25 
Lithuania's cooperation with the oblast is largely modelled and developed in 
accordance with the Nida Initiative (NI) launched in 2000. The NI exceeds the scope of 
bilateral relations and is aimed at co-ordinating in practice the development of the 
Kaliningrad oblast as a 'pilot' region under the auspices of the ND Initiative: to bring 
the oblast closer to the neighbouring regions and to strengthen cross-border 
cooperation. 26 Vladimir Nikitin, a former member of the Kaliningrad Duma, claimed 
that the oblast's co9peration with Lithuania should be considered as a model for 
regional cooperation. 27 
Regional and cross-border cooperation with Kaliningrad directly concerns several 
countries of the EU's ND Initiative. 28 The list of the projects on cooperation with 
Kaliningrad perfectly illustrates the wide range of common interests between Lithuania 
and Russia: the 2K (Klaip6da and Kaliningrad) project to unite both seaports into a 
single smoothly functioning transport infrastructure system; construction of transport 
corridors across the oblast; deepening of the mouth of the tributaries of the river 
Nemunas; plans for the creation of a specialised AIDS prevention centre, with branches 
in Klaip6da and Kaliningrad; as well as joint training programmes for border and 
customs officials operating on the Russian-Lithuanian and Russian-Polish borders. 29 
Analysis of the implementation of these projects shows great progress achieved in the 
transport field. This is largely due to the fact that Lithuania and Kaliningrad are situated 
at the heart of a very important transport hub in the Baltic Sea area. The future 
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economic development in this area is expected to involve an expansion of common 
infrastructure projects, e. g. trans-European transport corridors 30 , and a long-term energy 
transmission project (a Baltic electricity grid), designed for the further integration and 
cooperation of the regions around the Baltic Sea. Regular Lithuanian-Russian business 
roundtables serve as a powerful instrument in promoting economic cooperation. 
On the whole, if at the micro level Kaliningrad is a 'natural laboratory' for Russia-EU 
integration, so for Lithuania, Kaliningrad has lately become a 'window of opportunity', 
with the possibility of facilitating the development of all levels of cooperation with 
Russia. 31 Lithuania sees herself as an interlocutor between the oblast and the European 
Union and is determined to continue this policy of engagement. However, the ambitious 
projects of the ND Initiative rely upon the support of PHARE, TACIS and other EU 
assistance programmes and funds, which need better synchronisation. Lithuania and 
Russia are still waiting for practical progress of the ND Initiative, which yet has not 
been efficient. The potential of the CBSS, which proved to be a strong contributor to a 
positive development of EU-Russia relations, could be better utilised. 
To minimise the oblast's socio-economic backwardness, to promote its development as 
a 4pilot' region and to integrate it into CEE sub-region, these factors are of vital 
importance. The first is the context of Lithuania-Russia and EU-Russia relations. It is 
obvious that without Russia's willingness the Kaliningrad oblast will not be integrated 
into the EU. The second is Lithuania's ability to engage Poland, and, possibly, the 
whole EU, in this process. Acting on her own Lithuania will not be able to influence 
substantially the oblast's development. Lithuania has to initiate, support and promote 
such EU projects that create conditions for Kaliningrad's close integration into the EU. 
7.2.4. Movement ofpersons 
The geographical location of the Kaliningrad oblast predetermines that the free 
movement of people is one of the most sensitive issues resulting from EU enlargement. 
Upon the accession of Lithuania and Poland to the EU, the oblast found itself 
surrounded by EU members. Once Lithuania and Poland join the Schengen zone, there 
will be a unified visa area with strict border control. Along with Lithuania's 
commitment to apply the requirements of the Schengen acquis on her territory, the 
introduction of a visa regime for Russians crossing Lithuania became inevitable. It 
implied that commuters to Kaliningrad from Russia and vice versa would need visas or 
special travel documents to pass through Lithuania and Poland. 
Since 1992 Lithuania and Latvia accepted visa free transit for trains between 
Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia. Russia granted Kaliningrad custom-free trade, which 
boosted border trade but made the oblast dependent on imports from abroad. However, 
as the Baltic States sought to join the EU, they also had to adopt its Schengen border 
regime. Lithuania decided to demand visas for transit since January 2003 and for visits 
to the country from July 2003. This evoked anxiety protests in Russia, since the oblast 
was dependent on free trade, on the cooperation with neighbours and with Russia. 
it is in this discourse that the notion of Kaliningrad's sovereignty acquires key 
importance. Being concerned that the Baltic enclave's one million people is cut off from 
the Russian mainland, Moscow claimed that the visa issue is a violation of sovereignty. 
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But it seems that by toughening its stance on Kaliningrad Moscow wanted to prevent 
even the slightest threat to the country's territorial integrity: separated from Russia, 
Kaliningrad may press for independence, setting a precedent for other regions. 
Moreover, Moscow was likely to worry that the oblast's acquisition of special status 
would undermine the results of regional reforms, whose main goal is to place federal 
subjects on an equal footing, which is arguably one of Putin's major achievements 
during his presidency. This forced the Kremlin to take a dubious stance by combining 
two principally different problems: the transit of Russian citizens between the 
Kaliningrad oblast and the mainland, and a completely different matter - the transit of 
residents of the oblast (Russian citizens) to EU countries. 
It goes without saying that after Lithuania and Poland concluded accession negotiations 
with the EU, the only framework to discuss movement of people was Russia-EU 
dialogue. From the very start, Moscow considered transit visa requirements totally 
unacceptable. It is worth noting that the Kaliningrad problem dominated EU-Russia 
relations to such an extent that it prevented any dialogue from taking place at a practical 
level on many other issues. 32 Moscow asserted that it would not allow Kaliningrad to 
become subject to a EU 'blockade' and embarked on tough negotiations with the 
European Commission, bringing intense pressure on Brussels and selected EU capitals - 
Paris and Berlin in particular. This was the first time that the European Union and 
Russia were engaged in negotiations over a concrete question that went to the heart of 
EU doctrine - the Schengen agreement and the EU's external boundary. It also 
encroached on the sovereignty of Lithuania. The dispute brought Russia face to face 
with reality. She had been ignoring Kaliningrad for years and had simply been putting 
off negotiations over a readmission treaty with the EU. 
From the outset of negotiations visa problems were over-politicised. Moscow itself 
called the issue 'political'. President Putin even defined the visa dispute with Brussels 
and Vilnius as a test for EU-Russia cooperation, saying that the Union's rejection of 
Kaliningrad transit would be 'a rejection of Russia's European choice'. 33 In a sense it 
proved that Putin also has his 'red lines' but, contrary to Primakov, he does not speak 
about them. 34 Apparently, these 'red lines' are the former Soviet space and the 
Kaliningrad oblast. 
The issue of securing the borders of Schengen countries was of a technical nature, and 
the answer to it had to be technical, found within a limited period of time. Although the 
Schengen agreement is a legal barrier, it can be dealt with. However, rather than getting 
into practical talks, Russia was only putting demands without doing her homework, i. e. 
modernising border crossings, creating conditions for expanding consular network, and 
combating illegal migration and organized crime in the oblast. Similarly, the Russian 
passport system was outdated and unreliable. 
A major question here for all interested parties - Lithuania, the European Commission, 
the Russian Federation and Poland - was how the introduction of visas could affect the 35 development of the Kaliningrad oblast and its relations with the surrounding region. In 
this respect, two principles should be preserved: not to infringe Lithuania's sovereign 
right to exercise the necessary control of the border, including the refusal of entry into 
her territory, and to simultaneously create favourable conditions for cross-border 
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movement to open Kaliningrad for cooperation. Because of traditional transit routes 
through Lithuanian territory, this question is of less importance for Poland and targeted 
directly at Lithuanian-Russian and, consecutively, EU-Russian relations. 
The desire of Russian political elite to establish privileged visa free access between 
Russia and the Kaliningrad oblast via Lithuania, a EU member country, deserves 
special mention. Two key issues were singled out: first, transit to/from the exclave has 
to be implemented by using, according to Moscow's demand, 'corridors' or 'sealed 
trains' (i. e. visa-free transit by high-speed trains); second, ensuring free movement 
between the oblast and Lithuania, Poland, and the EU, which is the key factor in the 
economic development of Kaliningrad. The talks about 'corridors' made the Poles and 
Lithuanians worry about the violation of their sovereignty and reminded them of Danzig 
corridor in Poland in the 1930s. 36 Another option - visa-free transit by high-speed 
railway - is also a rather complicated legal, technical and financial issue. 
It should be stressed that Lithuania got a chance to reap the benefits of the structural 
power the EU provides to its individual members even before the actual accession. The 
European Commission adopted a strong stance to separate the issue of Lithuania's 
accession from the issue of Kaliningrad transit, while providing Lithuania with the 
possibility to participate indirectly in the negotiation process with Russia. In the course 
of negotiations, Lithuania demonstrated good will in seeking flexible solutions to a visa 
regime for Kaliningrad within the limits of Schengen. 37 Despite rather uncompromising 
positions of both sides - Russia's insistence on visa-free transit, and the Commission's 
rejection of any notion of 'corridors' in the Schengen space, the agreement was reached. 
To sweeten the pill for Moscow, the EU, Russia and Lithuania agreed on the scenario of 
'procedural improvement'. It is the European Commission's endorsed plan for a special 
transit pass -a facilitated transit document (FTD) (or a facilitated rail travel document 
(FRTD))- for Russians travelling via Lithuania to/from the oblast. In accordance with 
Joint Statement of the European Union and the Russian Federation on Transit between 
Kaliningrad Region and the Rest of the Russian Federation, Russians could apply to 
Lithuania for either a multiple-entry direct transit document or for a so-called 'light 
38 document', issued only for single return trips by train to/from Kaliningrad. With 
respect to the economic and social development of the oblast, the parties agreed to 
implement a 'comprehensive package of measures' in order to ensure 'easy passage of 
borders for legal purposes with a view to facilitate human contacts and promote the 
development of the Kaliningrad region'. 39 
Despite calling its standoff with the EU a 'political' argument, Moscow's acceptance of 
the Kaliningrad deal appears to be based on technical reasons. In the Joint Statement, 
the Russian Federation explicitly confirmed its 'intention to conclude an 
intergovernmental readmission treaty with the Republic of Lithuania, covering persons 
of all nationalities'. 40 The EU, in turn, committed itself in 2003 to launch a feasibility 
study for visa free transit by high-speed non-stopping trains in order to evaluate the 
political and legal aspects, as well as the technical obstacles involved in this issue. 41 
All in all, the issue of visa-free transit to the Kaliningrad oblast clearly demonstrated 
that Moscow was much more concerned with domestic affairs rather than those of the 
exclave. Members of the Kaliningrad Duma were made to adopt resolutions demanding 
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that the issue of transit of passengers should be related to the ratification of the 1997 
border treaty between Lithuania and Russia. Many times Moscow postponed the 
ratification of the treaty, threatening not to endorse it at all, until its final approval by 
the State Duma of the Russian Federation in November 2003, after the decision on 
passenger transit had been adopted. 42 According to Professor Raimundas Lopata, 
Director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius 
University, it was nothing but Moscow's attempts to ensure the further functioning of 
the oblast as 'the hostage mechanism'. 43 
7.3. Military transit of the Russian Federation via the Republic of Lithuania 
Kaliningrad's most important railway and road connections with 'big' Russia pass 
through Lithuania. That is why Lithuania considered these infirastructural links the 
gravest threat to her security after the Soviet Army left in 1993. Russia tried to exploit 
the issue of military transit, pressing Vilnius to sign international treaty that would have 
given an uncontrolled civil and military transit corridor to/from Kaliningrad via 
Lithuania. The latter saw these demands as an attempt to undermine her sovereign rights 
over her own territory. Lithuania was also concerned that such a treaty could infringe on 
the country's prospects for NATO membership and kept rejecting Russia's proposals. 
In order to facilitate the withdrawal of Russian forces from Central Europe and the 
Baltic States, Lithuania agreed to permit military transportations from Kaliningrad to 
Russia exclusively by rail, and was very restrictive concerning military transit in the 
opposite direction. Though formally Moscow started demanding an agreement on the 
military transit to/from the oblast via Lithuania in 1992, the Lithuanian government 
rejected this idea to protect the state's sovereignty. 44 Instead, Vilnius officially 
responded by a verbal agreement that there would be no complications for movement of 
the Russian troops to/from Kaliningrad. As the troop withdrawal from Central Europe 
(Eastern Germany) was of crucial importance for Russia, she had to accept such an 
arrangement. It was within this context that the procedure of Russian military transit via 
Lithuania started to take shape. The historical and legal background to Russia's military 
transit to/from Kaliningrad via Lithuania is given in Appendix H. 
In general, the 1995 agreement on the military transit, established through the exchange 
of diplomatic notes 45 , could be viewed as a compromise. This kind of judgement could be supported by the fact that Vilnius did not manage to make Moscow accept 
Lithuania's adopted regulations on the military transit, while Moscow failed to force 
Vilnius to sign a transit treaty. However, in retrospect, this exchange of notes ought to 
be regarded as a victory for Lithuanian diplomacy. The fact is that the notes were based 
on the agreement, which fixed the military transit of the Russian Federation from 
Germany and did not legitimise the military transit to/from Kaliningrad via Lithuania. 
This means that with the completion of the 'German' transit Moscow had no legal 
grounds for arguing that Russian military transit via Lithuania was legitimised 
permanently. It is also worth noting that the exchange of notes 'did not have an effect of 
international a 76 eement'; it only testified, and still does, a certain consensus between the 
two countries. After all, the 'German' rules per se conditioned temporariness, as they 
referred to the transit of the Russian troops withdrawn from Germany. This implied that 
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Russia principally agreed with Lithuania's unilateral decision to grant temporary 
permission for the military transit of the Russian Federation. Thus, in essence, Moscow 
acknowledged the absence of levers at its disposal to retain Lithuania within the sphere 
of Russian legitimacy. This, nevertheless, has not stopped Moscow from making 
consistent efforts to impose such legitimacy on Lithuania. 
At present, these 'German' regulations continue to govern the military transit to/from 
the Kaliningrad oblast via Lithuania. The dominant direction of military transit is to 
Kaliningrad. With the diminution of forces in the oblast and the use of sea-bome transit, 
the number of soldiers and cargos moving through Lithuania has declined by 35 percent 
to the Kaliningrad oblast and by 20 percent from the oblastý7 There has been an 
increasing gap between planned and executed military transit. 
Both Lithuanian and Russian authorities claim to be satisfied with the status quo. Yet 
from time to time Russia's political leadership repeats its request for a formal legal 
transit treaty. Two following parts of this chapter will look into technical and political 
aspects of the military transit. 
7.3.1. New tendencies and technical aspects ofmilitary transit 
New developments show that the significance of military transit for Russia by railway 
to/from Kaliningrad is declining (see Table 3, Appendix H). Lately, Russia has carried 
out more transportation by sea. There is enough evidence that sea routes may be 
applicable for the transportation of Russian military cargoS. 48 Alternative routes, 
exploited by Russia for commercial purposes, could be easily used to redirect military 
transit to sea routes. Lithuanian authorities note that heavy Russian equipment is no 
longer moved by land but via the Baltic Sea. 49 Cargos from St. Petersburg or 
Lomonosov to Baltiysk in the Kaliningrad oblast are being transported by ships of the 
Russian Baltic Fleet. After opening of the ferry between St. Petersburg and Baltiysk it is 
likely that their sailing route will increase even more. Thus, the possibilities for a sea- 
borne transit will only grow. It is anticipated that Russia could transport by sea about 50 
percent of all military cargos to/ from Kaliningrad. 50 As detailed in Appendix H, the 
military share of Russian transit constitutes only a small part of the overall load. This 
non-military part could be easily converted into commercial transit and later used for 
military purposes. 
Regarding military transit by rail, Lithuania considers Russia's applications on a case- 
bya-case basis and issues permissions for the transit of military personnel and military 
cargos, when the Military Movement Control Centre of the Lithuanian Ministry of 
National Defence escorts and takes control over it. All military transit by rail, such as 
military cargos, with or without Russian military escort, or just military personnel, is 
checked at the border posts of Lithuania. Only one shipment may be authorised at a 
given time in any direction. Russian military personnel are transported separately from 
their weapons, in sealed wagons and at a different time. 
The railway route for such shipments is fixed and is not subject to modifications: Kena 
- Vilnius (Vaidotai) - Kaunas - Kybartai and backwards (see map 5, p. 251). The 
Military Movement Control Centre of Lithuania provides armed guards to escort a 
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transit shipment. The total number of military personnel, transported through the 
territory of Lithuania, may not exceed 180 persons. The list of strictly prohibited items, 
including the transportation of WMD, rocket fuel and/or its components, is established 
by the resolution of the Lithuanian government. 51 
Since the beginning of 1995 (when legal regulations came into force), there have been 
no major problems concerning the performance of the military transit. Russia actually 
complies with the defined order, and the ongoing process does not constitute any 
serious threat to Lithuanian security, since coal, fuel, vehicles and food are the 
predominant materials being transited. 52 Military personnel and cargo movement of the 
Russian Federation to/from the Kaliningrad oblast via Lithuanian territory is provided 
for in the Table 3 of Appendix H. 
As regards military transit via Lithuanian airspace, the order is set out in the Lithuanian 
Law on the State Border and Protection Yhereof and the Regulations on the Use of the 
Airspace of the Republic of Lithuania. 53 These two documents establish the procedure 
for transit flights, i. e. rules for obtaining permits, form of application and transit routes. 
Russian authorities must obtain a permission, issued by the Lithuanian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (in consultation with the Lithuanian Air Forces) on a case-by-case basis. 
In compliance with the requirements, only one Russian military aircraft is allowed to be 
in Lithuanian air space at the same time. All Russian aircraft may use only one fixed air 
corridor Podil-Musni-Kraki (see map 5) and fly no lower than 6000 feet (1,920 km) 
altitude. Flights of Russian strategic bombers (Tu-22 type) and other aircraft with 
combat armament and equipment are strictly prohibited. Transportation of post, medical 
loads and military personnel (including conscripts) is most often indicated as the 
purpose of the flights of Russian aircraft. On average, about 130-160 flights are 
conducted every year. 
To sum up, since 1995 Russia has been seeking to formalise the issue of military transit 
through Lithuanian territory by a long-term legal treaty, thus seeking, in one sense, to 
retain Lithuania under Russian control. The military transit is being carried out in 
conformity with the Resolution No. 938 (3 October 1994) of the Lithuanian 
government. 54 The majority of Russian military cargos are transported by railway. Non- 
military shipments and troops to Kaliningrad constitute the bigger part of the overall 
loads (Table 3). The alternative way of transportation by sea, including military cargos 
and personnel, is already in use, and is set to increase. This should naturally diminish 
the need for the military transit through the territory of Lithuania. 
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Map 5. The railway route and the air corridor of Russian military transit to/from 
the Kaliningrad oblast via Lithuania 55 
Note: Black line shows Kena-Kybartai railway route, blue line - Podil-Musni-Kraki air 
corridor. 
7.3.2. Political aspects 
The question of military transit returned to the forefront of talks between the two 
countries when Lithuania moved closer to joining NATO. Despite the fact that the 
functioning military transit causes no problems on the practical level, Moscow has been 
regularly stirring up the issue by claiming that transit is purportedly not regulated under 
international law. 56 Russian senior officials, including Sergey Ivanov, and even 
Vladimir Putin, used to argue that the current transit regulations were outdated, 
incompatible with the changed context of NATO-Russia partnership and unsatisfactory 
regarding the shipment of hazardous cargos. 
57 
In January 2001, the European Commission stated that the current military transit was 
performed by virtue of special regulations between Lithuania and Russia and underlined 
the necessity to review these regulations within the context of the EU enlargement. 
Such a review was related to Lithuania's commitments to implement EU directives 
regarding the transportation of hazardous cargos. It is indicative that the EU has not 
introduced any definite requirements with respect to the military transit, and this issue 
has not even been included in the negotiations chapters. 58 
In 2003, the Russian side presented its own version of a draft transit treaty, which 
significantly softened transit conditions, and was therefore rejected by Lithuanian 
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officials. Russia's position is clear: to obtain the automatic right for military transit and 
transport of dangerous materials (e. g. rocket fuel) via Lithuanian territory by fixing 
these requirements in a new legal treaty. Meanwhile Lithuania wants to codify the 
procedure of issuing transit permissions on case-by-case basis. The refusal of Vilnius to 
accept Moscow's argument is based on the realities that the practical execution of the 
Russian military transit via Lithuania proceeds without any major complications. 
On the whole, Lithuania avoided the conclusion of any special treaty granting Russia an 
automatic right for the transit of military cargos and personnel. The existing legal 
framework does not ensure Russia an automatic right to the military transit, neither by 
air nor by railway. The annually renewed regulations are likewise applied in respect of 
the military transit of other foreign countries. It is noteworthy that the entire practice of 
the Russian military transit via Lithuania proves that despite some sporadic events 
Lithuania has formed quite an efficient and functional mechanism for the regulation and 
administration of the military transit. 59 
Lithuania's policy is not to conclude any bilateral treaty authorising the military transit 
by rail, road and air. Setting regulations for the military transit is a prerogative of a 
country through which such transit is being executed. Therefore, when exercising her 
sovereign right, Lithuania chose to regulate the Russian military transit through her 
territory by national legislation, taking into account the requirements of the EU and 
NATO, simultaneously trying not to undermine her interest in building mutual trust in 
relations with Russia. 
7.4. Russia's geo-economic pressure 
Economic levers are becoming an important weapon in Russian foreign policy arsenal: a 
shift from geopolitical to geo-economic reasoning with regard to the Baltic States took 
place in the period of 1997-2000. Already since the mid-1990s, in her strategic 
documents Russia started to underline the point that economic cooperation is one of the 
key factors for the 'rapproch6ment' with the Baltic countries. The CFDP study of 2000 
'The Baltics - trans-European corridor for 21st century' states that transit is playing an 
increasingly important role in the economy of the Baltic countries, making up about 7 
percent of Lithuania's GDP . 
60 As main transit flows through the Baltics come from 
Russia, she acquires additional levers for geo-economic pressure on these countries. 
Russia's economic pressure on Lithuania has manifested itself in three directions: first, 
the safeguard of transit routes for Russian goods; second, consolidation of Russian 
capital; third, taking advantage of being the main supplier of energy resources. For 
Russia Lithuania is important primarily as a part of an export-import route to the West. 
Suffice it to mention Klaip&da port's vital significance for Russia: it is ice-free and 
easily accessible from many Russian regions. Well-developed Lithuanian transport 
system, which allows Russia to ensure the movement of goods to Western Europe, is 
the second important aspect. The third aspect is energy relations between Russia and 
Kaliningrad. 
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Russia's attempts to make Lithuania's accession to the European Union subject to the 
solution of the transit issue showed Moscow's inclination to exercise its geo-economic 
pressure on the smaller neighbour. This became especially obvious in mid-1990s, when 
Moscow refused to ratify the trade agreement or implement the most-favoured nation 
regime in trade with Lithuania unless she solved the issue of the military transit (see 
Appendix H). In purely economic terms, Moscow viewed Lithuania's membership of 
the EU positively- common border with the Union would allow Russia to maintain 
intensive economic relations and to use the opening transit corridor. In a geo-economic 
sense, Lithuania was a matter of concern for Russia with respect to the Kaliningrad 
problem. Russia was worried that Lithuania, being a EU member, may disassociate 
herself from Russian energy system, leaving Kaliningrad in the situation of energy 
blockade. Even more important was safeguard of the transit (both civil and military) to 
the Kaliningrad oblast. 
Russia finds it worthwhile to increase her economic leverage when pursuing her 
political objectives in new NATO and EU member states. Therefore Russia considers 
the consolidation of capital in Lithuania beneficial in both economic and political sense. 
Under present conditions, almost 100 percent of Lithuanian oil and natural gas is 
imported from Russia, and Lithuania is totally dependent on Russia's nuclear fuel 
industries for reactor fuel rods. With this degree of dependence on Russia's supplies, it 
is no surprise that Russian companies are able to play a decisive role in Lithuania's 
economy. This is evidenced by the ongoing privatisation of strategic objects in the 
Lithuanian energy sectors. Russia considers it necessary to economically penetrate the 
Baltic States, to establish joint ventures or take part in the privatisation of strategic 
objects, as it will help ensure her access to EU markets. Moreover, it would serve as 
partial counterweight against the operation of Western capital in this area. 
The energy independence of a country is defined as independence on import of energy 
resources, or at least the possibility to choose from several suppliers. The issue of 
energy dependence should be viewed as an issue of national security, especially for the 
Baltic States, where energy resources can be imported mainly from Russia. Like many 
other post-Soviet countries, Lithuania inherited an energy infrastructure which 
determines the absolute dependence upon the imports of natural gas, oil, nuclear fuel 
and other energy resources from Russia. Russia's status as the key supplier of energy 
resources enables her to effectively use economic pressure upon Lithuania, often for 
political purposes. 
Buzan claims that the worst-case scenario for the economic security of a country is not 
when that country is dependent on the supplies of resources but when supplying 
countries attempt to use the resulting vulnerability for gaining favourable political 
concessions. 61 The dependence of the Baltics upon imports of energy resources from 
Russia poses a real threat not only to the physical base (economy), but also to the 
political independence of these countries. The threat is reasoned by Russia's attempts to 
manipulate with energy dependence for political purposes in the past. In other words, 
the threat for national security of the Baltics resulting from the energy dependence is a 
'historical concern'. According to Buzan, 'historical concern' is one of the criteria that 
determine the intensity of the threat. 62 
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The first manifestations of Russia's economic pressure were already seen in Lithuania 
in 1992-1993, when the Ycltsin government was using an energy cut-off in an attempt 
to influence policy change in the Baltic States. It is no coincidence that the cut-off 
immediately followed the demands of the Baltic States concerning the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from their territories. Later on, during 1998-1999, Transneft nine times 
cut off oil shipments to Lithuania. This was Moscow's response to Lukoil's lost position 
in the privatisation of the Lithuanian oil complex (see below in this chapter). 
All of the above, Russia's economic interests in Lithuania go hand in hand with geo- 
economic pressure upon her. The privatisation of the Lithuanian energy sectors proves 
this. This became particularly the case in Putin's Russia, where the dramatic increase of 
former intelligence officers occupying high level positions in the government and 
energy firms has led to the situation when energy companies are more instruments of 
politics than of profit-making. This section analyses interests and behaviour of Russia as 
the supplying country in order to assess the implications of energy dependence for 
Lithuania's national security. In detail, Russia's influence on each of the three 
Lithuanian energy sectors - natural gas, oil and electricity - and the likelihood of its 
expansion or diminution is discussed. 
7.4.1. The gas sector 
Lithuania uses 2.7 billion cubic meters of natural gas annuall Y. 63 Natural gas reaches 
Lithuania from Russia (Gazprom is the prime supplier) through the territory of Belarus 
by a single gas pipeline Minsk-Vilnius. The gas supply infrastructure inherited by 
Lithuania from the Soviet era provides no possibility to import natural gas from sources 
other than Russia. When analysing the realisation of Russian interests in the Lithuanian 
gas sector, it is important to bear in mind that Gazprom, a company holding world's 
largest reserves of natural gas and the biggest pipeline system, is also the most 
consistent executor of Russian foreign policy. 64 Amsterdam warned that Gazprom's 
interests could turn into a threat to democracy within the countries where the company 
establishes itself. He called for uncovering the political impact of Gazprom in Central 
and Eastern European countries. 65 
In general, the natural gas sector is of key importance to the energy system of Lithuania: 
gas supplies and prices are critical for continuous operation of certain industries, heating 
and electricity (majority of power plants, except for Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant 
(NPP), prefer using more environment-friendly gas to fuel oil). Should the price for 
natural gas increase, this may destabilise the social situation, cause inflation and 
undermine the international competitiveness of the country. Thus Russia, being in 
control over Lithuania's natural gas sector, has an exceptionally powerful tool to 
influence the political life of the country, including decision making processes and the 
distribution of governing political powers. Furthermore, once Ignalina NPP is 
decommissioned according to the EU Negotiation Chapter (the first reactor was closed 
in 2004, the second is planned to be decommissioned in 2009), natural gas will be the 
main fuel used for the production of electricity. 
In her National Energy Strategy, Lithuania is committed to diversify the sources of 
natural gas supply. However, there are several objective reasons, which impede 
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Lithuania's achievement of independence in the natural gas sector. First, there is a big 
difference between the price of gas paid to Gazprom by Lithuania and the market 
price. 66 Second, although there are international projects aimed at exploration of 
possibilities to provide Poland, Lithuania and some other countries of Eastern Europe 
with natural gas, extracted by Norway or Denmark in the North Sea, these reserves are 
67 likely to suffice only for some 25 years. Theoretically, Lithuania could import natural 
gas from the Western countries, provided the implementation of this project is agreed in 
advance by Norway, Denmark, Poland and other Eastern European countries which 
could undertake to consume a certain amount of Norwegian gas. 68 
Gazprom is eagerly striving to control the Lithuanian market for natural gas, thus 
gaining additional chances to keep Lithuania dependent on Russian gas supplies. 
Equally as in other countries, in Lithuania Gazprom resorts to two instruments of 
ensuring its influence: first, participation in the privatisation of gas companies, which 
administer the pipeline infrastructure and sell natural gas to the end users in dependent 
countries; second, the establishment of alleged 'independent' gas distributors in 
dependent markets. These 'independent' intermediary companies have been used to 
(reward' local politicians and act as instruments of Russia's intelligence services. 
Natural gas in Lithuania was bought directly from Gazprom and sold to consumers only 
by the country's monopoly, natural gas company AB Lietuvos Dujos. From 2002, the 
Lithuanian market has been dominated bý Dujotekana, a Lithuanian-registered natural 
gas company, Gazprom's intermediary. 6 Since then Lietuvos Dujos has made only 
some 22 percent of natural gas consumed in the county amually. 70 Gazprom serves 30 
percent of the Lithuanian gas market for Dujotekana. 71 
As a rule, Gazprom offers to selected intermediary companies not only the largest gas 
quotas but also prices which are lower than that offered to other operators. This enables 
Gazprom to have absolute control over the natural gas market in the dependent country. 
What is more, such a policy has a negative reflection on the financial indicators of an 
'unprivileged' company. This was the case with Lietuvos Dujos, when it was listed for 
privatisation, and Gazprom had the ability to impinge on the value of the company. 
Moreover, during the privatisation of Lietuvos Dujos the intentions of the Lithuanian 
government to find a fair balance between Eastern and Western interests failed to 
materialize. 72 Lithuania had to give the green light to the sale to Gazprom of 34 percent 
of state-owned shares of Lietuvos DUjOS. 73 In total, Gazprom currently has between 30 
to 51 percent of formerly state-owned energy companies in Lithuania. 74 
It is likely that, in Russia's estimation, the established role of Gazprom in Lietuvos 
Dujos will allow it to block development projects in the gas sector that Lithuania may 
have in future, e. g. connection of the national gas supply network with the European 
one, which Russia regards as unacceptable for her. In this respect, Lithuania's chances 
to free her national gas sector from the dependence on the sole supplier are nothing but 
doubtful. 
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7.4.2. The oil sector 
During the period of 1960-1980 an integrated oil refinery complex was built in 
Lithuania. It consisted of the oil refinery AB Maieikitj Nafta, the Birz'ai Oil Pumping 
Facility and the Novepolotsk (Belarus)-Biriai Oil Main. The oil refinery was designed 
to process oil extracted in Russia and to supply with oil products the entire North 
Western region of the USSR. Presently Maieikiij Nafta is the only oil processing 
enterprise in the region, satisfying all needs of the entire oil market of the Baltic States 
and annually increasing its production for the Polish market. This complex is the 
country's top tax payer, accounting for at least 10% of Lithuania's GDP and earning 
high profits in the regional markets. 
Upon regaining independence Lithuania started to build the B5ting6 oil import-export 
terminal in the Baltic Sea, which was opened in 1999. The terminal enabled Lithuania 
to import and process oil from sources other than Russia. In fact, this proved not to be a 
viable option, because the transportation of oil to the Biitingd terminal by oil tankers 
would be a lot more expensive than carrying oil from Russia by pipelines, thus making 
Ma2eikiai oil refinery products not competitive in the market. Moreover, the capacity of 
refinery is 15 million tons per year, while the B5ting& terminal can import only 6 
million tons annually. 75 
Hence, although the existing infrastructure allows Lithuania to get crude oil from other 
regions of the world, in reality the country's oil sector still depends upon oil supplies by 
pipelines from Russia. It should be noted that Lithuania has some resources of her own: 
the geologically projected and actually extracted oil resources amount to 278 million 
and 87 million tons respectively but the economic conditions and the existing 
infrastructure are not sustainable for processing Lithuanian oil in Maleikiai oil 
refinery. 76 
Like the natural gas sector, in the oil market Lithuania has some trump cards to play in 
order to keep Russia from imposing drastic measures, such as suspension of supplies. In 
the natural gas sector the strong point has been transit of natural gas via Lithuania to the 
Kaliningrad oblast. However, Lithuania's will be deprived of her role as a natural gas 
transit country to Kaliningrad after opening the NEGP; this project envisages building a 
separate branch-line to the oblast. In the oil sector, Russia used to have a particular 
interest in B5ting& oil export terminal, since oil extraction by Russian companies was 
increasing more rapidly than consumption, leaving them with a shortage of oil export 
capacity. 17 Meanwhile, Putin's administration is committed to reduce Russia's 
dependence upon oil terminals in the Baltic ports; oil terminal in Primorsk, opened in 
2001 as a part of Baltic Pipeline System, was designed precisely for this purpose. 
According to Maleikiti Nafta, in 2002 the company incurred losses of about 5 million 
USD due to the competition with Primorsk . 
78 Despite the fact that Primorsk's capacity is 
insufficient for fully handling Russia! s oil volumes available for export, Moscow is 
under-utilizing B5tingd and Ventspils, which show but its politically motivated 
decisions with regard to Lithuania and Latvia. 
From 1998 to 2000, Lithuania exemplified the linkage of Russian energy and politics. 
For a long time Lithuania has been in the interest zone of the Russian largest oil 
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company Lukoil, which was very active in the process of privatisation of Maieikizi 
Nafita and which has the lar fý est network of service petrol stations in Lithuania, with 
more than 100 retail outlets. 9 Over time, the bargaining for ownership of Lithuania's 
energy assets involved Lukoil, Y7VK and Jukos, Russia's largest oil companies, with 
Moscow clearly favouring Lukoil. Before 1997, Lukoil had managed to secure effective 
control over all the facilities of Maleikiai oil refinery without making significant 
investment in the plant's modernisation. At that time, the Lithuanian government 
(Conservatives and Christian Democrats) supported the deal with Williams 
International, believing that a large investment by a U. S. oil company would enhance 
national security and help Lithuania gain accession to NATO. Williams recognised from 
the start that it could not operate in Lithuania without a long-term agreement with one 
of the Russian companies on crude oil supply. This would be impossible without 
granting a Russian company a share of the equity ownership. 80 
When it became apparent in 1999 that Lukoil might not gain legal ownership and 
management control of the facilities of Maleikiai oil refinery, Moscow, with the 
support of Lukoil, initiated an anti-Williams information campaign in Lithuania. 81 
Lukoil also prevented a Kazakh oil company from fulfilling a 1999 contract to supply 
maieikiq Nafta with crude oil. The threat to the Kazakhs was to have all of their 
westward shipments through the Transneft system stopped if the contract with Lithuania 
went forward. Furthermore, during an extremely tense period of negotiations between 
Williams International, Lukoil and the Lithuanian government, Lukoil on nine different 
occasions was able to persuade Transneft (and the Russian Ministry of Industry and 
Energy) to cut off oil shipments to Lithuania through the large pipeline that runs 
through Belarus to Biiting6 terminal. Although Transneft and Lukoil justified each cut- 
off by citing technical or supply problems, in fact, each interruption was an attempt to 
force Lithuania to cede control of her oil refinery complex. Lukoil's supporters in 
Lithuania pointed to the stoppage as a proof that Williams was not an effective partner 
for LUkoll. 82 Despite this, Lithuanian negotiations did not follow the script that Lukoil 
had written. In 1999, another Russian oil company, Yukos, was able to secure the 
Kremlin's (and Lithuanian) approval to conclude a deal with Williams. 
Thus, in 1999-2002, in her oil sector Lithuania had a joint venture with the U. S. 
company Williams International, rejecting a bid from Lukoil. Unfortunately, for 
political reasons Williams was unable to reach a long-term agreement with the Russian 
crude oil suppliers and suffered losses in other markets. Instead of profit, the Lithuanian 
company ran up USD 187 million in losses. Eventually Williams withdrew from 
Lithuania in autumn 2002 due to the economic hardship of its mother company. 83 
In September 2002, Yukos purchased from Williams International its interest in 
Maleikiq Nafta, thus becoming a holder of the controlling interest of the company. 
Compared to other Russian companies, Yukos was less politicised and became an owner 
in unusually transparent negotiations with the Lithuanian government and Williams. 
Yukos had striven to strengthen its position in those businesses that enabled it to control 
the entire chain of production, from manufacturing a product until its sales to the end 
user, i. e. the Klaip6da oil export terminal and the retail fuel market. By and large, the 
Lithuanian government has been quite satisfied with Yukos' management of Maleikiai 
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oil complex. Yukos completed a major upgrade of the equipment in 2004, raising 
product quality to EU standards. 
After the destruction of Yukos, the Russian government tried to seize control of 
Maz'eikiai oil complex from the Lithuanian state. 84 Under the cover of debt collection 
Moscow sought to pre-empt its acquisition by international oil companies that showed 
their interest in Maleikiai. It also sought to devalue stock of AB MaieWil Nafta and 
then authorize a favoured Russian company to acquire Yukos' stake on the cheap. 85 
Suffice it to mention that Lukoil and Gazprom were among those companies who 
announced their interest in taking over Yukos' stake in Maleikiai. 
Being a EU member and having the only oil processing enterprise in the region and the 
oil export-import terminal, Lithuania is important for both Russian energy 
conglomerates, seeking to occupy Central European market, and for Central Europe, 
willing to resist Russian pressure. Not incidentally, acquisition of shares of Maieikiij 
Nafta became so attractive not only for the Kremlin-controlled Russian energy giants 
but equally for Kazakhs and their American partners, and for Poles, the main initiators 
of oil concerns in Central Europe. 86 
The Lithuanian government's annual 2004 report on national security issues and a 
follow up report to the parliament in spring 2005 affirmed that a takeover of Maleikiai 
by the Kremlin-friendly companies would jeopardize Lithuanian national security, and 
that the destruction of Yukos increased that probability. It was also clear that under 
almost any scenario, a non-Russian company would partner with a Russian oil 
supplier. 87 That said, the Lithuanian government tried to do its best to make AB 
Maieikiq Nafta a member of trans-national corporation. Such corporation, having 
access to Caspian oil is expected to diminish pressure from Russian oil suppliers. 88 
While an ability to guarantee crude oil supplies is a self-evident requirement, the 
following additional criteria have to be met by any possible purchaser of Maleikiai 
stock: independence from the influence of Russian authorities; a commitment to refrain 
from interfering with Lithuania's political processes; adherence to Western standards of 
corporate governance and management; public accountability and full transparency of 
business practices; and, most important, any Russian purchaser should have a real, not 
fictitious Western partner, with the power to block politically motivated decisions 
detrimental to Lithuania. In June 2006, it was clear that Poland's PNK Orlen became a 
buyer of a majority interest in Maieikitj Nafta. 
7.4.3. The electricity sector 
Lithuania's electricity grids are connected with those of Kaliningrad, Belarus and 
Latvia, and are part of the parallel-operating unified energy system of Russia. The 
dominant position is occupied by Ignalina NPP. Since 1992, it has been producing over 
80 percent of Lithuania's electricity needs, with the rest exported to Latvia and Belarus. 
Such status of the NPP was determined mostly by production costs, which are 
considerably lower than those of other power plants of Lithuania. 89 
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Two nuclear power reactors of Ignalina NPP have given the country a measure of 
independence. It is an irony that EU membership is likely to make Lithuania more, 
rather than less, dependent on Russian energy imports. Under strong pressure from the 
EU, Lithuania agreed, at least for now, to close both of its relatively modem, but Soviet- 
designed, nuclear power (RBMK-type) reactors. Upon decommissioning of Ignalina 
NPP the largest electricity generation load will be put on the thermal power plants, 
which use natural gas or fuel oil (which does not comply with EU environmental 
standards) for production of electricity. 
Russia has strong interests in the privatisation of some profitable companies of the 
Lithuanian electricity sector. The Russian corporation Inter RAOJES Rossii, Yukos and 
other Russian capital companies were among the candidates to acquire the transmission 
networks Ryttj Skirstomie/i Tinklai and Fakarq Skirstomieji Tinklai, Lietuvos Elektrind 
and Kruonis Pumping Storage Plant. 90 The Lithuanian market has become an 
exceptional focus of Inter RAOJES run by Chubais. Since 2000, the daughter company 
of Inter RAOJES has controlled exports of the Lithuanian electric power to Belarus and 
the Kaliningrad oblast-91 Thus, the business niches in the electricity market, where 
Lithuania used to have certain advantages against Russia (Kaliningrad has no other 
option of electricity supplies, but imports from Lithuania), were handed over to the 
Russian company. 
Back in 1997, Lithuania and Poland were discussing a so-called 'power bridge, a plan 
to integrate the energy system of the Baltic States with that of Western Europe via 
Poland. This project could have enabled Lithuania to reduce her energy dependence on 
Russia in general, and dependence on exports into the Russian markets in particular. 
Moreover, it would give Lithuania the possibility to import excess electricity from 
Poland or Western Europe, if it becomes necessary after the closure of Ignalina NPP. 
However, the construction of 'power bridge' was delayed due to the lack of interest 
from Polish side. But even if this project was implemented, Lithuania could not get rid 
of the Russian influence in her electricity market for the obvious reasons: natural gas 
can be imported only from Russia; Russian companies dominate in the market of 
electricity production; the price of electricity generated in the East is by far lower than 
that in Lithuania. 92 All of the above means that the dependence of the Lithuanian 
electricity sector upon Russia after decommissioning of Ignalina NPP is most likely to 
increase. In order to avoid future dependence on Russian electricity supplies Lithuania 
has to consider the development a new nuclear facility. 93 
7.4.4. Implicationsfor national security 
Energy dependence in itself does not pose a serious threat to a country's political and 
security system. The United States, Western Europe, and, to an increasing extent, China 
are highly dependent on the import of oil and gas. The problem is that Russia 
manipulates her energy card seeking to pursue political goals. The Russian government 
and its controlled energy companies share the same interest in post-communist 
countries; therefore political authorities manifest active support in the consolidation of 
the presence of such companies in the strategic sectors of depending countries. 
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There are the two aspects of the energy dependence upon Russia. The first is related to 
the dependence on imports of raw materials, which has a structural character. In the 
natural gas, oil and electricity sectors this type of dependence was determined either by 
the system of pipelines inherited from the Soviet era or the technologies employed for 
the construction of Soviet energy objects (e. g. RBMK-type reactors). The structural 
dependence threatens national security by increasing the vulnerability of the national 
economy and social stability, especially if there is a conscious manipulation of such 
dependence (raw materials or their prices) for political purposes. 
The second type of dependence threatens national security by giving Russian 
companies, which dominate in a number of different energy sectors, a competitive 
advantage against other companies. They could use this advantage to influence the fate 
of energy projects aimed at unden-nining Lithuanian independence in the energy sector. 
in other words, Russia may, directly or indirectly, impede the implementation of 
projects that may put Russia at a disadvantage, e. g. construction of 'power-bridge' 
between Lithuania and Poland, merging the gas supply system with that of the EU, and 
so on. 
The chances of reducing Lithuania's dependence on Russian energy resources are small, 
thus turning it into a real threat not only to economic security but also to political 
independence of the state. The threat for national security resulting from energy 
dependence is a 'historical concern', since in the past Russia was inclined to manipulate 
such dependence for political purposes. Awareness of the ever increasing importance of 
economic levers in Russian foreign policy, as well as the fusion of the regime and 
energy companies for national security purposes, translates this threat into a realistic 
menace. 
7.5. Conclusions 
Lithuania's opportunities to pursue her national interests depend, to a considerable 
extent, on Russia's geopolitical orientation. In view of historical experience and the 
current situation in Russia, it is reasonable to expect that Russia's geo-economic 
interests and actions may cause a significant threat to Lithuania's national goals and 
even restrict her foreign policy. A factor of Russia-EU and Russia-NATO partnerships 
should not also be underestimated in Lithuanian-Russian relations. In the recent years 
these partnerships are undergoing continuous change. Russia has acquired a certain 
formal influence in NATO's decision making and is finther strengthening her economic 
ties with the EU largely because of the latter's dependence on Russian gas and oil. 
Due to the oblast's proximity to Lithuania, Kaliningrad-related issues often dominate 
Lithuanian-Russian relations. Moscow's view of Kaliningrad reveals a collision 
between its geopolitical interests in the Eastern Baltics and social-economic 
development of the region. This dual strategy of Russia ('home state') towards the 
oblast (the exclave) made the role of Lithuania ('host state) in developing cooperation 
with Kaliningrad more complicated. Suffice it to say that Russia effectively used the 
oblast as a factor for discouraging NATO from extending eastwards and turning the 
Baltic States into a 'special case'. 
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Lithuania has nevertheless managed to develop a stable relationship with the oblast, 
considerably reshaping the image of Kaliningrad to be seen as an opportunity for the 
development of overall cooperation with Russia. This could be viewed as a political 
achievement as it provides a good opportunity for Lithuania to pursue cooperative 
relations with Russia, as evidenced by a few common and successful projects in the 
Kaliningrad oblast. In a broader sense, such Lithuanian policy is aimed at promoting 
Russia's integration with Europe and simultaneously strengthening regional stability 
and security. This contributes to shifting the Kaliningrad problem from 'high' to 'low' 
politics, which, in essence, is much more important to the oblast and its residents. 
The Kaliningrad oblast did not become a factor blocking the enlargement of Euro- 
Atlantic institutions, nor did it cause any military conflict, as it was often forecast. It 
also has not turned into a 'black hole' within the context of soft security or the centre of 
social-economic instability in the Baltic region. The oblast is moving forward. On the 
other hand, the optimistic scenario with non-traditional solutions such as a free trade 
area and a broad local autonomy has not been realised. Discussions are still going on 
whether the overlapping of Western and Eastern structures in this part of the Baltic Sea 
region has neutralised the potential threat. This shows that the Kaliningrad issue 
remains especially sensitive. 
Russia has some specific Kaliningrad-related goals in Lithuania. Making a convenience 
of the precedent of a facilitated transit order, Russia seeks a simplified regime for the 
movement of persons to the EU, and in the future -a visa-free regime with the EU. 
Beside this, Moscow is interested to eventually legalise, by international agreement, 
military transit and traffic of dangerous materials (rocket fuel) through Lithuanian 
territory. In Lithuania's view, the issue of the Russian military transit to/from the 
Kaliningrad oblast via Lithuania, has only political aspects. The entire experience since 
1995 has proved that the problem of military transit is solved with the help of the 
currently functioning mechanism. 
Generally speaking, Lithuania's policy towards Russia may be described as very clear, 
transparent, resolute and consistent. This particularly manifests itself in Lithuania's 
cooperation with the Kaliningrad oblast. Due to geo-political, political, economic and 
cultural reasons Lithuania is very interested in the oblast's development. One of her 
major tasks is to integrate the Kaliningrad oblast in CEE sub-region. Here Lithuania 
should act together with Poland and initiate, support and promote such EU projects 
which create conditions for the oblast's close integration into the EU. 
Russia's geo-economic interests in the Baltics are being pursued through Moscow's 
'energy diplomacy'. Russia is interested in maintaining Lithuania's dependence on 
Russian energy resources; this gives her some leverage on the neighbour's domestic 
political life. Russia's economic pressure on Lithuania impedes the consolidation of 
economic independence or economic 'de-occupation' of the state. Consequently, the 
increase of such pressure worsens bilateral relations between the countries; this was 
particularly evidenced during the first privatisation of AB Maleikizi Nafta. That said, 
membership of NATO (and the EU) does provide security for Lithuania against military 
threats but it cannot guarantee full 'de-occupation' of the state. 
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Energy dependence-related threats to national security cannot be mitigated even by hard 
or soft security guarantees that are available now for Lithuania. All the more important 
is that the Baltic energy issue is not a major agenda item of the European Union, unless 
the security of supply to the states finther West (Germany, France or Britain) are in 
doubt. The EU's focus has been on increasing energy supplies from Russia instead of on 
the conduct of Russian companies in the region; some EU countries, primarily 
Germany, France and Italy, view Russia as the indispensable partner necessary for 
increased energy supplies. Apparently, the European Commission fails to understand to 
which extent Russian energy companies are already influencing government policies in 
many of the new member states and of the long-ten-n damage this can do to the EU 
itself. 
The basic factor in limiting an energy supplier's influence is a recipient's country ability 
to diversify sources of energy imports. This requires an open and transparent business 
climate, sufficient financial resources to pay for higher priced imports in times of crisis, 
and an access to international transit routes. In theory, Lithuania may completely refuse 
oil and gas imports from Russia. There are two alternative oil transit routes: the first is 
through Bdting6 terminal from the Caspian Sea, Latin America or Persian Gulf 
countries, the second - from Central Asia by railway. There is no alternative route for 
gas supply, except building a gas pipeline from Norway. In practice, however, these 
projects are but utopia: being very high-priced they would be an unbearable burden for 
Lithuanian consumers and business. Thus, Lithuania has neither the financial ability nor 
the geographic benefit of having more than one reasonably priced energy supplier close 
at hand. 
In reality, Lithuania's complete economic independence of Russia is almost impossible 
due to the latter's geographic proximity and economic potential. Lithuania's interest 
therefore should be focussed on the privatisation of strategic objects. By attracting not 
only Russian, but also West European and U. S. capital would be a major step in this 
direction. This would prevent total economic dependence on Russia and, 
simultaneously, assure her participation in the process: without Russian raw materials, 
Western investors alone cannot guarantee the profitable activity of Lithuanian 
companies. In 2002, the Baltic Council of Ministers established a coordination unit on 
energy to devise regional solutions to domestic energy shortages. Its goal is to introduce 
greater energy efficiency in the wider Baltic region. Among the projects are the Baltic 
ring electricity grid and an electrical 'power bridge' linking Lithuania and Poland. 
All in all, diversity of suppliers is a key issue here. The Lithuanian government did its 
best to make AB Maieikitj Nafta a member of trans-national corporation. A substantial 
life extension of the second nuclear reactor of Ignalina NPP or the construction of a 
new nuclear power plant in Lithuania would provide a greater degree of independence 
in electricity consumption. Lithuania now believes that that the EU has an obligation to 
help finance (or find financing), for a 1,000-megawatt transmission line in exchange for 
the closing of Ignalina NPP nuclear reactors. Considering the possibility of investment 
in clean coal technology might also be an answer to the Baltic energy question. 
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The two themes of this case study - Lithuania's relations with Kaliningrad and Russia's 
economic pressure - demonstrate that in the area of 'low politics' Russia keeps treating 
Lithuania as an area of her influence. Such a Russian attitude is very much in line with 
her perception of the CIS countries. This but confirms the conclusion that Lithuania's 
membership of the Euro-Atlantic institutions does provide her with a shelter against 
threats in hard security area ('high politics') but cannot completely protect her against 
the threats and challengers in 'low politics'. As in many CEE countries, economic 'de- 
occupation' proves to be the hardest goal to achieve. 
The essential goal for Lithuania is to have Russia as a reliable and predictable partner. 
Unless the big neighbour shares such qualities, Lithuania seeks to neutralise Russia- 
related threats and challenges and to formulate her policy accordingly. Therefore 
Lithuania in her interaction with Russia follows the policy of 'cautious neighbourhood': 
not to dissociate herself from Russia, make use of all the advantages of cooperation, 
and, simultaneously, to constantly assess Russia-related threats and risks and undertake 
measures to neutralise them. Lithuania's approach towards Russia is shaped in three 
directions. Firstly, monitoring of Russian intentions and activities, identification of 
possible threats and challenges, their prognosis and neutralisation is a key priority of 
Lithuania's domestic and foreign policies. Secondly, it is vital for Lithuania, together 
with the CEE states and with the EU at large, to make every effort in the diversification 
of energy sources. Least but not last, one of the major tasks for Lithuanian foreign 
policy is to create conditions for integration of the Kaliningrad oblast into the EU. 
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CHAPTER 8 
COOPERATION FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND ENGAGING 
RUSSIA TO THIS END 
8.1. The Baltic Sea region: introduction 
The Baltic Sea region (BSR) involves countries from four geographic and historic parts 
of Europe - Northern, Central, Western and Eastern; embracing Genriany from the 
Western Europe, three Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), the Baltic 
States, Poland from the Central Europe, and the Russian Federation covering a huge 
part of Eastern Europe (see map 6). In terms of security orientation, the BSR reflects a 
diversity: there are members of NATO and EU, there are also neutral states with a long 
history of military non-alignment, and there is Russia, having a special relationship with 
both organizations. 
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Map 6. The Baltic Sea region' 
Historically it is in the north where Russia and Europe have met most directly. Many 
wars were fought here, and competition over the control of the Baltic Sea was fierce, 
but there was also much trade and friendly exchange. It is in the BSR, where the major 
European powers have periodically tried to exert strategic and ideological influence and 
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where fundamental rights of minor nations were ignored. During the Cold War this 
region (and the whole of Northern Europe) was a buffer zone with a delicate balance of 
power, the so-called Nordic Balance. 2 But this is not to say that the region was free of 
conventional or nuclear threats. Substantial Soviet forces, including strategic units 
equipped with nuclear missiles, were deployed in all the three Baltic republics and 
Kaliningrad, and the Kola peninsula was another major area for Soviet military bases. 
For NATO, to deny the Soviet Union's access to the Atlantic, securing airspace and sea 
communication lines above and around the Northern Europe was of primary strategic 
importance. The end of the Cold War brought significant changes to this configuration. 
The delicate balance of power was broken. Finland and Sweden became EU members in 
1995. The Baltic States, shortly after regaining their independence in 1991, chose 
integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures as their strategic goal, which came to 
fi7uition in 2004. Meanwhile Russia has lost her standing as a world superpower and 
turned into a regional state with limited political, economic and even military (except 
nuclear force) leverages to affect international politics. 
For some years the BSR has conveyed a dual image. High-pitch 'securitization' has 
existed alongside rapid regionalization. 3 While it has been a potential trouble spot, due 
to the tangle between Russia and the Baltic States, it has also become one of the most 
regionalized parts of Europe. Some analysts refer to the BSR as the vanguard of a future 
developing Europe characterized by dense levels of institutionalisation. The network of 
national, sub-national and international, governmental and non-governmental, private 
and public organizations, agencies and institutions is so dense that national borders are 
almost completely disregarded. Peace culture, peaceful settlement of disputes and arms 
control are characteristic features shared by the Nordic and the Baltic States. Tradition 
of neutrality has strong roots in some of these countries. 
What is special about security of the BSR? From a traditional military point of view, the 
region is as predictable as a region can be in this turbulent era. There are no major 
military threats in the BSR. Nor has this region seen a single violent spark involving 
any kind of use or threat to use force from any country for at least the past decade. 
Today, the BSR is one of the most dynamically developing, outward looking and 
promising regions in Europe. The region that during the Cold War was almost devoid of 
region building, networking and trans-border cooperation, has transformed rapidly into 
a 'laboratory of innovative ways dealing with the divisive nature of borders and 
exclusionary politics'. 4 Good neighbourly relations and viable initiatives towards 
regionalization remain the key to regional security after the dual enlargement. The fact 
that the eastern borders of the Baltic States became the eastern borders of NATO and 
the EU should only add a new quality of credibility and reassurance to Russia, the 
biggest state in the region. A significant factor here is the increasing involvement of 
Russia in partnership relations with these organisations. However, in a rapidly changing 
world, no one can be assured that new unforeseen threats (e. g. terrorism, WMD, 
infectious diseases) may not emerge. In this sense, the BSR is no less and no more 
secure than any other region. 
Russia's rapprochement with the West, resulting in warming Russo-Baltic relations and 
the admission of the Baltic States to NATO, is a tremendous geopolitical change that 
has occurred in the entire BSR. The region, which used to be a highly 'securitized' area 
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since the Second World War, is shifting towards 'de-securitization'. What is more, the 
formation of the security regime in the BSR is starting to acquire a new level. It is 
becoming a 'NATO-centric regime' because even countries not belonging to NATO 
established solid relations with this organisation. 
5 NATO membership concerns the 
larger region: most probably, the Baltic accession to NATO will lead to the integration 
of Sweden and Finland as well sooner or later. Thus, it can be said that the security 
regime in the BSR is becoming a framework supported by two main pillars and 
embracing all the actors in the region - NATO members (Germany, Poland, Denmark, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and NATO partners (Sweden, Finland and Russia). The 
crucial factor for this framework to sustain will be the ftuther development of Russo- 
Baltic relations. It seems that all preconditions exist for ensuring regional stability and 
security without ignoring or leaving anybody overboard. 
There are numerous articles and studies which have been produced on the subject of 
security in the BSR (or the broader area - Northern Europe) and implications of the 
dual enlargement. This chapter does not pretend to deal with the full range of issues 
related to the security dimension of the BSR as a result of the ongoing political and 
regional integration. It is merely aimed at raising some ideas about the evolution of the 
BSR, its security agenda, Russia's place and role in this region, and the possibilities of 
more active engagement of Russia in regional cooperation. 
The chapter argues that in the aftermath of the dual enlargement, security is starting to 
assume a different posture and meaning on the regional agenda. With Russia's 
considerably softened attitude towards NATO enlargement and herself being actively 
involved in cooperation with the Alliance, there are no reasonable grounds for regarding 
the Baltic Sea area as a potential trouble spot. Likewise, the Baltic States increasingly 
focus on bolstering their positions in the current and future Europe rather than just 
remaining prisoners of the past. Do these trends imply that the security argument has 
lost something of its inherent value and that relationship between security and regional 
cooperation may drift apart? 6 In short, the questions of this chapter are: what is the 
relationship between security and region building? In which direction is the region 
moving and how is Russia accommodating herself in the BSR? The chapter also looks 
at the environment of multilateral security and cooperation - institutional framework of 
the BSR, assessing its impact on regional cooperation. Finally, when focusing on 
cooperation for regional security the chapter deliberates about the constraints and new 
opportunities of engaging Russia more actively. 
8.2. Link between security and regional cooperation 
The author subscribes to the arguments of Christopher Browning and Pertti Joenniemi 7 
that 'security' is a central and necessary component in providing states with motivation 
to cooperate with each other. In fact, it would be hardly possible for regional actors to 
think beyond security as an anchor for region building. Reference to 'security', in 
whatever form, has become a foundation for various region-building projects in 
Northern Europe. This idea, this section will show, has also been prevalent in 
understanding regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea area. Security concerns in the BSR 
have not had a divisive impact on cooperation. On the contrary, the focus on security 
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has become a motivation and reasoning to soften the political landscape through various 
cooperative and region-specific measures. This section will show a conceptual link 
between security and cooperation in the BSR. 
By and large, regional cooperation in the BSR can be underlined and explained by two 
discourses of security- neo-realist and neo-liberalist ones. It will be suggested in this 
section that, despite the fact that cooperation premised on neo-realist and neo-liberalist 
notions of security does differ significantly, these two discourses are more 
complementary than competitive. A point that should not be underestimated is the 
considerable impact of dual enlargement on security and regional cooperation in the 
BSR. 
8.2.1. Neo-realist discourse 
In neo-realist discourse, the referent object of security is the state, while the threat is 
constituted by other states. Cooperation between states is generally understood in terms 
of alliance building and balancing against other states viewed as threatening one's 
territorial sovereignty and independence. 8 Regional cooperation, on this basis, is driven 
by processes of 'othering' and exclusion. 
In the BSR during the Cold War this exclusionary element of realist discourse was 
strong: room for cooperation across the East-West divide was limited. Realists' 
concerns of preserving state sovereignty also limited this cooperation. In the post-Cold 
War period, cooperation driven by neo-realist security discourses was also notable. For 
example, engaging in cooperation with Western neighbours was the central strategy of 
the Baltic States (also Poland and, in the early 1990s, of Finland) in escaping the 
Russian sphere of influence and securing Western security guarantees. For these states, 
EU and NATO integration and regional cooperation were also perceived as enhancing 
state security vis-&-vis Russia. 
In this respect, it is worth noting two things. First, the Baltic States were initially not 
very keen on engaging in regional cooperation, perceiving such activities as a way to 
divert them from pursuing EU and NATO membership, and thereby leaving them in 
grey security zone between East and West. Subsequently, however, engaging in regional 
cooperation became seen as a route to NATO and the EU, via which they could prove 
their readiness to join these organisations. This links to the second point'that much of 
this regional cooperation involved NATO and EU attitudes and norms that this should 
not be understood as excluding Russia. 
Not only the Baltic States' approach to the post-Cold War regional cooperation was 
based on neo-realist security understanding; Russia has remained trapped in such 
thinking much more. In contrast to the Baltics, which were eager to cooperate with 
Russia in various spheres, except security and defence 9, for Russia neo-realist 
perception has undermined her involvement in regional cooperation at all, rather than 
promoting it in a specific direction. This can be seen in how Western projects of 
cooperation, such as the Northern Dimension or the Northern European Initiatives, the 
goal of which was opening Northwest Russia, including the Kaliningrad oblast, to 
270 
Western investment, were, quite for some time, depicted as attempts of the West to 
promote Russia's disintegration! 0 
Furthermore, Russia also followed a neo-realist approach to security in her relations 
with the Baltic States, regularly warning until 9/11 that NATO enlargement to these 
countries would require a more defensive militarist strategy from Moscow, perhaps 
even involving re-nuclearisation of Kaliningrad. Hostility towards the Baltic States was, 
to a considerable extent, encouraged by the fear of possible isolation from Europe, 
which has always been one of the major driving forces behind Russian foreign policy. 
8.2.2. Neo-liberalist discourse 
During the post-Cold War period neo-liberalist discourse of security has substantially 
contributed to promoting and explaining regional cooperation in the BSR. The Nordic 
countries, Germany and the U. S. have led the way there. They aimed at exporting 
concepts such as 'democracy', 'market economy' and 'cooperative security' to the 
Baltic States and Russia. This was pursued by establishing the CBSS in 1992 and later, 
in 1997, launching the ND and NEI, each of them driven by a concern to avoid the 
division and conflicts of the past re-cmerging. 
In comparison with neo-realist approach, the security agenda of neo-liberalist discourse 
is wider, encompassing soft security issues, being combined with new threats (e. g. 
terrorism and environmental concerns), or linked up with concepts, such as 
'democracy', 'community' and 'society' (societal security). Importantly, the soft 
security agenda shifts concern away from states towards individuals and society at 
large, which become the referent object of security. This is due to the fact that soft 
security threats are not states but such things like pollution or illegal migration. 
Tberefore they are usually seen as transcending the ability of any one state to deal with 
them. Instead, they are of trans-national, regional and even global dimensions and 
require cooperation between different states and societies. 
That these social, economic, environmental and other issues are presented as 'security' 
maters has been important in building motivation for action. Thus, the 'securitization' 
of soft security issues has been important in 'providing rationale for breaking with 
ordinary territorial constraints' and promoting regional cooperation in the BSR. 11 
However, contrary to neo-realist discourses, regional cooperation in neo-liberalist view, 
albeit being driven by a security threat, is no longer premised on the 'othering' of 
Russia but including her. In short, in neo-liberalist discourse the 'security' argument 
unites all actors in the region. 
Simultaneously, however, a fundamental difference between neo-realist and neo- 
liberalist security-driven cooperation notwithstanding, they have actually been rather 
complementary in the BSR. As Browning and Joenniemi argue, for the neo-liberalist 
agenda to gain ground it has been necessary to convince key state actors that pursuing 
such a course would also positively affect the neo-realist agenda. 12 This leads to a 
conclusion that 'securitization' of the soft security agenda has been seen as a way to 
'desecuritize' the hard security agenda, which has become apparent in Russo-Baltic 
relations. 
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8.2.3. The impact of international institutions: paradigm shýft 
The main driving force behind 'de-securitization' of traditional threats was a densely 
institutional i sed security environment of the BSR (see figure 2). Various international 
organisations (NATO, EU, CBSS), initiatives (ND), cooperation frameworks (Nordic 
Ministers Council/Nordic Council 14), individual states (the Nordic countries, U. S., 
Germany) promoted regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea area. What is more, with the 
dual enlargement ensuring Baltic security once and for all, and with NATO-Russia 
relations becoming increasingly cooperative, the neo-realist security-based (hard 
security) concerns that have underlain the post-Cold War region-building are becoming 
irrelevant. The region's key hard security questions are no longer so territorially fixed or 
dominated by Russia's relations with the Baltic States. The war on terrorism following 
the events of 9/11 has also contributed to this. As a result, more global and de- 
territorialized concerns of counter-terrorism and the proliferation of WMD have become 
more important. 
This implies that in the BSR neo-liberalist security discourse has prevailed over the neo- 
realist one. In other words, it is reasonable to conclude that a paradigm shift is taking 
place in the BSR: the neo-realist agenda is being overtaken by the neo-liberalist one. As 
the development of the region shows, international institutions in this respect, 
specifically NATO and the EU, have been not only instrumental but also the agents of 
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Figure 2. Institutional environment in the Baltic Sea region 13 
change. Boyka Stefanova argues that regarding the role of international institutions the 
underlying assumption is a transactionalist one. It has a normative impact: transactions 
lead to the acceptance of common rules, norms and expectations. " Due to NATO and 
EU enlargement, institutionalisation has occurred, and this further influences relations 
between countries in the region and their behaviour. That said, both NATO and the EU, 
through their normative impact in the BSR, contributed to region building. 
Paradoxically enough, this proposition is compatible with a neo-realist view of 
international institutions. It underlines that the main criterion for evaluating whether or 
not institutions are relevant in the international system is 'their capacity to bring and 
maintain international peace' 16 . In this regard, institutions are not only instrumental, but 
also, due to transactions within the system, serve as the agents of change. Applying this 
approach to the BSR, the logic runs as follows: through interactions and cooperation, 
the product of which is cooperative security 17 , international institutions (NATO in 
particular) promote and maintain peace - conflict-free conditions for the region's 
development. This demonstrates that international institutions do matter not only in neo- 
liberalist but also in neo-realist discourse. The BSR is a proper example, where, due to 
institutionalisation, both discourses tend to assimilate and allow a paradigrn shift to 
occur. 
Both discourses show that there is nothing to replace security as the basis for region 
building. 'De-securitization' of hard threats has not resulted in abandoning of security 
as a discursive mode. It may, indeed, be argued that this 'de-securitization' was only 
possible because 'the place of the now redundant enemy - the West and/or NATO - has 
been taken over by a new one, usually referred to as terrorism. ' 8 Although this enemy 
was present in Russia before 9/11 (the second Chechen campaign), after these dramatic 
events it became shared with the West, and this finally created conditions suitable for 
refocusing security discourse. This shows that regional cooperation continues to be 
linked to the questions of security, albeit primarily in a 'soft' manner. Such a link 
between security and cooperation is apparent in the current agendas of NATO and the 
EU, as well as in the continued Euro-Atlantic integration. 
8.2.4. Feasibility ofa security community in the BSR 
Assuming that a paradigm shift is taking place in the BSR, the next logical step should 
be the formation of a security community: a security regime, in Karl Deutsch's 
formulation, where the relevant actors are so integrated that they share a sense of 
community, such that a mutual assurance exists that disputes will be settled without 
resorting to war. 19 Additionally, in the opinion of Ole Weaver, the establishment of a 
community of 'dependable expectations for peace' occurs by 'de-securitization'. 20 in 
such a community the security of an individual country is no longer a primary concern 
as the security question is transferred to the region as a whole. 
The reasoning of such thinking rests on the conceptual link between security and 
cooperation, which was shown in the previous part of this chapter. In theory, the 
outcome of regional cooperation is 'cooperative security', which should create 
conditions for a security community to evolve. Is it feasible in the BSR? To what extent 
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may the dual enlargement of NATO and the EU contribute to the positive outcome of 
this process? 
To answer these questions one should take a model of Western European security 
community and apply it to assess indispensable and adequate conditions for the 
formation of a security community in the BSR. First of all, the necessary characteristics 
of an evolving community of states are: sharing democratic norms, values and 
expectations for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and regional integration. 
Furthermore, Western European security community has become the basic referent 
object of security at the regional level to such an extent that the interests and 
perceptions of individual states no longer exclusively determine security strategies, 
expectations and behaviour. 21 Finally, a community approach to regional security 
implies a fundamentally different security environment, i. e. community building 
configuration, in which the security dilemma becomes obsolete. 22 
Both EU and NATO are the major factors in relation to the security community building 
process in the BSR. In EU policy this is manifested by the partnership agreement and 
special arrangements with Russia, and support for regional security in the BSR. 
Moreover, the EU enlargement created conditions for the consolidation of a security 
community. Such conditions appear as a result of the extension of security functions to 
the third pillar of European integration - Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Following 
the eastward enlargement, the area of an internal security within the EU extended and 
created conditions for an improved security situation in the region. 
As far as NATO's role is concerned, the work in progress towards a qualitative change 
in NATO-Russia relations continues to expand the Alliance into indispensable, broader 
political functions and away from its military-strategic objectives. It also permits NATO 
to pursue its 'open door' policy not as a trade-off against concessions to Russia but as a 
consistent approach to the consolidation of the European security community and 
precluding any further divisions in Europe. Hence, the NATO-Russia relationship was 
no longer determined exclusively by NATO's enlargement to the Baltic States. The 
changed rationale of NATO's expansion suggested that the Baltic accession does not 
compromise the framework of a European security community. Hence, both NATO and 
EU enlargements created a rationale for extending the existing framework of the 
Western European security community to the BSR- However, this process has 
encountered several constraints. 
Already in 1999-2000 the growing prospects of Baltic membership in NATO indicated 
a different assessment of the security situation in the region: less strategic importance 
became assigned to Kaliningrad. However, other major issues, including Russian transit 
rights through Lithuanian territory and the free movement of Kaliningrad citizens in 
view of the EU enlargement to the Baltics, have acquired a high prominence on the 
Russian foreign policy agenda. Apart from this, Russia continued to 'securitize' the 
issue of ethnic Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia. All this shows two things. The 
first is that, following NATO enlargement, the security dilemma has been solved in the 
BSR and a 'securitization' shift has taken place. This corresponds to a win-win outcome 
for both sides - the Baltics and Russia. Second, 'securitization' as such is still there; it 
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has merely shifted along the spectrum from hard to soft security matters, i. e. 're- 
securitization' has taken place. 
It is also worth pointing out that Russia and the Baltic States failed to adequately 
explore the potential for their economic cooperation as an opportunity to alleviate hard 
security concerns. The state of affairs is one of distancing the Baltics from Russia, 
based on the previous persistence of the latter's overall unpredictable policy despite the 
Baltic States' desire to be a model of good neighbourly relations. In contrast, Russia has 
tried to use the Baltic dependence on oil and gas imports as a source of intimidation. 
This but forced the Baltics to 'securitize' their energy dependency on Russia. 
Finally, it is apparent that there are three subsets of relations in the BSR: the Baltic- 
Russian bilateral relations, the NATO-Russia and EU-Russia partnership. This, of 
course, is nothing to do with the shared sense of community. But the underlying reason 
why the formation of a security community in the BSR has been problematic is a 
prevailing balance of power logic on the part of Russia. The Russian political elite so 
far is able to conceive regional cooperation only as a zero-sum game. This is not to say 
that the overall Russian attitude to region building has not changed: since the early 
1990s it has been mitigated by increased communication between Russia and other 
states in the region, and by institutionalisation of confidence building measures via 
various integration initiatives at a broad regional level. 
All of the above, efforts and initiatives implemented by regional organisations 
notwithstanding, the prospects for the establishment of a security community in the 
BSR are not very bright, at least in the near future. A solution of the security dilemma in 
the region, as the result of NATO enlargement, is a substantial achievement in terms of 
improving the overall security situation in the BSR but not a sufficient condition for a 
security regime similar to that in Western Europe to emerge. The underlying reason why 
this process failed to materialise is that 'de-securitization' proceeded not completely, 
but only to a limited extent; 'securitization' only shifted from hard to soft security 
concerns. This is due to the fact that balance of power logic is still prevailing in 
Russia's mindset and she cannot accommodate herself in the regional format. In other 
words, despite its positive effect on region building, the dual enlargement has not made 
possible the extension of the European security community to the Baltic Sea area. 
Consequently, limits of 'de-securitization' make constraints on an effective regional 
cooperation; this is discussed in the next part of this chapter. 
8.2.5. Limits of 'de-securitization. - constraintsfor regional cooperation 
A lot of effort was made on behalf of the United States and the European Union to shift 
the agenda of regional cooperation towards Ide-securitization' of the BSR. The logic of 
'de-securitization' was rather experimental: to solve the traditional security dilemma in 
the BSR, the U. S. and the EU chose a post-modem approach: by building ties of 
economic interdependence, developing cross-border cooperation, strengthening NGOs 
was thought to create a win-win situation, in which hard security issues no longer 
mattered. 
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Despite clear merits of these efforts, some actors in the region still seem to be searching 
for traditional security challenges, which do not exist anymore. Russia is a very good 
example in this regard. Generally speaking, Moscow's approach is part of the extremely 
modernist nature of President Putin's political project, mainly structured according to 
the logic of national interest, in which the inherently trans-national and post-territorial 
idea of the BSR does not fit well. 
By and large, it could be said that Putin's 'modem' and nationalist domestic and 
international agendas are the main constraint on the way of the region building. 23 
Putin's main message, unambiguously declared in his 2003 State of the Nation address 
and later reiterated on various occasions, is the consolidation of the entire society 
around an ambitious patriotic goal - to make sure that 'in a not too far off future, Russia 
will take its recognised place among the ranks of the truly strong, economically 
advanced and influential nations'. 24 His framework concept is the national interest and 
even the most globalist project of today's Russia - the WTO membership - is conceived 
in those terms. Against this background the possibility of developing contemporary 
Russian political discourse into something more post-modem is extremely problematic. 
Other constraints are to a large extent derivative from the first one. Russia cannot accept 
any outside criticism of her imperial history and abandon historical myths. Despite the 
fact that in Russian official statements the Baltic States tend to be described as part of 
the outside world, the tension between this position and the imperial approach is still 
discernible in the overall Russian treatment of the Baltics. 
The fact that in the Russian image of the BSR 'imagination as such is lacking' is also a 
significant constraint on regional cooperation. 25 The economic potential of the region is 
appreciated by many, but one would find it difficult to deduce how the political and 
economic elite of Russia is going to turn this potential into a working model of 
cooperation. Many Russian scholars are prepared to argue in favour of trans-national 
regional cooperation but the positive effect of such calls is usually limited to the 
promotion of a 'de-securitized' image of re 'onal cooperation as not threatening the 
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. 
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This discursive practice has been largely 
successful -a positive attitude to trans-border cooperation prevails among policy 
makers. However, this discourse is also structured around the fundamental concept of 
national interest: the task of trans-border cooperation is to help realise the foreign policy 
strategy of the centre. 27 
Finally, it could be said that the Russian image of the BSR tends 'to break apart into 
several groups of states', the most significant being the Baltic States and the Nordic 
countries, with the latter usually still enjoying a much more positive image than the 
former. 28 Besides, some foreign policy achievement in Putin's era - the rapprochement 
with the U. S., the NATO-Russia partnership and the intensifying dialogue with the EU 
- all tend to shift attention to the grand projects where the federal centre plays the 
central role, and thus to peripherialize the BSR in foreign policy thinking. 
One more point related to 're-securitization' of threats in the BSR should be taken into 
account. 'Security' as a discourse, which has become even more powerful after 9/11, 
tends to structure political space in a two-fold way. On the one hand, instead of making 
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borders less exclusive and turning them into interfaces for interaction, the international 
community at large is concerned with homeland security, which implies building 
barriers to protect 'us' from 'them'. Russia is a very enlightening example in this 
respect. In her current discourse, security - in the context of the war against terrorism - 
is the overwhelming mode of thinking, and this can hardly promote openness to the 
world 'out there'. On the other hand, new threats, such as terrorism, WMD or 
environmental pollution, are of a trans-national or even global nature, therefore they 
require a joint response from the international community. From this point of view, the 
new security environment has to be more conducive to new post-territorial political 
developments, which transcend national borders. Therefore 'de-securitization' of new 
threats, traditionally attributed to the realm of soft security, in the new international 
environment now seems to be counterproductive. Such approach to security produces 
inward looking strategies of the BSR countries and leads to thinking 'inside the box', 
while the contemporary security environment calls for outward looking strategies and 
thinking 'outside the box'. In this sense, the 'regionality' feature of the BSR turns into 
an impediment to develop a truly trans-regional approach to security challenges. 29 
Besides, the BSR can offer very little in the fight against terrorism. 
8.3. Environment of multilateral security and cooperation 
When analysing cooperation for regional security it is important to assess the relevance 
of one of the independent variables of the Knudsen model - an environment of 
multilateral security and cooperation. According to Knudsen, such an environment will 
help stabilise asymmetric relations between great powers and small states. A crucial 
factor in this respect is support to small states in their relations with great powers. This 
support is defined as an assistance rendered by multilateral security and cooperation 
environment to small states in the implementation of their goals. Knudsen argues that 
benevolence of multilateral security and cooperation environment may be assessed in 
tenns of importance of international and regional institutions in international politics. It 
is also critical that these organisations should include potentially competing great 
powers. This section will show to what extent the Knudsen model is relevant to the 
BSR. 
As the recent history of the region reveals, in 1991-1994, mainly three organisations - 
the UN (an international body), the CSCE (which later became OSCE) and the 
European Council (the latter two both regional bodies) had a stabilising effect on the 
BSR. It was achieved with the help of multilateral international agreements, such as the 
UN Charter and the Final Act of the CSCE in Helsinki and the Paris Charter, outlining 
standards of behaviour among states. The best proof of the benevolence of security and 
cooperation environment for the Baltic States was the consolidation of their legal 
independence. The CSCE undoubtedly played a central role in resolving dilemmas of 
Baltic-Russo relations and in maintaining regional stability. It was the CSCE which 
managed the conflict between Russia and Latvia/Estonia over the rights of Russian- 
speaking population. After all, the CSCE was the international format that ensured 
successful withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic States. However, efforts made by 
the Baltics themselves should not be underestimated: they managed to move this 
problem from a bilateral to an international level -a level of multilateral security and 
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cooperation environment. This enabled them to avoid a direct confrontation t6te-a-t6te 
with the much more powerful state. By and large, when solving the problem of Soviet 
troop withdrawal, several major factors played in support of the Baltics: a favourable 
international environment, including positive international opinion and the low level of 
tension between the great powers (the U. S. and Russia); successful tactics of the small 
states (Baltic countries); supportive positions of other great powers, first and foremost 
the U. S. 
The CSCE's crucial role in the early 1990s notwithstanding, it was of little use in 
further settlement and non-nalisation of Russia's relations with the Baltic countries. 
Upon the withdrawal of the Soviet Army, the consolidation of political independence of 
the Baltic States acquired a particular salience. Added to this, Baltic aspirations for 
NATO membership negatively effected Russo-Baltic relations. A mini Cold-War 
between the Baltic States and Russia started, with its periods of tension and d6tente. 
Meanwhile, the CSCE was not able to contribute practically to the ending of this war, 
except, in the best case, to preserve the status quo. It became clear that the conflict 
could only be ended by a more powerful organisation capable of conducting an equal 
dialogue with Russia. Interestingly enough, NATO itself became such an organisation. 
Upon uniting the former antagonists (Russia and the Baltics) into the PfP and the 
NATO Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which later became the EAPC, the 
Alliance managed to find a proper form of the institutionalisation of relations with 
Russia. It was the PJC, which began its activities when the decision to start the first 
NATO enlargement by admitting the three Central European countries was taken. Thus, 
a stabilising NATO role manifested through increasing its presence in the region. But 
even this role was not a sufficient factor for the final normalisation of Russo-Baltic 
relations and security situation in the BSR: the security dilemma remained to be solved. 
This was achieved in 2004 upon the Baltic accession to the NATO Alliance. 
How do these developments in the BSR correspond to the Knudsen model? First, the 
positive influence of the environment of multilateral security and cooperation in 
stabilising Russo-Baltic relations is obvious. It has manifested itself many times since 
the early 1990s, the most significant of them being in two periods: Soviet troop 
withdrawal and the NATO enlargement in the region. Second, the benevolence of the 
security environment alone does not warrant successful and effective solution to the 
problem. Other important factors, such as the activities of small states, influence of the 
neighbouring great power and policies of other great powers, play an indispensable role 
here. Third, Knudsen's perception of multilateral security and cooperation environment 
is too narrow: he excludes such international organisations which do not embrace 
potentially opposing great powers - NATO, EU and CBSS30 _ in this way eliminating 
their role in Russo-Baltic relations. Moreover, does not take into account the factor of 
international opinion. 
8.4. Engaging Russia in regional cooperation 
A precondition for making the dream of a united and integrated Europe come true is to 
get Russia involved as an active partner in the process. The BSR is the proper 
laboratory for Russia's engagement in the wider Europe. Cooperation in this region 
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since the end of the Cold War has gone a great length towards producing a better 
understanding of the regional environment. Russia has played a significant role in the 
region's development by participating in various regional organisations; and initiatives. 
After the dual enlargement, regional cooperation with Russia is gaining a new 
momentum and expanding within the framework of both NATO and the EU with a view 
of creating a peaceful and integrated BSR. 
Today the economic imbalance between Russia and the EU is one of the most 
fundamental threats to European stability and security, and if the prosperity is not 
moved to the east, Russia's problems will soon become the EU's problems. The way 
things are now, Russia is the only country in the region to remain outside the WTO. 
Crime, including organised cross-border crime, is another serious threat to economic 
development and regional integration. 
Kaliningrad is the focal point of many outstanding issues related to the whole region's 
future. It is therefore of vital importance that cooperation with Kaliningrad runs 
smoothly. The oblast may turn out to be the test case of cooperation between Russia and 
the EU, showing that mutual problems can be solved through cooperation. A special 
obligation lies on the Baltic States, especially Lithuania, to continue the positive 
cooperation with Russia concerning the Kaliningrad oblast. 
There are a number of initiatives and formats in one way or another promoting regional 
cooperation in the BSR: the CBSS, ND Initiative of the EU, NEI and the brand new E- 
PINE Initiative 31 of the U. S., and so on. Most of these were designed to assist the Baltic 
States and Russia to prepare for integration. Will they retain their value after the dual 
enlargement? Regardless of the past merits, their future utility must be reviewed. Some 
of them will fade away and some will grow in importance. 
Prior to the dual enlargement there was a clear security agenda for the BSR that 
embraced two major objectives: first, to assist the efforts of the Baltic States to 
reintegrate with Europe politically and mentally; second, to facilitate Russia's transition 
from an expansionist authoritarian empire into a Western-style democracy that would be 
in cooperation rather than in confrontation vis-h-vis the rest of Europe. The NEI and ND 
were focused on the agenda 'before the dual enlargement'. Both initiatives were related 
to the above mentioned objectives: integration of the Baltic States, assuaging Russian 
concerns about Western goals in the BSR and preventing Kaliningrad from turning into 
a 'black hole' right in the heart of Europe. The CBSS, and equally the ND and NEI, 
centred on soft security matters, quality of life, economic prosperity, cross-border 
transactions. 
As far as Russia herself is concerned, as already mentioned in chapter 6,1997 had 
served as a pivotal year for shaping her policy towards the Baltic States. Since then, 
Russian political priorities have shifted from hard to soft security measures, 'from 
geopolitics to geo-economics'. 32 The issue of military security has started to acquire a 
much lower profile in the regional security agenda than before. There were also 
Russia's proposals for confidence building measures and for cooperation on economic 
and environmental issues, especially in Kaliningrad oblast, to reduce tension there and 
to allow economic, rather than military, solutions to the enclave's problems. 33 
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For the past decade, NATO enlargement has been the most important issue in the 
region, influencing the political climate in many fields other than defence politics. Once 
NATO enlargement finally became a reality the big security question in the Baltic Sea is 
no longer on the agenda. This, however, does not mean that the vestiges of mutual 
mistrust, especially between the Baltic States and Russia, have finally been laid to rest. 
The NATO-Russia Council is a big step forward towards developing a lasting positive 
relationship between Russia and the enlarged NATO member states - the Baltic 
countries. But the problem here is that Russia still sees the Baltic States as belonging to 
her sphere of influence, albeit outside the CIS, yet not qualifying as true European 
countries. In short, balance of power logic still commands the overall Russian view of 
international politics and this creates the biggest problem in Russia's regional 
integration. One should always bear in mind that the military strategic importance of the 
BSR to Russia increased as Russia lost her position in Central Europe. 
It should be stressed that that the Baltic States have been trying to play a positive role in 
engaging Russia in regional cooperation. Since the restoration of their independence 
and, particularly, during the course of their integration in NATO and the EU, the Baltic 
States have pursued two broad strategic goals with regard to Russia. The first is to 
encourage the positive development of Russian foreign policy: away from Cold War 
rivalry and toward increasingly constructive partnership in meeting common security 
challenges. The second goal is to promote the development of effective, accountable 
democratic institutions which, over time, could bring Russia closer to a European 
community of shared values. Over the longer tem, these goals were inextricably linked 
- the degree to which Russia can become closer to the Euro-Atlantic community will of 
course depend upon the extent to which she shares the common values of that 
community. 
Since late 1990s, with the aim of enhancing mutual confidence with Russia, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania have been implementing bilateral confidence and security building 
measures (CSBM). In March 1998, Valdas Adamkus, the Lithuanian President, in his 
statement on the development of relations with Russia expressed Lithuania's interest in 
a more effective utilisation of CSBM provided for by the Vienna Document (VD). He 
declared Lithuania's readiness to consider the possibilities of applying reduced 
thresholds of the notification of military activities under the VD in exchange for 
military information, as well as increasing openness and transparency in non-routine 
military activities. 34 
In the light of Adamkus' statement, some confidence building measures vis-a-vis Russia 
were undertaken: extending invitations to Russian military observers to international 
military exercises held in Lithuania, exchanging additional inspections and verification 
visits beyond the quota set forth in CSBM of the 1999 VD, and inviting Russian 
military and civilian representatives to attend training courses on environmental 
security. Both countries also agreed to exchange information on military forces in 
Lithuania and Kaliningrad oblast under the CFE Treaty. 35 In January 2001, Lithuania 
and Kaliningrad finalised an arrangement on additional CSBM to be applied on the 
basis of reciprocity on their territories. 
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It is also noteworthy that after NATO decision to include the Baltic States security- 
related dialogue between them and Russia became more intensive. Concrete new 
initiatives speak for themselves; ranging from establishing high level contacts, 
expanding arms control and CSBM regime, exchanging ship visits, to planned joint 
military activities and joint military training (participation of Russian officers in 
international environmental courses held in Lithuania). 
All in all, there are more than enough frameworks for regional cooperation in the BSR. 
Hence, there is no need to invent any new formats and duplicate existing ones. First of 
all, it is necessary to build upon existing political will. There is a strong mutual interest 
to bring forward regional cooperation in BSR. Secondly, it is important to seek the 
involvement of the United States in these matters. The U. S. and Europe share basically 
the same security agenda in the Euro-Atlantic area - strengthening regional security and 
countering new challenges like terrorism and proliferation of WMD. Finally, given the 
strategic position of the Baltic States, it is their obligation and destiny to serve as a vital 
link of trust, stability and, above all, security between North America and Western 
Europe on one hand, and European regions and nations on the other. Upon joining 
NATO, the Baltic States became members of the NRC. Hence, their security relations 
with Russia acquired a new quality, which create conditions for the formation of a new 
security regime in the region. 
8.5. Conclusions 
Over the past decade, in Europe in general and in the BSR in particular, perceptions of 
security have changed. Until very recently, in the BSR it was inappropriate to speak 
about the concept of soft security because of the traditional focus on hard military 
security. The soft security agenda is less conducive to the 'oppositional formations 
between different states' and instead promotes inclusion and the formation of security 
interdependencies. 36 This laid grounds for 'de-securitization' and region building in the 
Baltic Sea area. Thus, as dominant conceptions of security have shifted from 'hard' to 
'soft' agendas, so has the emphasis on region building. 
The analysis of Russo-Baltic interaction since early 1990s seems to suggest that Ide- 
securitization' of hard security matters in their relations contributes to better relations 
between the neighbours and, consequently, to expanding regional cooperation in the 
BSR. However, 'securityper se has not been replaced by any other major concept and 
commands regional cooperation agenda in the BSR. Regional cooperation continues to 
be linked to the questions of security, albeit primarily in a 'soft' manner. 
The BSR is as stable a region as can be in this unpredictable era. Referring to the 
Knudsen model, an environment of multilateral security and cooperation did play a key 
role in stabilising asymmetric relations between Russia and the Baltic States, thus 
promoting stability and security in the region. However, the model shows significant 
limitations: it tends to rely mainly on the benevolence of the security environment, 
clearly underestimating or neglecting other important factors, such as activities of small 
states, influence of the neighbouring and other great powers and international opinion. 
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This chapter showed that international institutions, particularly NATO and the EU, have 
been the main agents for change in the BSR to an extent, allowing a paradigm shift to 
take place in the BSR: the neo-liberalist security agenda to overtake the neo-realist one. 
But although the BSR looks an ideal place for the formation of a security community, or 
the extension of the European security community with common rules, norms and 
decision-making procedures, this assumption appears to be premature. The underlying 
reason for this outcome is very simple - Russia today is still not able to accommodate 
herself in this regional format. It remains for regional actors, the Baltic States among 
them, to find new ways to engage Russia more actively into regional cooperation. This 
would contribute to confidence and cooperative security building in the BSR. 
All regional actors must make full use of the existing framework for cooperation in the 
BSR, as well as look for new opportunities. International institutions, such as NATO 
and the EU, as well as frameworks of multilateral cooperation, such as the CBSS or the 
ND, - all these mechanisms serve to safeguard regional stability and security. This is 
what is meant by security through interdependence: establishing as many bilateral and 
multilateral ties as possible and building on very practical initiatives, pooling resources 
and working together. In the defence realm, it is time to consider launching a concrete 
regional initiative that would involve NATO, Russia and the Baltic States. 
During the 1990s and onwards, the BSR has shown enormous potential for cooperation, 
which was successfully realised by various cooperation mechanisms. Hence, 
cooperative security is achieving its task in the region. The regional network of 
interdependence and functioning cooperative structures promote stability in the BSR. 
Furthermore, upon the Baltic accession to NATO and the EU and growing Russian 
cooperation with both organisations, security environment in the region became more 
homogenous for two reasons. First, a new quality of the NATO-Russia relationship and 
the Alliance's enlargement into the BSR has undoubtedly brought Russia closer to a 
cooperative security model. Second, the Baltic Sea is becoming an internal sea of the 
European Union, and the BSR is becoming a playground for the direct EU-Russia 
relations. Finally, the region is a test case for the Western approach to an undivided 
Europe. The major task in the BSR - to make war and conflict impossible and 
cooperation and prosperity inevitable - is partly implemented. 
At the same time, much remains to be done: a shared sense of a security community is 
still lacking in the BSR. To use the existing opportunities and implement the shared 
interests, the BSR needs a new and active agenda, which should be built upon several 
initiatives if it is to succeed. The primary imperative is to engage Russia. The role of 
Russia in the region should not be neglected and a positive agenda must be worked out. 
All the countries in the region, including the Baltics, share a common interest to bring 
Russia closer to the Euro-Atlantic community and involve her in an open dialogue on 
security and defence affairs. Security is as much about interdependence as it is about 
trust and dialogue. Stability and security of the BSR only have sense as part of a broader 
security framework, namely European, Euro-Atlantic and global security systems. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
9.1. Russia in the international system 
It is possible to explain the similarities and continuities of Russia's performance in large 
part as a result of the international environment, which conditions foreign policies of all 
states. As a general rule of statecraft, Russia has pursued balance of power politics. The 
most common technique associated with the balance of power is forming or joining 
military alliances, but the balance of power may also entail, inter alia, military build- 
ups, intervention in weaker countries or resort to war. Tsarist Russia was a member of 
the Triple tntente (with Great Britain and France) in the period leading up to the First 
World War, as a counterbalance to the Triple Alliance led by Germany. In the Soviet 
period the Warsaw Pact served as a military counterpart and as a counterweight to 
NATO. The Russian Federation differs from preceding regimes in not being a member 
of any military alliance. 
Russia has not yet established her place in the new world order, which is being formed 
in the wake of the Cold War. In the 1990s, her search for the rightful place in the 
process of globalisation was impeded by the weakness of the Russian statehood and the 
economy. These days, it is made more difficult by the West's fears of a stronger and 
undeniably more authoritarian Russia. Although Putin's Russia has shaped her 
orientation towards the West, she has not chosen a model of integration but a concert of 
great powers. This suggests that Russia has rejected conflict relations with great powers 
but has not abandoned the objective to recreate her power capable to challenge the 
West. Western values, which should make the basis for integration, are merely 
declarative. Russia's Western-centric orientation manifests, in essence, by her choice of 
Western space for the purpose of a political game as opposed to her decision for the 
value-based integration with the West. In Putin's foreign policy strategy international 
organisations, first and foremost the UN, are only means to participate in this concert. 
Since the UN is a forum of great powers, cooperation or regular contacts with their 
leaders become one of the most convenient means for Russia to seek the status of great 
power and other strategic goals. A delicate Russian balancing in the concert provides 
her with an opportunity to wait for a redistribution of global forces in her favour (e. g. 
division of strategic interests between the EU and the U. S. ). 
Putin remains largely faithful to the strategic objectives that have shaped Russian 
foreign policy since his accession in January 2000. First and foremost is the 
establishment of Russia as a global power in the new security architecture. The second 
objective is Russia's selective integration into Western-dominated international 
structures. Russia seeks recognition as a fully-fledged member of abstract entities such 
as the 'civilized world' and 'Europe', as well as concrete organizations like the WTO. 
However, she is reluctant to accept any diminution of sovereignty and freedom of 
action, which might result from membership of NATO or the EU. Third, maintaining 
the Western-centric orientation of Russian foreign policy is of key importance for her. 
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The West, the U. S. in particular, remains the prime source of global power in its various 
dimensions. Fourth, it is equally important for Russia to present the image of a 
geographically balanced or 'multi-vectored' foreign policy, founded in a positivc-surn 
view of international affairs. The Western-centrism of Moscow's world-view does not 
preclude the development of close relations with China, the FSU and the Muslim world. 
On the contrary, highlighting Russia's multiple identities is important to emphasize that 
she remains a big power despite her post-Soviet strategic decline. Last but not least, an 
overriding objective is to project power and influence wherever possible. In the regional 
context, this implies tightening links with the former Soviet republics so that the latter 
would become de facto Moscow's 'sphere of influence'. Globally, Russia seeks to 
influence developments by virtue of her position as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council and one of the world's leading energy suppliers. 
Russia treats the United States and NATO as tactical allies in terms of realpolitik What 
is more, by cooperating with NATO Moscow seeks to cause a certain power erosion 
'from inside' of this organisation. By participating in the NATO-Russia Council in the 
format of '27' Russia wants to achieve three major goals: to weaken the trans-Atlantic 
link (U. S. -European relations); to promote evolution of NATO from a military defence 
block to a political organisation and to slow or impede NATO enlargement. 
On the other hand, Russia's Western-centric orientation, including her realpolitik-based 
rapprochement with NATO, is rather a risky business as it may eventually shift Russia's 
evolution towards a limited regional power. The only more obvious result of Moscow's 
policy is the overlapping of Russian and Western structures: Russian companies, 
especially energy firms, penetrate into Central and Eastern Europe, meanwhile NATO 
and the U. S. expand their influence in the FSU - Moscow's traditional dominated area. 
However, this may give the contradictory result: it may structurally bind Russia to the 
West but equally it may become a breeding-ground for Russian imperialism to wait its 
time until global ratio of forces would change against Western benefit. 
it is not entirely obvious what final objectives Moscow expects to achieve by pursuing 
its Western-centric policy. It could be considered three alternatives of possible Russian 
objectives: pragmatic trans-continental, euro-continental and euro-Asian. 1 Pragmatic 
trans-continental objectives imply Russia's systematic involvement into a trans-Atlantic 
security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok, where Russia is the key partner of 
the United States, with the U. S. to divide up Europe in zones of influence or create a 
European balance of power where Russia herself is an arbiter. In pursuing Euro- 
continental objectives Russia may seek to eventually oust the U. S. from Europe and to 
establish a European balance of forces. This could be achieved by strengthening the 
integration of Russian and European energy infrastructures, by integrating economic 
and security structures through the creation of a common economic space and joint 
political institutions. Such an integrated 'Euro-Russia' would turn into an alternative 
centre of global power to the U. S. and China. Euro-Asian objectives imply that Russia 
would seek to oust the U. S. not only from Europe but from the entire Eurasia and to 
challenge the global American domination. It is more likely that these objectives and 
means of their realisation are not geo-strategic alternatives but compliment each other 
and are constituent elements of a solid long-term geo-strategy of Russia. Growing 
dependence on Russian energy stimulates Western European states to establish closer 
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economic and political contacts with Russia, thus automatically involving her in 
European matters. This creates favourable conditions for Russia to weaken trans- 
Atlantic relations and, eventually, try to undermine U. S. influence in the entire Eurasian 
continent. 
As a great power, Russia sees a major threat in the strategic solidarity of Europe and the 
United States. In length of time, this solidarity may not only curb Russia's imperial 
ambitions, as a result of effective 'containment' levers, but also subordinate her foreign 
policy to the West due to the effective mechanisms of Russia's involvement into the 
Euro-Atlantic space. Therefore Russia tries to exploit several circumstances: first, 
frictions between the U. S. and separate European states (especially between the U. S. 
and France or the U. S. and Germany); second, competition between some Western 
European states (e. g. France and the UK); third, disagreements between 'old' and 'new' 
Europe; fourth, a common Western interest to have Russia as a main supplier of raw 
materials and as a factor necessary for the balance of forces in the international system. 
9.2. Domestic and external agendas of Putin's Russia 
President Vladimir Putin's policies can only be understood in the context of the period, 
coming after Yeltsin's ten-year presidency, when social and political relations had been 
deteriorated, although certain freedoms had become established. In considering Russia's 
domestic agenda, much depends upon the assessment of the character and intentions of 
the Russian President himself. Putin is the driving force behind many of the policies that 
have raised concerns in the Western world: the centralisation (or even monopolisation) 
of political power, the military campaign in Chechnya, the steps taken against the 
curtailment of Russian freedoms, and so on. 
Having inherited a weak and corrupt state, Putin set a strategic goal to get Russia back 
on her feet. He made state building and modernisation the central priorities of his rule. 
Putin has used his presidency to set the stage for deeper changes in Russia's domestic 
and foreign policies. This is in contrast to his predecessor, who had little influence on 
these areas. By the end of Yeltsin's era, his role was limited to defending the position of 
his 'family' and to backing some flgures from his former entourage. 
Putin's state building project, however, casts serious doubts on its success. The 
consolidation of power has not improved efficiency of state building. The apparent 
strengthening of the Russian state is largely an illusion: by building the 'power vertical' 
Putin has strengthened the Kremlin but not the state. Although the Putin regime has 
been able to stem the disintegration of the state, it has not managed to build a state 
strong enough to implement reforms, capable of prosecuting organised crime and 
stamping out corruption. The Russian economy has experienced a comparatively good 
record of growth, but this is only due to the growing world price of oil, not as a result of 
the country's economic modernisation. Although political power of Yeltsin's oligarchs 
was curbed, they were replaced by new political clans - the siloviki. The main danger 
stems from inside the system - the pyramid - that Putin has created, and it is that of 
stagnation. Without an effective system of checks and balances the government is 
increasingly unable to handle political, socio-economic and security crises within 
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Russia. Thus, the regime has revealed itself as not only authoritarian but also 
dysfunctional. Instead of consolidating the state, super-presidentialism made it only 
weaker. The outcome of Putin's regime may be described as 'unstable stability' in place 
of 'stable instability' in Yeltsin's time. 
In the conduct of foreign affairs Putin's achievements are more visible. Putin 
formulated a more consistent foreign policy designed to break with Yeltsin's erratic line 
and to establish realism and pragmatism as key instruments for attaining Russia's 
national objectives. Such a policy reflects instincts of the Russian elite, especially the 
Kremlin. These instincts are derived from a realpolitik mentality and can be 
surnmarised as follows: self-image as a great power, preference for bilateralism, 
emphasis on the more traditional elements of national might, desire for equal status with 
the most powerful members of international system, and the condescension or benign 
neglect towards 'minor' states. In short, the prevailing political sentiments favour a 
more assertive, nationalist line in world affairs. 
The main foreign policy goal, as reflected in Russia's official Foreign Policy Concept, 
has been the creation of conditions to ensure the country's economic rebirth through 
tous azimuts policy that had a leaning towards the West. Putin took advantage of the 
opportunity opened by 9/11 to consolidate the cooperative dimension of Russian foreign 
policy and proclaimed a new course of rapprochement with the West. Indeed, the West 
retained its dominant position in Moscow's worldview, which made Russian foreign 
policy overwhelmingly Western-centric, albeit not pro-Western. 
Putin started from the premise that Russia was a European country with a European 
vocation, thus, she has a role to play in European affairs. Simultaneously, he has placed 
even a higher value on partnership with the United States as instrumental on increasing 
Russia's international weight. Russia has gained much from her special relations with 
the U. S, which made Moscow largely relinquish its traditional disadvantageous anti- 
American policy. Most important, Russia has become a privileged partner of the 
mightiest state in the contemporary world. U. S. -Russian relations considerably 
contributed to the growth of Russia's status in international organisations, among them 
the G-8. Thus, although Russia's 'rapprochement' with the West has proved to be only 
a tactical decision as opposed to a strategic one, she received considerable gains in her 
international standing. Russia's role as a desirable partner of the West in the spheres of 
energy and the war on international terrorism has been boosted. 
Russia pursues different agendas with different parts of the West - Europe and the U. S. 
- and tries to gain advantages on both sides. On issues like terrorism and homeland 
security, Russia's policy seems to be closer to the U. S. than to Europe. Meanwhile, with 
Europe Russia places her emphasis on energy relations, trade, investment and 
institutional dialogue. Hard security issues in partnership with the U. S. and soft security 
dialogue and institution building with Europe - such are the two faces of Putin's 
westernisation. 
There seems to be an apparent lack of congruity between Putin's domestic and foreign 
policy motivations. While seeking to secure his own power base, Putin's domestic and 
foreign policies have followed different trends; the so-called parallelism in Russian 
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politics, whereby domestic developments are characterised by autocratic measures, and 
foreign policy follows a more liberal line. But these parallels intersect, as the domestic 
agenda has a direct reflection in the realm of foreign policy. Indeed, Russia is a mixture 
of retrenchment and regression; both internally and externally. Russia's foreign and 
security policy is symbolic for its dualism: on the one hand, international cooperation is 
continued, on the other hand, a large part of the Russian security establishment remains 
focussed on the preparation for large-scale conflicts, reliance on the state's robust 
nuclear posture and in its feeling of encirclement by the hostile West. Hence, Putin's 
Western-centrism does not imply a structural change of Russian foreign and security 
policy. It is characterised by manoeuvring between traditional Russian imperial 
thinking, in terms of power and influence, and in recognising Russia's new post-Cold 
War status, resulting in cooperation with the West. Continuation of this dualism is likely 
to be the future of Russia's foreign and security policy. 
Putin's Russia has clearly reversed a cycle that began in the mid- I 980s with perestroika 
and glasnost. The great Russian romance with the market economy has ended, as has 
the commitment to openness. Russia is non-democratic at home and is demonstrating 
imperial temptations in the post-Soviet space. Russia is using her energy lever as a 
means of upholding the state's geopolitical interests, which is outmoded in Western 
thinking. 
Putin's domestic agenda has become a key issue in relations with the West. European 
and U. S. political elites insist that good relations with Moscow should not be bought at 
the expense of Russian democracy. While welcoming Western trade and investment, 
Moscow resists the encroachment of 'alien' political and civilizational values. Putin 
believes Russia must follow her own path - an attitude that means rejecting external 
, interference' in issues such as Chechnya and status of democracy. It is unlikely that 
Putin will refrain from centralising his power because of Western criticism. As such, the 
Russian president must make a difficult foreign policy choice: either allow his domestic 
politics to jeopardise relations with the West or refrain from moving Russia towards 
authoritarianism. 
In attempting to predict Russia's future evolution, the key question is whether Putin 
views his brand of statism and 'managed democracy' as a means to an end (i. e. to 
enable Russia to cope with social, economic and security challenges of staggering 
proportions) or an end in itself. The two foreign policy goals Russia is seeking today - 
great power status and economic development - are linked, but it is worth considering 
each separately as they have different dimensions. Put simply, there are different kinds 
of great power, and there are different forms of economic growth and development. A 
commitment to great power status does not require the rebuilding of the Russian empire, 
nor does a commitment to economic growth and development necessarily require liberal 
economic reform, integration and globalisation. There are two ways Russia might go 
seeking to become a great power: a 19th century approach based on spheres of influence 
and balance of power politics, or a 21st century approach based on a highly 
technologically advanced economy, openness to globalisation and multilateral approach 
to security issues. 
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The current state of affairs in Russia confirms that she has chosen the balance of power 
approach. In fact, Russia is redefining her geopolitical position. Since the mid-1980s, 
the Russians have been of the opinion that abandoning geopolitical confrontation with 
the West would result in economic benefits. Put another way, the Russians were 
prepared to learn from the West and took their bearings from the West. Today Russia's 
view of this strategy is divided. The debate is between those who want a complete 
reversal in policy -a large minority - and those who acknowledge that massive 
readjustments must be made at all levels, but the basic idea of private property and 
markets should not be completely abandoned. What is going on, therefore, is a struggle 
over how far democracy should be curtailed and to what extent market reforms should 
be reined in. Overlaying this is a deep suspicion about the intentions of the West. The 
dominant view is that the West's demands for increased democratisation are an attempt 
to weaken Russia. Moscow still seems to perceive its relations with the West as a zero- 
sum game. 
But this is not to say that Russia is rejecting her Western-centric orientation. Russia's 
economic priorities call for heavy doses of foreign trade and investment, which 
crucially underpin her foreign policy to maintain a Western-centric approach. Therefore, 
despite Russia's cooling relations with the West, Putin will seek to avoid any major 
confrontation with the United States and Europe. In such circumstances, Russia seems 
to adapting a policy that has its slogan: 'Together with the West but going our own 
way'. The Putin regime in executing its external policy was not able to overstep 
boundaries of neo-realism: the rapprochement with the West has not been an end in 
itself but only a means to an end: resurrecting Russia as a major power. All of the 
above, the change of traditional paradigm has not taken place under Putin; only its 
content has become slightly broadened. Apart from territorial control, contemporary 
Russia is very much concerned about the increase of her soft power (especially through 
her energy leverage), which today actually defines the country's international weight. 
9.3. Russia's European policy 
Russia's agenda in Europe concerns the question of the fundamental orientation of 
Russia herself, encompassing a specific culture and civilisation. This largely gives a 
reasoning for putting 'Europe first' in Russia's foreign policy. In a more narrow sense, 
it consists of making Europe instrumental for Russia's transformation: it is mainly in 
Europe that markets and potential investment lie. EU is an indispensable anchor for 
Russia in Europe. The two key factors that make relations with the EU salient to Russia 
are the latter's dependence on the EU markets and the Union's dependence on Russian 
energy resources. 
In geopolitical terms, Russia needs Europe mainly as a balancing weight to U. S. 
hegemony in the world. Therefore, Moscow is satisfied with every sign of 
disagreements of Euro-Atlantic relations and with any effort of the EU to emerge as an 
independent global centre of power. However, Moscow is not interested in the long- 
term strengthening of the EU. In other words, Russia would like to participate, together 
with the European Union, in the creation of a new multi-polar world order but in the 
long-term perspective Russia's geo-strategic interests would demand a strategic 
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subjugation of the EU. This largely explains why in the short and medium-term Russia 
aims at connecting herself with the European Union in the spheres of energy and 
economy, as well as through the network of common political institutions, where the 
U. S. is not involved. Simultaneously, Russia avoids joining the EU in order to fully 
preserve sovereignty in her domestic politics. In principle, Moscow accepts European 
structures as a reality, albeit strategically the fragmentation of these structures and the 
return to the paradigm of balance of national interests would be more acceptable for 
Russia. Reasonably, in short and medium perspective Moscow is more interested in the 
EU's internal integration according to the model of centre-periphery, in which the real 
integration of CEE states into European structures, such as Schengen space or euro 
zone, may not happen. In accordance with this scenario, Russia would have favourable 
conditions for cooperation with the EU, for retaining her sovereign domestic policy and, 
simultaneously, for strengthening her leverage on internal political and economical 
processes within the Union, especially in CEE. 
A characteristic feature of Russia's European policy is the expansion of bilateral 
relations with individual countries. Russia views bilateralism instrumentally, as a tool 
for advancing Russia's interests inside Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions, first of all 
the EU and NATO. This particularly applies to Russia's relations with Germany: by 
establishing close relations with Berlin Moscow seeks to develop its strategic 
partnership with the EU. 
A new shift of Moscow's policy vis-h-vis Kaliningrad is a vivid example in this respect. 
If earlier temporary obstacles, neighbouring Lithuania in particular, has complicated 
Moscow's attempts to draw a geopolitical line with the oblast, now new concrete 
directions to the West, opening up possibilities to neutralise intermediate factors, have 
been found. One of the most visible directions is the joint Russian-German project - 
North European Gas Pipeline under the Baltic Sea. Thus, the Kaliningrad oblast is 
actually becoming geopolitically related to Russia and is very important to the 
development of her strategic relations with Western Europe. 
Generally speaking, Russia's European agenda encompasses four key objectives: first, 
not to permit Western Europe and its dominated international organisations (EU and 
NATO) to expand influence in the post-Soviet space; second, to increase Europe's geo- 
economic and geo-energetic dependence (this especially applies to 'new' Europe) on 
Russia; third, to turn some new members of the EU and NATO (the Baltic States) into 
Russia's agents of influence in Euro-Atlantic institutions; fourth, to divide the European 
Union and weaken trans-Atlantic ties, as well as support the EU and NATO's political 
and economic decisions that are beneficial for Russia. 
The landmarks of EU-Russia relations almost coincide with important events in the 
NATO-Russia relations, and, to some extent, are influenced by their developments. 
However undoubtedly, there is an internal logic in Russia's approach to the EU. One 
could name the three stages in the history of EU-Russia relations: first, 1994-1999 - 
start of formal contacts; second, 1999-2001 (emergence of the ESDP) - expanding 
agenda and changing nature of the bilateral relationship; third, since 2001 - step-by-step 
institutionalisation of EU-Russia cooperation. 
290 
Within fifteen years, the importance of the EU shifted from the purely economic sphere 
to a wider comprehensive agenda. The enlarged EU has come physically closer to 
Russia over a wide spectrum of relations, including the security area. At the same time, 
Russia's place in European security has moved much closer to Russia herself Foreign 
policy questions which were formerly part of what Russia considered her 'far abroad', 
have now become issues affecting her 'near abroad'. NATO and, especially, the EU 
enlargement opened the gate to greater EU involvement in the FSU. At the start of 
Putin's second term, which nearly coincided with the dual enlargement, the Russia 
leadership has become worried that Russia is losing her control over developments in 
this vital region. On the other hand, Russia lacks a realistic national strategy with regard 
to the CIS in general, and the European CIS countries in particular. The way these 
problems are solved will determine Russia's relations with Europe and the future 
development of the political and economic picture in Russia. The current Russia's 
policy in the FSU is preventing Russia from coming to terms with her imperial legacy. 
Very indicative of the current impasse are also differing EU and Russian views on the 
frozen conflicts in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova (Transdnistria) and 
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh). While acknowledging that each situation has unique 
features, the basic difference in approach lies in the Russian preference for maintaining 
the status quo and Moscow's view of the central authorities and the separatist enclaves 
as more or less equal parties. This contrasts with EU (and U. S. ) main emphasis on 
restoring the sovereign integrity of Georgia and Moldova. Closely tied to this question 
is the ongoing existence of Russian military bases in these countries. 
Russian-European dialogue over Putin's six years has progressed little. Although the 
parties have intensified their bilateral contacts and have had more frequent summit 
meetings, it has brought to light several problems. First and foremost, Moscow has 
realised that it has no bureaucratic mechanism for extending effective influence over the 
decision making process in Brussels before a decision is made. Moreover, with EU-25 
(some of the new members have difficult relations with Moscow), a new geopolitical 
reality has arisen in Europe with which, despite rhetoric to the contrary, Russia has not 
developed a 'strategic partnership'. Finally, Russia and the EU have not worked out a 
long-term model for their relationship. Relations between the EU and Russia lack a 
strategic depth and remain in the sphere of quite narrow pragmatic matters. 
In the absence of the prospect of Russia's membership of the EU, Moscow's dialogue 
with Brussels remains a largely bureaucratic exercise, and Russia's accommodation of 
the EU enlargement does not seem assured. Beyond their general agreement on 
scommon spaces', the EU and Russia agree on little at the moment. Russia and the EU 
still differ in their approach to many fundamental issues of cooperation: the modality of 
joint peacekeeping efforts, activities in the 'common neighbourhood', as well as the 
institutional structure of the partnership. The EU's attempts to influence Russia's 
internal development through giving advice, or even offering incentives, has not been 
successful. Russians simply perceive Europe as intrusive and arrogant. The EU, while 
complaining about a lack of cooperation on the part of Russia, is also worried about the 
erosion of her democratic standards. Such concerns boil down to the existing value gap 
between the EU and Russia. As democracy does not take priority in Russia, Putin's 
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policy does not lead to structural integration with Europe (and the West at large) but to 
the specific overlapping of Russian and Western structures. 
The problem for Putin's Russia, seeking to be part of Europe, is that Europe is about 
something more than geography and interests; it is also a set of values. Russia, however, 
has a very pragmatic view of her relations with the EU. It is nothing to do with the 
creation of a space of common values and rules; it is simply an acquisition of special 
privileges and exceptions. Therefore Moscow sees the blending of values and interests 
in EU policy and rhetoric as interference in Russian affairs. 
While Russian-EU political cooperation may be stagnating, relations at other levels - 
trade, economic cooperation and energy dialogue - are quite dynamic. However, 
Russia's reliability as a supplier of oil and gas must be measured in terms of Putin's 
undistinguished efforts to use energy as a weapon against her insufficiently compliant 
neighbours. Moscow's objective is to secure long-ten-n contracts with Western 
European consumers that tighten Gazprom's control of supply and distribution, and 
forestall European efforts to secure alternative supplies. 
There are also options for security cooperation between Russia and Europe. They 
should encompass the two agreed 'common spaces' - the 'common space of freedom, 
security and justice' and the 'common space of external security'. The first 'common 
space' implies extending to Russia the principles and practices of EU internal security 
policy. In other words, cooperation in this 'common space' should include encouraging 
normative changes in Russia's domestic security policies - such as respect for human 
rights, democratic values and the rule of law - and working together to minimise cross- 
border security threats, ranging from organised crime to border security to illegal 
migration and environmental hazards. As for the 'common space of external security', 
which is linked to EU-Russia cooperation under the umbrellas of the EU's CFSP and its 
emerging ESDP, the security agenda may range from fighting international terrorism, 
proliferation of WMD, nuclear safety and disarmament to crisis management and 
'frozen' conflicts. No lasting settlement in Moldova and Georgia is possible without 
full-scale Russian involvement. However, Russia should reaffirm her commitment to a 
peaceful settlement of the disputes, support the territorial integrity of Moldova and 
Georgia and comply with an agreement with those countries on matters pertaining to the 
Russian military presence there. 
Russia-EU security cooperation may also include military-technical cooperation in areas 
of perceived comparative advantage. Europe's lack of a strategic airlift capability has 
long been noted; Russia has offered her resources to fill the gap. Kaliningrad remains 
another important cooperation area. Contrary to the widespread perception, the key 
problem is not a transit between Kaliningrad and 'big' Russia but the remaining 
economic disparities between the oblast and its neighbours. If this gap widened further, 
Kaliningraders would call for more autonomy, perhaps even separation from Russia. 
The issue could then escalate into a major dispute between the EU and Russia. But it is 
likely that the new regional leadership has already devised a programme for the oblast's 
development and for turning Kaliningrad's position within the EU territory from a 
liability into an asset. 
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The Kremlin leaders want to see Russia as a modem great power but they have yet to 
define what they mean by that and how they intend to get there. The EU and Russia 
need to complement their plans to create 'common spaces' with a constructive dialogue 
on their shared neighbourhood. Moscow should not regard this neighbourhood solely as 
a source of problems. These countries can be useful partners for both sides, as they are 
eager to deal with Russia and Western Europe; they are prepared to continue to act as 
transit states, or even intermediaries, between them. 
Overall, Russia should continue to move forward in her relations with the EU, but there 
will be disruptions and crises along the way. The evolution of Russian foreign policy is 
also a part of that learning process. Foreign policy should be aimed at assuming a new 
global role, but abandoning the role of a superpower and emphasising the Euro-Atlantic 
factor. This is only possible on the basis of a strong and purposeful domestic policy, a 
gradual and consistent expansion of democratic principles and institutions. This will not 
be a quick and easy process, at the same time, it will be a great historical challenge. 
Russia can modernize and succeed in a globalised world by opting for a European 
identity and a gradual integration into a Wider Europe. Building new relations with the 
European Union will be one of Russia's most difficult foreign policy tasks over the 
coming period. There is no alternative to their long-term rapprochement. However, past 
experience requires a realistic modification of Russia's relations with the EU. 
9.4. Russia's agenda in the post-Soviet space 
Since 1992, Russia's 'near abroad' has been perceived as one of the top priorities of 
Russian foreign policy. But it is only during the rule of Putin that the more active 
concrete policy towards the FSU has been conducted. Under the pragmatic hand of 
Putin's leadership, Moscow has largely abandoned its 'near-abroad' rhetoric of 
Yeltsin's later years. However, abandoning the rhetoric of Yeltsin's 'near-abroad' 
doctrine has not meant that Moscow has abandoned all of its underlying assumptions. 
Russia acts as a status quo power that is often not able to prevent or resist change. In 
2003-2005, Russia's foreign policy in FSU countries was increasingly showing the 
signs of reanimation of the empire. And this was not accidental. External imperialism 
towards neighbouring countries was closely related to Putin's authoritarian rule at 
home. 
The notion about the priority of post-Soviet space for Russia and the FSU countries has 
found its military and political embodiment in Russia's Defence White Paper of 2003. 
Criteria of interfering with the neighbours are set: the danger of instability in the 
country that may affect the situation in Russia, violation of human rights and 
democratic freedoms and uncontrolled territory by the central government. This is the 
first time in post-Soviet history when a document permits the use of military might 
against CIS partners. In accordance with Russia's strategic documents, the perception of 
threats to national security became so broad that, if there is a political will, a formal 
pretext for the utilisation of the Russian Armed Forces in another state's territory can be 
found at almost any time. 
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Notwithstanding the centripetal forces that hold the CIS together there are the member 
states' long ties with Russia related largely to their dependence on Russia for energy 
and trade and, to a lesser extent, for external defence. Russia exploits the diverse 
instruments which still has at her disposal in order to promote both cooperation and 
influence within the CIS by using the network of regional organisations in the political, 
military, economic and other spheres. Whereas Russia once relied on her political- 
military might, gravitating towards the traditional methods of the use of force, she now 
increasingly uses economic tools. Moscow's control over energy production and 
transportation represent the most effective means of pressuring FSU states to take 
account of Russian economic and strategic interests. One could easily see competition 
over the control of energy resources and their transportation behind practically all 
political processes taking place in the CIS space in 2003-2005. The main issue has been 
whether the West will manage to develop a system of supply of energy resources from 
the Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin that would constitute an alternative to 
Russia. Moscow is clearly using her energy monopoly to influence political and security 
policies of the neighbouring FSU countries. This may reinforce the already serious 
problem of corruption and lack of transparency in these countries and eventually result 
in depriving them of investment by Western energy firms which feel reluctant to 
compete with non-transparent Russian companies for privatised assets and investment 
opportunities. 
Despite the fact that Russia's long-term interest is the stability within the FSU, she 
seems to benefit from unresolved regional conflicts. Russia feels uncomfortable with 
democratic states along her borders; therefore Moscow is supporting instability in the 
CIS by sponsoring pro-Russian regimes in secessionist states: Transdnistria, Abkhazia, 
Ossetia. Russian peacekeeping forces helped to 'freeze' conflicts in Georgia and 
Moldova. Moscow prevented any real internationalisation or conflict mediation beyond 
the current modest roles given to the OSCE and UN; only in October 2005 the EU 
started a border (between Moldova and Ukraine) monitoring mission. Such a behaviour 
aims to maintain political and economic influence beyond Russia's borders and to 
impede democratic development in Moldova and Georgia. Thus, Russia's perception of 
the FSU as her traditional sphere of influence remains unchanged. 
After EU enlargement the concept of the 'former Soviet space'- Russia's 'near abroad' 
- where Russia was once a powerful player by virtue of history, ceased to exist, as the 
region moved towards a new geo-strategic reality. Half of 'near abroad' has turned into 
an 'intermediate Europe' or a 'common neighbourhood'. This new shared 
neighbourhood does matter because it may stimulate both cooperation and conflict 
between Russia and the EU. Russia and Europe have opposite views of the 'common 
neighbourhood': Russia wants to restore her status as a major power at the expense of 
this neighbourhood, whilst the EU wishes to ensure security and stability at its 
threshold. 
In this overlapping 'near abroad' Russia has lost her influence: European CIS countries 
have become reoriented towards the EU. The reasons behind this include the folding up 
of democracy in Russia, loss of her leading position in the CIS in terms of the quality of 
economic growth, the scale of terrorist activity, and so on. Moscow does not have any 
attractive project to offer these countries. The 'carrot' it can offer does not look 
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appealing enough: Russia's domestic challenges make her less attractive as a source of 
integration for her CIS neighbours. The majority of the existing alliances between those 
neighbours and Russia are premised on their regimes' desire to protect themselves 
against a potentially revolutionary public discontent. Those alliances are to an extent 
offset by other governments that have united to help one another to consolidate their 
'independence' from potential Russian pressure. Moscow's 'stick', equally, can only 
make relations with the political regimes and people of neighbouring countries more 
problematic; no one can guarantee that using the energy weapon will prove effective. 
Europe, meanwhile, has acquired attractiveness as a zone of stability and economic 
prosperity. Ukraine has advanced the farthest among the former CIS countries along the 
path of reorientation towards the EU. The issue of accepting European influence has 
also sprung up in other European CIS countries - the South Caucasus countries and 
Moldova, albeit to a smaller degree. The situation looks far from ordinary even in 
Belarus, a country much farther away from Europe in terms of support. The 
transformative energy of the EU that came to Ukraine is bound to come to Belarus as 
well. It is possible that Belarus will follow Ukraine's footsteps after Alexander 
Lukashenko leaves office. Hence, competition for attractiveness between Russia and the 
EU seems to have been won by the latter. 
Moscow's weakening influence and poor understanding of dynamics in neighbouring 
states was particularly visible in Ukraine. Despite Russia's political and financial 
backing of Yanukovich, Moscow was unable to influence the outcome of the 
presidential elections. This was perceived by many in Russia as a first major political 
defeat in the former Soviet space. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine transformed the 
geopolitical landscape in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. 
It is likely that, at least for a short time, Moscow has abandoned its ambitious project of 
reintegration within the CIS that was pursued in the 1990s, and instead, is concentrating 
on a few limited projects involving several neighbours. Despite ongoing tensions in 
relations with Lukashenko, the idea of Russia-Belarus 'union state, remains alive. 
Moscow's other major institution building initiatives are patterned on the EU and 
NATO: in the economic sphere - the formation of SES, in security sphere - the CSTO. 
However, the SES achievements have been insignificant so far and its prospects remain 
vague. As far as the CSTO is concerned, it is becoming a useful tool for Russia to retain 
her military influence in the CIS and is envisaged to be a Russia-led counterpart to 
NATO. At the same time, policies of some CIS states, particularly Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova, seeking close relations with both of NATO and the EU in order to develop the 
possibility for future membership, may considerable weaken the CIS structures and is 
challenging Russia's dominant position in the FSU. Moreover, currently on the rise is 
GUAM grouping, which is considered by its member states to become an alternative to 
Russian-centric CIS organisation. 
Today's Russia is not so much neo-imperialist as POst-imPerialist. When it comes to the 
post-Soviet space, Russia is forced onto the retreat. As a result, Russia has been on an 
offensive to challenge Western (particularly U. S. ) influence in the 'near-abroad' and she 
is increasingly sceptical about her ability to keep the whole CIS in her 'sphere of 
influence'. The best that Russia could do for her smaller neighbours would be to 
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become more stable, prosperous and at peace with herself. This would give Russia 
considerable 'soft' power - the ability to convince rather than coerce - in the post- 
Soviet space. Tolour revolutions' may not weaken Russia's position in the CIS 
provided that Russia has a pragmatic policy of non-involvement. The main lesson from 
the post-revolutionary period in Georgia, Ukraine and the events in Kyrgyzstan is that 
Russia should develop cooperation with other regional players, including Europe, the 
United States and their key institutions, in the interest of stability and development in 
what has become their 'common neighbourhood'. EU enlargement and the so-called 
dwar on terror' have provided a lasting strategic rationale for Western engagement in 
Eurasia. Russia has yet to formulate clear strategic interests in her relations with 
neighbours on the basis of post-Cold War and post-9/11 realities that go beyond historic 
legacy and fears of encirclement. 
9.5. Russo-Baltic relations 
9.5.1. Explaining Russo-Baltic asymmetric relationship 
Russo-Baltic relations are marked by some peculiarities. Firstly, it is a relative and 
structural power disparity between Russia and the Baltic countries. Secondly, Russia 
has never come to tenns with the Baltic independence. Thirdly, relations are based on 
geographical proximity, the geo-strategic position of the Baltic States and the historical 
past. The latter gives plenty of reasons for the Baltics to fear their big neighbour: a 
traditional imperial policy is ingrained in Russia's bearing historically and culturally. 
Such a Russian approach presupposes the necessity to maintain some spheres of 
influence, which are needed to increase the power of the 'centre'. Spheres of influence 
are considered as a means of accumulation of Russian power, which opens the door for 
her penetration into economic and political processes of the neighbouring states. It is for 
this reason that the Baltic countries perceive an increasing Russian power as a negative 
factor for their mutual relations. The Russia-related threats to the Baltic States manifest 
in several different forms of pressure: economical, political and cultural. 
This dissertation confirms that the Knudsen model helps analyse many features of 
asymmetric relationship between a great power and a small state. All six independent 
variables of this model (the importance of a small state's geographic location; tension 
variable - degree of tension between great powers; power cycle variable - the degree of 
extroversion in a great power's foreign policy; historical past (historical record); policy 
of other rival great power(s) towards a small state; environment of multilateral security 
and cooperation) and a dependent variable - 'de-occupation'- have manifested 
themselves in one way or another in Russo-Baltic relations. Some flaws 
notwithstanding, these variables allow us to explain principal consistent patterns of 
relations between great powers and small states and the factors that have influence upon 
them. 
The importance of the Knudsen model is validated in the following aspects of Russo- 
Baltic relations. First, the historical record retains its importance for the perception of 
the political elites of the Baltic States (the level of distrust varies depending on the 
configuration of political forces within the state). Second, the strategic importance of a 
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small state implies that the Baltic countries play a significant role for Russia; but this 
role is shifting from a geo-political/geo-strategic to a geo-economic one. Third, the 
degree of tension between Russia and the United States did have an affect on Russo- 
Baltic relations: when the tension increased, Russia's pressure on the Baltics grew as 
well, which led to the worsening of their mutual relations. The introvert phase of 
Russia's development also positively contributed to the achievement of political goals 
of the Baltic States. Equally, favourable multilateral environment of international 
security and cooperation has significantly contributed to the stabilisation of power 
asymmetry between Russia and the Baltic States. 
On the other hand, the analysis of Russo-Baltic relations has also revealed some 
limitations of the Knudsen model, which can be divided into three groups. The first 
group reflects the imperfection of independent variables. Knudsen gives insufficient 
attention to the details of some variables. The best example is the factor of the strategic 
importance of a small state - the key indicator of relations between a great power and a 
small state, as it pre-determines interests and policy of a great power vis-A-vis a small 
state. The Knudsen model does not envisage the segmentation of this factor into smaller 
parts - geopolitical, geo-strategic and geo-economic importance. Such a segmentation 
would allow us to look at the strategic importance of a small state not as an all-in-one 
formation but as significant mutually competing and interacting forms. Ostensibly, the 
decreasing geopolitical importance of a small state is not a reason for its big neighbour 
to lose interest in that state. The same state may attract a great power's attention because 
of its geo-economic importance. Another example would be the assessment of a power 
asymmetry between a neighbouring power and the other great power. Given a power 
asymmetry (e. g. between Russia and the United States), success of the policy of a 
neighbouring great power (Russia) vis-A-vis a small state (a Baltic country) would be 
undermined, especially if the other great power (the U. S. ) is deeply involved in a small 
state's affairs. The other great power, though being remote from a small state, may 
render an effective support for it, thus, effectively counter-balancing the influence of a 
neighbouring great power. An appreciation of this factor allows us to explain many of 
Russia's policy losses in the Baltic States. One more example of shortcomings of this 
model is narrowing down of the scope of a variable of multilateral environment of 
security and cooperation. The Knudsen model takes into account only those 
international and regional organisations of which Russia is a member and international 
law. Meanwhile the elimination of other influential organisations, such as NATO and 
the EU, or other factors (e. g. public opinion) does not permit display of the full content 
of this variable. 
The second group of shortcomings comes from underestimation of the fact that through 
their mutual interaction one independent variable may neutralise the impact of the other. 
For instance, an introvert phase of a neighbouring great power does not imply that it 
will not exercise any pressure on a small state, only perhaps to a lesser degree. Equally, 
the creation of a favourable multilateral environment of security and cooperation does 
not imply stabilisation of power asymmetry between a great power and a small state. 
Without the impact of other key factors - active policy of a small state or influence of 
other great powers (a tension variable)- this will not be effective. 
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The third group of shortcomings is related to the fact that in certain circumstances the 
Knudsen variables may have a completely opposite effect. For example, the historical 
past not necessarily purports destabilisation of relations between a great power and a 
small state. Given the coincidence of their interests in length of time, the importance of 
this factor decreases and it may destine good cooperative relations. 
With reference to Mouritzen and his four scenarios of coexistence between a great 
power and a small state (domination, isolation, balancing among various influences of 
great powers and obedience to a great power) it is possible to affirm that the Baltic 
States are implementing the balancing model in their relations with Russia. All three 
levels of 'de-occupation' (political, legal and economic) confirm this conclusion. The 
Baltic States seek to become a good example of co-ordination of interests of several 
power centres - the United States, the European Union and Russia. The U. S. treats the 
Baltics as reliable political partners (they are among the most pro-American states in 
Europe). For Russia, the Baltic States are the arena for consolidation of her economic 
interests and the gateway to Western European markets. The EU views the Baltic 
countries as the area of expansion of the Union's political and economic influence, as 
well as experts on Russia-related matters, especially regarding the implementation of 
the concept 'Wider Europe - European Neighbourhood Policy'. In security area, the 
Baltic States are full-fledged members of NATO (U. S. -dominated organisation). Baltic 
membership of the EU is expected to secure a balance to Russia's political and 
economic influence. All of the above, the balancing model is seen as the best 
corresponding to the current international environment and national interests of the 
Baltic States. The future of the Baltic States depends on their ability (as small states) to 
maintain the stable balance of interests between the U. S., the EU and Russia. 
9.5.2. Russia's agenda in the Baltics 
Changes in the global balance of power after the Cold War forced Russia to change her 
geo-strategic plans in the Baltic Sea region. At present, Russia's expanded cooperation 
with the West is but a sign of new tactics by seeking to achieve, as much as possible, 
political and economic benefits and recreating Russia's image as a strong state, without 
relinquishing long-term goals in the Baltic countries and the whole of Eastern and 
Central Europe. 
Being involved in various cooperation mechanisms with the BSR states and exploiting 
competition between the U. S. and the EU, Russia tries to implement a strategic model 
of geopolitical manoeuvring. The essence of this strategy is not so much to ally with 
Euro-Atlantic structures but to turn this space into an area of geopolitical and geo- 
economic artifices aimed at attaining different aims. Russia's agenda in the Baltics 
encompasses two key objectives: first, to increase geo-economic and, especially, geo- 
energetic dependence of the Baltic countries on Russia; second, to turn them into 
Russia's agents of influence in the Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
It has always been difficult to define the place for the Baltic States in Russia's foreign 
policy concept: they do not fit in the traditional doctrine of 'near abroad, nor do they 
correspond to postulates of policy of 'far-abroad'. Nonetheless, geopolitical pressure, 
originating from the doctrine of 'near-abroad' has been applied against the Baltic 
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countries. It has manifested through Russia's accentuation of legitimate freedom of 
actions in the Baltic region, as well as the attribution of this region to the vital sphere of 
her interests or the assessment of Western actions in the Baltics in geopolitical terms. 
Relations between Russia and the Baltic States are marked by the major asymmetry of 
relative power. This allows Russia to treat the Baltic countries as a natural space of 
expansion of her geopolitical power. Put otherwise, Moscow, with the help of special 
services and political and economic 'agents' of control in the Baltic States (i. e. some 
political parties, political and economic interest groups, and mass media) is shaping a 
certain loyalty supporting mechanism for Russia. Putin's Russia unwillingness to admit 
the fact of Soviet occupation of the Baltics, let alone to apologise for the occupational 
crimes, reveals her attitude of imperial nostalgia towards the Baltic States. It is Russia's 
politics and her superiority vis-A-vis neighbouring states that force the Baltic countries 
to treat Russia still as a threat to their social, political and economic stability. 
The umbrella of Euro-Atlantic institutions above the Baltic area and the changed status 
of the Baltic States dictate a completely new model of Russia's behaviour: more subtle 
and covert actions. Although Russia is still searching for ways of defining her policy 
towards the Baltics, it is apparent that the Russian government is unwilling or unable to 
understand that it cannot treat the Baltic States as its 'near abroad', i. e. a legitimate 
sphere of influence. Despite the fact that in Russian official statements the Baltic States 
tend to be described as part of the outside world, the tension between this position and 
the imperial approach is still discernible in the overall Russian treating of the Baltics. 
This is especially the case in 'low politics', where Moscow continues to view the Baltic 
countries as an area of its influence. Such a Russian attitude to the Baltics is very much 
in line with her perception of the CIS countries. This but confirms that Baltic 
membership of the Euro-Atlantic institutions does provide the Baltic States with a 
shelter against threats in hard security area ('high politics') but cannot completely 
protect them against soft security threats and challengers ('low politics'). 
Russian geopolitical interests and actions in the Baltic States are primarily aimed at the 
undennining the autonomy of their political decisions, i. e. weakening their structural 
power. Baltic dependence on Russian energy supplies is arguably the strongest tool 
Russia currently possesses to influence the policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Moreover, by her current European energy policy Russia is further increasing this 
dependence. First of all, by developing cooperation with some Western European 
countries, Moscow projects the strategy of alternative transit infrastructure, which is 
directed towards the exclusion of the Baltic States from newly developed transit routes, 
thus reducing their opportunities to become geopolitical-bridge states. Secondly, 
Moscow is heightening control over transport corridors of energy resources in CEE. 
Taking advantage of their economic dependence and the dependence on Russian energy 
supply, Russia is seeking to transform the Baltic States to her agents of influence in the 
Euro-Atlantic institutions. Russia is seeking the direct dominance in the Baltic energy 
sectors by controlling strategically important objects in their energy systems. This kind 
of dominance would eventually lead to the integration of the Baltic and other CEE 
countries to the Russian energy system. Such a dependence would allow Russia to turn 
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the Baltic States into a geopolitical buffer zone against the U. S. and other Atlanticist 
countries of Western Europe. 
9.5.3. The role of international institutions in Russo-Baltic relations and region 
building 
The main criterion for evaluating whether or not institutions are relevant in the 
international system is their capacity to bring and maintain international peace. 
Applying this approach to the BSR, the logic runs as follows: through interactions and 
cooperation, the outcome of which is cooperative security, international institutions 
(NATO in particular) have promoted and maintained peace - conflict-free conditions 
for the region's development. This demonstrates that international institutions have had 
a stabilising effect on inter-state relations, particularly on Russo-Baltic relations. 
The positive influence of the environment of multilateral security and cooperation in 
stabilising Russo-Baltic relations is obvious. It has manifested itself many times since 
the early 1990s, the most notable of them being Soviet troop withdrawal and the NATO 
enlargement in the region. International institutions, such as NATO and the EU, as well 
as frameworks of multilateral cooperation, such as the CBSS, the ND and the NEI, - all 
these mechanisms served to mitigate Russo-Baltic relations by engaging them in 
regional cooperation. This is what is meant by security through interdependence - 
cooperative security: establishing as many bilateral and multilateral ties as possible and 
building on very practical initiatives, pooling resources and working together. 
In general terms, the role of international institutions is a transactional one, which has a 
normative impact: transactions lead to the acceptance of common rules, norms and 
expectations. Both NATO and the EU, through their normative impact in the BSR, 
contributed to the region's building. The overall Russian attitude to region building has 
changed: since the early 1990s it has been mitigated by increased cooperation between 
Russia and other states in the region, and by institutionalisation of confidence building 
measures via various integration initiatives at a broad regional level. 
International institutions, particularly NATO and the EU, have been the main agents for 
change in the BSR to such an extent that it made possible a paradigm shift to take place 
in the region: the security dilemma in the BSR is no longer on the agenda, thus, 'de- 
securitization' has occurred. The analysis of Russo-Baltic interaction since early 1990s 
suggests that 'de-securitization' of hard security matters contributes to better relations 
between the neighbours and, consequently, to expanding regional cooperation in the 
BSR. What is more, the security regime itself in the region is changing. First, it is 
becoming a 'NATO-centric regime' because even countries not belonging to NATO 
established solid relations with this organisation. Second, the Baltic Sea is becoming an 
internal sea of the European Union, meanwhile the BSR is becoming a playground for 
the direct EU-Russia relations. 
This is a substantial achievement in terms of improving the Overall security situation in 
the BSR but not a sufficient condition for a security community -a security regime 
similar to that in Western Europe - to emerge. The underlying reason why this process 
failed to materialise is the prevailing balance of Power logic on the part of Russia. 
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Russia today is still not able to accommodate herself in this regional format. As a result, 
'de-securitization' proceeded not completely, but only to a limited extent; 
(securitization' only shifted from hard to soft security concerns. 
Overall, international institutions based on cooperative security are achieving their task 
in the region. The regional network of interdependent and functioning cooperative 
structures promote confidence in Russo-Baltic relations and in the region as a whole. 
The region, which used to be a highly 'securitized' area, is shifting towards 'de- 
securitization'. This, however, does not mean that the vestiges of mutual mistrust 
between the Baltic States and Russia have been laid to rest. A shared sense of a security 
community is lacking in the BSR. Much still has to be done. It remains for international 
and regional actors, the Baltic States among them, to find new ways to engage Russia 
more actively into regional cooperation. All the countries in the region, including the 
Baltics, share a common interest to bring Russia closer to the Euro-Atlantic community 
and involve her in an open dialogue on security and defence affairs. This would further 
contribute to confidence and cooperative security building in the region. 
9.5.4. Perspectivesfor the Baltics in countering Russia-related threats andpromoting 
co-o erative Russo-Baltic relations p 
The fundamental long-term interest of the Baltic States is to have Russia as a credible 
and predictable partner. As long as Russia falls short of these characteristics, the Baltics 
should pursue a 'cautious neighbourhood' policy towards Russia and be prepared to 
respond to Russia-related threats. The Baltic States have, nevertheless, to identify a 
changed situation in their interaction with Russia and create a new strategy for a 
mutually acceptable modus vivendi. Current Russo-Baltic tensions manifest themselves 
in a more sophisticated way. Therefore it is of crucial importance for the Baltic States to 
thoroughly assess the complexity and ambiguity of the state of affairs. 
Russia's integration with Western security structures, which has been developing 
according to the model of concert of great powers, as opposed to the principles of 
topening' to the West, is dangerous for the Baltic States. This turns into a threat to 
national security of the Baltic countries and constrains their foreign policies. On the 
other hand, membership into Euro-Atlantic institutions has considerably increased the 
structural power of the Baltic States; they have acquired new levers that allow them, at 
least in part, to restrict Russia's actions. There are three areas where the Baltic States 
can affect Russia's behaviour. First of all, being EU members, the Baltic countries may 
have an impact on soft security issues, i. e. they may influence political, economic and 
social processes in Russia and her relations in these aspects with the EU. Second, as 
NATO members, the Baltic States may equally have an impact on Russia"s relations 
with the West in hard security area. Third opportunity that has opened for the Baltics - 
to become 'experts' on Russia in the West and use this expertise in shaping Western 
strategy vis-A-vis Russia. 
An essential task for the Baltics is to work out the most appropriate strategy to respond 
to Russia-related threats and challenges. It is obvious that only the essential 
transformation of Russian domestic and foreign politics would enable the neutralisation 
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of these threats. There are three overlapping levels, where ongoing processes may create 
conditions for the neutralisation of Russia-related threats: 
First, Russia's rejection of Eurasian geopolitical concept and her move towards 
universal integration with Euro-Atlantic space, i. e. 'opening' to the West; 
Second, transformation of Russia as a politically authoritarian state with centralised 
economy into a state which is based on democratic values and principles of market 
economy-, 
Third, transformation of Russia's mentality from a great power to a national state -a 
regional power. 
A major goal for the Baltic countries is to reduce Russia-related threats by acting in two 
ways: directly - through bilateral relations with Russia, engagement with her institutions 
and other bodies; and indirectly - through making influence on Russia's structural 
environment. The direct way is aimed at binding Russia to the Euro-Atlantic space, 
which would stimulate Russia to assume obligations in the spheres of democracy and 
liberalisation of economy, and curtail her expansionist tendencies by concentrating on 
the tasks of domestic economic and social development. The indirect way is perceived 
as dernocratisation or 'europeanization' of the post-Soviet space, i. e. spreading of 
European values towards the East. In practice, this has been taking place with the 
involvement of Euro-Atlantic institutions and Western European states in the post- 
Soviet space. In fact, the Baltic States have already contributed a great deal to the 
democratisation of the post-Soviet space by extending security and stability to the 
Eastern neighbourhood: to such countries as Ukraine, South Caucasus, Moldova and 
Belarus. It is worth stressing that, when acting in both ways, the Baltic States should 
make use, to the possible extent, the tools related to their increased structural power, as 
a result of their membership of NATO and the EU. 
Baltic activities in the post-Soviet space should be focussed on the following directions: 
First, strengthening political independence of Belarus and Ukraine from Russia; 
Second, strengthening the development of civil societies and democracy in South 
Caucasus states; supporting the internal consolidation of this sub-region, which would 
curb Russian military and political influence in separate South Caucasus countries, and 
seeking to increase the role of South Caucasus sub-region as an alternative corridor for 
oil and gas transit to Europe, thus, reducing the Baltic dependence on Russian energy 
resources. 
Third, supporting the integration of Ukraine, South Caucasus states (especially Georgia) 
and Moldova into Euro-Atlantic security structures; 
Fourth, seeking to neutralise the impact of Russia's created system of 'geopolitical 
hostages' - separatist structures in Transdnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia - on the 
political orientation of Moldova and Georgia; 
Fifth, supporting regional security projects, such as GUAM; 
Sixth, changing Russia's attitude to the limits of her 'sphere of influence' or 'natural 
interest zone'. One of the key factors, which supposes, in Moscow's view, the 
subordination of the Baltic States to Russian sphere of influence, is the Kaliningrad 
oblast. Therefore consequent 'europeanization' of the Kaliningrad region would turn it 
from a political object into a subject, which, even remaining as an integral part of 
Russia, would be more under EU, rather than Russian, influence. The Baltic States 
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should seek ftirther demilitarisation of Kaliningrad or, at least, the reduction of a 
relative influence of the military sector on the functioning of the oblast. 
The real conditions for Russia's 'opening' to the West may appear only if Russia starts 
to implement fundamental internal reforms, first of all, the programme of liberalisation 
of her national economy. This process could be pursued with the help of supporting 
efforts of Western European states and international organisations (e. g. the WTO and 
international Monetary Fund), which possess structural power levers to liberalise 
Russian economy. Economic liberalisation would enable: first, to limit the influence of 
Russian political regime on commercial economic structures; second, to increase 
opportunities for Western capital to enter Russia's domestic market; third, to create 
conditions for the CIS and the Baltic States to transform their direct dependence on 
Russian specific sectors (primarily the energy sector) into 'contractual' dependence on 
autonomous subjects (private firms) of the Russian economy; fourth, to establish 
conditions for Russia's political 'binding' to the West. 
The enduring goal of the energy policy of the Baltic States is to considerably reduce 
their energy vulnerability, i. e. three-fold dependence on Russian energy: dependence on 
import, dependence on one source and dependence on infrastructure - gas and oil 
pipelines. Seeking to minimise such a dependence, it is of crucial importance for the 
Baltics to intensify energy dialogue with Western European and CEE states, as well as 
with the states of the Caspian Sea region (South Caucasus) and Central Asia, which are 
extracting oil and gas. 
Taking into account the strategic imperatives of Russia's European and international 
agenda, the Baltic policy vis-h-vis Russia should be two-fold: 
First, a positive and comprehensive Russo-Baltic dialogue is possible in the event that 
Russia abandons her hidden expansionist strategy and allows democratic processes to 
intensify within the state, and consistently implements economic reforms, first of all the 
liberalisation of the energy sector. 
Second, as long as Russia's cooperation with Western security structures is based on the 
logic of concert of great powers, and essential Russia's political and economic reforms 
are further delayed, preventive measures should dominate Baltic policies towards 
Russia. In other words, the Baltic States should pursue a policy of 'cautious 
neighbourhood': not dissociate themselves from Russia, make use of all the advantages 
of cooperation with her, and, simultaneously, to constantly monitor Russia-related 
threats and undertake preventive measures to neutralise them. 
Two major groups of Baltic foreign policy needs vis-A-vis Russia can be identified: the 
defensive/preventive needs and the cooperative needs or the policy of engagement. The 
fulfilment of these principal needs (two equally important goals) is related with two 
factors: 
First, Russia's involvement in the Euro-Atlantic space is possible only if Russia is 
ready to be involved as an equal partner but not seeking to increase her structural power, 
which potentially may be directed towards suppression of the Baltic interests. 
Second, the regular maintaining and strengthening of relations with Russia, as well as 
cooperation with Russian representatives in multilateral formats, should take such 
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means and forms that contribute to the creation of a positive image of the Baltic States, 
or at least do not increase Russia's opposition to the Baltics. 
The defensive/preventive needs encompass the three kinds of goals to be pursued 
seeking to reduce current Russia-related threats to the Baltic States. 
Political goals include: making Russia a credible and predictable partner; promoting 
dernocratisation and political pluralism in Russia via Euro-Atlantic structures; not 
permitting Russia to halt the EU's internal integration and, by exploiting of the NATO- 
Russia Council, to take control of the Alliance's agenda and undermine the 
effectiveness of NATO decision making; and reducing the influence of Russia's 
military structures and special services on her foreign policy and on political, economic 
and social processes of neighbouring states. 
Economic goals comprise: lessening the dependence of Russian economic subjects on 
the political regime; boosting the attractiveness of the Baltic States as economic 
gateway between the West and the East; and reducing Russian influence on the 
economic subjects of the Baltic countries. 
Social, cultural and informational goals are: strengthening Russia's orientation to 
internal social stability aimed at creating the 'welfare state' and curtailing Russia's 
cultural and informational expansion to the Baltic countries for the purpose of 
propaganda and disinformation (i. e. seeking to increase tension in Russo-Baltic 
relations, provoke the division within the Baltic societies, impair the image of the Baltic 
States, and so on). 
The realization of the cooperative needs should be based on supporting Russia's 
positions on separate areas provided this is not against the Baltic interests. With the help 
of EU-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation mechanisms the Baltic States should seek 
to positively influence the agenda of Russian foreign and domestic policy. There are 
several directions that provide opportunities for maintaining cooperative Russo-Baltic 
relations: 
To promote mutually positive rhetoric (public discourse) in Russia and the West. The 
Baltic States should seek to form a favourable discourse and public opinion within the 
Russian society, the elite and other specific groups. The ways of achieving this goal 
include the presentation of positive aspects in Baltic-Russo relations, foreseeing the 
, target audiences' (e. g. Russia's big European cities), involving cultural activities, and 
so on. 
To support Russia-EU cooperation on four spaces. Efficient cooperation in this sphere 
may help achieve not only 'civilised' relations between Russia and the EU based on 
European values but also the realisation of some specific Baltic interests. For instance, 
economic cooperation between Russia and the EU, including the Baltic States, may help 
them strengthen the status of gateway between the West and the East. It should also 
promote more rapid social and economic development of the Kaliningrad oblast. The 
Baltic countries should aim for this Russia-EU project to become an effective 
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mechanism of engaging Russia in European space but not to turn to an additional room 
for Russia's geopolitical manoeuvres. 
To support Russia's membership in the JVTO. Russia's involvement in the liberal trans- 
continental network would increase opportunities for the Baltic States to transform their 
current dependence on Russian energy sources to 'contractual' dependence, i. e. 
relations based on the principles of business and the law. 
To promote practical cooperation with Russia in the security area. The Baltic States 
should particularly support Russia-NATO-EU cooperation in the fight against terrorism. 
In addition, they may initiate common projects or exercises in the Baltic Sea and invite 
Russian officers to Baltic military education institutions; this would contribute to the 
building of mutual trust and confidence between Russia and the Baltic States. 
To promote the building of civil society and social activities in Russia's 'pilot' regions, 
such as Kaliningrad, Pskov, St. Petersburg. The key sectors that need such a support are 
protection of human rights, environmental security, cooperation between public and 
private sectors, and so on. 
To promote projects of regional cooperation in ýpilot' regions. This would open 
additional opportunities for the Baltic States to demonstrate the advantages of their 
active policy in these regions. 
To intensify pragmatic economic, social, and cultural relations. The Baltic States, 
jointly with other Western countries, may provide consultations for Russia's private 
sector and NGOs- 
To support Russia's mediating role in relieving possible threats to regional and global 
security. The Baltic support to such Russian activities or the recognition of Russia's role 
in maintaining stability in the international system, provided this does not contradict 
national interests of the Baltic States, should contribute to constructive Baltic-Russo 
interaction in international formats. 
By and large, all these Baltic activities should be focussed on involving Russia in 
European space. This particularly concerns the neighbouring region - the Kaliningrad 
oblast - that has a direct border with Lithuania. Kaliningrad is not only a challenge but 
equally a 'window of opportunity' for Lithuania's cooperative initiatives. The key 
Lithuanian policy goal towards Kaliningrad is to design the model of the oblast's 
development that is congruous with Lithuanian and European interests and to identify 
the conditions, which would allow to promote political and economic transformations of 
the oblast. 
By solving (or largely only imitating the process of solution) economic and social 
problems of the oblast in the 'encirclement, of Euro-Atlantic structures, Russia prefers a 
bilateral engagement with big Western European powers, first of all Germany, while 
bypassing Kaliningrad's immediate neighbours - Lithuania and Poland. Thus, Russia 
artificially increases tension between EU members and reduces opportunities for 
regional cooperation among the Baltic Sea states in solving the Kaliningrad's problems 
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in substance. On the other hand, Russia, by escalating the Kaliningrad problem, uses it 
as a blackmailing tool ('geopolitical hostage') in order to get concessions in other areas 
of Russia-NATO and, particularly, Russia-EU relations. Such tendencies are very 
unfavourable for Lithuania, since she is eliminated from the solution of the Kaliningrad- 
related issues and becomes a potential hostage of agreement between Russia and 
Germany (and eventually the EU). 
That said, one of the major tasks of Lithuanian Policy vis-A-vis Kaliningrad is to restrict 
Russia's possibilities to exploit the Kaliningrad issue on a bilateral level of large 
European powers. The solution of the Kaliningrad-related problems should be sought on 
a local or regional level. In other words, the elimination of the Kaliningrad issue from a 
bilateral big-power level should correlate with a growing influence of Lithuania, Poland 
and other regional players (the Nordic states) in solving questions related to the political 
and economic status of the oblast. The task for Lithuania, by acting jointly with Poland, 
is to consolidate her participation in decision-making process vis-h-vis Kaliningrad. 
This is the first necessary condition when seeking the balanced development of the 
oblast. The second condition is the transformation of the Kaliningrad oblast to a 'pilot' 
region: this would create conditions for geopolitical change and encourage the oblast's 
move towards political autonomy. Moreover, the concept of a 'pilot' region should be 
based on the creation of favourable economic environment for foreign investments in 
the oblast (as a free economic zone), the penetration of Western capital and the increase 
of transit importance of the region. Finally, the third condition - demilitarisation of 
Kaliningrad would weaken 'centripetal' tendencies in the oblast, i. e. its dependence on 
the federal centre. 
it is possible to affirm that Russia and the EU command sufficient political and 
economic power to turn the Kaliningrad region to a successful model of Russia-EU 
cooperation -a 'pilot' region. It is equally obvious that a key condition for such a 
transformation is liberalisation of Russian policies in both economic and political 
sectors. On the other hand, current actions of the federal centre show that critical 
changes in its policies vis-A-vis Kaliningrad, at least in a short-term, are hardly possible: 
Moscow takes priority of the political centralisation of the state, which implies the 
political subordination of the region. This sets the goal for the Baltic States, particularly 
for Lithuania: when decreasing Kaliningrad's vertical subordination to the federal 
centre, to engage the oblast, as much as possible, in the EU space. 
The achievement of this goal would require the implementation of the following tasks: 
First, in order to achieve solidarity among EU states vis-A-vis Kaliningrad, it is 
necessary that the Kaliningrad question should be considered at EU-level, not at a 
bilateral level of big European powers; 
Second, to initiate projects that would involve the oblast in the networks of European 
infrastructure; 
Third, to monitor economic processes in the oblast; 
Fourth, to initiate the establishment of coordination centres in the Baltic States (in 
Lithuania) that would be responsible for the formulation and taking control over 
coherent Baltic policies vis-A-vis Kaliningrad; to intensify cooperation with the region 
at a municipal level; 
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Fifth, to intensify the dialogue between Baltic and Kaliningrad societies, especially 
between economic and academic elites with the aim of promoting the formation of 
Kaliningrad identity and the oblast's integration into the Baltic region. 
All in all, a positive agenda must be worked out to bring Russia closer to the Euro- 
Atlantic community and involve her into an open dialogue on security and defence 
affairs. NATO-Russia and EU-Russia relationships, entering new levels of cooperation, 
provide the Baltic countries with an opportunity to bring the expertise of their relations 
with Russia to the NATO and EU tables. The Baltic States should continue pursuing a 
policy aimed at creating stability and security zone in the EU's Eastern neighbourhood, 
which is perfectly in line with EU policy toward a Wider Europe. The Baltic 
contribution should include democratisation and strengthening the political 
independence of these Eastern neighbours and participation in the initiatives aimed at 
spreading security and stability as well as reducing development gap further east. 
I 71bere terms are used in Laurinavidius, Motieka, Statkus, p. 324. 
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GLOSSARY 
ABM - Anti-Ballistic Missiles 
BALTBAT - Baltic (Peace Forces) Battalion 
BALTDEFCOL - Baltic Defence College 
BALTNET - Baltic Air Surveillance Network 
BALTRON - Baltic Naval Squadron 
BALTSEA - Baltic Security Assistance 
BCM - Baltic Council of Ministers 
BNS - Baltic News Service 
BSR - Baltic Sea Region 
CBC- cross-border co-operation 
CBSS - Council of the Baltic Sea States 
CFDP - Council of Foreign and Defence policy (in Moscow) 
CFE - Conventional Forces in Europe 
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security policy 
CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States 
CRC - Control and Reporting Centre 
CRRF - Common Rapid Reaction Forces 
CSBM - confidence and security building measures 
CSCE - Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
CSO - Collective Security Organisation 
CSIS - Centre for Strategic & International Studies 
CSR - Common Strategy on Russia 
CSRC. - Conflict Studies Research Centre 
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CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
DCMT - Defence College of Management and Technology 
DIIA - Danish Institute of International Affairs 
DWP - Defence White Paper 
EAPC - Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
EC - European Connnission 
EEC - Eurasian Economic Community 
ENP - European Neighbourhood Policy 
EUPM - EU Police Mission 
ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy 
FAPS1 - Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information 
FBGS - Federal Border Guard Service 
FDI - foreign direct investment 
FIG - financial-industrial groups 
MIA - Finnish Institute of International Affairs 
FIS - Foreign Intelligence Service 
FSB - Federal Security Service 
FSU - former Soviet Union 
FTD - facilitated transit document 
FRTD - facilitated rail travel document 
G-8 - Group of Eight 
GS - General Staff 
GUUAM - Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova (see explanation in 
vocabulary) 
IAIR - Institute for Applied International Research 
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IAIR -Institute for Applied International Research 
IASPS - Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies 
ICBMs - Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles 
IISS - International Institute for Strategic Studies 
IIRPC -Institute of International Relations and Political Science 
INOGATE - Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe 
JHA - Justice and Home Affairs 
LATA - Lithuanian Atlantic Treaty Association 
MIA - Latvian Institute of International Affairs 
MIC - military industrial complex 
NAC - North Atlantic Council 
NACC - NATO Atlantic Cooperation Council 
NATINEADS - NATO Integrated Air Defence System 
NCOs - non-commissioned officers 
ND - Northern Dimension 
NCM - Nordic Council of Ministers 
ND - Northern Dimension 
NEGP - North European Gas Pipeline 
NEI - Northern European Initiative 
NGO - non-govemmental organisation 
NI - Ni a Imfiative 
NMD - National Missile Defence 
NPP - Nuclear Power Plant 
NRC - NATO-Russia Council 
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OPEC - Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries 
OSCE - Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe 
PCA - Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
PfP - Partnership for Peace 
PRF - Pennanent Readiness Forces 
PJC - Permanent Joint Council 
RASCC - Regional Air Surveillance Co-ordination Centre 
RIIA - Royal Institute of International Affairs 
RRF - Rapid Reaction Forces 
PRF - Permanent Readiness Forces 
R. U. E. - Russia in the United Europe 
CSIS - Center for Strategic & International Studies 
SCO - Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SCSI - Strategic and Combat Studies Institute 
SES - Single Economic Space 
SEZ - Special Economic Zone 
SMEs - Small and Medium Enterprises 
SOFA - Status of Forces Agreement 
SOR - Strategic Offensive Reductions 
TACIS - Technical Assistance to the CIS 
UES - Unified Energy Systems 
VD - Vienna Document 
WMD - weapons of mass destruction 
WTO - World Trade Organisation 
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VOCABULARY 
Change of a state's geopolitical influence -a change of a state's power inside a 
geopolitical region and/ or in regard to other geopolitical subjects (liberation from 
influence, spread of influence, control, division/sharing of influence, loss of influence, 
retreat, dependency). 
Concert ofgreat powers - an informal union of great powers showing their interests to 
solve international problems by consent. It is based on the logic of geopolitical 
maneuvering. 
De-occupation - the consolidation of independence; it encompasses legal, political and 
economic de-occupation. 
De-securitization - is to be understood as the shift from hard security issues back to the 
normal political game and bargaining. 
Geopolitics traditionally indicates the links and causal relationships between the 
political power and geographic space. It studies political and strategic significance of 
geography, which is defined in terms of the location, size and resources of places. It 
combines geo-economics (geo-energetics) and geo-strategy. 
Geo-economics - analyses the distribution of economic power and the changes of this 
distribution across the Earth. It can be defined as the concentration of economic power 
and its projection to achieve political goals. 
Geo-energetics - analyses an uneven spatial distribution of energy resources in the 
Earth and particularities of their transportation, how this inequality gives geo. 
economical and, eventually, geopolitical supremacy for particular political subjects over 
others and how this supremacy can be exploited or neutralised. It is about concentration 
of energy resources and projection of power to achieve political goals. 
Geopolitical bridge(gateway) -a spatial political entity, which connects (i. e. performs 
the function of a bridge) different geopolitical regions, also regions and states, thus 
facilitating the exchange of people, ideas and goods. 
Geopolitical buffer -a neutral state or group of states, which separates territories or 
zones of influence of geopolitical actors (or their allies), thus lowering the probability of 
direct conflict. 
Geo-strategy -a long-ten-n concentration of a state's power and its Projection in various 
dimensions of space (land, sea, air, outer space, cyberspace) to achieve its own 
objectives. The state's geo-strategic position is its capacity to spread its power or to 
block others' attempts to do so in those spatial dimensions. 
GUAMIGUUAM - Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova Group formally founded 
in 1997 as a political, economic and strategic alliance designed to strengthen the 
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independence and sovereignty of these CIS countries. The group was created as a way 
of countering the influence of Russia in the area. In 1999, it was renamed GUUAM due 
to the membership of Uzbekistan, which, however, withdrew from the organisation in 
2005, causing the restoration of the original name. 
Modernity and post-modernity - refer to changes in social and economic institutions. 
Modem can mean all post-medieval European history in the context of dividing history 
into three large epochs: Ancient history, the Middle Ages and Modem. In general, 
modernity reflects industrial society; post-modemity - post-industrial society. 
Modernism and post-modernism (not to be confused with modernity and post. 
modernity) - are associated with aesthetic and intellectual movements such as in the 
architecture and literature. 
Regionalization - as a concept, it is part of integration theory. Within this framework, 
various criteria are employed for identifying different regional configurations: 
geographical (location), economic, transactional (volume and frequency of exchange of 
people, goods and services), and so on. 
Relative power of the state - the potential or capability of the state to control the 
interaction with other states; it is the entirety of various resources of the state (military, 
economic, social, political and cultural ones). 
Securitization -a term introduced by the so-called Copenhagen School. It refers to the 
processes whereby interaction becomes centred on issues of hard security. 
Structural power of the state - the capability of the state to set the rules of international 
relations, its agenda and the rules of decision making. 
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Appendix A: Economic Reform 
Is Russia's economic transition over? According to Vladimir Mau, Director of the 
Centre for Economic Reform of the Russian Government, Russia faced four transition 
processes within 10- 15 years. The first was an economic crisis, which lasted longer than 
in Poland but shorter than in Belarus or Argentina. The second was post-economic 
transition, having a very specific character in Russia. But the most important was the 
third process - the crisis of industrial society, which might be compared to the crisis in 
the U. S. in the 1970s. Finally, the fourth process is revolutionary transformation. The 
government is not able to control it and, in Mau's view, this explains everything what 
the previous three processes could not explain! 
The first three processes are over; macroeconomic stabilisation has been achieved, and 
the process of revolutionary transformation, involving both the dismantling of the old 
state systems and their subsequent rebuilding, comes to an end as well. Whilst to some 
extent Russia is a modem and technologically advanced country, she faces challenges 
different from those experienced by Western countries in the 1970s during their 
transition from industrial to post-industrial societies. 2 The post-communist 
transformation of the Russian economy from totally state-controlled to a market 
economy has had an impact on this transition process. In short, the post-communist 
period is over, and the current real challenge for Russia is the country's transition to 
post-industrialisation; this process can only be described upon its completion. In Mau's 
view, it is more accurate to describe the current Russia's phase of reform as post- 
industrial 'catching up'. 3 
In 2001, by resuming market reform, Putin sought to prove that the consolidation of 
power was not a goal in itself. Putin's agenda came into focus: a strong state with 
elements of authoritarianism in combination with some kind of economic liberalism. 
Putin used Portugal's level of economic development as a stage that Russia needs to 
reach quickly. Even if Russia's GDP grows at 8 percent a year, it will take her 15 years 
to catch up with today's Portugal or Spain. 4 In other words, it could take a generation 
for Russia to fix her economic problems: for the next 15-20 years Russia will lag behind 
the leading group of industrial countries even if she succeeds in implementing a 
successful economic policy. 
The dimensions of Russia's integration into the world economy, as of any other country, 
have, among others, institutional aspects. Putin has consistently promoted Russia's 
greater integration into economic supranational entities - the EU, the WTO and the G8. 
Economic growth and integration into the world economy dominated several of his 
annual State of the Nation speeches, delivered to the Federal Assembly 
of the Russian Federation. In May 2003, Putin set the target - the country's gross 
domestic product (GDP) must double in ten years (i. e. by 2012). Putin also noted part of 
the problem: 'Russian bureaucracy has proven ill-prepared', and part of the solution: 
'the success of the country greatly depends on the Russian entrepreneur's success', 
which requires a long way to go. 5 In 2004, after the re-election for a second term, in his 
annual address to the Federal Assembly Putin outlined plans to keep the country from 
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being 'pushed to the outskirts of the global economy', saying that Russia needs 'to grow 
faster than the rest of the world'. 6 He predicted that the country's economy would 
double by 2010 (instead of the previous target date of 2012), bringing down annual 
inflation to 3 percent within the same timeframe. The real essence of Putin's economic 
agenda is a plan to establish a full mortgage market. This would not only allow citizens 
to develop equity but would also provide reliable income for domestic investment - 
something Russia has lacked for many years. No less important is Putin's aim to 
achieve a fully convertible rouble, which would remove one of the most serious 
obstacles to foreign investment. In order to create a viable market, further structural 
reorganisation of the Russian economy is badly needed in key sectors, including 
banking reform, the creation of securities market, a reduction in state regulation, and the 
expansion of private initiative. The question is whether the Kremlin feels the urgency to 
push these reforms. 7 
It is obvious that Putin's reforms require closer cooperation with the West. After the 
enlargement, the European Union started to account for over 50 percent of Russia's 
foreign trade turnover. Putin attaches a high priority to the WTO membership, 
motivated primarily by political and civilizational factors. Not belonging to the WTO, 
Russia cannot pretend to be an integrated and 'normal' member of the international 
community and successfully promote her economic interests abroad. At the same time, 
Moscow's selective understanding of 'integration' is reflected in its attempts to obtain 
membership on concessionary terms. 
Russia's integration into the world economy is not confined to the flow of goods, capital 
and labour. An area where much remains to be done is the building of the infrastructure, 
linking Russia with the world economy, which, in turn, requires heavy capital 
investment. Therefore radical improvement in investment growth is a major objective 
for the government. A major obstacle to attractng foreign investments is high level of 
regulation of the Russian economy. According to Evgeny Gavrilenkov, the Russian 
economy is very closed at 'exit points'. 8 There is a direct correlation between the level 
of regulation of Russian economy, the concentration of bureaucracy and the investment 
ratio: the more economically regulated the region, the more bureaucrats and the less 
investment rate it has. Futhermore, the more bureaucracy is growing, the less small 
business is being developed and the higher unemployment is. 9 
Pursuing his state building and modernisation project, Putin realises that Russia needs 
an effectively functioning private-sector economy to thrive. However, while the 
command economy was dismantled, a functioning market economy has not flourished. 
Many state-owned enterprises enjoy a privileged position, despite the fact that business 
in the private sector is generally more efficient. Advantageous procurement contracts, 
clear conflicts of interests among state officials and pursuit of political projects are the 
most prominent features of the state-owned business sector. 
Where Russia remains particularly weak is in promoting SMEs. According to Opora, a 
small business lobby group, in 2004 a number of SMEs reached 950,000, accounting for 
13 percent of GDP compared with more than 50 percent in many Western economies. 10 
Furthermore, what Russia has not achieved is competitive manufacturing industry. 
Russia is almost left out of the revolution of information technology, let alone the post- 
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industrial development as such. The systematic risks of investing in Russia remain high, 
and the total volume of FDI is very small compared to the scale of the Russian economy 
and its potential. " As a result of the Yukos affair, investor confidence has declined and 
foreign investment slumped due to the fear of instability. 12 
I Mau, V., 'Building and economy to underpin political progress and social change', Presentation at the Wilton Park 
Conference 668 'Putin's Russia: Two Years on' (UK, I1 -15 March). 
2A transition phase often described as 'stagflation'; there is a decline in more traditional sectors with substantial 
growth in new sectors (in Russia, the telecommunications and electronic industries are growing annually by as much 
as one third since 1998). Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Starobin, Fairlamb, Crock, p. 49. 
5 'Poslaniye Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii' [Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation], Moscow, the Kremlin (16 May 2003); httD: //www. kremlin. ru/events/detail/2003/05/44646. shtmi. 
"Poslaniye Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii' (2004). 
7 The Ten-Year Strategic Programme (sometime known as the Gref Programme) is to tackle many issues necessary 
for the country's economic progress, including tax reform, fiscal reform, the Land Code, banking reform, pensions 
refonn, etc. 
8 Gavrilenkov, E., 'Foreign direct investment: what needs to be done to maximise the prospects for foreign direct 
investment', Presentation at the Wilton Park Conference 'Putin's Russia: Two Years on' (UK, 11-15 March). 
9Average concentration of bureaucracy is 8 bureaucrats per 1000 people, but in some regions it reach 16-17 per 1000. 
Ibid. 
10 Buckley, N., 'With his eye on keeping control, Putin misses a moment for economic reform', in Financial Times 
(15 Apr 2005). 
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Federation Project (Chatham House, Aug 2004). 
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Appendix B: NMD and ABM 
The Russian policy response to the NMD plans of the United States had combined 
alarm and assertiveness with a willingness, particularly demonstrated after 9/11, to find 
some kind of a compromise, i. e. some sort of a legally binding document to be signed 
on offensive arms limitation. For years, Russia used to warn that loss of the 1972 ABM 
Treaty would undermine the nuclear strategic stability on which the delicate balance of 
forces rested during the Cold War. Moscow claimed that without this treaty other an'ns 
control agreements could not stand, and threatened a new arms race that would restore 
the Cold War acrimony. For Russia, the ABM Treaty was a guarantee against U. S. 
building a shield that would render worthless Russian nuclear arsenal - one of the last 
remaining tokens of her superpower status - by creating the possibility, however 
hypothetical, of an American first strike. 
Yet, some changes occurred between the first Russian warnings in 1999 and Bush's 
decision in December 2001 to withdraw from the treaty. At the very start the idea of a 
disagreement between American and Russian presidents about U. S. missile defence 
plans was seen as a looming diplomatic disaster. But given the new warmth between the 
leaders since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the difference of opinion over this issue was 
expected not to divide Russia and the United States. By calling it merely a 'mistake' 
rather than a catastrophe, Putin claimed that it would not cause a crisis situation in 
Russian-U. S. relations, as it was expected. Not only had Moscow withdrawn from any 
arms control agreements; instead, Russia and the United States started to move forward 
with the discussions for a new agreement on deep cuts in strategic arms that would not 
threaten the interests of both countries and of the world. ' 
Was it just 9/11 that so fundamentally altered the strategic environment from Putin's 
perspective that his views on nuclear issues underwent such a metamorphosis? Or did 
Putin recognize that in Russia's weakened condition there was little his country could 
do in response to the U. S. offensive and defensive nuclear strategy that would advance 
American interests? No single explanation is sufficient. To understand the response of 
the Putin administration to the U. S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty one must account 
for 9/11 and changing Russian foreign policy priorities, the post-Cold War structure of 
the international system, and particularly, Putin's calculations in a domestic and foreign 
policy context. 
In short, what happened was that the Russian government, to borrow Celester 
Wallander's phrase, has bet it 'will not loose as much from a world without [the ABM] 
treaty as it will gain from the United States willing to co-operate'. 2 In keeping with this 
new mood, the U. S. gave Russia something she badly wanted - an agreement by both 
sides to slash the size of their strategic arsenals from the current total of about 7,000 
deployed nuclear warheads to a fraction of that number - to between 1,700 and 2,200 
over the next ten years. This agreement came just in time to relieve Russia of a financial 
burden that she could not sustain. Russia ideally liked the number of warheads reduced 
to 1,500 each. Thus the agreement to cut nuclear delivery systems to below 2,200 per 
side produced neither relief nor apprehension. 
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Given the improbability of Western nuclear or conventional attack, the formalisation of 
arms control agreements with the United States became above all important for Russia 
geopolitically. The whole of Russia's vehement opposition to U. S. strategic missile 
defence plans should be seen in this light. The real point in resisting Washington's plans 
was that Moscow was no longer able to challenge them. In short, the darna e was not to 
Russia's physical security, but to her 'geopolitical stature and self-respect'. 
The deep power asymmetry between the United States and Russia meant that, when it 
came time for changes in their relationship, in many respects Moscow did not have a 
choice but to go along with what the Bush administration wanted. However, the U. S. 
withdrawal soon after the American-Russian rapprochement in the wake of 9/11 was 'an 
embarrassing slap in the face 94 and a disappointment for Putin. His relatively mild 
response to U. S. withdrawal could thus be seen as an attempt to distract attention from 
Washington's poor treatment of Moscow, which seemed to suggest that Russia was not 
in fact that important in the post-9/1 I world'. 5 
Apparently, Russia accepted, from a position of weakness, a deal with the United States 
on nuclear weapons - sensible, given that she was barely able to keep the ones she had 
- and Putin decided not to make a fuss about American intension to build missile 
defences. It was also understandable that even if Russia had insisted in the preservation 
of the ABM Treaty, she could do little about it in practical terms as the U. S. was 
pushing ahead with the NMD. 
For American officials, this change of stance by the Kremlin was a welcome re- 
interpretation by Russia of her own interests. The anti-missile defences, which the U. S. 
wanted to deploy were not directed at Russia's large rocket forces, but at the much 
smaller arsenals that 'rogue states' (Iran, Iraq or North Korea) may one day direct at the 
United States. Whatever the scope of the American system, it was unlikely to be 
extensive enough to stop a full-scale attack by hundreds of Russian rockets. From this 
point of view, Russia had every interest in giving U. S. the flexibility she wanted, as 
long as Moscow was able to extract a high enough diplomatic price. 6 
As Sergey Rogov, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of U. S. and 
Canada Studies, noted in the beginning of 2002, 'Russian-American treaty on mutual 
security could replace the 1972 ABM Treaty'. In his view, such a document would 
never end up as the ABM Treaty did, for 'it will be a document concerning political and 
7 military partnership rather than reciprocal control'. It is noteworthy that during the 
whole period of talks with his counterpart, Putin wanted to codify the cuts in a fully- 
fledged arms control treaty - complete with timetables and verification. Bush, however, 
insisted that a gentlemen's agreement or handshake would suffice. 
To quote Andrew Kuchins, Director of Russian and Eurasian Programme of Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Russia 'faced ( ... )a choice between a bad treaty or 
no treaty at all 8- between accepting a treaty that allows maximum flexibility for both 
the U. S. and Russia or risking the complete demise of arms control regime. The final 
outcome - the Strategic Offensive Reductions (SOR) Treaty9 that was signed in 
Moscow in May 2002 and called 'the funeral of the Cold War'10, bears little 
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resemblance to the comprehensive treaties that were at the heart of international arms 
control efforts since the 1970s. " 
Declarations of good intentions notwithstanding, the treaty's main deficiency is the lack 
of clear-cut control mechanisms: there are 'no timetables and very little monitoring'. 
Instead, there is 'much discretion whether to store rather than scrap the weapons'. 12 
Parties to the treaty will be free to mix and match their arsenals, subject to the rules 
agreed under START I Treaty, which forms the legal underpinning for the new treaty. 13 
This suits the United States, which wants to keep maximum flexibility. But it presents a 
dilemma for Russia, which faces growing pressure to downsize her nuclear stockpile, 
not least for financial reasons. Russia also had to swallow hard to accept an unusually 
short notice for withdrawal from the treaty and the absence of any explicit links to U. S. 
plans for a missile defence system. 14 
By and large, in the past decade, Russian-U. S. relations have changed drastically 
including their relations in the nuclear sphere. Both sides have reached an 
unprecedented level of mutual transparency in the nuclear field, which was impossible 
to imagine during the Cold War. Nevertheless, in their doctrines and operational plans 
for the use of strategic nuclear forces, both Russia and the U. S. continue to proceed 
from the concept of mutual nuclear deterrence. What is more, it was Putin's tactic to 
play down the idea of strategic stability (as he did with other geopolitical concepts), but 
this in no way signifies its irrelevance. Moscow's insistence that nuclear weapons 
reductions would be formalised in a legally binding agreement with Washington 
demonstrated its continuing attachment to strategic stability and parity, and to 
preserving what it can of Russia's geopolitical status. The importance of these priorities 
was so overriding that Moscow showed unusual flexibility on such contentious issues as 
the disposal or storage, instead of destruction, of nuclear warheads to be eliminated 
according to the agreement. 15 
In summary, Russian acquiescence on this deal is another step forward in U. S. -Russian 
relations, going beyond mutually assured destruction, but hardly a conclusive leap. For 
one thing, it was the most radical cut in history in strategic nuclear stockpiles. For 
another, sceptics say that the SOR Treaty, albeit being heralded as a landmark treaty and 
as 'the final nail in the coffin of the Cold War' 16 , may have limited practical effect. Clearly, it will be implemented because both sides have reasons to reduce their nuclear 
stockpiles unilaterally anyway. And doing together helps build mutual trust. Perhaps 
even more important is that parties also agreed to a New Strategic Framework, a 
political declaration that redefined the U. S. -Russian agenda, with a new emphasis on 
co-operation and joint action to face the common problems that confront them in the 
new millennium. 
The most salient conclusion that could be drawn from Russia's position on the ABM 
Treaty withdrawal and the SOR Treaty is that, ironically enough, Moscow is taking a 
4major step towards getting beyond the parity paradigm' 17 that has characterised the 
U. S. -Russian nuclear relationship. Although the Treaty maintains the appearance of 
parity, reality looks different. Because of financial constraints, Russia is likely to deploy 
1,700 or fewer nuclear warheads while the United States will remain at the 2,200 
warhead upper limit allowed by the Treaty. 18 Nuclear parity will therefore no longer 
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exist. Thus, the SOR Treaty is the 'first document that does not regulate mutual nuclear 
deterrence in U. S. -Russian relations'. 19 At the same time, it does not offer a new basis 
to replace deterrence for developing a relationship between the U. S. and Russia. Nor 
does it create a genuine 'new framework for strategic stability, 20 , which has lately been 
the subject of expert deliberations on both sides. 
All in all, the SOR Treaty, in all probability, will be the last 'traditional' arms control 
agreement, which had dominated the Russian-American relations since the 1960s. Some 
analysts are brave enough to conclude that if the tendency, which is emerging today, 
persists, the new agenda in U. S. -Russian relations will be less and less based on arms 
control. It could be assumed that it would be supplanted by two new groups of 
interconnected issues: preventing the proliferation of WMD and combating terrorism. 21 
For the time being, such prognosis looks too optimistic and goes beyond Putin's neo- 
realist perspective on international relations. 
I 'Arms and the men', in The Economist (Nov 16,200 1), p. 19. 
2 Wallander, C. A., 'Russia's Strategic Priorities', in Arms Control Today (Jan-Feb 2002); 
h=: //www. armscontrol. orL, Jact/2002 01-02/wallanddanfebO2/asp. 
3 Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution ofRussian Foreign Policy, p. 88. 
4 Kuchins, A. C., 'Explaining Mr. Putin: Russia's New Nuclear Diplomacy', in Arms Control Today (Oct 2002); 
http//: www. armscontrol. orz/act/2002 10/kuchinsoctO2. as 
5 Ibid. 
6 Wallander, 'Russia's Strategic Priorities'. 
7 'Russian expert proposes Russia - US treaty on mutual security instead of ABM treaty', in Interfiax (10 Jan 2002). 8 Kuchins, 'Explaining Mr. Putin'. 
I Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, in 
Arvis Control Today, Vol. 32, No. 5 (June 2002), p. 9. 
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Angeles Times (15 May 2002). 
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12 Ibid. 
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16 'What we'd like to see at summit', in Moscow Times, Editorial (23 May 2002); 
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18 Ibid. 
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Appendix C: Russia's bilateral relations with the CIS countries 
For obvious reasons Putin prioritises the CIS countries. Belarus and Ukraine - the states 
of direct neighbourhood - are the most important countries in the post-Soviet space. In 
assessing current trends of Russia's relations with Belarus, it is necessary to take 
various aspects - strategic, military, political and economic. In purely strategic terms, 
importance of Belarus is obvious: she lies on a traditional, main East-West axis for 
military invasions; allows Russia a direct access to pipelines, provides Russia with rail 
and road links to the core countries of the EU and NATO; brings Russia in close 
proximity to her Kaliningrad exclave; and hosts important Russian defence assets., The 
geopolitical role of Belarus is probably the most crucial: she represents a 'kind of a 
rupture in the geopolitical axis that the West is building from the Baltic area to the 
Black Sea'. 2 
Located in the heart of Europe and bordering with NATO and the EU, Belarus is the last 
truly autocratic regime left in Europe and Russia's closest Slavic ally. The survival of 
the anti-Western regime and dictator Alexander Lukashenko is not without the 
Kremlin's support. Russian diplomacy used to defend this dictatorship in international 
fora, such as the OSCE. Despite Putin's visible distaste for his eccentric Belarusian 
counterpart, Russia endorsed the dubious election result that returned him to office in 
2001 and 2006. 
Although Belarus is Russia's closest ally in the CIS, there has been little progress in the 
formation of the 'union state' and their bilateral relationship has been fraught with 
tension. In general, relations between Putin's Russia and Belarus 'are in a downward 
spiral'. 3 Putin has clearly chosen a very pragmatic course towards Belarus -a tactic of 
delaying integration process. The idea of having a union with Belarus has lost its 
significance under Putin, despite the fact that military co-operation between these two 
countries has been moving forward swiftly, especially in air defence. In fact, 
Lukashenko has nothing to offer Russia both politically and economically. On 
Moscow's part, it simply is reluctant to subsidise her ally's ruined economy, making 
only 3 percent of Russia's. Despite this and the country's political isolation within 
Eurbpe, Belarus has demonstrated opposition to the penetration of Russian capital in her 
strategic industries, as privatisation would weaken the economic basis of Lukashenko's 
political regime. 4 
Since assuming the presidency in 2000, Putin has held Lukashenko and his cherished 
&union state' at arms length. At the summit in St. Petersburg in June 2002, Putin 
slammed the very idea of a 'union state', all but killing the prospect, and since then 
relations have turned colder. The essential question in the creation of a 'union state' is 
the political form it would acquire upon merging. Putin called for the establishment of a 
joint state providing his Belarussian counterpart with two options. The first is based on 
the Russian Federation's constitution and is totally unacceptable for Lukashenko. This 
would mean that Belarus would stop to exist as a separate entity and be absorbed into 
Russia county by county, not as a single unit. Another alternative is similar to the EU 
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model. In this case the states would preserve their sovereignty, but 
5 
would share 
common economy and joint currency, which would be the Russian rouble. 
Lukashenko's regime is deeply vulnerable. Russia still supplies 80 percent of Belarus' 
oil needs, nearly all of her needs for natural gas and some electricity, and the country 
owes Russia some hundreds million U. S. dollars for overdue energy debts. 6 
Nevertheless, all the objections pertinent to the creation of a 'union state' 
notwithstanding, it is hardly likely that Russia will cancel her finiher integration, as 
losses will be unavoidable on both sides. First of all, Russia's political authority in the 
CIS space will weaken tremendously. Moreover, if the confrontation between the two 
states goes deeper, transit of Russian goods, gas and oil, going through Belarus, will be 
disturbed. Above all, growing development of a Russian-Belarussian regional military 
grouping in the Western direction is the key factor that glues these countries and is one 
of the most crucial security guaranties for the 'union state'. This grouping is perceived 
as a response to NATO's enlargement and possible deployment of NATO bases near the 
borders of the 'union state'. Thus, geopolitical, military and economic consequences 
resulting from the cancelling of integration processes will be more severe than current 
costs for the creation of a common state. It is likely that a compromised solution to 
military-political-economic problems will be achieved. 
Ukraine, which forms a bedrock in the post-Soviet international order, not just for this 
part of Europe, but equally for Eurasia, is the most important CIS country for Russia. In 
the 2002 parliamentary elections in Ukraine Moscow campaigned against Western- 
oriented, pro-market parties and openly helped anti-reform, corruption-tainted political 
forces unfriendly to the West. Since the beginning of the privatisation process, Russian 
capital became increasingly active in the Ukrainian economy (oil refining, aluminium 
production, telecommunications, and so on). Projects that were met with more 
opposition involve the international gas consortiums and power grids. 7 But even that 
was solved: Russian companies gained control over 80 percent of Ukraine's refinery 
capacity, much of the country's product industry and her oil retail trade. Moscow 
blocked Western attempts to gain Ukrainian support for the Odessa-Brody pipeline 
8 system which would bypass Russia in carrying Caspian oil to the West. In 2004, after 
nine meetings between Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kutchma, then Ukrainian President, 
the agreement giving a Russian company (TNK) access to the pipeline was signed. This 
effectively killed the Odessa-Brody pipeline project supported by the EU. Russia also 
warned Kazakhstan not to participate in the Odessa-Brody line. Weakening Russia's 
strong hold over East-West oil and gas pipelines would not be permitted by Moscow. 
Prior to Orange Revolution Ukraine's international orientation was twofold. On the one 
hand, the parliament consisted of reformist, European-minded and indeed pro-NATO 
majorities, while communists and other leftists suffered massive losses in the 2002 
elections. In sharp contrast to Russia's previous troubled relations with the Alliance, 
Ukraine has a record of close cooperation with NATO for nearly a decade. On the other 
hand, a former President Kutchma, being the chairman of the council of the heads of 
states of the CIS since 2003, encouraged his state's engagement with the structures of 
the former Soviet space. In April 2003, Ukraine became an associate member of the 
EEC, albeit declared not going to seek a full-fledged membership. 9 Moreover, on 19 
September 2003, in Yalta Russia and her three trading partners - Belarus, Ukraine, and 
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Kazakhstan - signed an agreement on a common economic space (SES). In short, the 
idea of cooperation with the CIS largely belonged to President Kutchma and his team. 
It is worth noting a source of instability which emerged in Russian-Ukrainian relations 
in October 2003. Without notifying Ukraine, Russia began to build a dyke, connecting 
her coast with the island of Tuzla in the Kerch Strait, close to Ukraine's Crimean 
Peninsula. As a result, Ukraine issued a protest asserting her non-negotiable sovereignty 
over the island. Moreover, she deployed troops to protect her border and threatened to 
abandon free-trade agreements with Russia should the dike crosses Ukrainian border. 
Putin did not order construction halted for about a month, with the dike only about 100 
metres from Ukrainian border. 
10 This did a great damage to Ukrainian-Russian 
relations, prompting Ukraine's leadership to seek greater security guarantees through 
closer cooperation with NATO and reaffirming her intent to join the Alliance despite 
Russia's opposition. 
Many analysts define Moscow's policy toward Ukraine as the latter's &retention' in the 
post-Soviet space. By demonstrating flexibility in pursuing multi-vector foreign policy 
- balancing between Russia and the West (NATO and the EU) - Ukraine has sought to 
'restrain this retention", which has made Kyiv an unpredictable and ambivalent partner 
for Moscow. The culminating moment of this effort was the 2004 presidential elections, 
termed Orange Revolution, which brought about a shift in the orientation of Ukraine's 
foreign policy. Under new President Yushchenko, Ukraine has unambiguously chosen a 
course towards the West. Yushchenko has publicly set the goals of Ukrainian 
membership of NATO, EU and the WTO. 
At the same time, however, because of domestic reasons, Ukraine has remained mindful 
of the interests of Russia, which Yushchenko, has called 'eternal strategic partner'. 
Moscow retains many levers of influence on Ukraine, especially in the energy sector 
(the 'gas war' in the beginning of 2006 perfectly demonstrated this), and Russian 
investments are seemed to increase following the liberalisatin of Ukraine's economy. It 
is also hardly possible that Ukraine is going to curtail the presence of Russian Black Sea 
Fleet in Sevastopol, which leased port facilities till 2017. 
Being close to Europe, the South Caucasus countries attract much consistent attention 
from the West. In the Caucasus, Moscow has actively used interventionist policies to 
establish its dominance. This is understandable given the particularly high strategic 
importance of the region in terms of energy and its close contacts with the most unstable 
areas of the Russian Federation, notably Chechnya. Strategically vital Georgia and oil- 
rich Azerbaijan have cast their hopes with the West. Their choice was reinforced by 
active American, Turkish, and British engagement. Georgia - along with Azerbaijan - 
provides the sole westbound corridor for Caspian energy transit, as well as crucial 
access for U. S. -led coalition forces from Europe into the greater Middle East. Socor 
argues that Georgia and Azerbaijan 'can only function as a tandem or not at all'; thus 
Azerbaijan stands or falls together with Georgia. Moreover, a collapse in Georgia would 
condemn also Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to permanent dependence on Russia for 
transiting their oil and gas; and that in turn 'would strengthen Russia's energy leverage 
on the European Union'. 12 Georgia and Azerbaijan have both been targets of especially 
active Russian pressure, albeit with different results. 
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In the late 1990s, after years of using tough pressure tactics against Baku, Moscow 
switched to a softer attitude, which has yielded better results for a limited 
rapprochement on energy issues. But in general Azerbaijan regarded Russia as the 
major supporter of Armenia in the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict aýd as a main cause of 
problems related with oil exports from the Caspian Sea. As a result, Russia's relations 
with Azerbaijan throughout many years progressed little. 13 In December 2003, after the 
death of the President Haidar Aliev, the Kremlin sought to complicate Azerbaijan's 
leadership transition by playing repeatedly on a local conflict - the Karabakh problem. 
Russia's relationship with Armenia is a different story. Lacking allies, Armenia has 
been entirely dependent on Russia's energy and product supply. The country, 
nevertheless, has learned some important lessons. First, Armenia appears to realise that 
the West, not Russia, can help recover her economy. Second, her economic 
improvement depends a great deal on the progress toward settling the Armenian-Azeri 
conflict and normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations. Armenian leadership is thus 
cautiously embarking on an adjustment of her foreign policy. Without questioning the 
alliance with Russia, she has realized the need for security cooperation with the United 
States and NATO. 
Georgia bears the brunt of Putin's pressure and is a testing ground of Putin's 
international conduct. In the Caspian basin, Moscow opposes any trans-Caspian 
pipelines that would follow the most direct route from the eastern shore to the European 
consumers, and exercises a near monopoly on the transit of Caspian energy to Europe. 14 
All this contradicts to U. S. Caspian energy policy, which promotes 'multiple pipelines' 
as a major U. S. and Euro-Atlantic interest. 
Georgia faces a mix of potentially violent threats from external, regional-separatist and 
clan-type sources, the overarching factor being Russian exploitation of Georgian state 
weakness. 15 There have been Russia's ongoing attempts to change Georgia's political 
course through military pressure and by encouraging ethnic separatism in Georgia's 
borderlands Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Reasons that have been advanced have 
included the so-called 'Great Game' over the oil pipelines routes, Moscow's desire for a 
deep-water port, and so on. The Baku-Thilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline built in 2005 should 
allow Georgia to achieve economic independence. 
Despite Russia's conflicting obligation under the agreement on the adapted CFE Treaty 
signed in 1999 at the OSCE Istanbul summit, Russia still retains three Soviet-era 
military bases with some 8,000 troops and large arsenals, not to mention two 
6peacekeeping' contingents retained without a legal basis and against Georgia's often 
expressed Will. 16 Russia insisted that the withdrawal of Russian military bases from 
Georgia would be negotiated bilaterally, claiming that Russia has already fulfilled her 
obligations under the 1999 Istanbul agreement. 17 Russia sought to prolong stationing of 
her troops in Georgia and wanted high financial compensation for closure and 
withdrawal. Moscow attributed its prolonged military presence to the need to fight 
international terrorism in the Caucasus. The obvious goal is permanent military 
presence. 
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From Russia's perspective, Georgia represents a convenient target in her 'war on 
terrorism'. The 'safe heaven' (real and imagined) provided to Chechen militants in 
places like the Pankisi gorge served as a convenient excuse for Russian military 
setbacks in Chechnya. What is more, Moscow's fixation on the Pankisi problem for 
some time distracted international attention from its more far-reaching moves to thwart 
Georgia's Western course. Russia's insistence on the need to destroy the 'safe haven' in 
Pankisi and to wipe out the 'terrorist threat' on her southern border was too convenient 
a weapon to use against Georgia. In 2002, President Vladimir Putin and his closest 
associates were publicly hinting that a free hand in Georgia was part of Russia's price 
for standing aside if the United States moves against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. U. S. 
deployment of about 200 special troops on Train-and-Equip mission for Georgian 
security forces in May 2002 was a political signal about underscoring the Western stake 
in stabilizing Georgia and safeguarding her independence. 
While bilateral (and trilateral, with the U. S. ) intelligence and counter-terrorism 
cooperation has improved since late 2001, the hostage siege in Beslan in September 
2004, North Ossetia, has led to newly increased Russian pressure on her southern 
neighbour. High-level reiterations of Russia's doctrine of pre-emptive strikes against 
terrorists abroad, according to many observers, put Georgia on the hit list. In fact, 
Georgia periodically accused Russia of conducting cross-border bombing raids over the 
past several years, a charge Moscow has denied consistently. 
Georgia's security dilemma became more complicated in the wake of Rose Revolution 
- peaceful overthrow of Shevamadze. While Tbilisi is now entering a 'post-post-Soviet' 
era, the separatist enclaves remain mired in the Soviet era, looking to Moscow for 
support and guidance. Thus Rose Revolution has increased the gulf between the centre 
and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while providing Adjara with the pretext to break 
relations with the central authorities. 18 Moscow lost no time capitalising on this. In late 
November 2003, the gathering was held in Moscow with participation of the Abkhaz, 
South-Ossetian, and Adjaran leaders and Russian officials. The event was designed to 
blackmail Tbilisi's new leaders by 'hinting at Adjara's potential secession' and a 
6possible trouble spilling' over from the other two areas. 19 
The visit of Georgian President Saakashvilli to Moscow in February 2004 and Russia's 
neutrality during the crisis between Tbilisi and the Adjaran leadership the following 
March slightly decreased tension in Georgian-Russian relations. In UN efforts to 
resolve conflict in Abkhazia Russia continued to play a rather passive role. In fact, 
Moscow has acknowledged that it issued Russian passports to more than a quarter of 
Abkhazia's current population (to approx. 50,000 residents). Given Russia's 
intensifying commitment to protect rights of ethnic Russians and citizens abroad, this 
actions casts doubt on Russia's credibility as an impartial mediator in the Georgian- 
Abkhaz conflict. 20 
In Moldova the Kremlin poses a two-fold problem for the Euro-Atlantic community. 
The first is that Moldova emerged as a Russian military outpost at a strategic crossroads 
in Europe outside Russia's borders, on the threshold of the Balkans. Moscow is 
obligated to the 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit declaration to scrap or take out its 
remaining arsenals and withdraw its personnel from Transdnistria, a tiny but strategic 
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breakaway region of Moldova, by December 2002. However, Russian troops remained 
in Moldova even after the December 2003 withdrawal deadline - the latest in a series of 
OSCE deadlines and resolutions that Moscow had breached .21A major problem here is 
related to the fact that Russian military and government have for the past 10 years 
armed, financed and provided political and diplomatic support for the separatist 
authorities, who are in fact citizens and officers of the Russian Federation. 22 
Russia thought to use the settlement negotiations of the 'frozen' conflict in 
Transdnistria to revise or repudiate withdrawal commitment agreed at Istanbul in two 
ways. Firstly, Moscow was seeking international and Moldovan consent to legalise the 
Russian troops as 'peacekeepers 9- 23 Secondly, Moscow pressed Moldova's President 
Vladimir Voronin to legalise the unlawful Russian military presence and Russian 
secessionist authorities in Transdnistria. The scenario envisaged handing secessionist 
authorities a share of power in Moldova's central government under a federal formula 
and guaranteeing such a settlement through a predominantly Russian military force. 24 In 
December 2003, Russia attempted to circumvent the five-sided negotiating structure - 
Moldova, Transdnistria, Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE - and negotiate a political 
settlement directly with Moldova and Transdnistria. The plan, advanced by a former 
Putin's aide Dmitriy Kozak (later he became Presidential Representative for the North 
Caucasus), envisioned a broad autonomy for Transdnistria within a federal state of 
Moldova, along with the long-term presence of Russian peacekeepers. Hence, the so- 
called Kozak Memorandum would have turned Moldova into a three-part 'federation' 
composed of Transdnistria, along with a Gagauz-inhabited unit that has traditionally 
been manipulated by Transdnistrian leaders, and the territory that remains from 
Moldova. This was supposed to be done in a wa that blatantly violates the principles of 
representative democracy and the rule of law. 2j In sum, the proposed 'solution' would 
have liquidated the Republic of Moldova as an independent state, which was recognized 
in this capacity by the world, including the Russian Federation. Fortunately, the EU and 
the OSCE prevailed on President Voronin not to sign this deal, and Russia's attempt to 
co-opt the Moldovan leadership failed. Finally, after the parliamentary elections in 
Moldova in 2005 President Voronin reversed the years of cooperation with Russia and 
initiated a marked pro-Western shift in foreign policy. 26 
In recent times the situation in five Central Asian republics - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - has undergone a substantial evolution on the 
one hand, while reflecting the permanence of a number of trends on the other. Given the 
U. S. presence in the aftermath of 9/11, Russia has ceased, even formally, to be the sole 
security guarantor of this region. Although U. S. political-military presence has 
drastically changed the pre-existing balance of forces, such basic characteristics as the 
peculiarities of a complex system of inter-local and inter-clan relations, elite rivalry, 
socio-economic problems and corruption have remained unchanged and continue to 
generate threats and security challenges both in individual states and at the regional 
level. 
Russia's major role in Central Asia has supposedly been that of sole guarantor of the 
region's internal security and its defender from external threat. However, Russia lacked 
attractiveness for the states undergoing the process of transformation, largely due to her 
inability to provide either direct financial support or indirectly, as a trade partner, 
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willing to purchase low-quality raw materials and manufactured goods for the sake of 
political dividends. Despite high Russia's interest in retaining her political and 
economic presence in Central Asia, there has been no regional strategy which would 
have balanced Russia's military-political and economic ties and made them mutually 
complementary. 
Under Putin, Russia has made significant efforts to regain influence in Central Asia, 
where, due to security situation and vast energy resources, the U. S. and other Western 
countries continue to maintain strong interests. Central Asia possesses immense oil and 
gas reserves in the eastern Caspian and northern Kazakhstan regions, and is a major 
supplier of uranium and other minerals. Russia has considerable economic, strategic and 
political interests in this region. Russia's geo-strategic aim here was 'to remain strong in 
the area and wield power within and control over ... the CIS, thereby ensuring the 
security of its southern flank. 927 However, Russian interests in Central Asia have 
appeared to be threatened by rising ethnocentric nationalism, the spread of Islamic 
fundamentalism and political Islam, as well as increasing third-party (e. g. Turkey, 
China, Iran) preponderance in Central Asia. 28 Therefore for years Moscow tried to 
create sufficient security conditions among the Central Asian states and set up separate 
agreements with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to defend them 
against Islamic terrorist network, as well as to protect them from Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
The year 2004 saw expansion of Russia's cooperation with Central Asian countries: 
growing profile of the EEC and SCO, summits of which took place in Kazakhstan's 
capital Astana. A number of Russian experts note the remarkable progress in the SCO 
institutionalisation. Opening of the headquarters of the SCO's Regional Anti-terrorist 
Centre in Tashkent is proves Us. 29 
Kremlin strategists seem particularly happy with the new Treaty on Strategic 
Cooperation signed by Putin and his Uzbek counterpart President Islam Karimov. The 
accord envisages, among other things, Russia's participation in the modernization of the 
Uzbek Armed Forces, including air defence system. Putin has labelled the results of his 
talks with Karimov as a 'true breakthrough in the quality of our relationship . 
30 Many 
Russian analysts note that Uzbekistan appears to have become disillusioned with 
prospects for cooperation with the West and, above all, with the United States. Russia, 
unlike the U. S., has not been critical of the suppression of the anti-government protests 
in Uzbekistan in May 2005. Therefore for Uzbekistan Moscow is a more desirable 
partner than Washington. Moscow will do what it can to encourage a reduction of the 
U. S. presence in Central Asia and boost its own presence. 
In Taiikistan there was established 201' Motorised division of the Russian Army - an 
official and permanent military base. Kyi: jzyzstan enabled American flights to 
Afghanistan over her territory, and allowed the U. S. to set up an airbase at Kant. There 
was also opened a new military basis, just a few kilometres from the U. S. -led base in 
Manas. Although Russia's presence here remains symbolic, it, nevertheless, raises 
immediate concerns, such as air traffic management between the two facilities. 31 The 
establishment of an airbase can be seen as part of a strategy to regain a former presence 
in this republic. 
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Russia managed to strengthen bilateral cooperation with her mightiest rival of the CIS - 
Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has increased her activities in the Caspian Sea, despite 
Russia's protests. The military forces of Armenia and Kazakhstan take part in the 
stabilization of Iraq. The results of the latest Russian-Kazakh summit proved the 
strength of Kazakhstan's position in her relationship with Moscow. On the one hand, 
Astana agreed to extend the agreement on the Baikonur space launch site until 2050 and 
granted Russia's Lukoil company a 50 percent share in a product-shariný agreement for 
the Tyub-Karagan oil field in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian shelf. On the other 
hand, Kazakhstan has made the final decision to participate in the Baku-Thilisi-Ceyhan 
oil pipeline project, which is opposed by Moscow. 33 
Kazakhtan acts in line with the traditional policy of Central Asian countries aimed at 
balancing among the interests of the major geopolitical players in the region, which, on 
top of Russia and the U. S., include also China. Friendship with the Russia is no obstacle 
to Kazakhstan's cooperation with the states that saw the victory of the 'colour 
revolution'. President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev entered into an agreement 
with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili for Kazakh gas supplies to Georgia. 
Western business has a broad representation in the strategically important oil and gas 
industry of the Kazakh Republic. Nazarbaev's win at the presidential elections was in 
no small part determined by the U. S. support. 
To sum up, the priority of economics in foreign affairs gives Moscow more room for 
manoeuvre in keeping its grip on the FSU states. However, there is a growing number 
of former Soviet republics, which are seeking to avoid Moscow's domination and 
control and are reluctant to have close ties with Russia; they prefer instead co-operation 
with U. S., NATO and the EU. Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus have assumed greater 
geopolitical significance for both Russia and NATO, as the Alliance and the EU have 
expanded eastward. Russia views with dismay the westward shift in foreign policy 
orientation in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. In fact, a multi-vector policy - 
cooperation with both Russia and the West - is now characteristic of all CIS countries, 
except for Belarus. 
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Appendix D: Collective Security Treaty Organisation in the post-Soviet space 
The dissolution of the USSR at the end of 1991 led to the break-up of the uniform 
defence space, including its components such as nuclear forces, air defence systems, 
and the MIC. The Russian Federation, struggling to hold its position as a great power, 
tried to maintain its dominance in the post-Soviet space by using various means, 
especially the military-political ones. 
In May 1992, a Collective Security Treaty (CSO), also known as the Tashkent Treaty, 
was signed. Those agreeing to the treaty were Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Countries which 
renounced the treaty were Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine. The Tashkent Treaty 
reflected a mix of a typical military alliance (its casus bell! was aggression against one 
of the members) and a collective security system (the treaty authorized the parties to 
solve conflicts in the post-Soviet space). 
In reality, the CSO was not effective. Russia failed to establish a reliable collective 
defence alliance in the CIS. The core of the rebellious group consisted of Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Moldova, which sought to integrate in the Western security 
and political structures, and Uzbekistan, which desired a leadership role in Central Asia. 
In 1997, these states created an economical-political organisation GUUAM, leaving 
Russia with a weakened sphere of influence. In 1999, the refusal of Georgia, Uzbekistan 
and Azerbaijan to renew the CST I 
made the ambitions to create a trustworthy security 
mechanism within the CIS hollow. 
Throughout the 1990s, the only successful enterprise of the CIS was common air 
defence system. It started to operate in 1995 and comprised ten CIS states, but its line- 
up changed very quickly. In 1997, Georgia and Turkmenistan withdrew from it. Russia 
was forced to cooperate on a bilateral basis with Uzbekistan and Ukraine. The future of 
the air defence system became a source of worry for Russia. 
The creation of the CSTO in May 2002 was aimed, first of all, at consolidating Russia's 
military presence in the CIS by transforming the CST into the CSTO. Its members 
became states that in 1999 continued the Tashkent Treaty - Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan - the most faithful Russian allies. The 
emphasis is placed on the adaptation of armed forces to take part in modem wars, 
especially against terrorism, and regain global power-projection capabilities. 
According to political analysts, the creation of the CSTO was calculated to coincide 
with NATO meeting in Reykjavik in 2002, which approved a role for Russia in some of 
the Alliance's decision-making processes through a newly created NATO-Russia 
Council. It signalled, as Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow of the Washington-based 
institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, put it, that 'Moscow feels entitled 
to set up an "eastern" bloc of its own', seemingly in response to NATO, and 
notwithstanding the latter's opening to Russia .2 In many opinions, it meant the counter- 
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balance to U. S. presence in Central Asia after 9/11, despite that Moscow accepted that 
presence. 3 
Obviously, this Kremlin project was rooted in the Soviet past. Nevertheless, Putin tried 
to tone down the CSTO's anti-Western stance, saying that the organisation was not 
created to offset NATO, rather it could work together with the Alliance. According to 
Putin, the CSTO was set up to react to a fast changing global security context and could 
in the future cooperate with other security organizations. Member countries of the 
CSTO, in his words, 'are not united against someone, but against threats' .4 The anti- terrorist campaign in Afghanistan in the autumn 2001 highlighted the ineffectiveness of 
CST in terms of coordination of actions, as Central Asian countries, rather than 
pursuing traditional military cooperation with Russia, started to give preference to 
bilateral relations with the U. S. Founding the new organization was a chance for 
Moscow to reassert its influence in former Soviet republics. 5 Russia expected that the 
CSTO would oblige its member states to co-ordinate their military relations with 
foreign countries. Putin clearly hoped that his alignment with the West against terrorism 
might earn him a 'tacit Western acceptance of his bloc-rebuilding agenda'. 6 That agenda 
included: the right to introduce Russian troops on the territories of the former Soviet 
countries; an exclusively Russian 'peacekeeping' role there; monopolizing the transit of 
Caspian oil and gas to Western consumer countries; and so on. 7 
The appointment of Nikolay Bordyuzha8 in 2003 as Secretary General of the CSTO 
showed Moscow's efforts to elevate the status of this organisation on the international 
arena: it has been granted an observer status in the UN General Assembly and 
recognized by the OSCE and the SCO. The CSTO summit meeting in Kazakhstan's 
capital Astana in June 2004 was a further step towards its consolidation. The leaders of 
member states discussed regional security issues and underscored their desire to 
establish practical cooperation with NATO, especially in Afghanistan. They also agreed 
to intensify military cooperation, especially in relation to the development of the 
CSTO's RRF. In 2004, joint RRF increased nearly 2,5 times. In addition, Moscow 
suggested creating Special Purpose Forces under the leadership of the Russian General 
Staff. In June 2005, the meeting of the CSTO Collective Security Council - the main 
CSTO's body - was held in Moscow. The meeting's decisions reflected the will to 
create the CSTO's military component. In particular, the members discussed a plan for 
the development of integrated air defence systems and the RRF capability improvement 
in Central Asia. Additionally, the commission for military-economic cooperation was 
established with the aim to achieve closer cooperation between military industries. 
Moscow envisaged setting up three CSTO regional groups of RRF: a Western group 
(Russia and Belarus), a South Caucasus group (Russia and Annenia), and a Central 
Asian group (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and TaJikistan). 9 As in the old Warsaw 
Pact, each member country would assign selected military units to joint forces for 
exercises or operations. Each group would function under Russian command in the 
region, all groups - under the central command in Moscow. 10 These palsn 
nothwithsatnding, limited military capabilities have kept the CSTO mainly political in 
nature: at present the Central Asian RRF group, with its HQ in Bishkek, remains the 
only multinational CSTO force. " 
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Two regional military groupings were established within the CSTO - Russian- 
Belarusian (about 200,000 troops) and Caucasian (practically Russian-Armenian). 12 The 
CSTO practically took over the common air defence system of the CIS. It is made of 20 
command control units and 80 combat units, including rocket regiments, fighter 
aviation, and radio electronic units. The first phase of the exercise of air defence system 
took place in Russia in June-September 2005. It was formally defined as the CIS 
exercise, but only the CSTO countries took part in it. It marked the next step of Russia's 
plan to replace the air defence system of the CIS with the integrated system of the 
CSTO. 
However, the CSTO countries still remain weak states, and this requires Russia to 
finance modernization of their military forces. What is worse, these states, even the 
group of core members, are not very inclined to follow Russia's demands. For instance, 
despite Russia's protests, Kazakhstan increased her activities in the Caspian Sea. The 
military forces of Armenia and Kazakhstan took part in the stabilization of Iraq. 
Kyrgyzstan enabled American Rights to Afghanistan over her territory and allowed the 
U. S. to set up an airbase at Kant. At the same time, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which 
cover 30 percent of the air space of the CSTO, did not participate in an active phase of 
air defence exercises in September 2005.13 
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Appendix E: Russia's theoretical and practical possibilities to join NATO 
Whether NATO enlargement process could eventually lead to Russia's membership of 
the Alliance remains nonetheless an unresolved issue. It poses a two-fold question. On 
the one hand, the provisions of the NATO Study on NATO Enlargement, such as 
promoting stabilisation and democratisation, offer no grounds for excluding Russia., To 
rule this out is to reinforce the belief in Moscow that NATO is being expanded to 
become an anti-Russian Alliance. 2 On the other hand, admission may make sense only 
as a symbolic ritual for including Russia in the Western world. Ironically enough, the 
ten Central and Eastern European members of NATO, the Baltic States in particular, 
want security guarmtees to protect themselves from Russia. From a practical viewpoint, 
Russia's inclusion in NATO would only undermine the Alliance as a military 
organisation, the main purpose of which still is collective defence (article 5) against 
external threats. And it would be naive to believe that NATO could ignore all the 
necessary military requirements for membership and admit Russia as ballast. Moreover, 
Russia herself does not need such a role. 3 
Within Russian pro-Western elite there are two schools of thought concerning NATO. 
The school wants Russia to seek NATO membership, at least at the political 4 
organisation, or to obtain an associate status. This school argues that only by acquiring 
membership can Russia finally change the old anti-Russian essence of the NATO 
Alliance. Second school, criticizing NATO for its weaknesses, proposes cooperation on 
an ad hoc basis. According to this view, institutional commitments of any kind, let 
alone NATO membership, would deprive of Russia of freedom of action, she would 
have to sacrifice her interests to those of Atlantic solidaTity. 5 
Arkady Moshes, Head of Russia and EU programme of the Finnish Institute f 
International Afairs, argues that accepting Russia as a full member of NATO would 
entail a number of consequences that current members would rather avoid. First, 
engaging Russia into intra-NATO process 'would diminish the influence of the United 
States and make the role of small European states even less visible'. Second, Americans 
cannot easily exclude the possibility of Russia trying to play a European 'card' against 
the U. S. Above all, decision making within NATO will be extremely complicated 
taking into account the difference of approaches between Russia and Western states 
towards many international issues. 6 
Russia's full membership of NATO would expose the Alliance to potential risks of 
military conflicts in the South and Far East along Russian borders. It would bring 
NATO to the borders of China, and require a commitment on behalf of its members to 
defend Russia against a supposed attack of the world's most populous state. Such a 
development would be just as unacceptable in Brussels, as in Beijing. 7 Above all, 
extending membership for Russia, however, would mean emptying the Alliance of its 
collective defence substance and 'OSCE-zation 8 of NATO, i. e. its evolution towards a 
discussion club with decreased military capabilities. 
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Even if NATO decided to transform itself into a political European organisation, in 
which Russian membership would currently make practical sense, this would take years. 
First, Russia's policies in the CIS and Chechnya, as well as Russia's domestic reforms, 
are incompatible with NATO membership. Second, Russia is too big and its problems 
are too intractable for Putin to achieve broad Russian integration with Western 
economies any time soon. 
As for Russia, the outcome ofjoining NATO would entail some negative consequences. 
First, immediately after applying for membership Moscow would lose its freedom in 
foreign policy. Second, there is a risk that well before becoming full member and 
obtaining security guarantees for herself, Russia would become 'a de facto shield for 
the West vis-A-vis southern threats to their security'. 9 Third, what would have to happen 
to the whole system of relations inside the CIS and its collective security system? 
Finally, the Russian leadership declared many times that Russia is not going to join 
NATO, as it stands today, in the near future. Her own armed forces could scarcely be 
integrated into the NATO machine, involving intrusive inspections, compatible 
equipment and a single military command. A Russian veto over NATO's operations 
would be unacceptable. 
The listed points concerning Russia's NATO membership, as Moshes put it, 'seems to 
make the whole affair a non-issue in the foreseeable future'. 10 Therefore Russia and 
NATO should rather focus now on seeking better ways of working together to address 
the problems of the post-Cold War era. As for the form of Russia's involvement in 
European security structures, Russia seeks to become an equal partner of NATO in the 
creation of a new system of European security. 
1 'NATO Study on NATO Enlargement' (Sept 1995); h=: //www. nato. int/docu/basictxt/enl-9502. btm 
2 Yost, D. S., NA TO Transformed The Alliance's New Roles in International Security (Washington: United States 
Institute of Peace, 1998), pp. 145-15 1. 
3 Safi-anchulL 
4 'Russia and the Globalisation Process: What to do?, in Strategyfor Russia: 10 Years of CFDP, Council on Foreign 
and Defence Policy (Moscow: Vagrius), p. 802. 
5 Pushkov, A., 'Why We Don't Need to Enter NATO', in Nezavisimaya Gazeta (27 Nov 200 1). 
6 Moshes, A., 'Russia and NATO: Analysis of Russian Perceptions', in Heurlin, B., Rasmussen, M., (eds. ), 
Challenges and capabilities - NA TO in the 21' Century (Copenhagen, 2003), p. 3 8. 7 Webber, p. 40. 
8 Moshes, 'Russia and NATO', p. 38. 
9 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
10 Ibid., p. 40. 
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Appendix F: Frameworks of interaction between Russia and the EU 
There are many points of interaction in the EU-Russia dialogue: economic 
development; common security-, trans-boundary problems, including the most sensitive 
visa and transit issues; stimulation of contacts between people and places; social issues, 
etc. The instruments andfora that the EU is utilising for the oblast are the PCA, CSR, 
Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS), the CBSS, and the ND. 
The CBSS has contributed a great deal to the development of the common goals and 
identity of the Baltic Sea region. The strength of this framework is its regional 
foundation, involving the Commission, EU member states (prior to the EU enlargement 
it involved candidate countries - the Baltic States and Poland) and Russia on an equal 
footing. ' The CBSS acts both as a co-ordinator and initiator of regional cooperation, as 
well as a mediator and an active partner for the EC in the implementation of the ND 
Action Plan. 
Equally it is also worth noting that the EU has room to improve upon. First and 
foremost, it has to bring full consistency into the PCA, CRS and ND, when dealing with 
Kaliningrad, since the current frameworks are too loose to be effective. For instance, the 
PCA and the CSR make up Brussel's framework for Russia - and not especially for the 
oblast. Moreover, the ND, which is implemented through the PCA and CRS, is also not 
well equipped when it comes to the Kaliningrad issue, as it does not present the oblast 
with a 'concept and means of implementation of sustainable development and structural 
reform'. 2 This initiative also suffers from a lack of continuity due to the changing 
presidency of the EU. Neither is there coordination of the financial instruments of the 
3 EU: TACIS, PHARE and INTERREG. All in all, there is a need for a more stable and 
viable policy towards Kaliningrad. 
Moscow's response to the CSR was the 1999 Russian MTS towards the EU. 4 Whilst 
reiterating many of CSR priorities, the document also included Moscow's proposal for a 
special agreement with the Union on Kaliningrad, which it wanted to be anchored 
within the Russian Federation, but which could also be used to transform Kaliningrad 
oblast into a 'pilot' region for EU-Russian cooperation. How this could be brought 
about has not been detailed. 
Differences in the language used between the CSR and Russia's middle-term strategy 
(MTS) are noteworthy. The EU in the CSR contains many references to support and 
assistance. Moscow, however, does not speak about 'support' but wants to utilise the 
EU's economic potential and management experience. Moreover, the readmission 
agreement is a priority in the CSR, but is has not even been mentioned in Russia's 
MTS. An important view, shared by the Union and Russia, is the need for Moscow to 
harmonise its standards and legislation with those of the EU. 5 
The Communication of the European Commission (EC) of January 2001 was a 
breakthrough in the EU's approach towards Kaliningrad. 6 The key aim of this 
document, whose bottom line is that the oblast can only gain from enlargement, is to 
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contribute to a debate between Russia and the EU on the future development of the 
region by involving Kaliningrad itself (as well as Lithuania and Poland). How much of 
a 'special case' for Kaliningrad is allowed by the EU? It could be said that the oblast is 
not in isolation if one is looking for opportunities. But so far Russia EU dialogue has 
been too general and too slow. The Kaliningrad issue attracts a great deal of attention, 
there is a proper strategy on paper, but the EU-Russian summit of May 2002 brought 
the parties concerned crashing back to earth. How could they break this vicious circle? 
In these deliberations one thing is clear - the final responsibility for Kaliningrad remains 
with Russia, and Russia herself should be more active in reducing the isolation of the 
oblast. 
The main problem is 7 that 
Moscow itself does not have a consistent approach to the 
future of Kaliningrad. If the Kaliningrad region is a pilot region, it will require Russia 8 
to give a more concrete substance to this vague idea. An obstacle to overcome is that it 
is too much bureaucracy on both sides. Obviously, pragmatic dialogue is much more 
useful than continuing political discussions. A point to be taken in to account: whereas 
the EU operates through institutions, Russia is governed by personalities. 
1 Although the ND Initiative is a replica to the CBSS in some way, the important difference is that in the CBSS the 
EC and Russia are on an equal footing with other participants, which helps the Council to achieve a higher level of 
inclusiveness than in NDI, where the EC has ultimate authority. 
2 Carlsen, P., 'Co-operation in the Baltic sea region', Paper presented at the I Ph Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference 
(St. Petersburg, 30 Sept -I Oct 2002), p. 4. 3 TACIS is primarily used in support of the implementation of the PCA, but it is also the main financial instrument of 
the CSR and one of the tools of the ND (with PHARE and Interreg). See Huisman, p. 18. 
4 Medium-term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union 
(2000-2010); httD: Heurol2a. eu. int/comm/extemal relations/russia/russian medium term strategy/index. litin. 
5 Ibid. 
6 'The EU and Kaliningrad', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM (2001). 
7 See 'Russian President Remarks'. 
8 Timinermann, H., 'Kaliningrad kak pilotnyy region dlya formirovaniya partnerstva mezhdu EC i Rossiey' 
[Kaliningrad as a pilot region in the creation of partnership between the ES and Russia], in R. U. E, (Moscow 2002). 
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Appendix G: Baltic Defence Projects' 
Together with Latvia and Estonia Lithuania runs a number of internationally supported 
defence cooperation projects, including a Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) 
with a Regional Air Surveillance and Co-ordination Centre (RASCC) in Karm6lava 
(Lithuania), a Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), and a Baltic Defence College 
(BALTDEFCOL) in Tartu (Estonia). A joint Baltic (Peace Forces) Battalion 
(BALTBAT), with its main training base in Adazi (Latvia), was terminated in 2003 as 
having fulfilled all its tasks. 
Cooperation among the Baltic States, especially in its early stage, cannot be imagined 
without the support and mediation of third parties. Western support to these projects 
was co-ordinated by the following countries: for BALTBAT - Denmark, BALTNET - 
Norway, BALTRON - Germany, and BALTDEFCOL - Sweden. Since 1997, experts 
from the Ministries of Defence and Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Western supporting 
nations joined in the Baltic Security Assistance (BALTSEA) management group. This 
expert-level unit matched actual Baltic development requirements in the defence area 
with the possibility of fourteen supporting nations to assist the Baltic States in specific 
fields of activities. This group also co-ordinated bilateral assistance and multilateral 
support to the Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian defence cooperation projects. Taken 
together, the multilateral Baltic defence cooperation projects ensured a more cost- 
efficient use of resources of the Baltic States and their supporters. 
The BALTBAT project was set up in 1994 with the aim of participating in peace 
operations under the auspices of the UN or other international organisations. Its 
development was centred on the gradual conversion of BALTBAT into a light infantry 
force with the necessary anti-air, anti-armour and other self-defence capabilities, able to 
perform tasks going beyond the scope of traditional peacekeeping. The BALTBAT 
project was also subject to the following developments: short-term deployment options, 
the development of national battalions and training centres within the BALTBAT 
system in each of the Baltic countries, training of replacement personnel, and creation 
of logistics system adequate to sustain future deployments. In 2000, the reorganisation 
of BALTBAT from a peacekeeping to an infantry battalion was completed. This 
reorganisation was aimed at preparing the battalion for participation in a wider spectrum 
of international operations and establishing the basis for BALTBAT's long-term 
participation in these operations. Since 2001, following the BALTBAT model and 
experience acquired in the course of implementation of the project, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania started to develop their national battalions - ESTBAT, LATBAT and 
LITBAT - which were to ensure continuous training of BALTBAT personnel and 
logistic support for the national BALTBAT units. Upon formation of national 
battalions, the Baltic States were ready to continue participation in international 
operations by sending BALTBAT infantry companies to support them. The battalion 
operated until 2003. 
The BALTRON project was initiated in 1998 and was designed to bring about closer 
and more effective cooperation between the Baltic Navies. It consists of 3-4 Estonian, 
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Latvian and Lithuanian ships that are to perform mine clearance operations in the Baltic 
Sea and possibly beyond. BALTRON is also expected to become a standing naval force 
and to be made available for international peace operations. An international staff 
authorised by the Commanders' Committee of Estonia Latvia and Lithuania commands 
the Squadron. The BALTRON Commander's and other international staff positions are 
assigned to each Baltic State in accordance with the rotation principle. Since 1999, the 
Naval Communication Operator Training Centre started functioning in Tallinn, Estonia. 
In 2000, a mine-hunting simulator was installed in Liepaja, Latvia. In 2001, a 
BALTRON diver-training and a "Lindau" type mine-clearing equipment service and 
repair centres were also opened in Liepaja. Presently BALTRON is focussed on mine 
clearing operations, high readiness mine counter measures, and patrol craft capable of 
participating in Article 5 and crisis response operations. 
As the host country of the Regional Air Surveillance Co-ordination Centre (RASCC), 
Lithuania plays a special role in the Baltic Air Surveillance Network - the BALTNET 
project. The project was developed under the Regional Airspace Initiative proposed by 
the United States in 1995 and with financial support provided by the U. S. Congress. The 
aim of the project was to create a Baltic air space surveillance network. Inaugurated in 
2000 the RASCC (established in the framework of the BALTNET project), together 
with three other national nodes in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which are linked by 
radar and communication network, comprise BALTNET. The RASCC personnel are 
internationally manned, i. e. all three Baltic States are represented here. The RASCC 
collects data from Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, and produces a consolidated air image 
over the Baltic States. The recognised air picture is then disseminated to the national 
nodes (that are responsible for airspace security and defence) and, by agreement, to 
other countries. The system is fully compatible with that used by NATO. In 2005, the 
RASCC was transformed into Control and Reporting Centres (CRQ of NATO 
Integrated Air Defence System (NATINEADS) for recognized air picture exchange. 
The Baltic Defence College - BALTDEFCOL - was established in 1999. Its aim is to 
train senior staff officers of the Baltic States who are going to serve within their 
Ministries of Defence, the Armed Forces and international staffs, to work as defence 
attach6s or instructors at the national military education institutions. The curriculum at 
BALTDEFCOL is adjusted to the specific conditions of the Baltic States, taking into 
account their geo-strategic environment and their current Armed Forces. The training 
process is based on maximum application of NATO procedures and standards as well as 
modem computer technologies and training methods. BALTDEFCOL provides 
excellent training not only to the Baltic military but is also assisting their partners. Most 
of the teachers at the Baltic Defence College are military experts from Western 
countries, such as Sweden, Denmark, the UK, the U. S, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, 
and Germany. 
1 White Paper99, Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania (Vilnius, 2000), pp. 14-17. See also 
O'hite Lithuanian Defence Policy Paper, Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania (Vilnius, 2002), 
pp. 14-16. 
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Appendix H: Russian military transit to/from Kaliningrad via Lithuania: 
historical and legal background 
Russian military transit to/ from the Kaliningrad oblasts was one of the most pressing 
problems in Lithuanian-Russian relations in 1993-1995. ' The origin of currently applied 
legal regulations for Russia's military transit via Lithuania dates back to January 1992, 
when the Lithuanian and Russian governments began negotiations on Russian troop 
withdrawal from the territory of Lithuania. 
Russian troop withdrawal from Lithuania took place until 31 August 1993. Until then 
Russia's military transit to/ from Kaliningrad across Lithuanian territory was carried out 
only on the basis of ad hoc permissions of the Lithuanian government. Simultaneously, 
due to the withdrawal of Soviet military formations from the German Federal Republic, 
their transportation, including military equipment, was executed through the territory of 
Lithuania. It continued till the end of 1994, well after Soviet troops withdrew from 
Lithuania. On 18 November 1993, the Lithuanian and Russian governments concluded a 
special agreement (with a fixed term of expiration) to set out the order of transportation 
of military cargos and personnel from Germany. 2 Primary transport line from the 
Kaliningrad oblast to the Russian Federation is shown in map 7. After the agreement's 
expiration on 31 December 1994 it was extended for another year with an automatic 
prolongation for the following years, provided no party made a request to terminate it. 
The prolongation of the regulation procedure of the military transit was acknowledged 
as the basis of exchange of the diplomatic notes between the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation. This was a 
compromise reached in the negotiations with Russia, trying to avoid the conclusion of a 
legal (political) treaty on military transit. 
In 1993-1995, upon the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania, Moscow started 
to press Vilnius in order to impose a long-term political treaty for military transit. In 
October 1994, the Lithuanian government approved regulations on the transit of 
dangerous and military cargos of foreign states across the territory of Lithuania. 3 
Russia, however, did not agree with the application of these regulations to her military 
cargos to/from Kaliningrad. Lithuanian authorities, in turn, refused to conclude any 
special treaty with Russia on the military transit that would impose certain obligations 
on the country. High-ranking Lithuanian officials stressed very clearly that Lithuania 
would neither be committed in advance to ensure any military transit, nor is she obliged 
to allow such a transit via Lithuania. Above all, the execution of military transit should 
be understood merely as an expression of good will from Lithuanian side. 
Russia used various means to impose a legal treaty. For instance, she precluded the 
enforcement of trade agreement between Lithuania and Russia (signed in Vilnius on 18 
November 1993), by asking and receiving EU support on this issue. 4 Under the 
circumstances of pressure and trying to avoid an imposed treaty, Lithuania had agreed 
to apply to the Russian military transit the same regulations as the 1993 agreement, 
concerning the transit of Russian troop withdrawal from Germany. Finally, on 18 
January 1995, after the exchange of notes between Lithuanian and Russian Ministries of 
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Foreign Affairs, the Lithuanian government extended to the Russian Federation the 
transit procedure for military materials and dangerous cargos by railway via Lithuanian 
territory. In response, Russia stated in her note the intention to start the implementation 
of the Lithuanian-Russian agreement on trade and economic relations of 18 November 
1993, which allowed Lithuania the most-favoured nation regime in trade with Russia. 
Thus, by presenting her note to Russia, which actually confirmed continuity of transit 
practice in accordance with previously set rules, Lithuania solved the issue of military 
transit without concluding a new treaty. The extension of the transit procedure was valid 
until 31 December 1995, and is finther renewed annually. As a result, from 1995 up to 
now, Russian military transit by railway is being regulated by legal procedures that are 
automatically prolonged each year. 
In practice, Russian military transit is being carried in accordance with the Lithuanian 
legislation, the Government's Resolution No. 938 (3 October 1994) On Approval of 
Regulations of Transportation of Dangerous and Military Goods of Foreign States 
across the Territory of the Republic of Lithuania. It sets the detailed order of military 
transit by railway. During the years this resolution was modified. The amendments 
served to improve the practical execution of military transit, e. g. setting the institutional 
framework: the Military Movement Control Centre of the Lithuanian Ministry of 
National Defence is an institution responsible for taking control of the military transit, 
i. e. its planning, coordination and execution. Some of the amendments are related to 
Lithuania's accession of the European Union (the Lithuanian commitments to 
implement the Shengen acquis); some were necessary because the earlier provisions of 
the resolution constituted an infringement of the UN, EU or OSCE sanctions. 
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Map 7. Russian military transit (primary transport line) via Lithuania 5 
Note: the rail link of military transit from Russia's mainland to Kaliningrad goes along 
the most direct route: across the territory of Belarus, then via Vilnius and Kaunas to the 
oblast. 
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Table 3. Military cargo movement of the Russian Federation, to/ from 
the Kaliningrad oblast via the Republic of Lithuania6 
ilcars (numbers i 
Nameof Year 1997 Year 1998 Year 1999 Year 20 00 Year 2001 
cargo To 
KO 
From 
KO 
To 
KO 
From 
KO 
To 
KO 
From 
KO 
To 
KO 
From 
KO 
To 
KO 
From 
KO 
Supplies 
(wagons) 
5023 119 1285 116 3680 128 2583 58 3231 96 
Explosives 27 62 15 61 9 210 ----- - ----- ---- Equipment 21 117 144 245 96 108 22 183 74 96 
Rocket fuel ------ 32 ------ ------ 2 ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 
Weapons ------ 28 33 15 _ 79 83 ------ 41 15 26 
Troops 7969-- 2919 1 8838 2168 10086 2971 8985 4165 10813 2680 
Railcars (numbers) 
Nameof Year 2 02 Year 2 03 Year 2004 Year 2005 
cargo To 
KO 
From 
KO 
To 
KO 
From 
KO 
To 
KO 
From 
KO 
To 
KO 
I From 
KO 
Supplies 
(wagons) 
2498 2 2973 70 1947 94 2598 83 
Explosives ---- ---- ------ ----- ------ ------ ----- ----- Equipment 38 132 54 218 37 42 20 113 
Rocket fuel ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ----- ----- Weapons 21 107 2 5 6 132 ---- 13 
Troops 3296 254 4364 1075 2839 852 259 22-2- 
KO - the Kaliningad oblast 
NOTES: 
1. Explosives, weapons and part of military equipment are escorted. Railcars for 
the escort are included in this table. 
2. In June 2000,25 railcars with chemical weapons' destruction equipment crossed 
Lithuanian territory from Germany to Russia. In 2003, there were 12, in 2004 - 
24, in 2005 - 234 railcars. 
3. According to Government's Resolution No. 691 (19 June 2000) the 
transportation of rocket fuel is forbidden. 
4. Russia is asked to restrain the transportation of explosives, until appropriate 
decisions are made. 
Overall, since the year 2000, only 4 types of cargo have been transported: supplies, 
military equipment, weapons and troops; the main cargo are supplies and troops to 
Kaliningrad. The content 'supplies' is purely of the household nature: coal, clothes and 
food. Military cargos, such as equipment, and especially weapons, do not make up a 
significant amount and tend to decrease. Small infringements occasionally occur from 
Russian side, such as: military transports with supplies do not have necessary registered 
documents; belated submission of additional transit plans (it is required 24 hour notice 
for military transport; 12 hour notice - for military commands); military transports enter Lithuanian territory without a earlier co-ordinated plan (it has to be presented 21 days 
before), etc. These problems are being solved at a working level between the officials of 
the Military Movement Control Centre and Russian authorities. 
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1 'Information regarding Russian military transit to and from Kaliningrad', Non-Paper, Ministry of National Defence 
of Lithuania (Vilnius, May 1998). 
2 Transit route was from Mukran ferry (Sassnitz) through Klaip&da seaport, then by rail to Belarus. The Agreement 
'On the Transit of Troops and Military Cargo of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Withdrawn from the 
German Federal Republic of Germany through the Territory of the Republic of Lithuania' (18 Nov 1993). Transit 
route was from Mukran ferry (Sassnitz) through Klaip&da seaport, then by rail to Belarus. 
3 'Regulations for Transportation of Hazardous and Military Cargo'. 
4 In Dec 1994, there was a press release on behalf of the embassies of the EU states, stating that Lithuania should 
make an agreement with Russia on military transit, which would contribute to the stability in the Baltic Sea region. 
5 See h! W: //www. lib. utexas. edu/mavs/eu=e/lithuania po]98112g, 6 Data provided by the Military Movement Control Centre of Lithuania. 
389 
